

War, Warlords, and Interstate Relations in the Ancient Mediterranean

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War, Warlords, and Interstate Relations in the Ancient Mediterranean

Edited by

Toni Naco del Hoyo and Fernando López Sánchez



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List of Abbreviations

Addit. Prosp. Haun.	(<i>Copenhagen Continuation of Prosper</i>). (ed.) Mommsen, T. (1892–8) <i>Chronica Minora</i> , vol. 1, Berlin: 249–339. (tr.) Muhlberger, S. (1984) ‘The Copenhagen Continuation of Prosper: a translation’, <i>Florilegium</i> 6: 71–95.
ADelt	<i>Archaiologikon Deltion</i> 23, 1968.
Ambr. Ep.	Ambrose, <i>Letters</i> . Liebeschuetz, J.H.W.G. (2005) <i>Ambrose of Milan: Political letters and Speeches</i> , Liverpool.
Ambr. Ob. Theod.	Ambrose, <i>Obituary for Theodosius</i> . Liebeschuetz, J.H.W.G. (2005) <i>Ambrose of Milan: Political letters and Speeches</i> , Liverpool.
Amm. Marc.	Ammianus Marcellinus. (ed. and tr.) Rolfe, J.C. (1939) <i>Res Gestae: Ammianus Marcellinus</i> , 3 vol., London.
Aug. Ep.	Augustine, <i>Letters</i> . (ed. and tr.) Baxter, J.H. (1930) <i>Augustine. Select Letters</i> , Cambridge.
BMCRR	Grueber, H.A. (1910) <i>Coins of the Roman Republic in the British Museum</i> , The British Museum, London.
Chron. Gall. 452	<i>Gallic Chronicle of 452</i> . (ed.) Burgess, R.W. (2001a) ‘The Gallic Chronicle of 452: A New Critical Edition with a Brief Introduction’, in Mathisen, R.W. and Shanzer, D. (eds.) (2001) <i>Society and Culture in Late Antique Gaul: Revisiting the Sources</i> , Aldershot. (tr.) Murray, A.C. (2003), <i>From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader</i> , Toronto.
Chron. Gall. 511	<i>Gallic Chronicle of 511</i> . (ed.) Burgess, R.W. (2001b) ‘The Gallic Chronicle of 511: A New Critical Edition with a Brief Introduction’, in Mathisen, R.W. and Shanzer, D. (eds.) (2001) 85–100; (tr.) Murray, A.C. (2003) <i>From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader</i> , Toronto.
CIS	<i>Corpus inscriptionum semiticarum</i> , Académie des Inscriptions & Belles-Lettres (France), 1, Paris, 1881.
CJ	Codex Justinianus. (ed.) Krüger, P. (1945–63) <i>Corpus Juris Civilis</i> , Berlin.
Claud. Eutrop.	Claudian, <i>Against Eutropius</i> . (ed. and tr.) Platnauer, M. (1922) <i>Claudian</i> , vol. 1, Cambridge.
Claud. Stil.	Claudian, <i>On Stilicho’s consulship</i> . (ed. and tr.) Platnauer, M. (1922) <i>Claudian</i> , vol. 1, Cambridge.
CLRE	Bagnall, R.S., Cameron, Al., Schwartz, S.R and Worp, K.A. (eds.) (1987) <i>Consuls of the Later Roman Empire</i> , Atlanta.

CTh.	Codex Theodosianus. (eds.) Mommsen, T. and Meyer, P. (1905), <i>Theodosiani libri xvi cum constitutionibus Sirmondianis</i> , Berlin. (tr.) Pharr, C. (1952) <i>The Theodosian Code and Novels and the Sirmondian Constitutions</i> , Princeton.
Eunap. Fr.	Eunapius, <i>Fragments</i> . (ed. and tr.) Blockley, R.C. (1983) <i>The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of the Later Roman Empire</i> , vol. 2, Liverpool.
Fast. Vind. Prior.	<i>Fasti vindobonenses priores et posteriores</i> . (ed.) Mommsen, T. (1892–8) <i>Chronica Minora</i> , vol. 1, 263–264; 274–336, Berlin.
FD	Pouilloux, J. and Lewis, D.M. (1977) <i>Fouilles de Delphes, Tome III, Epigraphie, Fascicule IV, Les inscriptions de la terrasse du temple et de la région nord du sanctuaire (nos. 351–576)</i> , off-print <i>American Journal of Archaeology</i> 81.
FGrH	Jacoby, F. (ed.) (1923–1959) <i>Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker</i> , Berlin.
Greg. Tur. Hist.	Gregory of Tours, <i>The Histories</i> . (eds.) Arndt, W. and Krusch, B. (1884) <i>Gregorii Turronensis Opera</i> , Hanover. (tr.) Thorpe, L. (1974) <i>Gregory of Tours. History of the Franks</i> , London.
Hyd.	Hydatius. (ed. and tr.) Burgess, R.W. (1993) <i>The Chronicle of Hydatius and the Consularia Constantinopolitana. Two contemporary accounts of the final years of the Roman Empire</i> , Oxford.
LDélos	Dürrbach, F. (ed.) (1923–1927) <i>Inscriptions de Délos</i> , Paris.
IG	Kern, O. (ed.) (1913) <i>Inscriptiones Graecarum</i> , Bonn.
IGRR	Cagnat, R. (ed.) (1911–1927) <i>Inscriptiones graecae ad res romanas pertinentes</i> , 3 vol., Paris.
IK KIOS	Corsten, Th. (1985) <i>Die Inschriften von Kios</i> , «Inschriften griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien», 29, Bonn.
ILLRP	Degrassi, A. (ed.) (1957–1963) <i>Inscriptiones Latinae liberae rei publicae</i> , 2 vol., Firenze.
ILS	Dessau, H. (ed.) (1892–1916) <i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i> , 3 vol., Berlin.
IMT Skam/NebTaeler	Barth, M. and Stauber, J. (eds.) <i>Inschriften Mysia & Troas [IMT]</i> , Leopold Wenger Institut, Universität München, Version of 25.8.1993 (Ibycus), Packard Humanities Institute CD #7, 1996.
IThesp.	Roesch, P. (2007) <i>Les inscriptions de Thespies</i> , Lyon.
IvO	Dittenberger, W. and Purgold, K. (1896) <i>Die Inschriften von Olympia</i> , «Olympia», 5, Berlin.
Joh. Ant. Fr.	John of Antioch, <i>Fragments</i> . (ed. and tr.) Roberto, U. (2005) <i>Ioannis Antiocheni Fragmenta Ex Historia Chronica: Introduzione, edizione critica e traduzione</i> , Berlin; (ed. and tr.)

- Mariev, S. (2008) *Ioannis Antiocheni fragmenta quae supersunt*, Berlin and New York.
- Jord. *Rom.* Jordanes, *Romana*. (ed.) Mommsen, T. (1882) *Iordanis Romana et Getica*, Berlin: 3–52.
- KAI Donner, H. (von) and Röllig, W. (1966–1969) *Kanaanäische und aramäische Inschriften. Mit einem Beitrag von O. Rössler*, Wiesbaden.
- LGPN I Fraser, P.M. and Matthews, E. (eds.) (1987) *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names I: Aegean Islands, Cyprus, Cyrenaica*, Oxford (repr. 1994, 1996).
- LGPN II Osborne, M.J. and Byrne, S.G. (eds.) (1994) *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names II: Attica*, Oxford (repr. 1996).
- LGPN IIIa Fraser, P.M. and Matthews, E. (eds.) (1997) *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names IIIa: Peloponnese, Western Greece, Sicily, and Magna Graecia*, Oxford.
- LGPN IIIb Fraser, P.M. and Matthews, E. (eds.) (2000) *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names IIIb: Central Greece: From the Megarid to Thessaly*, Oxford.
- Malchus. *Fr.* Malchus, *Fragments*. (ed. and tr.) Blockley, R.C. (1983) *The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of the Later Roman Empire*, vol. 2, Liverpool.
- Marc. Com. Marcellinus Comes: (ed. and tr.) Croke, B. (1995) *The Chronicle of Marcellinus: a translation and commentary*, Sydney.
- MRR Broughton, T.S.R. (1950–1986) *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic (with supplements)*, 3 vol. (Vol. 1: 509–100 BC; Vol. 2: 99–31 BC; Vol. 3: Supplement), American Philological Association, Atlanta.
- Not. Dign. *Notitia Dignitatum*. (ed.) Seeck, O. (1876) *Notitia dignitatum: accedunt Notitia urbis Constantinopolitanae et Laterculi provinciarum*, Berlin.
- OCD Hornblower, S. and Spawforth, A. (eds.) (2003) *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Third Revised Edition, Oxford.
- Olympiod. *Fr.* Olympiodorus, *Fragments*. (ed. and tr.) Blockley, R.C. (1983) *The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of the Later Roman Empire*, vol. 2, Liverpool.
- ORF⁴ Malcovati, H. (ed.) (1976) *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta Liberae Rei Publicae*, 2 vol., 4th ed., Turin.
- Oros. Orosius. (ed.) Zangemeister, C. (1889) *Historiarum Adversum Paganos Libri VII*, Leipzig. (tr.) Fear, A.T. (2010) *Orosius: Seven Books of History against the Pagans*, Liverpool.
- PA Kirchner, J. (1901–1903) *Prosopographia Attica*, Berlin.
- PAAH Πρακτικά τῆς ἐν Ἀθῆναις Ἀρχαιολογικῆς Ἑταιρείας (1837–), Archaiologiki Etaireia, Athens.

Pacat.	Pacatus, <i>Panegyric for Theodosius</i> . (ed. and tr.) Nixon, C.E.V. and Rodgers, B.S. (1994) <i>In Praise of Later Roman Emperors. The Panegyrici Latini: Introduction, Translation and Historical Commentary</i> , Berkeley.
Paul. Diac. <i>Hist. Rom.</i>	Paul the Deacon, <i>Roman History</i> . (ed.) Crivellucci, A. (1914) <i>Pauli diaconi Historia romana</i> , Rome.
PLRE 2	Martindale, J.R. (ed.) (1980) <i>Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire (AD 395–526)</i> , vol. 2, Cambridge.
Priscus, <i>Fr.</i>	Priscus, <i>Fragments</i> . (ed. and tr.) Blockley, R.C. (1983) <i>The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of the Later Roman Empire</i> , vol. 2, Liverpool.
Procop. <i>BV.</i>	Procopius, <i>The Vandalic War</i> . (ed. and tr.) Dewing, H.B. (1916) <i>Procopius, History of the Wars</i> , vol. 2, Cambridge.
Prosper.	Prosper, <i>Chronicle</i> . (ed.) Mommsen, T. (1892–8) <i>Chronica Minora</i> , vol. 1, 341–499, Berlin. (tr.) Murray, A.C. (2003) <i>From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader</i> , Toronto.
RDGE	Sherk, R.K. (1969) <i>Roman documents from the Greek East: senatus consulta and epistulae to the age of Augustus</i> , Baltimore.
RE	<i>Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Alterumswissenschaft: Register der Nachträge und Supplemente</i> .
RGDA	<i>Res Gestae Divi Augusti</i>
RIL	Chapot, J.-B. (ed.) (1940–1941) <i>Recueil des inscriptions libyques; rédigé et publié</i> , Paris.
RO	Rhodes, P.J. and Osborne, R. (eds.) (2003) <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions 404–323 BC</i> , Oxford (Revised paperback edition, 2007).
RRC	M.H. Crawford (1974) <i>Roman Republican Coinage</i> , Cambridge.
SEG	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>
Syll ³	Dittenberger, W. (1915–1924) <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , 3rd. ed., Leipzig.
Theod. <i>HE.</i>	Theodoret, <i>Church History</i> . (ed.) Parmentier, L. and Hansen, G.C. (1998), <i>Historia ecclesiastica: Kirchengeschichte</i> , Berlin.
Theoph. <i>AM</i>	Theophanes, <i>Chronographia</i> . (ed. and tr.) Mango, C. and Scott, R. (1997) <i>The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor: Byzantine and Near Eastern History AD 284–813</i> , Oxford.
TOD	Tod, M.N. (1946) <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century BC</i> , 2nd ed., Oxford.
Zos.	Zosimus. (ed.) Paschoud, F. (1971–1989) <i>Zosime. Histoire Nouvelle</i> , Paris. (tr.) Ridley, R.T. (1982) <i>Zosimus: New history</i> , Canberra.

List of Contributors

Manuel Álvarez Martí-Aguilar

University Lecturer in Ancient History, Universidad de Málaga, Spain.

Craig B. Champion

Professor of Ancient History, Syracuse University, USA.

Altay Coşkun

Associate Professor of Ancient History, University of Waterloo, Canada.

Arthur M. Eckstein

Professor of History and Distinguished Scholar-Teacher, University of Maryland, College Park, USA.

Michael P. Fronda

Associate Professor of Ancient History, McGill University, Canada.

François Gauthier

Course Lecturer in Ancient History, McGill University, Canada.

Daniel Gómez-Castro

Post-Doctoral Fellow in Ancient Greek History (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science), Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya, Japan.

Rafael Grasa

Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and, formerly, President of International Catalan Institute for Peace (2008–2016), Catalonia.

Fernando López Sánchez

Khalili Research Centre and Wolfson College, Oxford, UK.

Polly Low

Senior Lecturer in Ancient History, the University of Manchester, UK.

Toni Nāco del Hoyo

Research Professor in Ancient History, Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA), at Universitat de Girona, Catalonia.

José Pascual González

Senior Lecturer in Ancient History, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain.

Jordi Principal

Curator collection Classical World and Provincial Roman Archaeology, at Museu d'Arqueologia de Catalunya (Barcelona), Catalonia.

Boris Rankov

Professor of Ancient History, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK.

Louis Rawlings

Senior Lecturer in Ancient History, Cardiff University, Wales, UK.

John W. Rich

Emeritus Professor of Ancient History, University of Nottingham, UK.

Nathan Rosenstein

Professor of Ancient History, Ohio State University, USA.

Eduardo Sánchez Moreno

University Lecturer in Ancient History, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain.

Nicholas V. Sekunda

Professor of Ancient History, Gdańsk University, Poland.

Christopher Tuplin

Professor of Ancient History, University of Liverpool, UK.

Jeroen W.P. Wijnendaele

Post-Doctoral Fellow in Ancient History, Ghent University, Flanders, Belgium.

Sophia Zoumbaki

Research Professor in Ancient History, the National Hellenic Research Foundation, Athens, Greece.

Introduction: ‘Multipolarity’ and ‘Warlords’ prior to the Roman Empire

Toni Naco del Hoyo and Fernando López Sánchez***

When this Introduction was being written, in April 2017, the climate in which it was composed, in geopolitical terms, could clearly be labelled as a ‘post 9/11 world’ or even a ‘coming multi-order world’. These are some of the current expressions used by political scientists and international relations scholars who are devoted to the study of modern societies and their major conflicts.¹ However, the US’s ‘unipolar’ domination of interstate relations, arising after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, has been recently disputed by Russia, China and other countries that adopted a new global role. Within this complex and multipolar background, a historical approach has recently re-emerged with more energy than ever. Originating in the 1970s and 1980s, prior to the fall of the Soviet Union and the brief period of unipolar and uncontested American hegemony between 1991 and 2001, what is known as ‘World history’, ‘Global history’ or ‘Transnational history’, aims to comprehend any given historical period mainly from an interconnected and global view. World historians address their topics by using thematic approaches with major focal points in perspective, such as integration and difference, or core and periphery.²

Consequently, it is not surprising that research on ‘anarchy’, ‘multipolarity’ and ‘interconnectedness’ within Graeco-Roman interstate relations, a social science approach persuasively adopted by A.M. Eckstein in his most recent studies on the Hellenistic world and the ‘coming of Rome’, definitely sounds modern to contemporary ears. Thus, war, violence, terrorism, insurgency, and their treatment by the mass media are topics that have aroused considerable interest among ancient historians and classical archaeologists of late.³ Having

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** Khalili Research Centre and Wolfson College, Oxford.

1 Adler 2008; Flockhart 2016.

2 Pitts and Versluys 2015: esp. 3–4, 15–18.

3 Two more recent examples are: Armstrong 2016: 2–3 and n. 6, who mentions Wijnendaele 2016; see also Campbell and Tritle 2013; Bakogianni and Hope 2015; Howe and Brice 2016; Manning 2016: 1–44.

said this, the aim of this book is to challenge certain prescribed perspectives on the relationship between war and politics in classical antiquity, when considered from a multidisciplinary standpoint and, in particular, through a social science perspective. It cannot be denied that the latter has recently become a very useful approach, complementing the more traditional research methodology provided by the classical studies. Bearing all of this in mind, a closer look at interstate relations over the last four centuries BC has recently uncovered two apparently independent phenomena, which are better understood when analysed collectively. On the one hand, we have true ancient polities—regardless of their exact form—as well as stateless entities such as pirates, brigands and private networks of traders and sailors, all sliding towards anarchy and militarism. On the other hand, we have strong powers such as Carthage, the Hellenistic kingdoms and of course, Republican Rome, expanding towards State formation, forceful military structures and ultimately, empire building. Therefore, we will focus our attention mainly on a historical period when war was an endemic phenomenon and Rome was still far from becoming a unipolar power within the ancient Mediterranean.⁴ Paradoxically, the historical record attests that any attempts to achieve peace between belligerent parties often resulted in ‘continuing war by other means’, to misquote Carl Von Clausewitz.⁵

Clearly, this volume is not the first scholarly work to attempt to interconnect Ancient History on the one hand, with International Relations theories and social science research such as modern studies on warlordism, on the other. As previously mentioned, the end of the Cold War gave way to a multipolar, unstable and more insecure world. This reality in fact resembles what Polybius and other Hellenistic writers knew of and depicted with utmost detail in their works. Today’s multipolar reality makes us better prepared to understand the meaning and historical background behind such ancient writings. Likewise, thanks to certain innovative comparative approaches provided by the social sciences, today we appear to be better equipped to understand how the ancient international relations, geopolitical conflicts, war and peace strategies, etc. operated in such a remote historical past.⁶ For instance, according to V. Gabrielsen—who also actively participated in our 2013 conference

4 Fergus Millar blatantly remarked that ‘war was in fact endemic in the Graeco-Roman world until we reach the Roman Empire’, Millar 2002: 9.

5 Howard 2002: 36: ‘It was only in the last years of his life that Clausewitz came to his famous conclusion that ‘war was nothing but the continuation of policy with other means’ or, more explicitly, ‘simply the continuation of policy with the admixture of other means’ (pp. 69, 605; emphasis added)’.

6 Eckstein 2006; 2008; Lake 2008; Nay 2013; Flockhart 2016.

in Barcelona—the modern debate should not necessarily give priority to the hegemonic policies of state-like polities, but also to alternative forms of organised violence that merit further research. In particular, he recently drew attention to the connecting role played by the sea in ancient Greek warfare. His work reveals not only the increasing involvement of private entrepreneurs and traders—sometimes organized in private networks and associations—as military suppliers, but also the increasing need of securing trade routes that are often threatened by pirates and other stateless entities. In fact, this volume clearly emphasizes that many actors having equivalent or almost equivalent forces, regardless of being either institutionalised polities or stateless formations, played a relevant part in the historical quest for hegemony within the Mediterranean basin over at least the last four centuries BC.⁷

On the other hand, this is not the first volume to extensively address ‘warlordism’ within a modern context. In 1994, a thought-provoking study on *Warlords from the Byzantine Empire*, by P.A. Blaum, had already suggested the usefulness of connecting present-day warlords flourishing in troubling moments with similar phenomena, but from more remote historical periods. For instance, Blaum’s work has provided us with some useful tools in order to better understand how, in the remote past and also in more modern periods, state institutions have virtually stopped functioning following a situation of anarchy and conflict, even in the most powerful states. Even today, in periods of extreme turmoil and anarchy, certain individuals can assume both military power and political leadership, mainly thanks to their extraordinary personal charisma, exerting hegemony in the particular region that they occupy but also aspiring, unlawfully, to achieve international recognition. Their continuity in power depends not only on their military skills and successes, but also on an elaborate political discourse that is designed to legitimize their hegemonic position. These are the so-called ‘warlords’, a term that is currently acknowledged to have been initially adopted by the English language from the German: ‘Kriegsherr’.⁸

In theoretical terms, differentiating a ‘warlord’ from an illegitimate ruler is not an easy task. The divide between independent ‘warlords’ and ‘obeying generals’, although clear in principle, is often blurred, depending more on specific historical and regional features. Generals respond to superior hierarchical institutions and usually obey the state that they serve, whereas warlords tend to behave as independent (or quasi-independent) military commanders. Furthermore, and to make matters more complicated, during

7 Gabrielsen 2015: 188–199.

8 Blaum 1994; Zimmermann 2010: 27–29.

times of chaos and disintegration of states, generals may become regional warlords and can influence the course of events at the heart of states. As previously mentioned, modern historians and social scientists have stressed the difficulties in defining terms such as 'warlordism' and 'warlord', which are mostly built up with evidence provided by contemporary societies. However, when such terms are applied to classical antiquity, we run the risk of employing extemporary analysis and perhaps, even trivialization may take place. Too often, 'warlord' is used in a simplistic manner; for example, to describe an individual who is only imbued with military and political leadership, literally 'a war lord', a man commanding troops. Nevertheless, as all of the contributors of this volume shall certainly indicate, the theoretical debate concerning interstate relations and 'warlordism' in a violent and multipolar classical Mediterranean scenario is certainly much more complex.⁹

Taking this into account, it is unnecessary to emphasize the general relevance of W.V. Harris's aggressive views of Roman Republican imperialism, mainly presented in his influential 1979 book on the nature and objectives of Roman expansion, which has generated endless scholarly reaction ever since.¹⁰ His well-known arguments were based on economic motives related to the profits that Republican Rome obtained from its territorial expansion and a unilateral perception of Roman military ethos. According to his view, both issues became a shared commitment of the aristocratic elites as well as of Rome's lower classes.¹¹ However, Harris' opinion is being arguably opposed by A.M. Eckstein, among others, due to his alignment with the 'realist' theories of modern international relations. According to Eckstein, a fierce fight for hegemony in an increasingly interconnected Mediterranean 'anarchy', where no power actually oversized other powers, is what the history of our period was truly about, at least until Rome's leading role began to emerge as a true superpower as of the early second century BC.¹² All of this immediately highlights the central role of 'interconnectedness' which is how Eckstein translates Polybius' *symplokê*, firstly between political entities competing with each other for a hegemonic position, and secondly between political factions within each

9 See, specifically, the chapter in this volume by Rafael Grasa, a specialist in present-day International Relations and Peace Studies, with its extensive bibliography. When addressing warlordism in modern societies, most of the contributors to this book have referred to works such as Giustozzi 2005; Marten 2006/2007; Amsorg 2001, and most recently Malejacq 2016, who defines warlords as 'non-state armed actors': 91.

10 See, as recent syntheses: Edwell 2013; Hoyos 2013.

11 Harris 1979.

12 Eckstein 2006; 2008; 2013: 138–139, and his specific chapter in this volume.

particular polity. In the latter case, their fighting sometimes transcends the mere internal strife by enrolling external powers in what has at times been called ‘empire by invitation’. Although it was originally conceptualised by modern historians dealing with the US’ leading role in Europe after the end of World War II, it has also been applied to the classical world. For instance, C.B. Champion has been using a similar approach when describing certain episodes of Rome’s intervention in the Hellenistic East during the latter half of the second century BC.¹³

Nevertheless, such ‘realist’ views have most recently been responded to, first by ‘constructivist’ theoreticians, such as P.J. Burton, who has devoted his work to demonstrating how Roman *amicitia* and other similar networking institutions were even more efficient than military expansion in terms of strengthening Rome’s hegemony.¹⁴ And second, in a new book that was written as a thorough reflection on Roman power ‘dans la longue durée’ (2016), W.V. Harris has reinforced his well-known arguments regarding the aggressive view of Republican expansionism. He thus insists on Rome’s internal cohesiveness as ‘merely a necessary condition of empire-building’, along with its ‘aggressive willingness to make war’ and multiple forms of investing the profits that were already obtained from its territorial expansion. Furthermore, in his book, Harris forcefully reacts to some of his critics on several fronts. For instance, he is not at all persuaded by the argument that aggressive powers such as Republican Rome were not as imperialistic because their expansion had not been ‘planned’. In response, he claims that most imperialist powers throughout history never planned their eventual conquests and accordingly, this does not mean that they were less expansive. Harris also disagrees with those who discredit his view simply by featuring other Mediterranean powers as being just as aggressive as Republican Rome. According to Harris, such ‘uniform aggressiveness’ does not fit with the available evidence, especially when Rome was consistently imperialistic for several centuries, unlike the occasional ‘aggressiveness’ that we may detect in the distinct Hellenistic states or rules, for instance.¹⁵

Some of these issues were initially addressed in a conference—*ICREA Conference on Multipolarity and Warlordism in the Ancient Mediterranean, cent. 4–1 BC*—held at the Museu d’Arqueologia de Catalunya (Barcelona) on

13 Champion 2007. See also Tabachnick 2009.

14 Burton 2011, chapter 1. See more recently Jehne and Pina 2015.

15 Harris 2016: 13–14; 29, 36–37. Harris strongly opposes the arguments by scholars such as Eckstein whose perspective of Roman imperialism is based on ‘realist’ international relation theories, developed thanks to modern social science models: Harris 2016: 42.

23–25 May 2013. This event, co-organized by the editors of this volume, was funded by the *Catalan Institution of Research and Advanced Studies* (ICREA), thanks to the ‘Icrea Award 2012’, and a conference grant (2012 ARCS1 00268) awarded by *AGAUR*, the research agency of the Catalanian government. The conference brought together established scholars, early postdoctoral researchers and postgraduate students from nine European countries, Australia and America, all of whom participated as speakers, invited discussants and poster presenters. After the first theoretical session, six others followed, according to chronological and geopolitical criteria, from the fourth century Greek and the Achaemenid East to the Roman West and the Augustan period. In addition of the main conference programme, two sessions of poster presentations were also organized.

Once these lively discussions were digested, it was decided that the best course of action was to submit a publication proposal to Brill’s Impact of Empire Series, based on a suggestion made by one of our contributors, John W. Rich, whom we wish to thank for his ongoing encouragement. Accordingly, most chapters in this volume have been derived from papers that were either presented at the original conference, or were withdrawn at the last moment from the list of contents. The latter was the case of Louis Rawlings and Eduardo Sánchez-Moreno’s chapters, although they were reconsidered at the end, by request of the authors. Likewise, due to the theoretical dimension of some of the debates conducted during the conference, most of the chapters of this book include extensive theoretical sections, addressing either the feasibility of the application of modern theories on interstate relations and the scope of the multipolar world, or the meaning and dimension of the warlord phenomenon to their specific studies on classical antiquity. Therefore, our contributors have made an intellectual effort by reflecting on and writing their papers using approaches that extend beyond their own disciplines, for instance, when discussing modern literature borrowed from the social sciences. This undertaking may be considered to be a real challenge in terms of aiming to break certain intellectual barriers between disciplines and implementing cutting-edge research. Ultimately, such an effort has prevented us from developing some of the theoretical arguments that were mentioned in this Introduction, leaving the individual authors to tackle most of these issues from multiple and varied perspectives in their own chapters. Nonetheless, as will be seen in greater detail later, we have also invited two reputed scholars who did not participate in our 2013 conference, to contribute to this book, offering chapters on seminal topics that concern more modern chronologies, in an attempt to provide additional food for thought in our theoretical debate.

In this way, this volume has been conceived and organised chronologically, including twenty chapters that are presented in two main sections, comprehensively extending from the end of the Peloponnesian War to the Augustan Principate. The first section, 'Achaemenid Persia, Fourth Century Greece and Carthage', contains seven chapters. If anything, the grouping of such varied regions in one entire section is meant to counterbalance the second and more coherent section, 'The Hellenistic World and Rome', whose obvious core is Rome's hegemonic role in a multipolar scenario, which progressively led to unipolarity.

Progressing through the various chapters of the first section, first, Christopher Tuplin's study sketches the general pattern (in time and space) of Persian use of mercenary soldiers, surveys the contexts in Persian imperial history in which the concept of 'warlord' may appear to be applicable, and argues that the employment of Greek mercenaries—initially an accidental development—provided the necessary basis for one type of Achaemenid warlordism. Secondly, Polly Low's chapter explores the role of the warlord in the interstate society of Classical Greece, and focuses specifically on their normative function: that is, the ways in which the activities of these quasi—(or sometimes entirely) independent commanders were represented and conceptualised, both by observers and by the warlords themselves. Referring to Daniel Gómez-Castro's chapter, it considers Lysander's role in the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC Sparta. In this paper, Gómez-Castro argues that Lysander strengthened the power of certain inferior Spartan social groups, decreasing the oligarchy's attachment to censuses. A non-stop war situation in Greece and Asia Minor, deliberately promoted by Lysander, eventually offered new opportunities to such social ranks, and furthermore, assimilated Lysander's political and military roles to what today may be called a warlord.

Similarly, the next chapter states that very little is known about the mechanisms whereby the large mercenary forces fielded in the fourth century were actually recruited. This stems from the poor condition of the source material dealing with the topic. Of all of the mercenary generals who served throughout the fourth century BC, the majority of material is preserved regarding the career of Iphicrates, which is the topic that has been selected by Nicholas Sekunda for his contribution. In continuation, José Pascual focuses on the Phocian and Theban military commanders, examining the true nature of military command and the conditions under which it was exercised in central Greece during the fourth century BC. He cogently argues that their political and military command ultimately brought about a profound transformation of their own states: a dynasty of warlords, their friends (*philoi*) and military forces (*dynameis*) that virtually replaced an entire federation.

Manuel Álvarez Martí-Aguilar's study moves in a completely different historical direction, considering the Phoenician and Punic West. According to Álvarez Martí-Aguilar, a reinterpretation of a passage (44.5) from Justin on Carthaginian rule over the Iberian Peninsula leads to a dramatic change in the view of the Phoenician *koiné* in the 4th century BC. This new framework ultimately reveals the dynamics of the 'Tyrian network', numerous communities connected by kinship ties through the figure of Melqart as founder and *archegetes*. As argued in this chapter, this colonial network—a true multipolar structure—eventually contributed to Punic expansion across the West. Finally, Louis Rawlings's chapter considers the Carthaginian attempt to play local politics and manipulate local and regional multipolarity to its advantage in the Western Mediterranean. It is argued that the Carthaginians were relatively adept at manipulating local politics and conflicts, and at integrating and aligning the ambitions of local warlords with their own interests. Ultimately, the inherent fragility and transience of local personal power structures contributed to the failure of the wider imperial system, during the intense strains of the Second Punic War, and the Romans exploited this to undo Carthaginian alliances in Spain and Africa.

Regarding the second section on the Hellenistic World and Rome, the first chapter by Fernando López Sánchez explores the Galatian movement into Macedonia in 280–277 BC, arguing that they may have been 'invited' by a Macedonian royal faction in its struggle for power. A closer examination of passages from Justin, Pausanias and Appian leads López Sánchez to question whether Bolgios, Brennos and their Celtic followers were just savage military leaders or the active part of a deceptive succession to the Macedonian crown after Lysimachus' assassination in 281 BC. Next, according to Altay Coşkun's chapter, an 'ancient warlord', if ever such a thing existed, would have been called *tyrannos* or *lēstēs*. Since modern implications of 'sub-nations' and 'failed states' are not applicable, Coşkun believes that the warlord would have been a ruler who drew on military force with only a deficient legitimacy. Moreover, this definition is too broad to serve as a heuristic category, given that it also applies to leaders from subsequent Hellenistic Anatolia; several Roman generals such as Sulla and Antony also fulfil these criteria. Finally, it is suggested that a study of 'ancient warlords' should mainly concentrate on the rhetoric that seeks to establish or deny legitimacy for military leaders.

In continuation, Arthur M. Eckstein's contribution entitled 'Rome, Empire and the Hellenistic State-System', highlights Rome's role as the main actor in interstate relations as of early second century BC. Nevertheless, Eckstein remarks on the haphazardness and extensive delay of emergence of Rome as a true imperial metropole. Following the defeat of Carthage, Macedon and the Seleucids, by 188 Rome had certainly achieved what political scientists term

‘unipolarity’ or a ‘sphere of influence’ (according to Michael Doyle’s vastly adopted terminology):¹⁶ in the Mediterranean system of states, the preponderance of power was now in the hands of a single entity. Rome enjoyed that inequality of power, but aside from that, Roman diplomatic interventions in Greek foreign relations were relatively infrequent and not always effective. In fact, Roman military interventions were exceedingly rare, and Roman intervention in the internal politics of Greek states was minimal. In fact, the next chapter proceeds to describe Rome’s new role in interstate politics through the looking glass of some Greek perceptive commentators. In his paper, Craig Champion focuses on Roman military and diplomatic behaviour during the Middle Republic, through the eyes of Greek statesmen who experienced them, making a case for the idea that, according to this perspective, individual Roman commanders frequently appeared to be ‘warlords’ (using this term quite loosely) according to the Greek statesmen who were forced to deal with them.

The two subsequent chapters offer a general overview of ‘warlordism’ in the Roman Republic, with slightly distinct perspectives: whereas John W. Rich includes the military commands of the early Republic in a study, which widely discusses the interpretations on warlords that have been provided by the social sciences and modern history, Nathan Rosenstein’s approach mainly focuses on the Late Republic and its political and military crises. Firstly, John Rich views a warlord as an individual controlling an area of territory within a weak state, at least in part through the possession of military force. Whether, as is often supposed, the *condottiere*-type figures were active within the archaic Roman world is itself questionable, and in any case, such individuals barely fit this definition of warlord. Neither do most of the military leaders of the late Republic, such as Sulla, Caesar and Pompey, who were always competing for control of the metropolitan state. The two exceptions are Sertorius and Sextus Pompeius, who were never able to bid for control of the metropole, but rather, established effective control of a region from which they were ousted, only after an extensive struggle with the metropolitan power-holders.

Furthermore, Nathan Rosenstein’s contribution adds more scepticism regarding the actual existence of Roman warlords (as defined by social scientists) during the Middle and Late Roman Republic, as compared to John W. Rich’s already sceptical arguments. In particular, Rosenstein explores the paradoxical functioning of Republican political culture. Rotation of military leadership, common amongst the aristocracy, was critical to elite soldiers in the middle Republic. Yet during times of military crisis, Rome turned to experienced war leaders, and it is now clear that the *populus*, not the senate, was responsible. But rather surprisingly, the voters did not continuously re-elect the

16 Doyle 1986: 35, 44–45.

same successful generals. Strikingly however, the trend during the middle and late Republic was precisely the opposite: iteration of the consulship became increasingly rare.

The following chapters take us to Italy and the provinces. The central premise of Michael Fronda & François Gauthier's presentation is that the relationship between Rome and its nominal allies in Italy and Sicily during the outbreak of the Second Punic War was characterized by a vast asymmetry of power: extreme 'unipolarity' in Realist terms, between 'hegemony' and a 'sphere of influence' in Doyle's scheme, perhaps even the early stages of state formation. Yet Rome's control was fragile, and with Hannibal's invasion, Italy reverted to a highly anarchic 'multipolarity', where several minor powers (e.g. Capua) and other polities began to pursue their own aggressive foreign policies. Meanwhile, Eduardo Sánchez-Moreno's contribution focuses his attention on the impact of Carthaginian and Roman 'spheres of influence' on Lusitanian territory, the southwest of Iberia, from the Barcid dominion in 237 to Carthage's fall in 146 BC. In the face of this troubling scenario, the Lusitanians played an important role in geostrategic, political and military terms, which deserves particular attention. Therefore, Sánchez-Moreno devotes his entire chapter to an analysis of Lusitanians' foreign policy and military strategy at the crossroads of two Mediterranean superpowers in dispute of the hegemony.

Next, heading East, Sophia Zoumbaki's chapter attempts to trace Sulla's impact on the poleis of mainland Greece, where some of the military operations of the Mithridatic War took place. It also focuses on the activity of several Roman officers included in the sources of this early stage of the war, and it attempts to shed light on certain aspects of their relations with the poleis. Sulla's initial contact with Greece focused on the destruction and plundering of towns and sanctuaries and on the demanding of resources and recruits—not only from Rome's allies but also from other regions of the Peloponnese and Macedonia. As for warlordism, Zoumbaki argues that some 'warlordish' features may be recognized in certain aspects of Sulla's activity, in regards to his relationship with the central authority in Rome, with his army, and with the population under his control in mainland Greece. Remaining in this period but heading back to the far West, Toni Naco del Hoyo & Jordi Principal's contribution assesses whether Quintus Sertorius's (pr. 83 BC) activities in Hispania, actively fighting the generals deployed against him by the current leading Senatorial party in Rome, qualify as warlordism. In this chapter, written jointly by an ancient historian and a classical archaeologist, the ancient evidence for this episode of the Late Republic which eventually brought Rome's Civil War to Hispania is observed from four innovative angles, provided by social science literature that usually examines modern warlords: as a military leader in

control of a limited territory, as a partisan politician followed by his people, as a ruler having a legitimating discourse, and finally, as an involved caretaker of foreign policy.

The final contributor to this section, Boris Rankov, addresses the question of the transition between the military structure of the old Republic and the new Imperial regime. He argues that the military dynasts of the late Republic shared a number of characteristics that are commonly attributed to warlords, including the establishment of units of personal bodyguards (often Spaniards and later Germans) and the granting of rewards and decorations for bravery and loyalty. Some of these practices were in turn reflected in bodyguard units, the awarding of decorations and the names of junior staff-officer ranks in the standing professional army created by the last of the military dynasts, Augustus.

Finally, as mentioned above, in order to enrich the debate presented in this volume, the editors invited two further contributors who did not participate in the 2013 conference. They were asked to submit chapters adopting an alternative approach and based on different historical periods than those that had originally been established for this project. We wish to unreservedly thank both scholars for accepting our proposal. In the epilogue, therefore, the reader will find a chapter written by Jeroen Wijnendaele, currently a post-doctoral researcher at Ghent University and a specialist on the study of warlords from the periphery of Roman history. Wijnendaele's paper examines the link between the collapse of the Western Roman Empire and the spread of warlordism in the Late Roman West. The final chapter has been written by Rafael Grasa, a Professor of International Relations at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and former President of the International Catalan Institute for Peace (2008–2016). His study on modern warlordism accurately applies the methodological approach of the IR theories and the social sciences with data fuelled by contemporary history and present-day reports.

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Four years have passed since this conference took place and we wish to thank all of the original contributors who presented papers at the conference, particularly those who were unable, for various reasons, to contribute to this volume but who actively participated in the congenial debates (Nicholas Purcell, Jonathan Prag, Philip de Souza, Vincent Gabrielsen, and Ian Leins), our three invited discussants (Paul Erdkamp, Josephine Crawley Quinn, and Saskia Roselaar) and all of the poster presenters (Tomás Aguilera, Isaías

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PART 1

*Achaemenid Persia, Fourth Century Greece,
and Carthage*



Mercenaries and Warlords in the Achaemenid Empire

Christopher Tuplin

Mercenaries and the Achaemenid empire go together in many people's minds—if only because contemporary Greek sources seek to insinuate that the empire became self-defeatingly dependent on mercenary forces. Actually it is only relatively few sources that do so, and they only do it in extreme terms rather late in Achaemenid history.¹ But that is largely a topic for another occasion.² In any event, Persian mercenary-use was rational but it was not universal—and not just in the sense that Darius III made a positive choice in its favour, where his Anatolian satraps seem to have taken a different view.³ (More pertinent is that it was only forty years since *any* of the *kings* actively sought to recruit mercenaries, and that same king had effectively rejected an opportunity over a quarter century earlier still).⁴

In this brief contribution (a mere sketch, not a fully formed picture, and one intended to invite others either to fill in the details or tear the whole thing up) I shall say something about mercenaries, then something about warlords, and then see how the two topics come together.

Mercenaries

The pattern of (reported) Persian use of mercenaries is distinctive: in the first hundred years of imperial history there is virtually nothing, whereas in the remaining 120 years about 45% of salient reported military events involve

1 Notable cases are Xenophon *Cyropaedia* 8.8.26; Plato *Leges* 697E; Isocrates 5.126.

2 I shall write at greater length elsewhere about the place of mercenaries (not only Greek ones) in the Achaemenid military establishment. In the meantime see Tuplin (forthcoming [a]).

3 Darius assembled 30,000 mercenaries at Issus and gave them a prominent place in the battle-line. The Anatolian satraps at Granicus had a considerable number of mercenaries at hand but effectively did not deploy them at all.

4 Artaxerxes had a substantial mercenary force (under Iphicrates) assembled for the Egyptian campaign of 373 (Diodorus 15.41.1). In 401 he did not take the opportunity to hire the Ten Thousand after Cunaxa.

mercenaries.⁵ Why is this so? To answer that we must first clarify the initial statements.

As to the second, the figure of 45% is an accurate assessment of the contents of the relevant database, but its force depends not just on defining what should go into that database but on the reliability of that database as a reflex of reality. It is at least as likely that the figure should be higher as that it should be lower. But the contrast with the pre-450 era is so great that it certainly betokens *something* in respect of the sort of specific military events that enter the database at all, the overwhelming majority of which at all times share the characteristic of coming from Greek sources—which means that it is a relatively homogeneous database, but also a slanted one.

As to the first: ‘*virtually nothing*’ implies *something*: what is that something? There are three pre-450 contexts in which the issue of Persian employment of mercenaries arises, and a fourth where it does not arise but perhaps ought to.

1. Just after Thermopylae a few Arcadian ‘deserters’, lacking livelihood and willing to be active (*energoi*), came to Xerxes (Herodotus 8.26). The 1620 Arcadians sent to Thermopylae (7.202) presumably withdrew just before the trap closed, so the deserters are a small group who hung around in the vicinity instead of retreating south. They had been soldiers, so future activity might be similar, though it is hard to see what use they thought a handful of Greek infantrymen would be to Xerxes. In any event Herodotus (whose interest is in Tritantaechmes’ reaction to their news that the Greeks had gone to Olympia to compete just for glory) says nothing of what happened to them, and one may suspect that one reason is that, even from the perspective of half-century later, the phenomenon of Greeks working for Persians as hired soldiers was insufficiently prominent for the historian to have thought to connect it with a story whose point was the contrast of Greek and Persian value-systems. (Of course, even as things are, the deserters reveal themselves as inadequate Greeks, not just because they negotiate with the king but also because they implicitly want to take his money.) These few Arcadians may have become mercenaries, but it is not plain that they are part of a larger pattern.

2. Certainly mercenaries were the Jews and Aramaeans of Syene-Elephantine, who received pay and rations but apparently not land-allocations. Of their military *activity* we see nothing directly (their military character is formally clearest from the fact that they constitute a *hayla* and are sub-organized

5 This statement is based on the work-in-progress cited in n. 2 and on an unpublished checklist of Achaemenid military events to which I have referred on other occasions (e.g. Tuplin 2010: 149).

into *degelin* whose eponyms are predominantly men with Iranian names),⁶ but we learn a good deal about their social, economic and religious activity—a topic first thoroughly studied nearly 50 years ago in Bezalel Porten's remarkable *Archives from Elephantine*. On the basis of various analogies with the Syene-Elephantine material, we may postulate similar soldiers at Memphis, and perhaps at Daphnae and Marea—all certainly locations where military forces are in place. The people at Syene-Elephantine are visible in dated Achaemenid era documents from 495 onwards (though the bulk of such texts belongs after 460) but their ancestors had been there in Saite times, and their employment by the Persians was a simple matter of continuity. This is likely to be true of many of their analogues at other locations.

3. The principle of continuity also applies to mercenary phenomena in Babylonia. Outside the category of temple-militia, identifying actual soldiers in Achaemenid Babylonia (as distinct from persons subject to service-obligations of a potentially military nature) is tricky and identifying mercenary soldiers in some usefully distinctive meaning of that phrase even more so. Our best bet are individuals who hired themselves to act as substitutes for Babylonian citizens upon whom lay an obligation of personal military service—a practice with Neo-Babylonian antecedents, and one not fundamentally different from provision of substitutes for non-military service-obligations. (The absence of a distinctive vocabulary for soldiers as opposed to workers is a real problem). Less certain is whether (a) the common substitution of personal service by silver payments produced cash that was systematically spent on hiring soldiers (so that references to such payments become an evidential proxy for mercenary soldiers) or (b) certain groupings of resident foreigners were soldiers. But in both cases there would again be Babylonian antecedents in principle and/or actuality. The resident foreigners/soldiers would also be analogous to the people at Syene-Elephantine and other Egyptian locations.

4. One Babylonian group that has attracted interest are the Carians at Borsippa in 524–513 whose subsistence was a charge on native Borsippian families.⁷ And they become entangled with our fourth context. Bluntly, what happened to the Greek and Carian mercenaries who had served the Saite kings? Equally, bluntly we do not know. Or rather we know that Greeks and Carians lived in Achaemenid Memphis but we have vanishingly small evidence that they functioned or were categorized as soldiers. It is quite likely

6 TADAE C3.15 may provide an indirect hint at the absence of troops on official business. The 'other *hayla*' involved in the destruction of the Jewish temple in 410 (TADAE A4.7: 8 = A4.8: 7) might include the Aramaeans based in Syene.

7 Waerzeggers 2006.

that the Borsippa Carians, some of whom had Egyptian names, were moved to Borsippa after Cambyses' conquest. But were they moved *as soldiers* or moved to stop them being soldiers, and in either case what does this show about the Egyptian situation? Certainly we cannot prove that the continuity seen with the Syene-Elephantine Aramaeans/Jews had an analogy with Greeks and Carians. The view can be taken that these outsiders from western Anatolia had a peculiarly intense association with the Saite dispensation (that being what is inscribed in Herodotus' story of the 'men of bronze' who arrived to save and empower the dynastic founder, Psammetichus I)⁸ and the new Persian rulers judged it too risky to take them on as defenders of the new dispensation. If so, these people were reckoned (fairly or otherwise) to have lost that distinctive quality of mercenaries—the willingness to work for anyone who provides satisfactory payment.

The upshot seems to be that, even in the early imperial period, mercenaries (non-Persians in receipt of remuneration for performing military functions more or less directly for the state) might exist where they were an inherited structural feature of the *status quo ante*.⁹ But such inheritance did not necessarily occur—and, although any decision *not* to continue a mercenary-practice entails some conscious thought about the mercenary model and one cannot therefore say the Persians simply did not register the phenomenon at all, it is as though they regarded it as an issue to be dealt with as and when it arose, not something about which they needed to be pro-active. I must stress again, of course, that this is a judgment constrained by the way the evidence lies: pertinent documentary sources are of limited scope and the reach of Greek sources has firm boundaries.

How did things change? A possible answer lies at the end of the Egyptian revolt of the 450s.¹⁰ This event notoriously takes somewhat different forms in the surviving narrative sources. In Thucydides (1.109–110) the Persians capture Prosopitis, few of the Greek participants in the revolt get out alive (those that did escaped *via* Cyrene), Egypt is wholly recovered apart from the marshland realm of Amyrtaeus, and the Libyan king Inaros, who had instigated the revolt, is captured by treachery and impaled. In Diodorus (11.77) there is explicitly

8 Hdt. 2.152. See Agut-Labordère 2012.

9 The possibility that the rebel Pactyes might hire troops in coastal Ionia (Hdt. 1.154) does not justify the belief that there was a structural phenomenon here that the Persians might inherit. (Note that the Lydian *xeinikon* of Hdt. 1.77 should not be regarded as a mercenary army).

10 Conventionally reckoned to have ended in 454. For a radically different dating scheme see Kahn 2008.

a truce under which the Athenians in Prosopitis depart *via* Cyrene (with no suggestion that there had been huge loss of life), but nothing is said about Amyrtaeus or Inaros. Ctesias (688 F14[37–42]) produces a fuller story. The victorious Megabyzus made a deal with Inaros and over 6000 Greeks (trapped at the fall of Byblos, not Prosopitis) that Inaros would not be harmed and the Greeks could return home when they wanted.¹¹ He then went to the king taking Inaros and the Greeks with him. Despite his anger at Inaros, who was responsible for the death of his brother Achaemenides, the king consented to spare them. But, after repeated efforts, the Queen Mother Amestris eventually persuaded him to renege, and five years later Inaros was impaled, while 50 Greeks (the only ones Amestris was able to lay her hands on) were beheaded. Upset at this broken undertaking, Megabyzus asked permission to retire to his own land (Syria: he is presumably satrap of Transeuphratene) and, having secretly sent the rest of the Greeks on ahead, joined them and openly rebelled. Strictly speaking, Ctesias does not characterize these Greeks as soldiers, never mind mercenaries, but it is hard to see that they were not part of Megabyzus' rebel force or what else to call them but mercenaries.

If Ctesias' story is accepted, then, Megabyzus had (from one point of view accidentally but from another quite deliberately) created an entirely new Persian-employed mercenary army—the first substantive (and perhaps, indeed, substantial)¹² example of such a thing, and the start of a tradition represented in the rest of the fifth century by the mercenaries of Artyphius (the son of Megabyzus—so this case was a matter of *family* tradition), Pissuthnes and Amorges (another father-and-son example), Tissaphernes (his were or included barbarians—perhaps non-Greek Anatolians, perhaps even specifically Carians in view of Tissaphernes' Carian *oikos*),¹³ Pharnabazus, Abrocomas and Cyrus.¹⁴ Whether Ctesias' story *should* be accepted is a question that will not be unanimously answered in the affirmative. But I do not think the possibility

11 Photius' summary is slightly awry here: the permission to depart was evidently limited by an initial requirement to be brought before the king. There are other missing details in the rest of the narrative (see further the studies cited in n. 2).

12 How many of the original 6000+ Greeks (less, of course, Amestris' 50 victims) entered Megabyzus' military employment is a question we cannot reliably address given that Photius' epitome has expunged what happened during the five years before Inaros' execution. Of course, even if we knew exactly what Ctesias indicated, that would not guarantee that that was exactly accurate.

13 By contrast, Keen 1998: 136 suggests they were Lycians. Tissaphernes certainly had some Carian *leukaspides* (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.15) who are *not* said to be mercenaries.

14 See variously Ctes. 688 F15 (52–53), Thucyd. 8.25.28, Diod. 13.50–51, Xen. *Anabasis* 1.4.3. For Cyrus we have above all the evidence of Xenophon's *Anabasis*. See Roy 1967; Lee 2007.

should be rejected out of hand. Granted Ctesias' habits, the inconsistencies with other versions of the end of the Egyptian revolt are not so fundamental as to be damning, and, although what we are dealing with is part of a larger saga of Megabyzus and although there is a certain analogy between Amestris' behaviour and that of Parysatis after Cunaxa,¹⁵ these facts do not guarantee that the components of Ctesias' narrative are entirely non-historical. For our purposes all that matters is that there was a revolt in Transeuphratene and that the rebel army included Greek soldiers. There is no positive impediment to that in other sources.

Warlords

One of the larger aims of this publication is to refine and/or problematize fruitfully the meaning of the term 'warlord'. As a starting point I take it to denote (as the salient part of the Oxford English Dictionary entry has it) 'a military commander with regional power-base ruling independently of central government'. Where do we find such people in the Achaemenid Empire?

They are, of course, people who presuppose some degree of disorder. The empire was supposed (for the purpose of ideological representation) to be peaceful and orderly. That is the message of the royal iconography of Persepolis and Naqš-e Rostam,¹⁶ and royal inscriptions—with the exception of the lengthy Behistun narrative—do not dwell on the details of the military assertion or re-assertion of order: the king's *personal* military skills are celebrated but suppression of e.g. *daiva*-worshipping dissidents occurs, textually speaking, in generic terms.¹⁷ The reality was somewhat different, and it is there we should start looking for warlords. There was disorder in the Great King's realm, and it comes in various forms.

First, there are succession crises with an actual or threatened military component: certainly in 522–521, 424/3 and (with a slight delay) in 401, and perhaps in 486 and 466.¹⁸ (Interestingly fourth century crises seem to remain

15 Lenfant 2004: cii–civ; Bigwood 1976: 19; Bichler 2006: 456–7.

16 The fundamental study is Root 1979.

17 Personal qualities: DNb (largely repeated in XPl). Suppression of *daiva*: XPh. A similar generality is encountered in DSe. For texts and/or translations of these inscriptions one may consult e.g. Kent 1953; Lecoq 1997; Kuhrt 2007 or Schmitt 2009.

18 A sense of the relevant events (and the varying types and quantities of sources material now available about them) can be conveniently gathered from Briant 2002: 97–138, 588–91, 615–34; and 518–24, 563–7.

court-located rather than involving the deployment of armies.) But episodes of this sort are about who is to be the Great King, not about the establishment of autonomous rulers within (what should be) the Great King's domains.

Secondly, there are regional secession crises in Lydia in the 540s, in various places (notably Media, Babylonia, Elam) in 522/521, in Babylonia in 484, in Bactria in the mid 460s (unless this was actually part of the succession crisis), in Media in 409, in Egypt in the early 480s, the 450s and from c. 404 to 343, in Anatolian Greece in 499–494 and 479–386, in Cyprus in the 490s and 340s, in Phoenicia in the 340s.¹⁹ What characterizes these episodes is the attempt of a politico-ethnic group to detach itself from the imperial structure. The aim was *mutatis mutandis* to produce what the Egyptians actually achieved in the fourth century—i.e. complete detachment from the imperial structure, not the sort of qualifiedly autonomous symbiosis one may think proper to warlordism.

In drawing that distinction (detachment / symbiosis) I may seem to open myself to the accusation of smuggling in a new definition—or a substantial new refinement of the definition with which I started. But the definitional statement that someone is 'ruling independently of central government' entails that that central government has an admitted continuing significance as a point of reference. In a case of large-scale politico-ethnic secession from the imperial state that is certainly not the case from the point of view of those who have seceded, and the fact that those from whom they have seceded *may* choose to regard the secessionists' leader as a mere warlord (the category *is* one that is to some extent in the eye of the beholder)²⁰ does not, I think, alter the situation: the secessionists could identify themselves and their aspirations with a pre-existing independent state structure and thereby claim real (historical) legitimacy for the geopolitical situation they were seeking to create, and this fact makes all the difference.

There are, nonetheless, points within some of these stories of secession at which the concept of warlord might at least deserve consideration.

Aristagoras (at Myrcinus) or Histiaeus (in the north-east Aegean) are perhaps too transient to count,²¹ but the situation with the post-454 Delta princes (Amyrtaeus, his son Pausiris, and Psammetichus),²² though certainly ill-documented, is not entirely ill-suited. Psammetichus was active (in 445/4)

19 Again, for convenience, I cite just Briant 2002: 37–8, 114–21, 146–156, 525, 534, 570, 596, 620, 640, 642–4, 650, 682–3, 685. For Egypt see Ruzicka 2012. On the dating of the Babylonian revolts of 484 see also Waerzeggers 2003/4.

20 See the chapters of Coşkun and Champion in this volume.

21 Hdt. 5.124–126, 6.5, 26–30.

22 Thucyd. 1.110, Hdt. 2.140, 3.15, Philochorus 328 F119.

a decade after the end of the Egyptian revolt, and Herodotus' argument in 3.15 would be dishonest if Pausiris was not in power for some time. To classify him as a warlord does, of course, involve some reinterpretation of Herodotus' expressed view that Pausiris was granted Amyrtaeus' *arkhê* by the Persians. But Amyrtaeus does look like someone who had asserted a local control that the Persians found it difficult and perhaps pointless to attempt to dismantle militarily. One cannot tell whether he first did so as a consequence of secessionist disturbances elsewhere in Egypt or had already done so previously.

Nor, if one wants to seek warlords among stories of ethnic secession, are the Delta princes the only possible objects of interest. One might also think of people such as Inaros or Evagoras.

Inaros—classified alongside Amyrtaeus by Herodotus as someone who caused unparalleled damage to the Persians—²³ was a Libyan prince (*basileus* in Thucyd. 1.104) who sought to acquire an Egyptian kingdom; in doing so he fomented a war of secession in Egypt but, in default of an accurate understanding of conditions in non-Greek Libya c. 460, we might choose to categorize his starting point as that of a Libyan warlord.²⁴ In another parallel with Amyrtaeus, Inaros' son Thannyras also allegedly benefited from Persian tolerance, despite his father's misbehaviour and unpleasant eventual fate. Again, tolerance might be interpreted as acceptance of the existence of a warlord whom it was not worth attacking, so long as he kept to his own patch.

Evagoras' period of conflict with the Achaemenid state began with him as the long-established ruler of Cypriot Salamis (a position he had originally acquired by *coup d'état*) and ended with his paying tribute (although on the basis that he accepted the Great King's suzerainty *hôs basileus basilei* not *hôs doulos despotêi*, Diod. 15.8.3, 9.2). These facts perhaps characterize him as an opportunist who was both minded and able to demand a degree of respect,

23 3.15. For further remarks about this see Tuplin (forthcoming [b]).

24 The fact that someone at Ain Manawir (Khargeh Oasis) dated a business document (IFAO 5446) to year 2 of 'Inaros, prince of the Bakaloi' (Winnicki 2006; Vittmann 2011: 400) is remarkable testimony to an ongoing Egyptian perception of Inaros as foreign adventurer rather than proper pharaoh. The suggestion (Vittmann 2011: 395) that he was the son of Psammetichus IV, the rebel pharaoh of 486–485, is entirely conjectural, though Psammetichus could have been a Libyan adventurer too. A different background is provided by the Inaros Epic, a cycle of stories about the resistance of Inaros of Athribis to seventh century Assyrian invaders that acquired Persian elements when retold as parallels to fifth century resistance to the Achaemenids (Ryholt 2004; Ryholt 2012; Holm 2014; Bledsoe 2015: 246–248). The interaction between this and the actions of Inaros (or 'Inaros?') is an intriguing, if irresolvable, issue—one compounded by the possible appearance of another troublesome Inaros in a letter of Arshama (TADAE A6.7:7, with Tuplin 2014a: 40).

but not quite a warlord. But what caused the conflict with Artaxerxes was not (in the first instance) any desire on his part for Cypriot liberty from the Persian yoke, but an ambition to enlarge his kingdom within the island. Insofar as he envisaged this as something he might expect to achieve without Persian interference, there is perhaps a faint allure of the warlord. Moreover, even if he had succeeded in asserting control over the other Cypriot city-kingdoms, it is hard to see that he could have maintained that position for long with no reference whatsoever to Achaemenid imperial power. As I have already remarked, people whom one describes as ‘ruling independently of central government’ are still defined by central government (to use a Greek distinction, though one that Greeks did not always deploy punctiliously, they have autonomy rather than freedom), and—even given Cyprus’ geographical insularity—that was surely the best Evagoras could aspire to. But it was a serious and distinctive aspiration. A man who, *even in defeat*, can get away with claiming to the Great King’s fellow-king (not his slave), is one who, had he been successful in his original venture, would have claimed no less; and such a man might reasonably be called a warlord.

Perhaps something similar might be said of other local non-Persian rulers within the system who (at least in the view of central authority) went rogue, e.g. Tennes (the ruler of Sidon in the 340s) or the Paphlagonian kings Corylas (c. 400), Gyes/Cotys/Otys (395/4) and Thuys (380s)²⁵ or, on a more restricted scale, Hermias of Atarneus (340s)—though it is possible that Tennes actually believed that persistent Persian failure to reconquer Egypt meant that true liberation could now be achieved in the Levant. In any event Tennes, Thuys and Hermias all badly misjudged the situation (interestingly two of them succumbed to deception by their Persian adversaries—so they went on misjudging it right to the end). The fact that intervention against Thuys came after what looks like a somewhat prolonged period of tolerated dissidence may serve as an explanation (even palliation) of his error—and a reminder that successful detachment from central government depends *inter alia* on the attitude of that very central government.²⁶ (The fact that Paphlagonia was non-tributary in the 330s suggests that the attitude changed again.)

Thirdly, there are a number of what look like almost structural sources of disorder—notably the Mysians and Pisidians of western Anatolia, the Carduchians of south eastern Anatolia and the Cadusians of the west Caspian

²⁵ But it is possible that ‘Thuys’ is the same person as Gyes/Cotys/Otys.

²⁶ The story about Thuys in Theopompus 115 F179 implies he was not, once captured and brought to the Great King, executed immediately. But no clear inference can be drawn from this.

region.²⁷ These seem to be regions that were never more than semi-attached to the empire.²⁸ The individual figures of power involved here might well count as warlords, but they are rarely visible and so admit of little comment.²⁹ It may be that in the moderately *longue durée*, the Paphlagonian rulers were more in this than in the previous category, differentiated from it only by the accident that we can name some powerful individuals. One might also have a similar thought about Lycia—a geographically self-contained but balkanized region existing in the shadow of the Athenian and Achaemenid empires.³⁰ Here, too, we can put names (some of them Iranian) to putative warlords because of the epigraphic and numismatic habits of those involved and the location of the area just within the horizons of detailed, though now only fragmentarily preserved, Greek historiographical narrative. We can also see from texts and images that the waging of war was a frequent and valued activity.

Fourthly, and finally, there are seditious satraps. This is another ‘familiar’ feature of the empire, though it is one largely encountered only from c. 450 to c. 350. One can make a list rapidly: Oroetes (Hdt. 3.126–128), Aryandes (4.166), Masistes (9.113), Megabyzus and his son Artyphius (see above), Pissuthnes and his son Amorges (Thucyd. 8.5, 28, Ctesias 688 F15[53]), Terituchmes (Ctesias 688 F15[55]), the younger Cyrus (though a king’s son and brother, he was also satrap of Lydia, Phrygia and Cappadocia),³¹ Tissaphernes (perhaps, at least in the king’s eyes),³² Ariobarzanes, Mausolus, Autophradates, Orontes and Datames (the five rebels mentioned in a much discussed passage of Diodorus who are also the subject of other epigraphic and literary evidence that is not easily assembled into a coherent narrative),³³ and Artabazus³⁴—and at a lower

27 See Briant 2002: Index of Geographical Names s.vv.

28 The Zagros peoples, whose symbiosis with the Achaemenid system—puzzling and unacceptable to the Macedonian conqueror—is discussed in Briant 2002: 726–33 and Henkelman 2005, are perhaps a slightly different case.

29 Artaxerxes’ escape from the disastrous Cadusian expedition, reported in Plut. *Artaxerxes* 24–25, involved playing two Cadusian *basileis* off against one another. Perhaps (at the time) this was a region of competing warlords, perhaps, indeed, it was that situation that tempted Artaxerxes to intervene on this occasion.

30 See Keen 1998.

31 The evidence about his rebellion and its aftermath is found in Xenophon’s *Anabasis*, Diod. 14.19–31, Ctes. 688 FF16–29, Plut. *Artax.* 1–20.

32 There was a local suggestion of treachery after the battle of Sardis (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.25), though another viewpoint made Tissaphernes an incompetent agent of the king’s interests rather than one who sought to subvert them (*ibid.*, Diod. 14.80.6), and some thought the hostility of the Queen Mother was a decisive factor (Diod. *ibid.*, Polyaeus 7.16.1).

33 Diod. 15.90–91. See Weiskopf 1989; Debord 1999: 302–366; Briant 2002: 656–675.

34 He too is implicated in the literature cited in the previous note.

level of satrapy or governorship such people as Aspis (Nepos *Datames* 4), the pseudo-rebel Mithridates, who pretended dissidence in order to trap Datames (*ibid.* 10–11), or Nehemiah (allegedly).

What did these people (especially the really high-status ones) want? It is hardly the case that all, or any (apart from Cyrus), actually wanted to be king. It is true that some of them were of sufficiently elevated status for this not to be the absurd aspiration that Ariaeus told Cyrus' mercenaries it was in his case (Xen. *An.* 2.2.1). Satrapies could, after all, be held by people close to the heart of the royal family, and not only in the somewhat special case of the younger Cyrus. A potential challenge to Xerxes in 486 came from a half-brother who was satrap in Bactria.³⁵ A similar thing nearly happened in 479/8, this time involving a full brother.³⁶ The later fifth century Egyptian satrap Arshama was almost certainly directly descended from the homonymous son of Darius and his favourite wife Artystone / Irtašduna—though Arshama is not, of course, a recorded rebel.³⁷ But on the whole the warlord concept is likely to be a more helpful way to think about these things.

In this context one may remember in particular the famous parley between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus described in Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.29–40. In the course of the discussion the Spartan king suggested that the Persian satrap might aspire to a state of regional autonomy, and the latter acknowledged that he might indeed pursue such an aspiration if the king did not give him overall control of the resistance to Spartan trouble-making. There is an issue of honour here, and such issues may often have been pertinent. This certainly applies in the case of Megabyzus discussed above, at least as represented by Ctesias. There is also the case of Spithridates, a Persian of high rank (*Persôn oudenos endeesteros*) who defected to Agesilaus because of a slight to his daughter (Pharnabazus' alleged intention to take her as a concubine) and abandoned him again because of a slight to himself (being deprived of some booty that he regarded as legitimately his).³⁸ I have sometimes wondered whether that second defection was (also) caused by the discovery that Agesilaus hoped for a *rapprochement* with Pharnabazus—something that would have put Spithridates in an awkward position and deprived him of the benefits he had imagined might come his way if the Spartans consolidated their power. More specifically, the Spithridates-Otys nexus (sealed by a marriage alliance: Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.3–15) might have looked to

35 Plut. *Moralia* 173BC, 488D–F.

36 Hdt. 9.113 (Masistes).

37 Tuplin 2014a: 10. This is based on M. Garrison's remarkable discovery that the two Arshamas used the same seal.

38 Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.11, 4.1.28, *Ages.* 3.3; *Hell. Oxy.* 24.3 (Chambers); Plut. *Ages.* 8.11. Spithridates' social rank: Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.6.

secure the material benefits of political autonomy in the event of a collapse of Persian royal authority in North and North-West Anatolia in just the way in which Agesilaus would shortly afterwards suggest that Pharnabazus might anticipate. Alternatively, Agesilaus switched his attention to Pharnabazus precisely because Spithridates and the Paphlagonian king had deserted him. Either way, the important thing in the present context is that Pharnabazus was not perhaps the only one who could contemplate the possibility of independent regional rule.³⁹

Of course, being a warlord entails a certain amount of war-making. With Tissaphernes, who is perhaps more famous for *not* making war, this would be an issue—except that it is not entirely clear that he was really a rebel. More interest in this regard attaches to the earliest figures in the list, viz. Oroetes, Aryandes and Masistes. Oroetes had an appetite for power and perhaps saw the 522/521 succession crisis as a green light for separatism, but dealt with a fellow-satrap and with Polycrates by treachery and was himself eliminated in a comparable fashion. (He turned out to have insufficient personal authority among the Persians of Sardis to outface the demands of a new Great King, despite the strange circumstances of the latter's accession.) Aryandes allegedly created some unusually pure silver coins. What that signified (if anything, or at least anything that was sinister) and why Darius eliminated a man who had apparently been loyal in 522/521 remains something of a mystery.⁴⁰ Masistes was liquidated before he could take refuge in his Bactrian satrapy—and any subsequent war would have effectively been for the throne anyway, for Masistes, like the younger Cyrus, was the king's brother. The salient fact, in other words, is the lack of a pertinent recorded military aspect to the trouble.

Warlords and Mercenaries

If we grant that there are figures whom we might characterize as warlords among the dissident satraps and perhaps elsewhere (essentially among dissident rulers who are not technically satraps), how do we connect them with mercenaries? I offer four observations, moving broadly from negative (1 and 2) to positive (3 and 4).

39 When Histiaeus conversed with unidentified Persians in Sardis *apostasios peri* and later sought unsuccessfully to continue the discussion by letter (Hdt. 6.4), was he seeking to promote something similar—a Persian authority in Lydia that would be detached from Darius and complaisant towards Greek independence?

40 On the puzzle of Aryandes and Herodotus' treatment of him see Tuplin (forthcoming [b]).

1. Although one may imagine that the warlord employer required personal charisma and a peculiarly strong relationship with his troops because he was employing them for a personal agenda and because his personal safety was peculiarly at risk, little evidence actually survives that gives special content or character to the relationship. Xenophon's evocations of the younger Cyrus' leadership style in *Anabasis* (or indeed of that of Mania in *Hell.* 3.1.13) are not strictly relevant, since neither Cyrus nor Mania is strictly a warlord. Perhaps one could interpret the fact that Datames got away with not paying his troops for a whole winter as a sign of charismatic leadership.⁴¹ Both Pissuthnes and Artyphius succumbed to the willingness of mercenaries to be bribed by their adversaries—perhaps that betokens a lack of charisma, perhaps just that incompetence or ill-fortune had got them in a position in which it made sense for those who could to jump ship. Recruitment processes are, *Anabasis* notwithstanding, generally poorly reported,⁴² and putative cases of warlordism produce no distinctive stories. B. Rankov, in this volume, suggests that the development of a special cadre of personal bodyguards should be characteristic of the armies of warlords: this seems reasonable, but I see no clear sign of this in the salient cases.⁴³

2. Not all putative post-450 warlords are demonstrably mercenary-rich. Idrieus hired mercenaries for the Cypriot war, and one might wonder if that is what Hecatomnus had been meant to do 50 years earlier.⁴⁴ But these are for someone else's external use, and when one contemplates the most famous Carian dynast, Mausolus—a figure whose activities beyond the borders of his satrapy (and sometimes those of the empire) and plain inclination to think big give him something of the allure of a warlord, even when he is apparently not openly in rebellion—one is struck by the scantiness of the evidence for his use mercenaries.⁴⁵ Terituchmes' rebellion stemmed (allegedly) from an incestuous passion for his sister Rhoxane and a plan to murder his wife Amestris

41 Polyæn. 7.21.1, Pseudo-Aristotle *Oeconomica* 2.2.24.

42 See Sekunda's chapter in this volume.

43 One might mention the 300 Milesian and Arcadian *logades* who accompanied Tissaphernes on his fatal trip to meet Ariaeus (Polyæn. 7.16.1) or the 400 Greek mercenaries who defected from Abrocomas (Xen. *An.* 1.4.6) and were identified as his bodyguard by Parke 1933: 36. But these are not, as they stand, stories about warlords. I see no reason to follow Parke 1933: 26 in identifying the *Hellênikon* of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes in Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.15 as (small) bodyguards. See Rankov's chapter in this volume.

44 Diod. 14.98 (Hecatomnus), 16.42; 46 (Idrieus).

45 But, then, Mausolus' agenda (from one angle) was a Carian one, naturally enough served by Carian troops. (See for further comment the studies mentioned in n. 2.) Any Hecatomnid inclination to warlordism is not significantly matched in another Anatolian

(who was also the king's daughter).⁴⁶ The location of these events is presumably in the Iranian centre or east of the empire (an area where our knowledge of anything that can safely be called mercenaries is exiguous)⁴⁷ and the scale of the ensuing conflict is obscure. Spithridates' military muscle consisted simply of (Iranian) horsemen, and the strength of the Paphlagonians with whom he became associated lay in horsemen and otherwise undefined peltasts.⁴⁸ Any warlords in Mysia, Pisidia, Carduchia or Cadusia were served by native soldiers: indeed it was the conjunction of their availability and the particular geographical circumstances that rendered such areas potential warlord territory in the first place.

3. People sometimes used to describe certain Greek mercenary commanders as *condottieri*, a word whose semantic field might even be thought to overlap with that of 'warlord'. Historians are now more prone to stress the ongoing interaction of such commanders with particular city-states and, therefore, to play down their character as free agents entirely unencumbered by political loyalties.⁴⁹ But Iphicrates was suspected by the Persians of a desire to seize control of Egypt for himself in 373 (Diodorus 15.42.2), and the Macedonian Amyntas is alleged to have attempted this in late 333.⁵⁰ It is true that Amyntas failed (despite there being no serious Persian occupation force to confront him) and that it seems rather unlikely that Iphicrates was unrealistic enough to harbour the idea. But the fact that the suggestion could even be made is enlightening: mercenary commanders were evidently perceived as men of remarkable personal ambition. (Egypt's history of detachment from the empire since the late fifth century, the instability of the early fourth century native dynasties and the general imperial crisis after Issus play a role too, of course.) Another case that deserves mention is that of Xenophon in 400. One way of reading the material in *Anabasis* V–VI about the possibility of founding a

dynasty operating under the Achaemenid umbrella, viz. that in Cilicia—at least, so far as current sources allow us to tell.

46 Ctes. 688 F15(53).

47 It has been claimed that (central Asian) Scythian mercenaries were a significant category in the military establishment; if so, they might be relevant. Megasthenes (715 F20) referred to Persian use of Hydracae as mercenaries. But the Alexander historians' representation of the heartlands and eastern part of the empire avoids use of the term 'mercenary'.

48 Spithridates: Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.11. Paphlagonian horse: Xen. *An.* 1.8.5; Diod. 14.22.5 (401); *Hell.* 4.1.3; *Ag.* 3.4; *Hell. Oxy.* 21.2 (395/4), Diod. 17.19.4 (334). Paphlagonian peltasts: Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.3 (*Hell. Oxy.* 25.2 [Chambers] speaks simply of *pezoi*). Incidentally, there are few signs of Persians employing mercenary peltasts (see the studies cited in n. 2).

49 See Pritchett 1974: 59–116. Low's chapter in this volume is also relevant here.

50 Arrian 2.13; Curtius 4.1.27f; Diod. 17.48.

colony in northern Anatolia is in a warlord framework.⁵¹ Later on, during a riot in Byzantium, the soldiers said Xenophon had the chance of seizing the city and becoming a 'big man' (*An.* 7.1.21). We normally see this as an invitation to become a tyrant: but arguably a foreigner who seizes a city and does not do so as the agent of some other sovereign state is a warlord. (And, actually, the two terms of reference are not incompatible.) That would apply to Charidemus in Troy in the 350s,⁵² and perhaps to other Greek figures. There are also some further *non*-Greek individuals who might be mentioned.

Glos (son of Tamos), defected from Persian service after his father-in-law Tiribazus' (temporary) fall from grace during the Cypriot War and is described as making alliances with the Spartans and Egyptians, while his son Tachos actually did what Xenophon contemplated doing and created a city called Leuce or Leucæ on a naturally fortified site by the sea in Aeolis.⁵³ What the status of the soldiers associated with these ventures was the sources do not say, but—whatever the case with Glos, whose power-base involved triremes and troops from the Cypriot War—when Tachos 'assembled a personal force' (*sunestêsato peri hauton dunamin*) for the foundation of Leuce, it is hard to see he will have done this without hiring mercenaries. It is regrettable that we do not know how long Tachos survived or whether Leuc(a)e had been claimed by Clazomenae by the time it figured in a further story of rebellion and treachery reported in Diod. 15.92.⁵⁴

Another interesting (albeit only theoretical) case certainly involved mercenaries and takes us back to Xenophon's *Anabasis*. In a celebrated conversation Clearchus suggests that Tissaphernes can be *philos* or *despotês* at will to those who live around him if he has the Ten Thousand in his employ (2.5.14), while Tissaphernes suggests that with their help he might at least have an upright *tiara* on his heart (2.5.23). Clearchus' remark evokes Agesilaus' conversation with Pharnabazus (see above),⁵⁵ and Tissaphernes' observation is perhaps to

51 The topic starts at 5.6.15 with Xenophon's observation that the exceptional military force represented by the Ten Thousand was the potential basis for such a foundation. His opponents figure the venture as an opportunity for organized banditry (5.6.19–20).

52 Demosthenes 23.154, Aeneas Tacticus 24.10. (One should distinguish such cases from the trope according to which certain mercenary-commanders lived in certain cities when 'resting').

53 Diod. 15.9; 18. The site was later acquired by Clazomenae. See Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 1046 (no.819). The outflow of the Hermus has caused much alluviation in the region, and opinions differ as to whether Leuc(a)e was still an island at this period.

54 Much later it was also associated with Aristonicus during his doomed attempt to defy Rome's claim to the former Attalid kingdom (Strabo 646).

55 Tuplin 2007: 68.

be seen as a more colourful way of saying something similar: the man with an upright *tiara* on his head is one who in his own estimation is a king—with all the consequent implications of detachment from the other king's authority. (Shades of Evagoras dealing with Artaxerxes as king to king?)

A different Clearchus—a former student of Plato and future tyrant of Heraclea Pontica rather than the Spartan mercenary commander—takes us to another case in a third part of Anatolia. Clearchus' back-story involved an association with a Persian called Mithridates. He served Mithridates as a soldier at a time when the latter was in conflict with Heraclea, and, having undertaken to secure control of the city for his Persian employer, double-crossed him and made himself tyrant instead.⁵⁶ The precise identity of this Mithridates is an issue within various larger prosopographical and administrative controversies (notably the antecedents of the Pontic royal family and the supposed satrapy of Mysia). This is no place to rehearse the details: I merely note that one sort of solution might authorize us to view Mithridates (and perhaps some other individuals) as semi-autonomous local dynasts operating in the Pontic coastal regions and hinterland well beyond the borders of Hellespontine Phrygia and Bithynia—the latter itself more than a little detached from actual Persian control.⁵⁷ This episode takes us *grosso modo* to the same North Anatolian region of dissidence already encountered in the shape of the Paphlagonian rulers Corylas, Otys/Cotys/Gyes and/or Thuys; and Mithridates' threat to Heraclea neatly recalls that of the Corylas to Sinope.⁵⁸

The Clearchus-Mithridates episode actually offers us two warlords, one Greek (classified as a tyrant) and one Persian (unclassified), and the previous discussion has identified both Greek and non-Greek candidates. It is perhaps worth underlining that any distinctively Achaemenid era warlord-mercenary nexus is not just about Iranian individuals. The general growth in (Greek) mercenary numbers in the fourth century flowed from the political and military characteristics of the Ionian-Decelean and Corinthian Wars (which are events of Achaemenid as much as of Spartan or Athenian or Theban history) and can be more specifically linked to Persian use of mercenaries in Anatolia, Cyrus' great recruitment drive in 402–401, the return to the market of the campaign-hardened survivors of his army, and Persian-financed mercenary use in mainland Greece in the aftermath of Cnidus. If the availability of mercenaries made warlord behaviour easier, then, whoever the beneficiaries may be

⁵⁶ Justin 16.4.1–10, Suda s.v. *Klearkhos*.

⁵⁷ I have in mind Bosworth and Wheatley 1998. But even different solutions (e.g. Debord 1999: 96–104) are not incompatible with the picture sketched here.

⁵⁸ Alleged in Xen. *An.* 5.5.23 in response to a Sinopean envoy's threat to seek Corylas' help against the Ten Thousand.

(whether Greek or Persian), we may see the process as an epiphenomenon of the Achaemenid dispensation.

4. Finally, the key point is that the first probable large-scale Persian employer of mercenaries is also the first troublesome satrap we *know* to have waged large-scale war against the King, or even to have planned to do so: to say e.g. that Aryandes was preparing to hire mercenaries would be to beg the question—even though some appropriate people may have been available in Egypt. Moreover, the first absolutely certain Persian employer of mercenaries (Pissuthnes—attested unimpeachably as such by Thucyd. 1.115, 3.34, and also Plut. *Per.* 25) also eventually rebelled.⁵⁹ In hindsight, acquisition of mercenaries (Greek, as it happened, in Megabyzus' case; Greek *and* non-Greek in that of Pissuthnes)⁶⁰ greatly enhanced the possibility for satrapal disobedience and warlordism; and what may have been a significant release of mercenaries onto the market after the abortive Egyptian invasion of 373⁶¹ perhaps fuelled the hard-to-decipher troubles of the following decade, while Artaxerxes III's intervention in the 350s similarly helped Artabazus, who, alongside Chares, won what was perhaps the most remarkable victory over loyalist troops ever enabled by the use of mercenaries⁶²—though, even so, he was not able to sustain his independence for long. If one wants a structural link between mercenary use and the eventual fate of the empire one might look here rather than to the more generic trope about excessive dependence on hired foreigners. Even so, the empire of 334 was not at the time undermined by satrapal warlordism (though perhaps damaged by a tension between Iranian satraps and the Greek grandee Memnon), because Artaxerxes III had apparently put a stop to it (as to other imperial problems)—so this version is perhaps as doubtful as the other one. A different slant might be to stress that the spectacle of satrapal warlordism in the 370s–350s contributed to a belief in the possibility of successful demolition of the empire. But it has to be said that contemporary claims about Persian weakness of the sort encountered in Isocrates do not dwell on satrapal separatism as such,⁶³ and (in any case) one may wonder how high such a

59 Ctes. 688 F15(53). How one locates his (not precisely dated) decision to rebel in relation to (a) the disruptions surrounding the accession of Darius II (Ctes. 688 F15[47–51]), (b) subsequent plots and rebellions (Ctes. 688 F115[52,54–56],15b) and (c) developments in the Peloponnesian War is, of course, a nice question.

60 Specific evidence of non-Greek mercenaries tends to be rare in all contexts.

61 An inference from the suspicions surrounding Iphicrates and the small number of mercenaries in Autophradates' force in Nepos *Datames* 8.

62 Scholia Demosthenes 4.19, FGrH 105(1), Diod. 16.22, 34.

63 The closest to exceptions to this all concern Carian dynast-satraps (Isoc. 4.162, 5.104; Dem. 15.11). For further comment see Tuplin 2014b.

consideration would rate alongside personal ambition and the desire for glory in the mind of an Alexander.⁶⁴

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State and Warlord in Classical Greece: From Bipolarity to Multipolarity

Polly Low

This chapter investigates the role of the ‘warlord’ in the interstate society of fourth-century Greece. My interest is, above all, in their normative function: that is, I am less concerned with exploring the strategic roles performed by these men, and more interested in thinking about the ways in which those roles were conceptualised and represented by contemporary observers. In particular, I want to address the ways in which the relationship between warlord and *polis* was negotiated. I hope to show that models which characterise this relationship as oppositional or ‘zero-sum’ are misleading; rather, we should see the role of the warlord as one which is articulated primarily through networks of reciprocity. These networks are, however, potentially complex and unstable, something which (I will suggest) becomes particularly apparent as the Greek world shifts from a bipolar to a multipolar structure after the collapse of the Athenian Empire.

Commanders, Condottieri and Warlords: Definitions and Models

Who are the ‘warlords’ of the fourth-century Greek world? A brief anecdote from Aeneas Tacticus (*Poliorketika* 24.3–14) can help to introduce some possible candidates (and criteria) for the label. The year is 360, the location is Ilion; two commanders—Charidemus and Athenodorus—acting, apparently, as entirely free agents, are fighting over control of the city:

I will give as an instance what happened in Aeolis to Charidemus of Oreus, after he had captured the town of Ilion by the following stratagem.... No sooner had they [a small group of Charidemus’ men] entered than they set to work, slew the sentinel, behaved as mercenaries usually do, and succeeded in occupying the gates, at which troops at once arrived and seized the citadel; for Charidemus was close at hand. Afterwards Charidemus himself entered with the main body, but took care at the same time to place a detachment in ambush, suspecting that a force would be sent to recapture the city, as was indeed the case. For on hearing the news, Athenodorus of Imbros, who with his army was at no great

distance, tried at once to send help. Then some of his men slipped into the city, passing amid the confusion for members of Charidemus' army. But before any more could enter, they were discovered by means of the password, and some were driven out, others slain at the gates; for the relieving force gave the password as 'Tyndaridae', while Charidemus' password was really 'Dioscuri'. This, and nothing else, saved Ilion from being at once recaptured by Athenodorus the same night ...

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What is missing from this episode is any sense of any wider strategic agenda to either Charidemus' or Athenodorus' actions. In part, this is a consequence of Aeneas' interests, but it is worth noting that Demosthenes too, describing the same event, suggests that Charidemus' capture of the city was strategically nonsensical (Dem. 23.155). Nor is there any suggestion that these two men are acting in the interests of anyone other than themselves: capturing Ilion is portrayed as a purely opportunistic act, designed to further whatever opaque, but presumably self-interested, agenda these commanders and their hired bands were currently pursuing.

What should we call Charidemus, Athenodorus, and men like them? This is not just a pragmatic question, because the choice of label brings with it a range of, implicit or explicit, analytical assumptions. In the absence of an ancient term which fully captures the ambiguous status of these men,² commentators have often looked for modern alternatives; the one which seems to have become most firmly embedded in the scholarly vocabulary is 'condottieri'.³ This is, of course, not a neutral label—and in fact it seems that it was precisely its moral (or amoral) connotations which appealed to its early adopters. For

1 The event is also alluded to in Polyaeus 3.14 and Plutarch *Sertorius* 1.3. The historicity of the episode is not in question, though it is possible that Aeneas' (and others') versions of the tricks deployed by the commanders might have been elaborated: the full version of the story involves a ruse with a horse, which seems slightly too neat to be coincidental, given Ilion's history: Whitehead 1990: 168. On the careers of these two men: see (on Charidemus), Pritchett 1974 (vol. 2): 85–89; Landucci Gattinoni 1994: 44–52; (on Athenodorus), Hofstetter 1978: no. 61.

2 The question of definition seems not to have particularly exercised ancient writers, although some ambivalence about these men's claim to the title *strategos* is occasionally visible, e.g. at Dem. 23.155 (Charidemus is described as στρατηγός ... εἶναι φάσκων).

3 The origins of the comparison, particularly in Anglophone scholarship, are discussed by Tritle 1992: 71–89; see also Pritchett 1974 (vol.2): 60, n. 6. The analogy was (influentially) picked up in Parke 1933 (see, e.g., the epigraph to ch. 10); for a more nuanced approach, see Trundle 2004.

C. Thirlwall, for example (discussing fourth-century generals under the heading ‘The Greek *condottieri*’):

The mercenary leaders, whatever might be the variety of their talents and characters, all perfectly resembled one another in one point: they had broken the ties which bound them to their native cities; they were under no control and had nothing to hope and fear from their fellow-citizens; their sole object was to secure their independence and to establish themselves in opulence and power elsewhere.⁴

The wider context of all this (in Thirlwall’s eyes) is the general decline and fall of the Greek *polis* in the fourth century:

These men communicated their dissolute habits to the citizens ... and thus contributed to corrupt the manners of the city more deeply than ever. These may perhaps be considered as the most direct causes of that visible increase of dissipation and licentiousness which struck a Greek historian of this period [an allusion to Theopompus] in the character of Athenian society.⁵

These commanders, then, exist in the world of the *polis*, but their ethos is often depicted as being entirely at odds with that of the *polis*: they have no particular affiliation, political, ideological or even spatial; they are driven only by greed and self-interest. They are unwilling, or unable, to exercise the obedience to the requirements of the *polis* which is characteristic of good citizens. A flourishing *polis* should have no need for such men; conversely, if these men are flourishing, something is terribly wrong with the *polis*.

Tritle has rightly emphasised the extent to which this unremittingly negative view emerges from a very specific modern set of concerns about military professionalism and specialisation.⁶ To that, I would add that it is also based on a set of assumptions about the primacy of the state (whether nation-state or city-state) as an actor in interstate politics, which, while (relatively) unproblematic if applied to the Western states-system between, roughly, 1648 and 1989, are less straightforwardly relevant to the classical Greek world.⁷ Be that as it may, the comparison has stuck; perhaps more significantly, this

4 Thirlwall 1849: 282–83.

5 Thirlwall 1849: 280.

6 Tritle 1992: 88.

7 See, briefly, Hansen 1988: esp. ch. 6.

way of framing the debate about these men also seems to have stuck, so that those who want to oppose the negative view of the Greek 'condottieri' as self-interested, apolitical renegades, have, typically, done so not by contesting the way in which that behaviour is assessed or categorised, but rather by trying to prove that such behaviour never (or at least, only rarely) occurred. The approach is most visible in Pritchett's study of the fourth-century 'condottieri', which seeks to demonstrate that the overwhelming pattern of their actions shows them to be behaving in the wider interests of their own *polis* (even if that might occasionally lead them to take non-*polis* employment); that they did not engage in financial exploitation for their own ends, but always on behalf of the *polis*; that any stories of disloyalty or treachery are either false, or have been misinterpreted.⁸ These men, for Pritchett, are not 'condottieri', because they are not freelancers, but, rather, loyal citizens; if they operate in a states-system which is in turmoil, the blame for this cannot be foisted onto them: 'we should look not so much to the moral decline of Athens but to the military power of Makedonia to explain Chaironeia'.⁹

But this way of arguing about these commanders seems to me to set up a false opposition. The 'condottieri', in the framework of this scholarly debate, are either with the *polis* or against it; loyal or disloyal; self-interested or altruistic. I do not want to deny that there are times when these men are at odds—normatively as well as strategically—with the *polis*: some examples of this will be discussed below. But to restrict any analysis of the relationship between state and freelance commander to this sort of 'zero-sum' model is unhelpful, not only because it runs the risk of over-simplifying a more complex set of motivations (on both sides of the relationship), but also because it fails to provide an adequate explanation for the prominence of these figures in this period of Greek history. (That is, to put the problem another way, if these 'condottieri' are so destructive to the Greek states system, why do they seem to play such a central part in it?).

It is here that the comparandum of the 'warlord' might prove helpful. Its value lies not, I would suggest, as a straightforward substitute for 'condottieri': this would run the risk of simply replacing one value-laden term with another (and in what follows—in spite of the title of this volume, and this chapter—I will avoid using the label 'warlord' to describe the Greek commanders under discussion). What the concept of (and scholarship on) warlordism does provide, though, is a more varied set of models with which to approach the question of the status of these independent military commanders, their

8 Pritchett 1974 (vol. 2): ch. 3.

9 Pritchett 1974 (vol. 2): 116.

contribution to the states system in which they operate, and their relationship with the established structures of political power.¹⁰ Particularly useful is the model of the 'warlord as abritrageur': that is, an agent who can exploit local connections, and local knowledge, both to sustain their own position in a region and to further the interests of a state in whose (broad) interests they can claim to be acting (and whose implied or actual support, in turn, provides the warlord with some degree of legitimacy); the whole system is essentially symbiotic.¹¹ Such a model provides a way of moving beyond the polarised debate which has characterised many analyses of the Greek 'condottieri'; it is probably not coincidental that it also fits well with an explanatory model which has gained increasing traction as a way of characterising other aspects of Greek inter- (and intra-) *polis* relations: namely, reciprocity.

Reciprocity and Its Limits

There is no need to provide here a full discussion of theories of reciprocity, nor of their applicability to many aspects of Greek politics,¹² but it will be useful to emphasise two key points. First, reciprocal relationships are non zero-sum: that is, it is possible (necessary, even) for both parties in such an exchange to gain something from it. Second: just because such relationships might be mutually beneficial, it does not follow that they are equal; in fact, quite the opposite: reciprocal relationships are driven by inequality, by the desire of both parties to leave the other in their debt, and thus ensure a future supply of beneficial actions.

We can see these assumptions in action in (to take a very straightforward example), an inscribed decree of 363/2 (RO 38), recording honours voted by the Athenians for Menelaus of Pelagonia, who was 'both joining in the war himself and providing money for the war against the Chalcidians and against Amphipolis' (lines 7–9).¹³ The terms of this honorific exchange are absolutely conventional: Menelaus is given public recognition (and some tangible privileges) as reward for his services; the Athenians are able to publicly advertise the benefits they have given to Menelaus, and in doing so assert their claim

10 Especially relevant is work which approaches warlordism with a comparative agenda: see, for example, Rich 1999; Marten 2006/7.

11 Ahram and King 2012.

12 For an overview, see Gill, Postlethwaite and Seaford 1988; particularly on the applicability of reciprocity to interstate relations: Herman 1997.

13 For the historical context, see Heskell 1997: 137–42.

over Menelaus' future loyalty. The expectation of this decree, and those like it, is that it should encourage the individual who has been honoured to continue to act in the interests of the honouring *polis*; since the inscribed honour gives the Athenians the final word in the process of mutually beneficial exchange, it is also Athens that currently holds the upper hand in the cycle of reciprocal exchanges.¹⁴

It is worth emphasising that this pattern of reciprocal exchange is visible not just in positive contexts, but also in much more critical accounts of the behaviour of these commanders. A notable example is Demosthenes' speech *Against Aristocrates*, a work whose primary purpose is to demonstrate the corrosive effect of the actions of the commander Charidemus on the power of the Athenians. Charidemus was a Euboean by origin (a citizen of Oreus), but he appears in the service not just of his native state but also Olynthus, the Thracian king Cotys, unspecified employers in Asia Minor (as in the anecdote from Aeneas Tacticus, above), and finally Athens. All of these affiliations are mentioned by Demosthenes in the *Against Aristocrates*—not least to try to convince his audience of the shakiness of Charidemus' commitment to the Athenian cause.¹⁵ But even here, in a speech whose argument is premised on the disloyalty of Charidemus and men like him, we find a regular assumption that such relationships could work, and that if they were to work, they would do so on the basis of reciprocity. So, for example, Iphicrates (another commander of questionable reliability) was in the wrong when, in spite of being awarded a bronze statue by the Athenians, he fought against them in support of the Thracian Cotys (130); but Iphicrates himself could claim to be wronged when Cotys failed to show appropriate gratitude for his actions (131; see also 136). These stories are, no doubt, told in order to paint a negative picture of the warped moral code of (this) commander and (this) employer, but in doing so they reveal an expectation that such a code should exist.

The claim that proper expectations of reciprocity have been neglected also forms a part of Demosthenes' attack on the main villain of his speech, Charidemus. This commander had been given various rewards by the Athenians,¹⁶ but—like Iphicrates, and like Cotys—had failed to respond with appropriate gratitude. This complaint is not, it is worth noting, unique to this

14 Lambert 2011: 195.

15 Oreus: 23.148; Olynthus: 23.150; Cotys: 23.130, 149, 158; Asia Minor: 23.154; Athens: 23.149, 150, 163–65.

16 Crowns, citizenship, the title of *euergetes*, and unspecified other rewards: Dem. 23.65, 145, 151, 185. Further crowns are reported in Dem. 18.114, and (if the restoration of Charidemus' name is accepted) in *IG* 11² 1496, lines 28, 32 and 36.

speech: Hyperides' *Against Diondas* (delivered c. 334) claims that Charidemus even faced legal action for his failure to continue to work in Athens' interests after having been honoured by the city (§3.15–18).

For Demosthenes, though, Charidemus' offence is portrayed as being something more than a simple failure to live up to the expectations of reciprocity. Demosthenes wants to characterise Charidemus' betrayal as something qualitatively different from that of the other leaders who feature in his speech, and the reasons for this can help in pinning down a specific area of tension in the *polis*-commander relationship.

At some point before this speech was delivered (in 352), Charidemus had been granted Athenian citizenship.¹⁷ This could itself be represented as part of the usual pattern of reciprocal exchanges (Demosthenes describes it as a *doreia*: 23.65). But Demosthenes also wants to claim that there is a crucial difference between this gift and the more normal run of free dinners, prime seats, and so on. Citizenship, says Demosthenes, entails involvement in a wider nexus of responsibilities: 'a share in our civil and religious observances, in our legal rights, and in everything in which we ourselves participate'. Later, he alleges that this involvement should be not just ideological, but also spatial: 'everyone who desires to become an Athenian citizen, because he has fallen in love with our customs and laws, will make his home in our midst, as soon as he receives our franchise....' (126).¹⁸ Charidemus' problem (or Demosthenes' problem with Charidemus) is that he has resisted this attempt to embed him more closely in the affairs of the *polis*. And it is this, Demosthenes alleges, which lies at the heart of the problem: the *polis* is behaving as it always has done; Charidemus is failing to keep to his side of the deal. The mutually beneficial system of bilateral reciprocity has broken down, and it is the commander (not the *polis*) who is to blame.

Demosthenes' claims are persuasive. But I am not at all sure that they are as uncontestably true as he wants to make them seem. In fact, my suspicion is that what Demosthenes presents as his ideal end-point (the commander fully absorbed into the world of the *polis*) is actually much more contentious than he lets on. There is evidence which points to the possibility of constructing a different sort of this relationship between city and mercenary commander—one which, far from insisting on exclusivity, instead exploits the flexibility offered by its absence.

17 The date of the grant is unclear (likely candidates are c. 364 or 357/6): for discussion, see Parke 1928: 170; Osborne 1983: 56–58; Kelly 1990.

18 On (honorary) citizenship and reciprocal obligation, see Ober 1989: 268; Liddel 2007: 180–82.

An example is the case of Athenodorus of Imbros (and elsewhere). This mid-fourth-century commander appears with a variety of affiliations. We have already seen him in Ilion, where he was probably working (or supposed to be working) in the service of the satrap Artabazus; but he seems also to have cultivated productive relationships with several Greek *poleis*. Demosthenes, in the *Against Aristocrates*, names him more than once as a potential *euergetes* to the Athenian demos (e.g. at 23.17, 123). That the *demos* of Kios (in Bithynia) felt the same way is revealed in an inscription (*IK Kios* 2) which records honours voted for him by that city. The precise nature of his services is left vague (he is described as an *aner agathos* and, again, *euergetes*: lines 4–5), but the level of honours awarded suggests that the Kians wanted to demonstrate particular gratitude: Athenodorus is granted a statue; privileges valid for multiple generations; and a guarantee of inviolability, backed up with a specific promise of military assistance.¹⁹ He appears again in an inscription of Imbros (*IG XII.8* 48): the text is extremely fragmentary, but it appears that he is once more being honoured, on this occasion explicitly for providing support (probably financial: lines 10–11) for a military expedition.

The basic process which is going on in each of these decrees is the same as the one we saw in the case of Menelaus: the public advertisement, and cultivation through advertisement, of a reciprocal, mutually beneficial relationship. But these examples add something new: namely, that there is no sense of exclusivity here. At least three Greek communities are happy to count Athenodorus as their benefactor. There may, of course, be an element of competition for his services (though the imprecise dating of the documents makes it impossible to know quite how they relate to one another), but there is no sense from this material that any city demanded or expected an exclusive claim to Athenodorus' loyalty.

The case of Athenodorus is unusual in being so (relatively) well documented. But I would suggest that this basic pattern is very unlikely to have been unique. In fact, Menelaus of Pelagonia (the honorand of RO 38, discussed above) seems also to have spread his services around the Aegean world: he appears in a decree of Ilion, being thanked (and rewarded with *proxenia*) for his contribution to ensuring that city's *eleutheria* (Tod 148 = *IMT Skam/NebTaeler* 225).²⁰ If we had better evidence for the ways in which any state other than

19 Honorific statues are not unparalleled in this period, but are not part of the standard repertoire of honours; they are particularly associated with military achievements: Gauthier 1985: 106; Ma 2013: 5.

20 He is described in the decree as an Athenian (line 2), having presumably received honorific citizenship from Athens between the passing of RO 38 (363/2) and this decree (c. 359): see Osborne 1983: 60–62.

Athens conceptualised—or indeed formally recognised—its relationship with Charidemus, my suspicion is that it would not look dramatically different. That is, I would argue that we should assume that this sort of interconnected, multilateral network of ties is the norm, and that it is Demosthenes, with his insistence on exclusive, bilateral obligations who is the outlier. If we had lost Demosthenes 23, and were faced with having to reconstruct the roles of these commanders simply from the epigraphic evidence, then I am not sure that we would be inclined to see them as anything problematic at all, still less as any sort of symptom of the decline of the Greek *polis*: these men, rather, seem to be a valued part of the Greek interstate system, in the fourth century at least.

Beyond Reciprocity: Multilateralism and Multipolarity

Having said that, though, we do—of course—have Demosthenes 23, and even if I want to claim that he is arguing against the norm, I cannot pretend that his arguments never existed—nor ignore the fact that such claims were at least plausible enough to put in front of an Athenian jury. I will concede that Demosthenes has identified a genuine issue, which again has at its heart the nature of reciprocal relationships. I suggested above that the desired outcome of a conventional process of reciprocal exchange was to leave the honouring *polis* in the superior position: they had established the framework for the relationship, and they had provided the most recent (and greatest) ‘gift’, leaving the honorand in their debt. In the second half of the fifth century, the Athenians, as dominant power in the Aegean, seem to have been almost alone in awarding honours to friends in other states.²¹ By the fourth century, however, this monopoly on gift-giving had been considerably diluted, and it is this loss of monopoly on gift-giving—and related loss of the authority which came from it—which, I suspect, is feeding at least some of Demosthenes’ anxiety in this speech.

This shift—from a bilateral system (in which Athens was the dominant party) to a more complex, multilateral system—might seem to some (especially, perhaps, to Athenians with happy memories of the simpler bipolar world of the fifth century) to be a change for the worse. But from other perspectives, the move towards multilateralism, and towards multipolarity, might be seen as a positive development. In particular, as I will try to show in this section, this development creates more opportunities for independent commanders—men like Charidemus and Athenodorus—not only to develop their own power

21 Low 2007: 241–48.

and influence, but also to deploy that power for the benefit of other actors in the states system. Here, the comparison of the 'arbitrageur' warlord might become especially useful, in two respects. First: the observation that these men tend to become especially visible, and valuable, in more messy interstate systems, because of their 'ability to serve as middlemen in complex exchanges across uncertain boundaries'.²² Second: the fact that this exploitation of boundaries has a literal, territorial aspect; warlords are 'creatures of the borderlands', operating at the margins of states and empires, and exploiting that instability for their own and others' ends.²³

Evidence for the potential of these men to act as middlemen is not hard to find. In fact, it has already been visible in the material we have just been looking at: that is, this network of overlapping connections, in which it can be hard to pinpoint exactly where a commander's primary loyalties (or even obligations) might lie. We can see this most strikingly, perhaps, in the various affiliations with which Athenodorus is labelled: to the Kians, he is an Athenian (*IK Kios* 2, line 4); at Imbros, he seems to be an Imbrian (implied by the absence of ethnic: *IG XII.8* 48, line 9), as he is for Aeneas Tacticus (*Pol.* 24.10); for Demosthenes, at the start of the *Against Aristocrates* he is most definitely an Athenian (23.12); later in the speech, though, he seems to slip more into the role of external benefactor (*euergetes*: 123), and is listed alongside the Thracian commanders Simon and Bianor (23.123, 180, 189).²⁴ For Thirlwall, as we saw above, this sort of slipperiness of affiliation was a sign of moral (and political) depravity; for Pritchett, it was something to be argued away. I would argue that the slipperiness is real, but that it is in fact a positive advantage, both for Athenodorus, and for the *poleis* who are using his services. Greek foreign politics frequently operated through the exploitation of local links:²⁵ the fact that Athenodorus has more links than most to choose from should have made him a particularly effective operator. And I would want to speculate, too, that the vagueness of Athenodorus' affiliation was also useful for those *poleis* who wanted to exploit his connections for other purposes. It is, I think, possible to construct a fairly plausible scenario by which the Kians, for example, would want to claim a

22 Ahram and King 2012: 170.

23 *Ibid.*

24 Some of the fluidity of Athenodorus' identity derives from the (equally ambivalent) status of Imbros in relation to Athens: Graham 1983: 167–68.

25 See esp. Mitchell 1997, and, with particular reference to mercenary commanders, Trundle 2004, ch. 5. A nice example of ancient awareness of the possible utility of this flexibility of affiliation is Nepos' assessment of Alcibiades' ever-shifting character: *Alcibiades* 11.

strong connection with an influential Athenian.²⁶ Demosthenes, on the other hand (e.g. at 23.17), seems to be pushing Athenodorus in the opposite direction, by tacitly aligning him with Athens' contacts in the North, Simon and Bianor. Here too, though, given Athens' objectives in this period (not to mention Demosthenes' objectives in this speech), it is possible to see why the orator wants to suggest that the Athenians have a vibrant network of friends up in that region.

In the case of Athenodorus, there is no firmly-attested territorial aspect to his activities; in fact, it is tempting to suspect that his effectiveness might derive precisely from his lack of a fixed territorial base.²⁷ But it is possible to see traces of a different approach to the exercise of influence, and one which perhaps brings us closest to the model of the 'warlord' of other periods and cultures: that is, the model of warlord not as the man without a state (or with ties to multiple states), but as 'inchoate state builder',²⁸ whose exercise of power in marginal territories is distinguished by its dual nature: 'the simultaneous claim to local supremacy but also a quasi-legal subservience and loyalty to a superior authority'.²⁹ A recurring feature of stories told about these commanders is that they seize settlements out in the regions where they are operating and then use those settlements as their base for further operations. So Iphicrates, we are told by Demosthenes (23.132), made his base in the city of Drys (in Thrace), when his misbehaviour made it impossible for him to come back to Athens. Demosthenes hints that such actions are an indication of the failings of this commander: too afraid to face the music in the city which he was supposed to be serving, he instead preferred to skulk away at the margins of the Greek world:

He [Cotys] reduced Iphicrates to such helplessness that he withdrew to Antissa, and afterwards to Drys, and lived there; for he did not think he could honourably return to you, whom he had slighted for the sake of a Thracian and a barbarian.

TRANS. VINCE

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- 26 For Athenian-Kian relations, see Hansen and Nielsen 2004: no. 745: the city was a member of the Delian League, and was still (or again) on good terms with Athens in 406/5 (*IG* 1³ 124), but seems to have moved into the Persian sphere of influence after 404 (Corsten 1985: 25–27).
- 27 Isoc. 8.24 alleges that Athenodorus had founded a city in Thrace, but gives no details about where or when this supposed foundation took place.
- 28 Ahram and King 2012: 170. The fact that the state-building is only inchoate is important: once a warlord becomes a leader of a state (proper), he ceases to be a warlord (proper): Marten 2006/2007: 47. (The boundary between inchoate and actual state is, of course, not always clear cut, even in the modern world, and still less in the Greek world.)
- 29 Ahram and King 2012: 172.

This is, at least, consistent with the line Demosthenes takes elsewhere in this speech about the obligations of citizenship: as we saw, one of his complaints against Charidemus was that he had failed to come to live in Athens, thereby betraying the fact that he did not intend to fully embrace his new role as citizen. The moralising reading of this spatial disconnection is also followed by Theopompus, although he (fairly characteristically) takes the line that the unreasonable behaviour of the Athenians is as much to blame for this as is the debauchery of the commanders:

[Theopompus] records the following about Chabrias, (general) of the Athenians: 'Unable to live in the city partly because of his licentiousness and the extravagance of his lifestyle and partly because of the Athenians. They are harsh with all their (eminent citizens). Wherefore (nearly? all) their prominent citizens choose to live outside the city: Iphicrates in Thrace, Conon in Cyprus, Timotheus on Lesbos, Chares in Sigeum, and Chabrias himself in Egypt'.

FGRH 115, F105, TRANS. SHRIMPTON

It seems hard, however, to believe that Iphicrates really withdrew to his Thracian outposts simply because they were convenient places to get drunk. Nor, in fact, am I sure that 'withdrawal' is necessarily the right way to think about his actions, or those of other commanders, especially if we consider the location and the past history of Iphicrates' chosen outpost. Drys was a member of the Delian League, in which it was assessed to pay one Talent of tribute.³⁰ In the fourth century it was occupied by a Spartan commander, Ischolaus, and besieged by the Athenian general Chabrias (Polyaen. 2.22). Polyaenus gives no context for these events, but it seems reasonable to assume a connection with the attempted expansion of the Second Athenian League in the mid-370s.³¹ Although this is about all we know of Drys' history, even this allows us to say two things: that this is a place with which the Athenians have a track-record of entanglements; and that it seems to be a potentially valuable possession. Iphicrates' decision to claim Drys as his base was therefore neither strategically nor symbolically neutral.³²

30 IG 1³ 77, col. 5, lines 29–30.

31 For a brief account, see Cawkwell 1981: 41–47. Other evidence for the location and function of Drys in the Classical period is discussed by Archibald 2010.

32 Comparable (though earlier) is the example of Alcibiades, who is recorded as having various boltholes in Northern Greece: Pactye, Orni, Bisanthe, and Neon Teichos (Xenophon *Historia Graeca* (*Hellenica*) 1.5.17, Diodorus Siculus 13.74.2; Nepos *Alc.* 7.4; Plut. *Alcibiades* 36.3); on the history and significance of these sites, see Rhodes 2011: 95–96; more

What, then, was the purpose of seizing Drys (and places like it)? And in whose interests should we imagine Iphicrates to be acting by doing so? The purpose is perhaps fairly clear: these settlements can be strategically important, and worth possessing either as an end in themselves, or as a launch-pad for further actions in the area. But actions on whose behalf? Demosthenes (as we saw above) assumes that Iphicrates has no concern for the Athenians at all when he seizes Drys, but it is not impossible to imagine a version of the story in which Iphicrates is a great philo-Athenian hero, reclaiming for the state one of their old imperial possessions.³³ I should be clear: my claim is not that Iphicrates was necessarily acting on behalf of the Athenians here. Rather, my point is that it is very hard to tell exactly whose interests he was furthering. Here too, I want to suggest, trying to insist on a zero-sum, with-us-or-against-us model for understanding these actions might not be the most helpful way to proceed.

A second example can help to flesh this out a bit: this is the behaviour of Chares at Sigeion and Ilion in the mid-350s.³⁴ Our literary sources suggest that Chares had a long-term association with this region,³⁵ but the material evidence adds further perspectives on the precise nature of his relationship with these two *poleis*. First: we see a revival, after a long hiatus, of cult activity at Ilion, which has been associated with a deliberate attempt by Chares to establish his power and legitimacy in the city.³⁶ Second: we have a run of coinage from Sigeion, coinciding with a period when Chares was active there, which features the name of the city, an owl, and a head of Athena (Chares himself is not named).³⁷ A third piece of evidence is also worth considering in this context: the *scholion* to Dem. 3.31 reports that Chares sent cattle to Athens, to

generally on Alcibiades' Thracian connections, Sears 2013: 90–110. Bisanthe and Neon Teichos are later offered (by Seuthes) to Xenophon (*Anabasis* 7.2.38, 7.5.8; for discussion of Xenophon's mercenary force as inchoate *polis*, see Hornblower 2004).

33 Harpocration, s.v. 'Drys' describes Iphicrates as establishing a *katoikia* in Drys (κατοικισθῆναι): perhaps a settlement of Iphicrates' veteran soldiers (Pritchett 1974, vol. 2: 66–67; Sears 2013: 215).

34 On Chares' career, see Pritchett 1974, vol. 2: 77–85; Parker 1986; Landucci Gattinoni 1994: 52–58

35 Capture of Sigeion in 355; inferred from Diod. 16.21–22, Σ. Dem. 3.31; presence at Ilion in 334: Arrian *Anabasis* 1.12.1.

36 Berlin 2002: 131–165; Berlin notes (p. 146) that the process could have been initiated by Charidemus, who (as noted above) captured Ilion in 360.

37 Six 1894: 306–10, who suggests (at p. 308) that the head of Athena might be modelled on Phidias' Athena Promachos (although Wroth 1894: xxxiii, proposes a Syracusan model; there is also a longstanding local cult of Athena at Sigeion: Herodotus 5.95). The absence

be sacrificed at the Boedromia, a gift which he funded from the booty seized when capturing Sigeion;³⁸ the Athenian people (according to the Scholiast) responded by rewarding him with a crown.

What can be inferred from all this? One fairly safe conclusion is that Chares was interested in establishing a long-term base in this region. In doing this, as we have seen, he would certainly not be unique. But here too we should ask: in whose interests was Chares acting? Both Sigeion and Ilion were potentially significant sites: Sigeion came under Athenian control soon after its (alleged) foundation from Mytilene;³⁹ Ilion was a later acquisition (probably coming under Athenian control after Mytilene's unsuccessful revolt from the Empire: Thucydides 3.50.3), but, by virtue of its history, might well have held particular importance for a state wishing to represent itself as panhellenic *hegemon*.⁴⁰ One interpretation of Chares' behaviour, then, might be that he was attempting to present himself as acting on behalf of Athens, by reasserting control over places which the Athenians conventionally considered theirs, by deploying Athenian iconography on his coinage, by enabling the Athenian *demos* to share in the fruits of his victory. If that is correct, then we could see this as a sort of riposte to Demosthenes' and Theopompus' claims that it is impossible to be a good Athenian citizen if one does not live in the city (and we could note that the Athenians continued to elect Chares as *strategos* during this period).⁴¹ But this would, I think, be too simplistic a reading of Chares' actions. To judge from the material record, Ilion did not become straightforwardly Athenian, or even Greek, in this period: the excavators have noted that the cult activity there in the fourth century seems to be as much influenced by Persian as by Greek practice, and certainly cannot be labelled as a straightforward imposition of 'Athenian' cult on the city. The coinage, again, could be read as an attempt to appropriate symbols of Athenian power or authority rather than to

of Chares' own name or image from the coinage sets it apart from other coinages minted by mercenary commanders specifically to pay their own men (Trundle 2004: 115–16).

38 Perhaps as many as 300 animals (if Isocrates 7.29 is a reference to the same episode). Theopompus reports (*FGrH* 115 F229) that Chares also used the proceeds from a victory over Philip's mercenaries to fund a sacrifice and dinner for the Athenians (on the historical context, see Pritchett 1974, vol. 2: 80–81).

39 Hdt. 5.94.2, with Hansen and Nielsen 2004: no. 791. Sigeion also has a history of acting as a home for marginalised Athenians: it was the base of the exiled Hippias (Hdt. 5.94.1).

40 Suggested by Berlin 2002: 141, who notes also the possible significance of the Spartan admiral Mindarus' detour to sacrifice at Ilion in 411 (*Xen. Hell.* 1.1.4).

41 He is elected general seventeen times between 367 and 338 (Develin 1989: 450); our sources suggest that he was often put on trial for his conduct as general (Aeschines 2.71), but always acquitted (Dem. 19.332); see Hamel 1998: 157.

replicate them: the use of owls on non-Athenian coinage is fairly well-attested in this period, and seen in states with no obvious ties to Athens at all.⁴² And the sending of cows seems to me most strongly reminiscent not of the actions of a dutiful citizen,⁴³ but, if anything, of an allied or colonised state: there are perhaps some echoes of the Athenian empire here.⁴⁴ Overall, it is far from clear whether Chares is attempting by his actions to emphasise his role as a loyal (if distant) citizen of Athens, or rather to shift his relationship with the *polis* in entirely the opposite direction: towards the sphere of genuinely interstate relationship between two independent actors in the interstate arena. And, I suggest, this lack of clarity is not just a problem for us—trying to puzzle out these actions from a great distance—but could also have been a worry for contemporary observers, as the polarised reactions to Chares' gift perhaps suggest: a crown from the people; despair from Demosthenes:

You, the people, robbed of nerve and sinew, stripped of wealth and of allies, have sunk to the level of lackeys and hangers-on, content if these men gratify you with a handout from the Theoric Fund or a procession at the Boëdromia.

DEM. 3.31, TRANS. VINCE

Conclusions

Reciprocal relationships pervade the interstate arena: they articulate relations between *poleis*, between *poleis* and individuals, between state and citizen. In many ways, then, it is no surprise to find that they can also be used to frame the relationship between *polis* and commander, including the sort of 'rogue' commander I have been looking at here. Even in this context, we need to start from the assumption that such relationships could be symbiotic, and mutually beneficial, rather than necessarily antagonistic.

Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the relationship was a source of anxiety to some; it is clear, too, that this anxiety is particularly visible on the state side of the relationship (that is: it is a concern, which, though strictly speaking voiced by individuals—Demosthenes, notably—is focalised as if it were a concern of the whole community). The roots of this anxiety, I suggest, lie in

42 Van Alfen 2011: 55–93.

43 The provision of victims for major state festivals was (in the fourth century) typically funded from ordinary *polis* revenues, not through liturgies: Rosivach 1994: 120–28.

44 Suggested by Moysey 1985: 226.

that set of overlapping ambiguities and instabilities which I have attempted to sketch out here: uncertainties about status, about roles, about exactly what the rules of the reciprocal game are. And while I think Thirlwall (and others) are quite wrong to try to map this anxiety onto any great crisis (moral or otherwise) of the fourth-century *polis*, I think it would be equally wrong to deny that there is anything amiss here: there is, I would argue, a reason why these concerns become so much more visible in the fourth century—and that is because (simply put) the fourth-century world is a more confusing place. To express that in slightly less facile terms: the fifth-century state system—or the system which dominated the Aegean from about 460 to about 410—might not have been a particularly pleasant one (especially for non-Athenians) but it was relatively straightforward, because its terms of reference were, for the most part, set and controlled by the Athenians. They were the state whose *philia* was worth cultivating, they were the state who handed out the rewards. When the empire ended, so too did this clarity; and with the loss of clarity came on the one hand, opportunity; on the other, uncertainty.

Again, I should emphasise that this uncertainty is not necessarily disastrous: as I hope to have shown, it can be productively exploited, in ways which might benefit the *polis* as well as the individual commander. But, to turn briefly to the other theme of this volume (the shift from bipolarity, or even unipolarity, to multipolarity in Greek interstate politics), the potential for this exploitation seems to me likely to be especially characteristic of post- (and perhaps also pre-) imperial states systems. These commanders are able to move into the gaps created by the retreat of Athenian imperial power; but in doing so, they create the possibility for the Athenians themselves to re-establish or consolidate that power (or—less optimistically—to tell themselves that they had re-established their power). The ‘warlord’ in this period did not necessarily threaten the idea of the state, or the sovereignty of the *polis*; what he did do, though, was both reflect and, to some extent, contribute to the complications of an already (and increasingly) complex network of intra- and inter-state interactions.

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A Spartan Warlord: Lysander and the Creation of a New Greek Empire

*Daniel Gómez-Castro**

What is a Warlord?

A detailed discussion on warlordism is not the main point of this chapter, particularly since it has been the topic of a more careful examination by social scientists and modern historians for the last few decades. Nevertheless, before delving into an analysis of the political and military activities of Lysander who, it seems, was an actual warlord in Ancient Greece, it is important to state that the label ‘warlord’ does not seem in any way anachronistic. As discussed below, a widespread use of such modern terminology regarding the history of Classical Greece only requires some type of theoretical adaptability. However, in dealing with this rather complex issue, it has to be understood that there is no generally accepted definition for warlords in modern historical periods or even in present-day societies. Accordingly, C. Schetter, R. Glassner and M. Karokhail’s accurate work on warlordism in modern Afghanistan, for example, allows us to have a stimulating theoretical starting point for this discussion, before comparing it to more remote historical data, such as Sparta and Lysander’s world.¹

As has been thoroughly discussed in other chapters from this book, the debate surrounding the correct definition of ‘warlord’ takes us back to the early gos, a time when the Afghan state structures began to appear in the news in Western media and, for well-known reasons, its ‘popularity’ has not declined in the ‘post 9/11’ world. Although this chapter does not intend to conduct a prominently terminological analysis, it would be appropriate to generically present the main ideas, streams of thought and problematic areas existing in the current debate on warlordism, which, as L. Orywal suggested, are basically divided between the material and idiosyncratic approaches.²

The most widely accepted view regarding warlords suggests that they not only become a real security problem within the frontiers of a specific state,

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1 Schetter, Lassner and Karokhail 2007.

2 Orywal 1996: 19.

but they also limit its entire potential and independence on several fronts. C. Schetter and his colleagues explain this phenomenon to perfection, warning that 'this labelling—warlordism—was the expression of a modern, state-centric understanding of physical security, which generally assumes that state institutions hold a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Contrary to this ideal situation, individual actors—so-called warlords—were identified as the ones who *de facto* control the means of force'.³ Thus, as these scholars suggest in the following lines, 'the argument persistently advanced is that their (the warlords) arbitrary habits and their control of the means of force are the main impediments to establishing a countrywide peace and security'. According to this prediction, the link between warlordism and 'failed states' is ultimately both the cause and the consequence of each other: a weak state that is incapable of effectively imposing its authority leaves a void that is occupied by warlords who, acting solely in defence of their own interests, shall weaken the state even further. In other words, the state is weak because there are warlords and at the same time, there are warlords because the state is weak.⁴

On the other hand, those who have been the most critical of this vision assert that the debate, presented in these terms, is based on the biased ideology of those who consider the state to be the sole legitimate authority in terms of exercising control (political, judicial and military) over a specific territory. This vision suggests that it is erroneous to relate warlords only with war, since, ultimately, they belong to a specific socio-economic context (with their own patronage, clan, tribal or religious networks) and their authority extends over many other areas. It is, in short, what some political anthropologists have defined as the classic break between 'political legitimacy' and state 'legality'.⁵ According to such a theoretical scheme, the warlord himself represents the territorial political structure closest to a specific community, whereas the state represents, in the best case scenario, an abstract entity that legislates based on the general interests of various communities or, in the worst case scenario, an entity controlled by another group or community other than that which always legislates in favour of its interests. Thus, it should be stressed that C. Schetter and his colleagues' definition of warlordism is of particular relevance. They believe that warlords are those 'actors who are able to make decisions without necessarily being controlled by institutional bodies of state

3 Schetter, Lassner and Karokhail 2007: 137.

4 Reno 1998, Collier 2000; Mackinlay 2000.

5 Oberson 2002: 71.

or society. Thus warlords control the means of physical force—private as well as state owned—and have the potential and capacity to decide about its use.⁶

These brief considerations regarding some theoretical approaches to warlordism, used by social scientists and modern historians, raises the inevitable question of whether or not it is really appropriate to consider Lysander, a most relevant Lacedaemonian political and military character from the late second half of the 5th century BC, an actual warlord. This is the issue that will be considered in the rest of this chapter.

Lysander

A detailed analysis of Lysander's character is key to understanding the historical development of Sparta—and, by extension, of Hellas—during the late fifth and early fourth century BC. The study of this historical figure, however, demands great caution, since the historical sources reporting Lysander's actions and intentions have been biased by their own ideology and views on the Spartan general.⁷ These works tend to focus their criticism of Lysander on three key aspects. First was his perceived cruelty towards his enemies, particularly the Athenians (incidentally, the vast majority of sources available are Athenian). The second criticism was made regarding his friendship with Cyrus the Persian—in other words, his Medism.⁸ A prime example of one of these historical sources is found in Plutarch's biography. In his work, Plutarch compared Lysander to none other than Sulla, addressing, with a clearly moralizing slant, the dangers posed to the state and individuals, due to Lysander's excessive lust for power. This perspective is so transparent that L. Canfora has argued that, in Plutarch's view, Lysander's ultimate goal was to become the 'King' of Hellas, an assumption based primarily on numerous sculptures and monuments that he had erected in his honour.⁹ The third area upon which the classical authors focused their criticism on Lysander was the political arena, in other words, his imperialist strategy. Lysander's political project has been consistently linked to a disproportionate sense of personal ambition, with his main interest lying in the fulfilment of his lust for power, particularly regarding

6 Schetter, Lassner and Karokhail 2007: 140.

7 Bommelaer 1981: 25. In a splendid article by Keen 1996: 285–296, the author highlights the countless contradictions found in the ancient sources when discussing Lysander.

8 Medism is understood as the political leanings of the 'Greeks who sided with barbarians to attack other Greeks', according to Tuplin 1997: 159.

9 Canfora 2001. See also Bommelaer 1981: 13–17; 25–45.

the prospects of becoming a tyrant. This, indeed, seems to be an accurate portrayal. Even in ancient times, comparisons were made between Lysander and Alcibiades on several occasions, and it is no coincidence that some modern authors believe that Lysander wanted to turn Sparta into a new Athens.¹⁰

However, Lysander had a more prosaic take on reality and, unlike Alcibiades, his ambitions did not extend beyond securing a leading position for himself and his group within Sparta. In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that Lysander wished to overthrow the Lacedaemonian social and political orders.¹¹ Rather, if Aristotle is to be believed (*Politics* 1306b 34–36), his goal in opening up access to the diarchy to all ‘equals’ was to turn Sparta into a purely oligarchic system. This suggests, as discussed in further detail below, that Lysander did not intend to carry out a political revolution, but rather sought to benefit from the discontent shared by many where Spartan politics was concerned. Therefore, it can be concluded that he conducted such a strategy in order to gain political clout in the city.

Sparta: New Challenges (404–396 BC)

To argue this point, it is essential to consider the state of Sparta’s society after the Peloponnesian War. In agreement with Charles Hamilton’s view that following the victory against Athens, Sparta was beset with strong social tensions as a result of the different political projects, which arose in regards to how to manage this victory. Lysander’s political project consisted of leveraging the Athenian imperialist network in order to build a Spartan maritime empire in the Aegean Sea.¹² According to the traditional view, this led to the introduction of substantial amounts of gold into Sparta, which threatened to overturn the Lycurgan order by greatly increasing the economic disparity among the *homoioi*. However, perhaps it was not the *homoioi* who benefited the most from the maritime empire devised by Lysander, but rather the numerous social groups that were disenfranchised from the Spartan political system.¹³ These included the *hypomeiones* (those deprived of their right to

¹⁰ Canfora 2001.

¹¹ Even Plutarch, following Ephorus along these lines, suggested nothing of this sort, limiting themselves to note the Lacedaemonian intention to make the monarchy accessible to all ‘equals’, Plut. *Lysander* 30.3.

¹² Parke 1930; Hamilton 1970: 294–295.

¹³ A limited review of the different social groups in Sparta may serve to illustrate our position regarding this issue. Between the group of *homoioi* and the *helots*, we find evidence

citizenship due to failure to meet economic requirements mandatory for *homoioi*, such as participation in the *syssitiae* or communal meals); those who failed to pass the *agoge*; the *tresantes* ('tremblers') who had fallen out of step with the *diaitia* (Lycurgan code of conduct) when fleeing the battlefield; the *nothoi* (illegitimate sons of Spartans and helots); or the *desposionautai* (helots who were employed as rowers in the Spartan fleet). The following brief observation by Xenophon alludes to the social status of harmosts: 'Nay, it is their helots whom they deem it proper to appoint as governors (ἀρμοστάς) [...], They are under the tyrant rule both of the governors and of the decarchies, which Lysander established in each city', (Xen. *Hellenica* (*Historia Graeca*) 3.5.12–13).

This last passage has generated several historical interpretations, the most daring of which have considered it to be an allusion to Lysander's helot origins. In accordance with Krentz's suggestion, this statement should be regarded as a rhetorical exaggeration made by the Thebans.¹⁴ Most likely, not even the harmosts (or even Lysander himself) fit the strict definition of a helot, but clearly most of them did not belong to the 'equal' class either, indicating that they came from one of the previously mentioned groups. There is another episode that could support the Theban view of the Lacedaemonians offered by Xenophon. Plutarch reports that in 404 (just before the fall of Athens), Lysander, in a personal initiative, intended to colonize Sestos in order to allocate plots of land among men from the 'inferior' class (κυβερνήταις καὶ κελευσταῖς) who had participated under his command in the Lacedaemonian fleet (Plut. *Lys.* 16.1), but ultimately this initiative was aborted due to the opposition of the ephors (Plut. *Lys.* 21.1). It appears that this series of events was the origin of much of the internal strife endured by Sparta over the following years. Accordingly, the fact that Lysander and, by extension Sparta, needed to recruit individuals from the class of 'inferiors' for the army in order to carry out his/its imperialist project, may also be understood in an opposite manner: that is, Sparta needed to launch an imperialist project in order to offer a viable economic outlet to the 'inferior' groups, thereby alleviating social conflicts in the polis.¹⁵

for approximately a dozen other intermediate groups such as, for example, the *nothoi*, *mothakes*, *tresantes*, *neodamodeis* or *hyponomeiones*. See Fornis 2003: 258–272 including his bibliography.

14 Krentz 1995: 199.

15 According to Lazenby 1997: 438 the conspiracy may be a 'distraction' to cover up Agesilaus' peculiar arrival to power.

The Cinadon's Conspiracy: A New Hypothesis

At this stage, it may be useful to refer to the well-known Conspiracy of Cinadon, which occurred shortly after the accession to the throne of the Eurypontid diarch, Agesilaus II (Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.4–11). It is well known that Cinadon belonged to the *hypomeiones* class.¹⁶ This condition is inferred since he did not belong to the group of *homoioi* (Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.5) but had major military responsibilities within the Lacedaemonian state (Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.9). This is similar to the case of another individual cited during the conspiracy, Tisamenus, a possible descendent of the Elean soothsayer of the same name, who achieved the position of citizen after the Battle of Plataea (Herodotus 9.33–35).¹⁷ On this basis, and conspiring with several 'inferior' social groups, Cinadon organised a revolt in Sparta with the intention of bringing down the Lycurgan sociopolitical order. The rebellion was suppressed before it could be carried out, and Cinadon was tortured and possibly executed. However, the relevant issue here is that Cinadon told the Spartan authorities that he had organised the conspiracy because he wished to be 'a Lacedaemonian inferior to no one' (Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.11).

This episode has traditionally been interpreted as one of the consequences of the imperialist policies undertaken by Sparta during the final stages of the Peloponnesian War, when, as previously proposed, the introduction of large amounts of gold emphasized socioeconomic disparities in Sparta. According to this interpretation, the Conspiracy of Cinadon may be understood as an anti-imperialist uprising, given that the consolidation of the empire would increase the quantity of gold introduced into Sparta and, at the same time, would lead to an increase in its inequalities. However, if this was the case, those who could have conspired to prevent the creation of a Lacedaemonian empire in Asia Minor and in the Aegean would have been precisely the *homoioi* (but not the 'inferiors') who were more likely to lose their land and, by extension, their citizenship rights. Despite all this, it is worth noting that our historical record on this issue remains inconclusive and it could also be interpreted as being precisely the opposite.

Firstly, it should be noted that this conspiracy was different from the other rebellions initiated by helots in Sparta, because it did not in any way resemble the struggles of slaves or serfs for their freedom. On the contrary, Cinadon himself boasted important positions within the Spartan administration. Moreover,

16 Krentz 1995: 179; Fornis 2007: 107.

17 It appears that at some time, Tisamenus (or his family) lost the position of citizen with full rights and was relegated to the class of *hypomeiones*. Krentz 1995: 180.

riots of this sort usually occurred rather spontaneously after a very specific event, such as a sudden crisis, sometimes caused by natural disasters, and always in rural areas, where state control was weaker. As a result, their intent was not to subvert the sociopolitical order of an oppressive state, but simply to escape its control. However, the Conspiracy of Cinadon required considerable planning. It was to take place within the city (Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.7), and its ultimate goal was to overthrow the Lysander state. Therefore, the helot participation was probably minimal, or even non-existent. The unwavering and clearly effective control that Sparta exercised over the helots has been perfectly described in Thucyd. 4.80.3. It may be inferred that if the uprising had been of a clearly helot-based nature, the state would have discovered the conspiracy more quickly, suggesting the relative lack of control of the so-called 'inferior' groups. However, *hypomeiones* and *neodamodeis* did have reasons to rebel if, as previously noted, these were the groups that were to benefit the most from Lysander's maritime empire, which is the core of this argument throughout this chapter.¹⁸

A cursory review of the events leading up to the conspiracy reveals that the fierce opposition of Lacedaemonian authorities to the colonisation of Sestos (Thracian Chersonese), the execution of the harmost Thorax, and the death sentence and subsequent exile of Gylippus in 404, were followed by the restoration of democracy in Athens and the dismantling of the decarchies during the following year. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that Sparta clearly renounced its maritime empire, and with it, war and war-related opportunities to improve its socioeconomic standing. Even the war launched against the Great King over control of the Greek cities in Asia Minor had a rather subdued beginning, and until Lysander and Agesilaus were dispatched in 396, conflicts in Asia were of very low intensity: in fact, Sparta contributed an extraordinarily low number of Lacedaemonian troops (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.4; Diodorus Siculus 14.36–37), namely 1000 *neodamodeis* (the rest were Peloponnesian allies, Greek soldiers from Asia Minor and mercenaries). Therefore, although primarily some theoretical assumptions and indirect historical evidence support this argument, this conspiracy may be better explained as resulting in the abandonment of Lysander's imperialist policy at the end of the Peloponnesian War.

Nevertheless, even if the Conspiracy of Cinadon is taken out of the analysis, the truth is that over the following years, the 'inferior' groups continued to generate social strife in Sparta, and in 398, Agesilaus allowed Dionysius I of Syracuse to recruit 1000 Peloponnesians as mercenaries, no doubt in order to alleviate social tensions in the city. With the arrival of Lysander and Agesilaus

18 Roobaert 1977; Talbert 1989; Fornis 2007.

in Asia Minor, the number of troops grew significantly (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2) and, over subsequent years, Sparta entered a period of sustained warfare that lasted for over 30 years. This may well explain why hardly any social conflicts growing out of the 'inferior' class in Sparta have been reported, at least until the rebellion of a group of two hundred *hypomeiones* in 370. At that point, the Thebans confronted the Spartans in the city of Sparta itself, coinciding with a secret meeting by an unspecified group of *homoioi* conspiring against the Lyncurgan state (Plut. *Agesilaus* 32.6–10).

Conclusions

Lysander's great political merit lies in his understanding of the fraught sociopolitical reality of Sparta, risking his own sociopolitical status in order to offer opportunities both to 'inferiors' and also perhaps to less-favoured 'equals', which would have been impossible without the creation of a Spartan empire. In this sense, it is significant, although somewhat suspicious, that Athenaeus (through the historian Phylarchus) would regard Gylippus, Lysander himself and even Callicratidas as *nothoi* (6.271 e–f), which suggests that it is perhaps more a reflection of the important role of the 'inferior' classes in the Lacedaemonian fleet led by Lysander rather than an actual historical reality.¹⁹ The truth is that Gylippus, an actual Mothax, may be considered a good example of the opportunities offered by war to its participants: the son of Cleandridas, a Spartan general sentenced to death for breaking the Lyncurgan code of conduct, rose to great fame and prominence after his victory over the Athenians in Sicily (Diod. 13.106.8; Plut. *Nicias* 18.5–7), in other words, as a result of the war.

The Empire spawned war; war generated new opportunities; and those opportunities fed Lysander's power in Sparta (particularly in Asia Minor, therefore making a powerful fleet so essential). The reasons behind Lysander's thirst for power are speculative to say the least. However, it seems, beyond all doubt, that Lysander led a purely militaristic faction that defended the building of an empire, while in the political arena he was content with other factions with different agendas. The rapid acquisition of power positions that were not held by the ancient Spartan elite (the Greek fleet and colonial world from Syracuse to Asia Minor) provided an opportunity for the 'inferior' Lacedaemonians who temporarily occupied these positions under Lysander's exclusive orders. He is

19 Bommelaer 1981: 36. On the other hand, it should also be noted that P.A. Rahe (1977: ii) considers Lysander to be a Mothax, believing that he began his military career by order of the diarch Agis and only managed to surpass his patronage thanks to Cyrus.

not, therefore, someone competing with the state, but someone coming from a distinct faction of the same background who understands that imperialism is the best form of alleviating internal tensions within the city, since it offers opportunities to the largest social group of the state: namely, those situated between the *homoioi* and the helots. With good reason, Cinadon suggested that the 'declassed' or 'inferiors' surpassed the 'equals' by a proportion of one hundred to one (Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.5). Common sense would indicate that this was an exaggeration, but at least it reflects the actual difference regarding their numerical composition.

Despite the rather inconclusive nature of the historical evidence, an overview of some of the events already mentioned here brings the Spartan Lysander very close to the modern definition of a warlord, a relevant individual who encourages conflict based on the view that war is positive and necessary in order to fulfill his own (mainly political) interests. It is often argued that the actual existence of warlords in any historical period corresponds to times of state weakness and direct confrontation with it. However, in Lysander's particular case, the exact opposite seems to occur. At a time when the state had the necessary strength to initiate an imperialist expansion movement, the social group, which was to obtain the greatest benefit from this political project, actively lobbied to carry it out. To summarise, it would seem that the Conspiracy of Cinadon acted more as a stimulus for Lysander's imperialist project (and later for Agesilaus') than as an anti-imperialistic conspiracy.

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The *lochagoi* of Iphicrates: Forming a Mercenary Army in the Fourth Century BC

Nicholas V. Sekunda*

To a volume concerned, at least in part, with the conception of ‘warlordism’, the figure of Iphicrates should be of supreme interest. He is the first individual whom Pritchett considered in his list of Athenian ‘condottieri’ generals. In my personal view, neither the title ‘warlord’ nor ‘condottiero’ would be appropriate in the case of Iphicrates. One is hard put to find an example when Iphicrates was serving other than in the interests of the Athenian state. Even when he was in the service of the Persian King, it seems that he was an elected *stratēgos* of the Athenian state. This is not a matter I want to go into in any depth here, suffice to say that according to Diodorus and other sources,¹ in 377/6 BC when Kalleas was archon at Athens, the Athenians to gain favour with the Persian King dispatched Iphicrates as *stratēgos* to act in alliance with the Persians. When the invasion failed in the year 374/3 BC (when Socratides was archon at Athens) he fled to Athens having fallen out with Pharnabazus. Pharnabazus sent ambassadors to Athens and accused Iphicrates of being responsible for the failure to capture Egypt. According to Diodorus (15.43.5–6) the Athenians replied to the Persians that if they detected him in any wrongdoing they would punish him as he deserved, and shortly afterward appointed Iphicrates as *stratēgos* in charge of their fleet. According to Develin ‘it is unclear whether he [Iphicrates] was one of the other regularly elected generals of the year [sc. 374/3 BC].’² To me the simplest resolution to this problem is to suppose that Iphicrates was not only serving as a regularly elected Athenian *stratēgos* when he was sent out to Egypt, and a regularly elected Athenian *stratēgos* when he returned, he also was a regularly elected Athenian *stratēgos* on loan to the Persian King for the intervening three years also.

The second reason why I have decided to concentrate on the career of Iphicrates in this article is the survival of more literary sources dealing with his career than is the case with any other general, Athenian at least. For example, by whatever chance Polyaeus preserves no less than 63 *Stratēgēmata*

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1 Diod. 15.29.4. The other relevant sources are gathered by Traill 2000: 584.

2 Develin 1989: 245; see also Tuplin 1984: 539 n. 14 on this problem.

attached to the name of Iphicrates, several of which are cited below. This compares with 33 for his nearest rivals Caesar (8.23) and Agesilaus (2.1) and 32 for Alexander (4.3).

A third reason for looking at the career of Iphicrates is because his career was truly a case of a meteoric rise out of humble origins. I can do no better than to cite Pritchett:

Iphikrates, the son of a shoemaker of the deme Rhamnous, won distinction, first, presumably as an epibates in boarding a ship of the enemy (Plutarch *Mor.* 187a), possibly at Knidos in 394, then as a young man of twenty in aiding the Boiotians in 393, if we can trust Justin 6.5.2 (*xx quidem annos natum*). We next find him in command of mercenaries (οἱ περὶ Ἰφικράτη μισθοφόροι) at the battle of the long walls at Lechaion (Xenophon *Hellenica* 4.4.9) during the Corinthian War, and later with his peltasts (μετὰ τῶν πελταστῶν) at Phleious and Sikyon. At Lechaion in 390, Iphikrates made his fame by cutting down a Lakedaimonian *mora*.³

The humble origins of Iphicrates would mean that at the start of his career he could not count on the support of any influential friends.

The Role of the *lochagoi* in Mercenary Armies

We know from the opening chapter of Xenophon's *Anabasis* how Cyrus the Younger assembled his force of Greek mercenaries. He first of all bade Xenias the Parrhasian, an Arcadian, his existing commander of mercenaries, and the commanders of the existing garrisons placed in the cities in his possession, to enlist Peloponnesian soldiers 'as many and as good' as they could. Then he gave money to Clearchus the Lakadaimonian exile and had him collect an army in the Chersonese. He also gave money to Aristippus the Thessalian to raise an army in Thessaly, directed Proxenus the Boeotian to come to him with as many men as he could, and bade Sophaenetes the Stymphalian and Sokrates the Achaean to come with as many men as they could raise.

Xenophon stresses that all the individuals mentioned above were existing friends (*xenoi*) of Cyrus, except Xenias the Arcadian, his existing subordinate, and Clearchus. It is altogether more uncertain at a lower level how these generals assembled their armies.⁴ In later times, especially during the Hellenistic period, the officer responsible for recruiting mercenaries was called a *xenologos*.

³ Pritchett 1974 (vol. 2): 62.

⁴ Though see the remarks of Griffith 1935: 256–7; Trundle 2004: 104–117.

The employer was actively recruiting, sending *xenologoi* out to recruit. In his *Address to Philip*, written in 346, Isocrates (5.96) uses the verbal form ξενολογέω 'to enlist mercenaries' seemingly for the first time in a contemporary context. Diod. (14.12.9) applies the term for the recruiting efforts of Clearchus, but this may be anachronistic.⁵ When Xenophon describes the reasons for men joining the Ten Thousand (*Anab.* 6.4.8), it is clear that they come forward to serve having heard of the reputation of Cyrus. In other words the recruitment process is, in the main, 'passive'. But who are responsible for organizing them into formed bands, principally on the Greek mainland?

The role of the *lochagoi* in the narrative of the *Anabasis* has been studied by, among other scholars, Nussbaum, Roy, Lee, and Trundle, who all concluded that the *lochagoi* held their commands thanks to them having been responsible for recruiting the *lochos* serving under them in the first place.⁶ The *lochagoi* represent the interests of those under their command in their dealings with the generals, and, conversely, they are used as intermediaries by the generals to influence opinion among the soldiery. The mercenary *lochoi* which comprised the Cyrean army had a strength of a hundred or thereabouts.⁷

The prime loyalty of the mercenary was therefore to the *lochagos* rather than to the *stratēgos*. This is made clear by two incidents from the career of Iphicrates drawn from the *Stratēgēmata* of Polyaeus. The first incident runs as follows:

[3.9.56] When Iphicrates learned at Ace that two officers (*hēgemones*) were traitors, he called his best men and ordered them, as soon as he summoned the men suspected of treason and inquired about the matter, to seize their arms and the arms of the companies (*lochoi*) they commanded. The men seized and held the arms. After proving the treachery, Iphicrates punished the officers with death and drove their soldiers out of the army unarmed.⁸

This incident without doubt occurred during Iphicrates' period of Persian service (376–373? BC).⁹ What form this treason might have taken is difficult to

5 See also Trundle 2004: 107.

6 Nussbaum 1959; Nussbaum 1967: 33; Roy 1967: 295, 317; Roy 2004: 287; Lee 2004; Lee 2007: 82; Trundle 2004: 109.

7 Lee 2007: 83–6.

8 Krentz and Wheeler 1994: 273.

9 Thus Pritchett 1974: 67–8. In discussing this passage later on in the same volume (p. 242) in the context of military discipline, Pritchett moves the place and date of this incident (wrongly in my opinion) to 'Aka (Thrace), in 374'.

imagine. McKechnie rightly points out ‘they would have to travel several hundred miles to find an enemy to desert to’.¹⁰ Perhaps, instead, the aim of the plot was not to desert, but to kill Iphicrates, or to discredit him in the eyes of his Persian employers.

Parke makes several observations on this passage.¹¹ Firstly ‘the anecdote illustrates again Iphicrates’ sense of discipline exercised with the rigour of which only a mercenary commander was capable’. Also ‘it shows once more how completely *λοχός* was the unit of the mercenary army and how intimately the *λοχίται* were bound up with their *λοχαγός*’. McKechnie additionally suggests,¹² quite plausibly, that ‘the degree of loyalty must surely suggest that the smaller unit, with its own leader, had existed longer than the army’. In other words, the *λοχαγός* had been recruited by Iphicrates, and he had brought his *λοχός* with him.

Finally Parke draws attention to the seizure of their arms. According to him this ‘was the severest penalty which could be inflicted on a mercenary (short of death or enslavement), for it both prevented him from deserting to the enemy and from continuing in his employment till he could purchase fresh arms—a heavy expense’. McKechnie finds this explanation inadequate on a number of points. As has already been pointed out, McKechnie believes that it is very unlikely that the traitors intended to desert to the enemy.

Furthermore McKechnie sees this passage as being an argument for the issue of arms to mercenaries by their employers, or at least ‘Iphicrates probably found the confiscated armour useful—the king could surely find some men to wear it’. At this point it is worth pointing out that I have suggested that it was during preparations for the invasion of Egypt in the Persian camp at Acre that Iphicrates devised the equipment of the ‘Iphicratean peltast’, the forerunner of the Macedonian phalangite, as a response to the lack of hoplite equipment among the Greek mercenaries recruited.¹³

The second incident, no less relevant to the independence of the mercenary *lochagos*, cannot be placed historically:¹⁴

[3.9.57] When 2,000 mercenaries deserted to the Laconians, Iphicrates sent a secret letter to the deserters’ leaders (*hēgemonēs*), exhorting them to remember the time agreed upon, when he expected help from Athens. Iphicrates knew the letter would be intercepted by the troops guarding

10 McKechnie 1989: 84.

11 Parke 1933: 105–6.

12 McKechnie 1989: 88.

13 For the military activity of Iphicrates during this period, see Sekunda 2014.

14 Krentz and Wheeler 1994: 275.

the roads. When the guards brought the letter to the Lacedaemonians, they hurried to arrest the deserters. They were glad to escape, having become untrustworthy to the Athenians and seeming untrustworthy to the Lacedaemonians.

The activities of one Athenian *lochagos*, Astyphilos son of Euthykrates of Araphen,¹⁵ are described by (Isaeus 9.14):

For he served first at Corinth, then in Thessaly and again throughout the Theban war, and wherever else he sensed that¹⁶ an army being collected, he went abroad holding a command (λαχάγων 'commanding a *lochos*'); yet never on his departure for any one of these campaigns did he leave a will behind him. The expedition to Mytilene was his last, for in it he perished.

We cannot tell if on all these occasions Astyphilos served as a mercenary, or as a *lochagos* in the conscripted Athenian citizen army. I have dealt with citizen *lochoi* of the Athenian army elsewhere.¹⁷ Each tribal *taxis* was divided into a number of *lochoi*, based on the territorial subdivisions of the tribe, most typically on the deme it seems. This is reflected in a passage in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Athēnaiōn Politeia* (61.3) which mentions that in the 320s the *taxiarchoi* appointed their own *lochagoi*. The Athenian citizen army was only rarely mobilized in the first quarter of the fourth century however, and so it seems that in the majority of cases Astyphilos would have served abroad as a mercenary *lochagos*; his *lochos* presumably being recruited at Athens from Athenian citizens. Trundle remarks: 'Clearly these were mercenary armies. It is well attested that Greeks passed on to other Greeks the news of good employment opportunities and information about good commanders'.¹⁸ The life and career of Astyphilos have partially been reconstructed by Davies:¹⁹

His first campaign in 394 entails that he was born at the very latest in 413/2.... Since his estate, apparently all in landed property, was well worth fighting over, his manner of life as a professional soldier must have been a

15 PA 2665; *LGP* II, 76 no. 2.

16 Trundle 2004: 112–3.

17 Sekunda 1992: 322–327.

18 Trundle 2004: 113.

19 Davies 1971: 230.

matter of choice rather than necessity ... The date of his death at Mytilene cannot be determined more accurately than 'sometime after 371.

It is possible that Astyphilos recruited for Iphicrates and was one of his *lochagoi*. Of this, however, we have no proof. My intention is to examine in turn the careers of those individuals for whom we have proof that they served as *lochagoi* of Iphicrates.

Polystratos

We know about Polystratos from two references in Athenian fourth-century literature. Demosthenes in his speech *Against Leptines* (20.84) which was delivered in 355 BC states: 'You, oh Athenians, once honoured Iphicrates, not only honoured him, but also on his account Strabax and Polystratos'.

Demosthenes (23.130, and also in 136) records that Iphicrates was honoured with a bronze statue, free food (*sitesis*) at the Prytaneion, and gifts and other honours. The statue is mentioned by Pausanias (1.24.7) as being placed on the Acropolis at the entrance to the Parthenon.²⁰ These honours were presumably all awarded to Iphicrates by the Athenian people on the same occasion. According to Dionysios of Halicarnassus (*Lysias* 12) the statue was awarded to Iphicrates after the archonship of Alkisthenes (372/1 BC) Iphicrates seems to have been back in Athens in 371/0 BC when the decree would have been moved, and 'seems to have been unsuccessfully challenged as unconstitutional by Harmodios'.²¹

According to Aeschines in his speech *Against Ctesiphon* (3.243) Iphicrates was awarded the statue 'because he destroyed a *mora* of Lakedaimonians', referring to events at Lechaion in 390 BC, but I do not think the testimony of Aeschines can be taken at face value. After the defeat of Chaeroneia the Athenians undertook to repair the fortifications of Athens. Demosthenes, who was Aeschines' political enemy, donated three talents of his personal money as a gift to the city to help with the repairs. Ctesiphon, who was a friend of Demosthenes, therefore moved that he should be awarded a gold crown. When the proposal came to the Athenian assembly Aeschines attacked the motion as unconstitutional. The trial of the case was delayed for six years, and only came to court in 330 BC, forty years after the award of the statue and sixty years after the battle of Lechaion. In the passage in question Aeschines rhetorically

²⁰ Richter 1965: 159.

²¹ Develin 1989: 249. On the case brought by Harmodius see Hansen 1970: 31, no. 9.

contrasts the statues that were set up to Chabrias for the battle of Naxos, and Iphicrates 'because he destroyed a *mora* of Lakedaimonians', and Timotheus because of his voyage to Corcyra, to the statue that Ctesiphon proposes to be awarded to Demosthenes—why? Because he is a taker of bribes? Because he is a coward? Because he deserted his post? I feel that Aeschines is generalizing, citing Iphicrates' most famous achievement, not the actual circumstances that led to Iphicrates being awarded the statue.

We know that Iphicrates was awarded his statue and other honours in the year 371/0 BC. It is logical to believe that Strabax and Polystratos were also honoured 'on his account' on the same occasion. I therefore disagree with the dating that Michael Osborne has assigned the grants of Athenian citizenship extended to Strabax and Polystratos, and to the assertion that there can be no doubt that Polystratos and Strabax were granted Athenian citizenship for their exploits as mercenary commanders under Iphikrates in the *Korinthiad*.²² Following the award of Athenian citizenship Polystratos was enrolled in the deme Rhamnous, the same deme as Iphicrates, and his name appears in an Athenian inscription.²³ The personal name Polystratos is too widespread to give any idea of his original ethnic origin. The name occurs in Athens alone 48 times.

In the *First Philippic* (4.24) delivered in early 351 BC, Demosthenes states that 'I am told that on a previous occasion the *polis* maintained a mercenary force (*xenikon*) at Corinth, commanded by Polystratos, Iphicrates, Chabrias and others.'²⁴ There is nothing to stand in the way of our believing that Polystratos was a non-Athenian commander of the mercenary peltasts at Corinth, but he only received his award of Athenian citizenship in 371/0 BC thanks to the initiative of Iphicrates.

We hear nothing of Polystratos apart from these two references. It may be true that at the time of Lechaion Iphicrates and Polystratos were social equals. In the twenty years that separate Lechaion and the award of Athenian citizenship to Polystratos their relationship had changed, and as time went on

22 Osborne 1983: (vols. 2, 4): 47, nos. T28, T29.

23 *PA* 12070; *RE* = Lenschau 1952: col. 1832–3; *LGPN* II: 375 no. 37.

24 According to Harpocration, in commenting on this passage (*sub nom.*), Didymus had failed to find any other reference to Polystratos. Consequently he proposed to read Polytropus and identify him with the mercenary commander mentioned by Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.11), but 'Harpocration has shown the absurdity of this suggestion' (Parke 1933: 50 n. 4); Pritchett 1974 (vol.2): 119 n. 17.

Polystratos acted less as an independent *stratēgos* of mercenaries and more as a subordinate *lochagos* to Iphicrates.²⁵

The Sons of Eponymos

We cannot exclude from our survey the deliverer of the speech of Isaeus *On the Estate of Menecles*, an anonymous speaker, the son of one Eponymos of Acharnai,²⁶ who together with his brother, having settled their two sisters with dowries, then ‘we ourselves, being in early manhood, betook ourselves to soldiering, and went abroad with Iphicrates to Thrace: after showing our worth and making some money, we returned home’.²⁷ Parke thought the two individuals to be common soldiers, but McKechnie has cast doubt on this conclusion:²⁸

The brothers were not necessarily serving as common soldiers: contrary to Parke’s assertion that ‘they had never been well-off’, they had been well-off enough to marry their sister into a liturgy-paying family. Each of the two sisters was given a dowry of 2,000 drachmas. Thus the brothers may have been able, because of their thoroughly respectable background, to reach a higher-paid rank quickly: perhaps ‘we achieved some recognition for our merits’ implies that they did.... What seems likely is that one of the brothers subsequently settled at home in Athens, and the other continued in an occupation (probably soldiering) which kept him abroad regularly; but his travel was, in his own word, *apodemia*: he was back in Athens from time to time.

So the brothers may have been *lochagoi* of Iphicrates after all. The time of their service in Thrace under Iphicrates cannot be established with any certainty, but Forster favours a date of *circa* 383 BC,²⁹ when Iphicrates was acting in a private capacity. Trundle’s comments on this passage imply that he accepts that Iphicrates was operating privately:³⁰

25 See also Parke 1933: 50 n. 4: ‘The context shows that for the sake of the argument Polystratos must have been at least a subordinate and probably not a citizen.’

26 PA 5020; LGPN II: 153 s.v. no. 1.

27 Isae. 2.6; trans. Parke 1933: 232.

28 McKechnie 1989: 90.

29 Forster 1927: 38.

30 Trundle 2004: 105–6.

The man with whom they associated on the campaign was their commander, and the fact that he was an Athenian, like them, is significant; that they became mercenaries by exploiting relationships within the *polis* to serve a man well known enough to have relationships outside it.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore what form these very 'relationships within the *polis*' may have taken.

Strabax

Like Polystratos, Strabax seems to have received his citizenship through the agency of Iphicrates in 371/0 BC. Additionally, Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 2.23.17) tells us:

And Theodektes in *The Law* (τῷ νόμῳ) that you make citizens of your mercenaries (μισθοφόροι), such as Strabax and Charidemos, for their respectability and virtue, and you will not make exiles of those among your mercenaries who have made such desperate atrocities?

Theodektes son of Aristander of Phaselis (c. 376/5–335/4 BC) was a distinguished rhetorician and tragic poet, living most of his life at Athens. The ancient sources claim he was a pupil of Isocrates, Plato and Aristotle, but in fact he was clearly older than Aristotle and influenced him.³¹ Theodektes' speech *The Law* is also mentioned by Aristotle at *Rhet.* 2.23.11. It seems to have been concerned with the legal position of mercenaries.

It used to be believed that the mercenary peltasts in the Athenian garrison at Corinth were recruited from Thrace.³² Consequently it has been suggested that Strabax was Thracian.³³ In fact the personal name Strabax appears to be Greek, explained as meaning 'squint-eyed' or 'cross-eyed' by Pape-Benseler,³⁴ and then in turn by Robert,³⁵ derived from the Greek adjective στραβός 'distorted, oblique: esp. squinting'. The personal name form Strabax differs from the more familiar form Strabon by the addition of the appellative suffix—αξ. Both Harpocration and Suidas list Strabax as an ὄνομα κύριον. It is very rare.

31 See Andrew L. Brown in *OCD*³: 1499.

32 Parke 1933: 51.

33 Osborne 1983 (vols. 2 & 4): 47.

34 Pape & Benseler 1884: 1445: 'Scheele (Schieler)'.

35 Robert 1963: 151 n. 3: 'louche, loucheur, louchon, louchard'.

It appears in the comedy *Truculentus* written by Plautus, as a name given to an Attic young rustic. The personal name Στράβας or Στραβᾶς appears once in Cyreniaca,³⁶ and in Lamia (Malis) once.³⁷ Our ex-mercenary Strabax appears as PA 12911.

Two other Athenians bearing the same personal name Strabax are listed by *LPGN* II on p. 405. Both are sculptors. The first had his name inscribed on a statue base (*IG* ii/iii² 3827) as the maker of a bronze statue erected in honour of Samippon the son of Molossos an Eleian³⁸ by the Athenian *boulē* and Areopagus. The letter forms of this inscription can be dated to the middle of the fourth century BC. The second bearer of the personal name Strabax had his name inscribed (*IG* II/III² 3891) as the maker of a statue to the Athenian Oiniades the son of Euarchos of the deme Erchia.³⁹ The letter forms date to the first century BC. Both statue bases were made of Hymettian marble and were found on the western side of the Parthenon.

Given the extreme rarity of the name it would be perverse not to identify the sculptor active in the middle of the fourth century with the mercenary enfranchised in 371/0 BC. Presumably the sculptor active in the first century BC is a descendant of the sculptor active in the fourth.

Charidemus of Oreus

Charidemus was born at Oreus on Euboea at the latest in 390 BC,⁴⁰ for he is first found serving as the commander of a group of mercenaries in an Athenian army under the command of Iphicrates in 368/7–364 BC.⁴¹ The earlier part of his career is extremely obscure before his grant of Athenian citizenship in 357 BC.⁴² For it we are almost completely dependent on the far from flattering information contained in Demosthenes' speech *Against Aristocrates* (23). It is perfectly possible that Charidemus was in service with Iphicrates earlier in Ake and Egypt during 376–3 BC. According to a fragment of Hermolytos preserved in Eustathius (13.130–34, 924):

36 *LGP* I: 413 s.v.

37 *LGP* III.B: 384.

38 Seemingly otherwise unattested (*LGP* III.A: 388 no. 2). His patronymic indicates some connection with the Molossians. Possibly the family were Molossian *proxenoi* at Elis.

39 PA 11351 = *LGP* II: 349 s.v. no. 3.

40 Pritchett 1974 (vol. 2): 85.

41 Dem. 23.148–9; Berve 1926: no. 823; Pritchett 1974 (vol. 2): 85.

42 Davies 1971: 571.

Ἑρμόλυτος δὲ ὁ τακτικός φησιν ὅτι Λυκοῦργος μὲν ἐνομοθέτησε Λακεδαιμονίοις ὕστερον τὸν τοιοῦτον συνασπισμὸν, Λύσανδρος δὲ ὁ Λάκων ἐν ἔργοις αὐτὸν ἐδίδαξε, καθὰ καὶ Ἐπαμινώνδας Θηβαίους καὶ Χαρίδημος Ἀρκάδας τε καὶ Μακεδόνas.

Hermolytos the Tactician says that Lycurgus later ordained for a *synaspismos* of such a type for the Lakedaimonians, Lysander the Lakonian taught it in his deeds, just as Epaminondas (taught it) to the Thebans and Charidemus to the Arcadians and Macedonians.

Elsewhere I have interpreted the source lying behind this passage as describing how Charidemus taught the tactics of the 'Iphicraean peltast', which he had learned from Iphicrates in Ake and Egypt during 376–3 BC. His period of Arcadian service should be placed in between 373 and 368 BC.⁴³

It might have been on the basis of relations established earlier with Iphicrates that the mercenary band commanded by Charidemus was incorporated into the Athenian forces commanded by Iphicrates and drew Athenian pay for three years from 368 BC onwards. When in 364 BC the Athenians sent Timotheos out to replace Iphicrates at first Charidemus refused to serve with Timotheos, and it is unclear from the text of Demosthenes (23.149–153) whether he continued long in Athenian service after 364 BC.

It would be extremely difficult, but not impossible, to have Charidemus in Macedonia in 359–8 BC to have participated in the retraining of the Macedonian army. According to Demosthenes (23.163–5) in this year Charidemus was in Thracian service, and after the death of King Kotys, was virtually in charge of Thracian affairs because Kersobleptes, his heir, was a minor. He fought with the Athenians for seven months.

According to Demosthenes (23.173) Charidemus was made an Athenian citizen 'because of Kersobleptes'. From this it is generally assumed that this took place in 357/6 BC the date of the third treaty between Athens and Kersobleptes,⁴⁴ although an earlier date of 364 BC or shortly after has also been proposed.⁴⁵ Either way, his award of citizenship does not seem to have been initiated by Iphicrates.

43 Sekunda 2014: 137–142.

44 Davies 1971: 571.

45 Osborne 1983: 56–8, T50.

?Zopyros of Miletus

Iphicrates gave the heroic name Menestheus to his eldest son who was born about 386 (*PA* 645115). The personal name Iphicrates is extremely rare, and the heroic name Menestheus hardly less so. In an article published in 1994, which I refer readers to for further details, I suggested that the Milesians Menestheus son of Iphicrates attested in an inscription of 283/2 and Zopyros son of Iphicrates attested in an inscription of c. 300 were probably brothers. Their father Iphicrates was probably born in the 370s or 360s. I suggested that the father of Iphicrates, who was possibly named Zopyros but the name is so far unattested in mid-fourth century Miletus, was a Milesian *xenos* and possibly a *lochagos* of Iphicrates the Athenian.⁴⁶

Philochares

Philochares son of Atrometus of Kothokidai,⁴⁷ was the elder brother of Aeschines the orator. There was a third brother called Aphobetos. Philochares was known to have served under Iphicrates, but more of that later.

Philochares had familial antecedents who had a distinguished military record. His maternal uncle, Kleoboulos son Glaukos of Acharnai (*PA* 8558), in the words of John Davies, 'exemplified what may have already been, and certainly became, a family tradition by achieving distinction as a soldier, probably during the Korinthian War'.⁴⁸ According to the testimony of Aeschines (2.78) Kleoboulos was serving along with Demainetos 'of the family of the Bouzygai' (presumably as *stratēgoi*) when they won the naval victory over Cheilon the Lakedaimonian *navarchos*. The date of this battle is disputed, but dates of 396/5 or 388/7 BC have been suggested for the battle and for when Demainetos and Kleoboulos held the office of *stratēgos* together.⁴⁹

Kleoboulos is also known from his grave stele, found two kilometres to the north-west of the modern village of Menidi (the ancient Acharnae), now in the National Museum (4951), which bears the following inscription:⁵⁰

46 Sekunda 1994.

47 *PA* 14775 = Fiehn, 'Philochares (1)', *RE* xix 2, 1938: col. 2433 = *LGPV* II: 460 no. 22.

48 Davies 1971: 544.

49 See the discussion in Develin 1989: 206–7, 217.

50 Papadimitriou 1957; Robert & Robert 1958: 241 no.217; *SEG* 16 (1959): 193; Translation in Clairmont 1970: 145–6, no. 68.

(a) Kleiobulos from Acharnai, the seer.

[image]

(b) Kleiobulos son of Glaukos,
the earth covers your dead body;
you were both a good seer and an esteemed citizen,
who the people of great-souled Erechtheus
truly said had won fame throughout Hellas by his bravery'.



FIGURE 1 *The grave relief of Kleoboulos son of Glaukos of Acharnae (after BCH 82 (1958) p. 365 fig. 3).*

Below the first line of the inscription is an image of an eagle with a snake in its talons (Figure 1). The animals shown are held to refer to function of Kleoboulos as a seer (*mantis*).⁵¹ The date of the grave stele, and therefore the death of Kleoboulos, is disputed. According to Georges Daux the stele dates to the second quarter of the fourth century,⁵² but Christos Karousos holds that its letter forms (orthography) date the inscription to the second or third decade of the fourth century.⁵³

Kleoboulos' sister Glaukothea, daughter of Glaukos of Acharnae, married Philochares' father Atrometos of Kothokidai. We have no idea whether the father of Atrometos was a military person, but the very name that he gave his son 'without trembling for fear' suggests as much.⁵⁴ In his speech *On the Embassy*, delivered in 343/2 BC, Aeschines (2.147) tells the audience the story of his father, then aged 94, which would entail that he was born in either 437/6 or (less likely) in 436/5 BC.⁵⁵ His property had been destroyed by the Peloponnesian War, he 'was so fortunate to be an athlete' (2.147). According to the interpretation of E.M. Harris by these words Aeschines 'is trying to show that his father, at least as a young man, was free from the need to work for a living and pursued the life-style of a *kalos kagathos*, exercising regularly in the gymnasium'.⁵⁶ Harris argues that Atrometos was prevented from practicing as an athlete, not by the interventions of the Lakedaimonians and their allies at the beginning of the war in 431 BC, when Atrometos would only have been six or seven then, but starting after the occupation of Dekeleia in 413 BC when Atrometos would have been 23 or 24.

Next Aeschines describes the activities of Atrometos during the reign of the Thirty. 'The chronology of these actions presents difficulties'.⁵⁷ He (2.78) tells us that Atrometos went into exile during the reign of the Thirty at Athens. The Thirty seized power in Athens in the summer of 404 when Atrometos would have been 31 or 32. His wife Glaukothea shared his exile in Corinth (2.148), which would mean that the marriage took place no later than 403 BC.⁵⁸ Athenian males would typically marry at the age of 30,⁵⁹ so the marriage may

51 On this device see also Schmidt 1983: 65 n. 15, and generally Rodríguez Pérez 2010.

52 Daux 1958.

53 Karousos 1960: 114.

54 Presumably this is why the Suda Lexicon emphatically lists Atrometos as a personal name at A 4390 Ἀτρώμητος: ὄνομα κύριον. καὶ ὁ ἄφοβος. See Adler 1931: 408.

55 Davies 1971: 544.

56 Harris 1995: 22.

57 Harris 1995: 23.

58 Davies 1971: 544.

59 Lacey 1968: 106, 162; Pomeroy 1997: 23 n. 2.

well have taken place while Atrometos was still resident in Athens. It was at this time, Aeschines (2.147) continues, that his father served as a soldier in Asia, in which he showed himself to have been courageous in danger (στρατεύθῃσιν μὲν ἐν Ἀσίᾳ, ἀριστεύειν δ' ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις), and (then) took part in the restoration of the democracy (2.78, 14). Aeschines might have sought to imply that the period of Atrometos' mercenary service came before the restoration of the democracy, although this does not need to be the case. Aeschines had no special reason to invent either Atrometos' participation in the overthrow of the Thirty, nor his mercenary service in Asia. A *scholium* on this passage states that:⁶⁰

μισθῶσαι ἑαυτὸν ἐκέισέ τιςι τῶν σατραπῶν διὰ πενίαν καὶ φυγὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν λ'.

he himself hired his services out over there to one of the satraps on account of poverty and flight from the 30.

Harris notes 'this is probably a guess, for the author of the scholium cites no authority and is apparently unable to name the satrap'. The only employer recruiting in 403 BC would have been Clearchus, recruiting mercenaries on behalf of Cyrus the Younger. Harris has demonstrated that his service as a mercenary in Asia must have come after the restoration of the democracy, and sums up the situation thus: 'the safest conclusion is to move Atrometos' service as a mercenary down to the 390s when our sources tell us many Greeks were hiring themselves out as soldiers to Persian satraps'.⁶¹ When Atrometos returned to Athens he earned his living as a teacher. In *On the False Embassy* Demosthenes (19.281) refers to Atrometos as a schoolteacher (γραμματιστής) and there is no reason to doubt this information.

The period of the mercenary service is, of course, just the period that in 397 BC Conon persuaded the Persian King to form a fleet, which, operating out of Rhodes inflicted a defeat on the Lakedaimonian fleet at Knidos in 394 BC. This was the battle in which supposedly Iphicrates first distinguished himself. If Atrometos participated in these events, however, one would have thought that Aeschines would have mentioned this. Philochares, who was the first-born son of Atrometos, would have been born at around this time. Aeschines, who was the second-born son of Atrometos, stated, in his speech *Against Timarchus*, which was probably delivered in the late summer of 346 BC,⁶² that he was then

60 Dilts 1992: 91 vs. 317 (in or. 2,147); see also Parke 1933: 226 n. 1.

61 Harris 1995: 23.

62 Harris 1985.

forty-five years old, which would place his year of birth in the year 391/0 or 390/89 BC.⁶³ Given that we can date the marriage of Atrometos to Glaukothea to shortly before 404 BC, we would not be far wrong if we put the birth of Philochares in the middle of the 390s.

In his speech *On the False Embassy* delivered in the year 343 BC Demosthenes (19.237) states that Philochares was a painter of alabaster boxes,⁶⁴ and tambourines, and that Aeschines and Aphobetos were junior clerks (ὑπογραμματέας).⁶⁵ This 'slight' directed at Philochares has caused untold difficulties among modern scholarship. Pliny (*Historia Naturalis* 35.28) describes a picture which Augustus displayed in the Forum at Rome:⁶⁶

The second picture is remarkable for displaying the close family likeness between a son in the prime of life and an elderly father, allowing for the difference of age: above them soars an eagle with a snake in its claws; Philochares has stated this work to be by him showing the immeasurable power exercised by art if one merely considers this picture alone, inasmuch as thanks to Philochares two otherwise quite obscure persons Glaucion and his son Aristippus after all these centuries have passed still stand in the view of the senate of the Roman nation!

The painting, obviously, showed a family group.⁶⁷ Art historians have been divided into those who support the identification of Pliny's Philochares with the brother of Aeschines,⁶⁸ and those who do not.⁶⁹ Since the discovery of the grave stele of Kleoboulos bearing the image of an eagle with a snake in its talons the case has been strengthened for those who would see a connection.⁷⁰

63 This dating was criticized by Lewis 1958, who proposed to emend the passage to make Aeschines born around 390 BC, accepted by Davies 1971: 545–7. See, however Harris 1988 who has argued that we should accept the text of Aeschines unemended.

64 See also Tischler 1978.

65 That both Aeschines and Aphobetos are accused of being junior clerks is made clear by a scholium on the passage in question ὑπογραμματέας δὲ τὸν Ἀφόβητον καὶ <τὸν> Αἰσχίνην. Dils 1986: 78 vs. 456. See further Harris 1995: 185 n. 33; and see MacDowell 2000: 301.

66 Translation by H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library, 1952); see A. Corso in Conte and Ranucchi 1988: 325 n. 1. On the picture see further Celani 1998: 137–8.

67 Pape 1975: 157; Hölscher 1989: 332 to no. 31.

68 Overbeck 1868: 336–7, nos. 1957–1959; Brunn 1889: 173; Reinach 1921: 300–303, nos. 379–381; Pfuhl 1923: 766.

69 Lippold, 'Philochares (3),' *RE* xix 2 (1938): col. 2433; Kansteiner 2014: 120–122, nos. 2842–2844.

70 Hölscher 1989: 329.

The picture seems to have been inscribed with the name of Philochares himself, and also, presumably with the names of Glaukion and Aristippos as they were quite obscure.⁷¹ Fortunately these questions, interesting though they are, are as unimportant to the conduct of Philochares as a *lochagos* of Iphicrates, as is the question of if Strabax was a sculptor.

In reply to Demosthenes Aeschines (2.149) describes Philochares as a man of not ignoble pursuits, 'spending his time in the *gymnasia*, and serving with Iphicrates' (ἐν γυμνασίοις διατρίβων, καὶ μετὰ Ἰφικράτους συνεστρατευμένος). Aeschines is not specific as to what campaigns Philochares served under the command of Iphicrates, but it was presumably during the final part of Iphicrates' career. Iphicrates died between 354 and 352 BC,⁷² but he does not seem to have campaigned after 357/6 BC. If Philochares was born in the mid-390s, he would have become available for military service in the mid-370s. We might imagine that he was a *lochagos* of Iphicrates from the mid-360s onwards.

Aeschines also says that Philochares has been a *stratēgos* for the past three years. As the speech *On the Embassy* was delivered in 343/2 BC Aeschines has in mind the archon years 345/4, 344/3, and 343/2 BC.⁷³ Evidently during his years of service as a *lochagos*, as Davies put it Philochares had 'gained public confidence enough to be elected as general'.⁷⁴

Social Groupings around the *Gymnasia*

Aeschines (2.149) says that Philochares spent his time in the *gymnasia*. The *gymnasia* were where the *ephēboi* received their physical training, and the mature young Athenians took their physical exercise. They were the ideal place for the recruitment of mercenaries.

Aeschines elsewhere (1.135) says that he himself frequents the *gymnasia*,⁷⁵ and that he has been an *erastēs*, or 'lover' many times. He confirms this by a second reference (3.216) where he rejects Demosthenes' censure of his frequenting the *gymnasia* with 'the younger men' (τῶν νεοτέρων). These are not necessarily to be taken as references to Aeschines' homosexuality. The verb to

71 See Smith (Philip) in Smith 1870: 299; Ferri 1946: 132 (*non vidi*).

72 Davies 1971: 250.

73 Develin 1989: 324, 326, 328.

74 Davies 1971: 545; Develin 1989: 324, 326, 328.

75 See also Plut. *Mor.* 840A, which says that when a young man (*neos*) he worked hard in the *gymnasia*, but which information, however, seems to be purely derivative from the speeches.

ἐράω 'love' in ancient Greek, as in modern English, should not be taken too literally to mean 'to engage in carnal intercourse' in all cases. In a military context the terms *erastēs* 'lover' and *erōmenos* 'beloved' are used of a pair of soldiers, the term 'lover' being adopted by a senior soldier who 'adopted' a junior soldier, who might typically be an ephēbe. In 1992 I suggested in an article that the role of the *erastēs* was formalized in Athens the post of the ephēbic *lochos* following the reforms of Epikrates in 335 BC I wrote the following there:⁷⁶

In modern European armies it is frequent practice, when recruits are brigaded together for introductory military training, to place in each section a young soldier who has just completed his military training. The task of this young soldier is to help the recruits with minor difficulties. For example, they may forget how to assemble weapons or equipment, or may not remember how to find their way around camp or where they are to report for training. It would be a waste of time for the military instructors to be constantly bothered with minor and irritating requests for help of this nature, and the recruits often find it less intimidating, even encouraging, to talk to someone who has only recently completed the ordeal they are currently enduring. The young soldier, who will be selected from among the best recruits of the previous few recruit cadres, will frequently also be given the limited responsibility of ensuring that all the recruits under his care turn up for training at the right place and time, and with the necessary equipment.

In a society that was tolerant of homosexuality, as Ancient Greece was, the strictly military roles of *erastēs* and *erōmenos* could develop into a homosexual relationship. Plato (*Leges* 636B) 'speaks of how the *gymnasia* corrupt the natural sexual desires which are common to men and beasts, and in the Athenian comedies the *gymnasia* are characterized, needless to say with considerable comic exaggeration, as places frequented by homosexuals'.⁷⁷ Consequently in some states homosexual relationships between *erastoi* and *erōmenoi* were not tolerated: 'several ancient authors on Sparta—Xenophon, Plutarch, Aelian, Maximus of Tyre—seem to say that they didn't at all'.⁷⁸ Dover explains the Spartan denial of any impropriety between the *erastēs* and *erōmenos* by alleged Spartan secrecy.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Sekunda 1992: 328–9.

⁷⁷ See my remarks in Sekunda and Hook 2000: 7.

⁷⁸ Davidson 2007: 326, and see 326–331 for a general discussion of the problem.

⁷⁹ Trans. Dover 1978: 190–1.

Members of a closed and secretive community are apt to meet by simple, confident denial any allegation by outsiders that the community misbehaves. If Spartans in the fourth century BC unanimously and firmly denied that their *erastai* and *eromenoi* ever had any bodily contact beyond a clasping of right hands, it was not easy for an outsider even at the time to produce evidence to the contrary, and for us it is impossible.

But the onus is on Dover to provide evidence to the contrary. For example Aelian (*Various Histories* 3.12) states that there is nothing shameful about Lakedaimonian love. Xenophon writes (*Lakedaimonion Politeia* 2.13–14) that if the attraction between the pair was sexually based, the lawgiver Lycurgus ‘banned the connection as an abomination’. He continues ‘that these things are not believed by some people does not surprise me, for in many cities the laws do not oppose the desire for boys’. The implication is that in other cities, including Sparta it seems, it was banned. Xenophon writes elsewhere (*Symposium* 8.34) that although practices such as sharing beds was normal among the Thebans and Eleans ‘with us [scil. the Athenians] are banned by the severest reprobation’.⁸⁰ Later on Xenophon contrasts the two types of ‘love’.

It is possible that the deme of Kothokidai, or the nearby town of Eleusis had a small *gymnasion*, or that the *gymnasion* frequented by Philochares, if indeed he was resident the deme in which he was registered, and his circle was at Athens itself—we simply do not know.⁸¹ Aeschines might have frequented the same *gymnasion* as his brother Aeschines, and Philon the brother-in-law of Aeschines may have done too.

Aeschines married a daughter of Philodemus, who was from a liturgical family, and had two brothers-in-law, Philon and Epikrates.⁸² Demosthenes (18.312) alleges that in 330 BC Aeschines had inherited from the estate of Philon more than five talents ‘but a certain amount of scepticism about this figure in probably in order’.⁸³ If true, Philon had considerable resources.

We know a little about the brothers-in-law of Aeschines thanks to the speech of Demosthenes *On the False Embassy* (19. 287), where he gives them the nicknames Nikias and Kyrebion, and informs us that the former served in Egypt under Chabrias and that the latter marched in a festival procession

80 Trans. O.J. Todd, Loeb Classical Library 1922.

81 The *gymnasiarchia* seems to be a deme liturgy: Whitehead 1986: 152, 224–5. The precise location of Kothokidai seems to remain unknown, but it probably lay near Eleusis.

82 See Davies 1971: 543–7; Philodemus (*PA* 14494; *LGP* II: 453, no. 41), Philon (*PA* 14862; *LGP* II: 462, no. 158), Epikrates (*PA* 4908; *LGP* II: 149, no. 104).

83 Davies 1971: 544.

without a mask. Kyrebion was a well-known parasite, whereas Demosthenes calls Philon Nikias 'to draw an unfavourable comparison between the military activities of Philon and those of the famous general of the Peloponnesian War'.⁸⁴ Aeschines (2.150) in reply gives the true names of his two brothers-in-law as Philon and Epikrates and defends the former as being 'so fit in body and so temperate in spirit' (καὶ τὰ σώματα οὕτω διακειμένους καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω σώφρονας) as to put Demosthenes to shame. Philon too, it seems had passed much time in the *gymnasia*.

The Mechanics of Mercenary Recruitment

In the pages above I have emphasized the difference between 'passive' and 'active' recruitment of mercenaries. 'Word of mouth was enough to assemble men for a campaign' Trundle has written,⁸⁵ but this is only true to a certain degree. A large amount of 'active' recruiting must have gone on in the background too. The *stratēgoi* were responsible for putting together the fighting force as a whole, and in the case of Cyrus the Younger they might be entrusted with the necessary financial resources. In other cases the soldiers might only be paid on arrival at the point of service (or even later), but the *lochagoi* were responsible for the recruitment of the *lochos*, its internal organization, and transport to the collecting point. When the *stratēgos* was tasked with forming a mercenary army, depending on the task in hand, he mobilized his network of *lochagoi* to carry out the task of recruiting at a local level. As we have seen, not all Iphicrates' *lochagoi* were based in Athens. The normal size of a *lochos* during the *Anabasis* was around a hundred men. This is too large a number for the *lochagos* to have recruited on an individual basis. He must have delegated this task to trusted friends and acquaintances. I suggest that many of these the *lochagos* would have met through the *gymnasia*, and that a lot of the recruiting itself took place at the *gymnasia*. It was, after all, the place where the young and mature men would train for war.

The lowest organizational unit of the mercenary army was the *syskēnia*, or 'tent-party'.⁸⁶ Given that the *syskēnoi* would share a cooking-fire and a tent in common, one would not expect them to number more than the typical half-file of 8, or at most the typical file of 16 men. The hoplites of the Ten Thousand were largely recruited from the poorer areas of the Peloponnese,

84 Harris 1986.

85 Trundle 2004: 112.

86 Lee 2007: 96–105.

like Arcadia and Achaea, so we have little evidence that the hoplites were accompanied by servants. Rather they took young men (*neaniskoi*), too young to serve themselves, presumably relatives, with them to look after their domestic arrangements.⁸⁷ The two *neaniskoi*, armed with daggers (*encheiridia*), who reported to Xenophon (*An.* 4.3.10–12) that they had found a crossing over the river Kentrites whilst out collecting brushwood for the fire, were presumably performing such a function. We hear of one case (*An.* 5.8.5) in which a free man had been appointed by his tent-companions to look after the mule of the tent-party. There must have been no one else available to perform this role.

In a mercenary *lochos* that was recruited in Athens the role of hoplite attendant (*skeuophoros*) would have been performed by slave(s). When an Athenian citizen army was mobilized it would seem that most hoplites would take their personal slaves along with them.⁸⁸ It was considered scandalous that Kephisodotus was sent to serve in the Corinthian War (394–386 BC), accompanied by his own under-age brother Harmodius to act as body-servant, by Dikaiogenes, uncle and legal guardian to the two brothers (*Isae.* 5.11).⁸⁹

I believe that these ‘tent-parties’ of mercenaries would be formed at the onset of the recruitment process, and that they would be principally be formed around friendships formed at the *gymnasia*, although other outlets for social activity in Athens, such as the drinking-clubs or *hetairiai* should not be ruled out.⁹⁰ Cyrus commanded his garrison commanders (*phrourarchoi*) to enlist men for him in the cities that they garrisoned (*Xen. An.* 1.1.6). Trundle has suggested ‘the generals in the cities of Ionia must themselves have delegated to lower-ranking officers the task of finding men to fill the ranks of the Ten Thousand’.⁹¹ Some of this recruitment could have taken place in the local *gymnasia*.

One final thought. Iphicrates’ service as a mercenary general was intimately bound up with his political success. Two of the anecdotes preserved in the *Stratēgēmata* of Polyaeus illustrate the effective use of the threat of violence.⁹²

87 Thus Sekunda 2013: 207.

88 On hoplite attendants at Athens see Pritchett 1974 (vol. 1): 49–51; Lee 2007: 256–9 (with more recent literature).

89 Though see also Davies 1971: 477.

90 On which see Jones 1999: 224–5. It is not to be ruled out that these clubs were to a large extent formed by associations of men who met in the *gymnasia*.

91 Trundle 2004: 109.

92 Krentz and Wheeler 1994: 253, 243.

The two anecdotes could refer to the same trial, namely the impeachment of Iphicrates by Aristophon of Azenia in 356/5 BC:⁹³

[3.9.29] Iphicrates was on trial for treason. Aristophon and Chares were the prosecutors. The charge was that at Embata he could have captured the enemy but did not fight it out. Seeing the court leaning toward the opposition, he stopped his speech and disclosed his sword in some manner to the jurors. In fear that he would have surrounded the court with armed friends, they all voted for his acquittal. After the victory when someone said that he had misled the jurors, he said, "I would be an idiot to act as a general on behalf of the Athenians, but not on behalf of myself against the Athenians".

[3.9.15] When Iphicrates was on trial on a capital charge, he stationed youths (*neaniskoi*) with hidden daggers (*encheiridia*) in court. By revealing the handles, they so terrified the jurors that they acquitted him out of fear.

Iphicrates was at the end of his career at the time, so he would not have direct contact with these *neaniskoi*, and these bravos were doubtless also recruited from the *gymnasia* through the agency of his *lochagoi*.

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93 Hansen 1970: 100 no. 100.

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Commanders and Warlords in Fourth Century BC Central Greece

José Pascual González

1 Introduction

Obviously, it will not be possible to discuss in detail in one chapter, the long and significant series of military commanders that fought in mainland Greece, the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean during the fourth century BC, in the period before Alexander.¹ Therefore, while the great commanders of the period² included king Agesilaus II of Sparta³ and Athenian *strategoi*, such as Chabrias, Iphicrates or Timotheus,⁴ this account will concentrate on central Greece and the Phocian and Theban military commanders: the Phocians, Philomelus, Onomarchus, Phayllus and Phalaecus⁵ and the Thebans, Gorgidas, Pelopidas, Epameinondas and Pammenes.⁶ These military leaders were largely responsible for or contributed to a number of extraordinary military innovations and developments which will be summarised to better examine the true nature and conditions of military command in the area extending from the frontiers of Attica to the limits of Thessaly and Macedonia. At the same time, the analysis allows reflection on the extraordinary multipolar and conflictive nature of

1 This chapter has been produced as part of the research project HAR2014-53885-P funded by the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad. All dates are BC unless otherwise stated. On central Greece in the fourth century BC before Alexander see Munn 1997: 66–106; Buckler 2003; Seager 2001: 176–186; Roy 2001: 187–208; Rhodes 2006: 190–225, 244–256; Buckler and Beck 2008.

2 See Lengauer 1979.

3 Niese 1894: 796–804; Poralla 1984, n°. 9, pp. 6–8; DeVoto 1982; Cartledge 1987; Hamilton 1991; Shipley 1997.

4 Chabrias: Kirchner 1899: col. 2017–2021; Kirchner 1901 n°. 15086; Davies 1971: 560–561. Timotheus: Klee 1937: col. 1324–1329; Kirchner 1901 n°. 13700; Davies 1971: 507 ff; Burich 1994; March 1994. Iphicrates: Kirchner 1901 n°. 7737; Davies 1971: 248 ff. See also Develin 1989.

5 Philomelus: Fiehn 1938: col. 2524–2525. Onomarchus: Stegemann 1939: col. 498–506. Phayllus: Stier 1938: col. 1902–1903. Phalaecus: Lenschau 1938: col. 1612–1613. See also Buckler 1989; McInerney 1999.

6 Gorgidas: Swoboda 1912: col. 1619–1620; Pascual 1996. Pelopidas: Reincke 1937: col. 375–380; Georgiadou 1997. Epameinondas: Swoboda 1905: col. 2674–2707; Fortina 1958. Pammenes: Lenschau 1939: col. 298–299; Buckler 1989. See also Hack 1975 and Buckler 1980.

fourth century Greece. Finally, these leaders' military command transcended the theatre of classical central Greece and projected their influence over the Hellenistic period.

However, these commanders, their achievements, the setbacks they suffered and the innovations they instigated or provoked, affected not only the states they fought, i.e. in terms of foreign policy, but can also be understood, at least in part, within the framework of the states they lived in, i.e. the domestic situation. In other words, their political and military command ultimately brought about a profound transformation of their own states. However, what kind of state are we talking about? It is true we know of a large number of poleis in central Greece during the Classical period,⁷ but practically all of them belonged to confederacies.⁸ It is well known that central Greece during the Classical and Hellenistic periods was the perfect environment for federalism; the federal state was the principal type of state and the one that engaged in international relations and entered into treaties.

It has long been noted that federalism implies the existence of dual citizenship. Thus federal citizenship or *sympoliteia* was seen as superimposed on the citizenship of each of the confederacy's member states, *autopoliteia*, or *patria* or *idia politeia*.⁹ Nevertheless, it is rarely indicated that these two forms of citizenship were asymmetrical in terms of the rights conferred by each of them, therefore, the federal *sympoliteia* related exclusively to participation in federal institutions. In the words of Aristotle (*Politics* 3.1275 a20): 'A citizen pure and simple is defined by nothing else so much as by the right to participate in judicial functions and in office',¹⁰ not by the right of epigamy or holding land and property anywhere in federal territory. These rights could be separated

7 On Boeotian poleis: Hansen 2004: 431–461. Phocis: Oulhen 2004: 399–430.

8 Without entering into a detailed analysis of the characteristics of a State, a definition can be established that is useful for this study, recognising a State by the existence of a series of differentiated institutions, which had their own officials, in which decisions are taken from a central political body in relation to a specific territory. A State can also be defined by the existence of a stratified society based on legal status, wealth and specialisation of labour (see Hall and Ikenberry 1989: 1, 95; Mann 1986: 109, 112–113, 117, 126, 135). Thus a Confederacy can be defined as a political community that has a central political organisation and includes the citizens of all the member states; it has assembly-based, representative or elective political institutions and its territory is defined by a series of frontiers (see Larsen 1968; Giovannini 1971; Aigner Foresti et al. 1994; Beck 1997; Corsten 1999; Pascual 2001).

9 Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.2.14; 7.4.33; Larsen 1968: xv; Sordi 1994: 4–5; Bearzot, 2004: 45–56.

10 Arist. *Pol.* 3.1275 a20: πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀρίζεται μάλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς.

from the *politeia*, as proxeny decrees demonstrate,¹¹ but in a confederacy, they were linked to the *autopoliteia*. Therefore, unless there was an *isopoliteia* agreement on dual citizenship, a citizen who belonged to a federal state and moved to another polis within the same federation became a metic.¹² Two decrees passed by the Thessalian city of Larissa in response to letters from Philip v, dated to between 217 and 214 (*Syll*³ 543; *IG* IX 2, 517; Buck, 1955: 226–227), make this clear. In order to strengthen the citizen body of Larissa, Philip v ordered, and the Larisseans agreed, that Larissean citizenship was to be granted *to all the Thessalians* and other Greeks that lived in the city (lin. 5–6: ὅπως τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν παρ’ ὑμῖν Θεσσαλῶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων δοθῇ πολιτεία). In other words, Thessalians who lived in Larissa were considered metics and not citizens of the city, even when they belonged to the same confederacy.¹³ In reality, the list of those who obtained citizenship, which appears at the end of the epigraph—although the latter is incomplete—includes, as new citizens, a native of Samothrace, one hundred and forty-two from Crannon and sixty from Gyrtion, the latter two cities being Thessalian poleis.¹⁴ Thus, in the situation observed here, the Phocian and Boeotian magistrates and the warlords, military

11 See McLean 2002: 234–236 (with references); Knoepfler 2001.

12 Pascual 2006: 333 ff; 2007: 177.

13 For the Thessalian confederacy in the Hellenistic period see Bouchon and Helly 2015: 240–249.

14 Polybius (4.76.1–2), referring to the same period, mentions the existence of common Thessalian laws, and Thessaly was one of the parties that joined the so-called Hellenic League in 224 (see Plb. 4.8.4; Scherberich 2009). In short, although subject to the laws of Macedonia, the Thessalian confederacy existed in the years covered by the decree in question, so it must necessarily be concluded that, in the Thessalian *sympoliteia* of that period, a Thessalian, who came to live in a different polis in Thessaly from his native city would not acquire local citizenship. A decree issued by the Phocian confederacy concerning Tenos (*IG* IX 1, 97), in which the Tenians were granted the same *isopoliteia* as that possessed by all citizens of Phocis, can be interpreted in the same way. It can be assumed that the Phocians belonged to a multilateral *sympoliteia* that did not originally include the exchange of local citizenship rights, which came to be known as an *isopoliteia*, and which had to be expressly agreed. *Isopoliteia*, as distinct from *sympoliteia*, is precisely what was granted to the Tenians: that is, a Tenian who came to live in a Phocian polis could obtain local citizenship and thus become a Phocian. However, the Tenians were not granted *sympoliteia*, that is, the participation of all Tenians in federal institutions by virtue of their origin; see Pascual 2006: 329, 331, 333; 2007: 175–177. See also the case of Chalcidian confederacy where reciprocal rights of intermarriage and of property have been expressly voted (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.19); see Pascual 2006: 329, 331, 333; 2007: 175–177. See also the case of Chalcidian confederacy where reciprocal rights of intermarriage and of property have been expressly voted (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.19).

command and conflicts need to be understood by taking into account the three-way nexus consisting of commander/magistrate, federal state and poleis.

2 Aristocratic Background

What is striking, first of all, about all these military commanders, is their aristocratic background and the aristocratic environment in which they circulated. They were also usually invariably rich. For example, according to Diodorus (16.23.4), Philomelus, who came from the polis of Ledon, enjoyed the highest reputation amongst the Phocians,¹⁵ and Pausanias (10.2.2) was declared to be higher in rank than any other Phocian.¹⁶ Philomelus himself was, on one occasion, able to pay fifteen talents from his own pocket to hire mercenaries (Diod. 16.24.2). Similarly, Aristotle (*Pol.* 5.1304 a) mentions a dispute involving an heir-ess that led to a conflict between Mnaseas, father of Mnason, and Euthykrates, father of Onomarchus. Apart from the possible role this dispute played in the outbreak of the Third Sacred War,¹⁷ it could be seen as two wealthy aristocratic families competing for power and influence. This aristocratic origin is even more in evidence amongst the Boeotians. For example, the anonymous author of the *Hellenika Oxyrhynchia* (20.1) asserts that, at the beginning of the fourth century, the Theban political factions were made up of the wealthiest and best citizens (οἱ βέλτιστοι καὶ γνωριμώτατοι τῶν πολιτῶν), that is, the aristocrats, who had participated in an oligarchic *politeia* and had already held military office in it.¹⁸

Pelopidas, Hippoclus's son, came from a very wealthy aristocratic family, and had also made a rich and aristocratic marriage,¹⁹ with his fortune allowing him to give many of his friends financial assistance, and also to fund Epameinondas's liturgies (Plutarch, *Aristides* 1.4; *Pel.* 3.1–2). Gorgidas,²⁰ who was certainly rich and an aristocrat, had, as such, been hipparch before 382 (Plut. *Moralia* 578 B);

15 Diod. 16.23.4: ὁ Φιλόμηλος, μέγιστον ἔχων ἐν τοῖς Φωκεύσιν ἀξίωμα.

16 Paus. 10.2.2: Φιλόμηλος σφᾶς ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Θεοτίμου, Φωκέων οὐδενὸς ἀξιώματι ὕστερος.

17 Buckler 1989: 18–20.

18 *Hell. Ox.* 20.1–2; 21.1; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25; Plut. *Mor.* 578 B; Bruce 1967: 110–113; Cook 1988: 57–85; Georgiadou 1997: 83–84.

19 Plut. *Pelopidas* 3.1: Πελοπίδᾳ τῷ Ἰππόκλου γένος μὲν ἦν εὐδόκιμον ἐν Θήβαις [...] τραφεῖς δὲ ἐν οὐσίᾳ μεγάλῃ, [...] *Pel.* 3.4: ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ παῖδες, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀμελῶν τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι καὶ σχολάζων τῇ πόλει τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον ἡλάττωσε τὴν οὐσίαν.

20 See Diod. 15.39.2, 50.6; Plut. *Pel.* 12.2, 4, 14.1–2; *Mor.* 576 A, 578 C, 594 B, 598 C–D; Polyaeus 2.2.1, 5.2; Swoboda 1912: col. 1619–1620; Buckler 1979: 53–55; 1980: 17, 40, 43, 143; 2003: 236–238; Pascual 1996.

his wealth meant that he belonged to the class of knights,²¹ The Sacred Band of Thebes, which he formed and whose precursor was the aristocratic charioteers and warriors corp (ἡνίοχοι καὶ παράβατοι) that fought in the battle of Delion in 424 (Diod. 12.70.1–2), and also suggests contacts with the aristocratic youth.²² Epameinondas came from one of the oldest and most aristocratic families of Thebes, the *Spartoi*.²³ His alleged poverty, according to some of the ancient sources, needs to be qualified (Plut. *Arist.* 1.4; *Pel.* 3.2). His family was wealthy enough to allow his father, Polymnis, to give him an education that was far from being considered poor: Lysis, the Pythagorean, taught him philosophy,²⁴ Dionysius, a musician whose fame equalled that of Damon, the teacher and advisor of Pericles, taught him the harp and singing; Olympiodorus taught him the flute and Caliphron dance (Nepos *Epamimondas* 2. 1–2). Finally, there was Pammenes who was sufficiently eminent to give Philip lodging in his house, while Philip was being held hostage in Thebes, by the Boeotians.²⁵

All those who belonged to these commanders' circle of friends were also aristocrats. Thus, Melon,²⁶ Damocleidas,²⁷ Theopompus²⁸ and Hismenias the Younger are recognised by Plutarch as the leading families of Thebes (*Pel.* 8.2: ἀνδρες οἴκων τε πρώτων). Hismenias the Younger was the son of Hismenias the Elder, one of the great leaders of the early fourth century, who became one of the richest men in the whole of Greece.²⁹ Melon owned chariots and horses (Plut. *Mor.* 587 D). Pherenicus³⁰ was also rich and probably an aristocrat: his father Cephisodotus had given Thrasybulus and the exiled Athenians financial

21 Pascual 1996: 145–150.

22 Plut. *Pel.* 18–19; Athenaeus 13, 602 A; Pascual 1996: 163–165.

23 Paus. 8.11.8; Vian 1963: 226.

24 Diod. 15.39.3; Nepos *Epam.* 2.3; Plut. *Mor.* 579 D–E, 583 A–B; Paus. 9.13.1; Diogenes Laertius 8.1, 39; Iamblichus *V. Pit.* 250; Porphyrius *V. Pit.* 35; Aelian *Varia Historia* 3.17; Cicero *De Oratore* 3.139; *De Officiis* 1.155; Demand 1982: 70–72; On Epameinondas' family: Plut. *Agésilas* 19.9; *Coriolanus* 4.3; *Mor.* 724 D, 786 D, 1098 A; Nepos *Epam.* 1.1.

25 Plut. *Pel.* 26.4–8; Justin 6.9.7; Aymard 1954; Hammond 1997; Buckler 2003: 323.

26 Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.2–12, 19; Plut. *Pel.* 8.2, 6, 11.2, 12.1, 13.1, 25.5; *Ages.* 24.6; *Mor.* 587 D, 596 A, 597 A; Kahrstedt 1931: col. 561–562; Buckler 1980: 16, 40–41, 44, 267–270; 2003: 213.

27 Damocleidas was Boeotarch at Leuctra in 371 and voted against Epameinondas (Paus. 9.13. 6). See also Plut. *Pel.* 8.2; 11. 1; *Mor.* 594 D, 596 D; Kirchner 1901: col. 2068; Buckler 1980: 40, 130–131.

28 Plut. *Pel.* 8.2; *Mor.* 594 D, 597 B–C; Paus. 9.13.6. Theopompus was ambassador to Athens in 377: *IG* II² 40, lin. 6 and trophy holder in Leuctra: *IG* VII 2462 lin. 2; Beister 1973: 75. See also Buckler 1980: 40, 131.

29 Plato *Meno* 90 A; *Republic* 336 A. See Plut. *Mor.* 527 B.

30 Plut. *Pel.* 5.3, 8.1; *Mor.* 576 C, 577 A; Buckler 1980: 39–44; 2003: 213.

assistance during the oligarchy of the Thirty in Athens (Justin 5.9) and Charon³¹ and Hippostheneidas³² were also rich and illustrious. Cleidon was wealthy enough to be a member of the cavalry (Plut. *Pel.* 8.3–5; *Mor.* 587 D) and Hypatodorus tried to bribe Sphodrias, a Spartan commander, who attacked Attica (Plut. *Mor.* 586 F, 587 D; *Pel.* 8.4–5). To summarise, there is no evidence of any military commanders of humble origin, consequently, it is advisable not to extrapolate or read too much into the Athenian example, Iphicrates, who was the son of a shoemaker (Plut. *Mor.* 187 A), and who may well have been an exception. On the contrary, education, traditions and an aristocratic mentality, together with wealth, seemed to be the common denominators of these leaders.

Therefore, the continuity of command over several generations within the same family is another issue that reveals the aristocratic nature and origin of these military commanders. Onomarchus³³ succeeded Philomelus as *strategos autokrator* and his lieutenant—i.e. subordinate federal *strategos*—and his successor was his brother Phayllus (Diod. 16.36.1; Paus. 10.2.6). When Phayllus died of natural causes in 351, the Phocians elected Phalaecus, the son of Onomarchus and nephew of Phayllus, as *strategos autokrator* (Diod. 16.38.1; Paus. 10.2.11). Even after the war, powerful individuals remained prominent. Mnaseas's son Mnason was known as the tyrant of Elateia, and was remembered by Pliny (*Naturalis Historia* 35.99, 107) for his extravagant taste. The concentration of power in the hands of a few men related by blood and marriage, is not, as has been claimed, a sign of an inherent weakness in the loose structure of the federal state that is controlled by the emergence of a group of warlords, who consolidate and centralise their power, nor is it a phenomenon peculiar to Phocis at the time of the Third Sacred War, but reveals the nature of Greek political and military leadership, which had dynastic elements practically everywhere.³⁴

Theban examples will suffice here: the case of Leontiades, the important philo-Laconian leader in the latter part of the Peloponnesian War.³⁵ His father,

31 Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.3; Plut. *Pel.* 7.1–13.1, 15.6; *Mor.* 595 A–C; Beister 1970: 7; Buckler 1980: 16–17, 40–43, 131–132, 143–146; 2003: 241.

32 Plut. *Pel.* 8.3; *Mor.* 586 B–D, 587 A–E, 588 B, 595 A, 598 D.

33 Diodorus (16.56.5) reports that Philomelus was the brother of Onomarchus, but Pausanias (10.2.2: Philomelus, son of Theotimus) and Aristotle (*Pol.* 1304 a: Euthycrates, father of Onomarchus) give them different patronymics.

34 McNerney 1999: 186.

35 *Hell. Ox.* 10.2, 5; 20.1; 21.1; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25–36; 4.7.19; Plut. *Pel.* 5.1, 6.2–3, 11.1, 5–9; *Mor.* 575 F, 577 C–D, 578 C, E, 596 C, 597 D–E; Buckler 1980: 16–17, 36–44, 130; 2003: 202–204, 213.

Eurymachus, was the Boeotarch that attacked Plataea in 431, which led to the outbreak of the war.³⁶ His grandfather, Leontiades, son of Eurymachus, commanded the forces that Thebes supplied to the Greek army at Thermopylae (Herodotus 6.205.2–3, 233.1–2). Similarly, Hismenias the Elder was Boeotarch in 395 and 394 and probably several times before and after that.³⁷ In 382, he was polemarch at the time of his execution by a Peloponnesian League court, instigated by the philo-Lacedaemonian Thebans (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.30). His son, Hismenias the Younger, was ambassador to Thessaly in 368 and Susa in 367, and he may have been Boeotarch at some point in the 360s.³⁸

All these military commanders belonged to and became leaders of political factions made up of a few hundred individuals, based on family connections and personal friendships.³⁹ They were all members of, and operated within, political factions that included families and friends, with known confrontations between them. For example, in 363, the Delphians expelled Astyocrates and his supporters, members of a pro-Phocian faction, whose property was confiscated, causing them to take refuge in Athens.⁴⁰ The pro-Phocian Delphians clashed with the Thracidae, an anti-Phocian faction, which Philomelus eliminated as soon as he took control of Delphi, confiscating their property.⁴¹ In the same way, Onomarchus tried to eliminate all the Phocian factions that opposed the continuation of the war.⁴² Onomarchus was a friend and comrade of Philomelus and was evidently the leader of the war faction, similarly to Philomelus before him. Onomarchus was followed by Phayllus, who, according to Diodorus (16.38.6: ἓνα τῶν ἑαυτοῦ φίλων), was also a friend of Mnaseas. Evidently the war had ended the contention between the families of Mnaseas and Euthyocrates. In fact, when Phayllus died of natural causes in 351, the Phocians elected Phalaecus, the son of Onomarchus and nephew of Phayllus as *strategos autokrator*, with the proviso that Mnaseas should serve

36 Thucydides 2.2–6; Demosthenes 59. 95–105; Diod. 12.41.2–42.2; Aeneas Tacticus 2.1.6; Buckler 1980: 42.

37 *Hell. Ox.* 20.1–2; 21.1–4; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.1–2; 3.5.1; Diod. 14.82.7; Plut. *Pel.* 6.5; *Mor.* 472 D, 527 D; Justin 5.9.8.

38 Diod. 15.71.2–7, 75.2; Plut. *Pel.* 27–29; *Artaxerxes* 22.4; Nepos *Pelopidas* 5.1–2; Paus. 9.15.1–2; Aelian *VH* 1.21; Buckler 1980: 120 ss., 133 ss., 144, 151–152, 240; 2003: 323–325.

39 Strauss 1986: 2, 18. See Hismenias the Elder's faction: Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.31: three hundred members; Nepos *Pel.* 2.3: a hundred.

40 *IG* 11² 109; *SEG* 16, 47; *FD* III 5, 15–18; Buckler 1989: 9–13, 25, 196–197; Beck 1997: 112; McInerney 1999: 206–209.

41 Diod. 16.24.3; *FD* III 1, 391; Buckler 1989: 10, 13, 24, 26, 39, 196; McInerney 1999: 131, 206, 208.

42 Diod. 16.33.3: τῶν μὲν Φωκέων τοὺς ἐναντιούμενους συλλαμβάνων ἀνῆρει καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἐδήμευεν.

as his guardian (Diod. 16.38.6). In the same way, Pelopidas and his friends were members of the ancient oligarchic faction led by Hismenias the Elder, Androcleidas, Antitheus and Galaxidorus,⁴³ and were forced into exile when the opposing faction led by Leontiades, Archias and Coeratadas⁴⁴ gained ascendancy. Pelopidas's faction, joined by Epameinondas, Charon and Gorgidas and their respective friends, formed the basis of the political and military leadership of Pelopidas and Epameinondas after 379 when they came to power in Thebes.⁴⁵

Thus, belonging to a political faction, and the importance and power of family and friends, were the starting points for gaining, exercising and passing on military command. It should be remembered that there were no military academies such as West Point, Sandhurst, or Toledo in Spain, or (yet) treatises on tactics, although these probably appeared during the course of the century (Aeneas Tacticus). Nor was there a professional army in which common soldiers received basic training, and officers could rise through the ranks. Perhaps the military training of leaders and commanders has not had the research it deserves. It can be assumed that apprenticeship was based on the traditions of family and friends, basic military education, ad hoc training, participation in military campaigns, of which there were many, and by actually exercising military command. Thus, Plutarch (*Pel.* 4.4–6) and Pausanias (9.13) state that Pelopidas and Epameinondas fought at Mantinea in 385. Plutarch (*Mor.* 578 B) informs of several members of the Theban faction that took refuge in Athens in 382, who had been hipparchs. Similarly, Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.2.31) says that members of the opposing faction were *lochagoi*, company commanders of hoplites. In summary, access to military command was based on aristocratic origin with participation and influence in a political faction rather than evident military skill, and this was especially striking in the case of Epameinondas: it is unknown whether he held any military command at all before he became Boeotarch in 371 but, at forty-one years of age, he succeeded in obtaining this office by belonging to a political faction.

All these commanders exercised continuous military command. Philomelus, Onomarchus and Phayllus were *strategoi* up to their deaths, and Phalaecus also exercised command on several occasions.⁴⁶ The Theban commander Gorgidas

43 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.4; *Hell. Ox.* 20.1–2, 21.1–5; Plut. *Lis.* 27.1; *Pel.* 5.1, 6.2; *Mor.* 577 A, D, 579 F, 598 A–B.

44 Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.15–22; 5.4.1; *Anab.* 7.1.33–41; *Hell. Ox.* 20.1; Plut. *Pel.* 11.2. See Cook 1988.

45 Pascual 1991.

46 Philomelus: Diod. 16.22.3, 31.4. Onomarchus: Diod. 16.31.5, 32.4, 33.2, 35.5–6. Phayllus: Diod. 16.35.1, 36.1, 37.13. Phalaecus: Diod. 16.38.6, 56.3, 59.2–3.

was hipparch by 382 and Boeotarch several times in the seventies, probably until his death.⁴⁷ Pelopidas was Boeotarch thirteen times between 378 and 364, the year of his death (Diod. 15.81.4; Plut. *Pel.* 15.3, 34.5) and at least once, in 371, commander of the Sacred Band.⁴⁸ Epameinondas, with the exception of 368, was Boeotarch continuously between 371 and 362, the year of his death. The case of Pammenes, the most important Theban commander after the death of Epaminondas, is very instructive. Pammenes had entered the political arena under the patronage of Epameinondas,⁴⁹ supported the creation of the *hieros lochos* and became Epameinondas's lieutenant in the Peloponnese. Hence, in the second expedition led by Epameinondas, the latter promoted him for capturing Sicyon.⁵⁰ In 367, he sent him with a thousand men to provide protection and assistance for the Arcadians who were building Megalopolis.⁵¹ In 369, after Pelopidas's first expedition to Thessaly and Macedonia, he received the young Philip as a guest and hostage in his house (Plut. *Pel.* 26.4). His brilliant military career continued after the death of Epameinondas. In the summer of 361, as Boeotarch, with three thousand hoplites and three hundred cavalrymen under his command, he came to the aid of the Megalopolitans (Diod. 15.94.1–3). In 355, at the beginning of the Third Sacred War, also as Boeotarch, he defeated the Phocians,⁵² and in 353/2 he led, as Boeotarch, five thousand soldiers in support of the Persian king against the satraps, and won two great battles in Asia.⁵³ We hear nothing more of him after this date, so he may have died at the end of the 350s.

Originally, even though the Phocian leaders developed in a different way to the Boeotians, they also were not mercenary leaders who came to office or usurped it with the use of mercenary troops, but commanders of troops that included mercenaries, exercising their power from an office or magistracy. That is to say, although the limits were vague in the case of the Phocians, all of them held the highest magistracies of the state, involving military command, and furthermore, they did so continuously. This was decisive in the case of the Thebans, less important or something of a façade in the Phocian

47 Diod. 15.32.1–33.6; Plut. *Mor.* 578 B; Polyæn. 2.5.2.

48 Diod. 15.81.2; Plut. *Pel.* 20.3, 23.6; Nepos *Pel.* 4.2.

49 Plut. *Mor.* 805 E–F; Buckler 1980: 132–134.

50 Diod. 15.94.2; Paus. 8.27.2; Polyæn. 5.16.3; Frontinus *Stratagematae* 3.2.10; Lenschau 1939: col. 298–229; Buckler 1980: 48, 134; 2003: 313.

51 Paus. 8.27.2; Buckler 1980: 132.

52 Diod. 16.31.2–5; Paus. 10.2.4; Eusebius *Praeparatio Evangelica* 8.14; Schober 1924: 70–71; McInerney 1999: 210–211, 337; Buckler 1989: 42–45; 2003: 407–408.

53 Diod. 16.34.1–2; Buckler 1989: 50–53; 2003: 411–412.

case. They were federal magistracies in keeping with the federal states' powers in foreign policy, and also collegiate magistracies, that is, the office of general was exercised jointly. Thus, for example, three *archontes or strategoi*, in the Phocian case and seven Boeotarchs in the Boeotian case operated in this way. However, within these collegiate magistracies there was a legally defined supremacy, *autokrateia* or hegemony. This would explain, for example, both the fact that Philomelus was, according to Diodorus (16.24.1), elected *strategos autokrator* and, when he died in combat the following year, Onomarchus, who shared his command, had therefore assumed hegemony.⁵⁴ Similarly, according to Thucydides (4.91.1), one of the Theban Boeotarchs, Pagondas, exercised hegemony at the battle of Delion in 424,⁵⁵ and the hegemonic Boeotarchs were always Thebans in all the Boeotian expeditions in the fourth century from the sixties onwards.

The supreme command appears to have been granted by the respective assemblies, although the difference seems to lie in the fact that the Phocian assembly assigned this for the whole term, whereas the Boeotian assembly did so for each expedition. Additionally, the generals were not restricted solely to commanding troops on campaign, but took part in the fighting and often died in combat. The known cases are those of Philomelus, Onomarchus, Phalaecus, Pelopidas and Epameinondas, and this practice would become habitual and universally recognised in the Hellenistic period. It is thus advisable, once again, not to extrapolate the Athenian trend towards a distinction between *rhetor* and *strategos*. Unlike Athens, where the principal political leaders can be defined as *rhetoires* and *strategoi*, there was some separation between orator and general throughout the fourth century in central Greece, and the orator, as such, does not appear to have played a major political role.⁵⁶ Menecleides, an enemy of Epameinondas, the only one described by our sources as an orator and who does not appear to have held any military office, is an exception.⁵⁷ All the others were military commanders who won their fame or increased their prestige on the battlefield and in political institutions. The Rhetor and General were not separate and were combined in military leadership.

54 Diod. 16.31.5: ὁ δὲ συνάρχων αὐτῷ στρατηγὸς Ὀνόμαρχος διαδεξάμενος τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἀνασωζομένης δυνάμεως ἀναχωρήσας ἀνελάμβανε τοὺς ἐκ τῆς φυγῆς ἐπανιόντας.

55 Thucyd. 4.91: Παγώνδας ὁ Αἰολάδου βοιωταρχῶν ἐκ Θηβῶν μετ' Ἀριανθίδου τοῦ Λυσιμαχίδου καὶ ἡγεμονίας οὕσης αὐτοῦ βουλόμενος τὴν μάχην ποιῆσαι.

56 See Hansen 1983; 1987.

57 Plut. *Pel.* 25.5–7; *Mor.* 540 D–E, 799 F, 817 F; Nepos *Epam.* 7–8; Appian *Syriaca* 41; Aelian *VH* 13.42; Beister 1970: 75–111; Cawkwell 1972: 277 ff.

The extension of democracy was certainly a characteristic of the fourth century in Greece, but we should take into account that ancient mentality was governed by decisive concerns such as family tradition and origin, wealth and hierarchy. Usually, it is said that in a Greek democracy all citizens participate directly in the institutions, but perhaps it is often forgotten that political factions, with a strong aristocratic component, mediated between state decisions, institutions and citizens, and could in practice control, in whole or in part, the institutions and decisions of the state. In the cases that are of concern here, democracies with an aristocratic leadership are discovered.

Obviously, and despite what has been said, command not only implied military genius, but also a wide range of other skills, in particular oratory, since all these military commanders frequently addressed their fellow citizens at the assembly or in the courts. Simply put, without the rhetoric and a capacity for persuasion, it was impossible to attain and, above all, hold onto military leadership. Oratory was used to justify their actions and raise the morale and confidence of their fellow citizens (Diod. 16.27.2). Examples of these are the speech given by Philomelus before the assembly of the Phocians, in which he urged his countrymen to occupy the sanctuary at Delphi, and the speech given by Onomarchus sometime later, also before the pan-Phocian assembly, in support of continuing the war (Diod. 16.32.3). For example, in the speech that Philomelus gave to the assembly of the Phocians (Diod. 16.23.4), he told them that they were unable to pay the fine imposed because of its size, and that allowing their territory to be cursed was not only cowardly but also put them in danger, since it would destroy their means of subsistence. He demonstrated the injustice of the Amphictyonic decision in terms of the disproportionate size of the fine compared to the small extent of the lands they were accused of cultivating (Diod. 16.24.5), he claimed Delphi for the Phocians, whom he said should protect and control the oracle, citing Homer in support of his case (*Iliad* 2.517–519), and told them what they should do: they should declare the fines unjust and invalid and demand the right to safeguard the oracle as the inheritance of their forefathers. He knew that this would mean war and asked them to elect him general with full powers and give him absolute authority (Diod. 16.23.6). He also assured them that the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians would come to their aid, ensuring that theirs would be the stronger force and promised that their enterprise would be successful. Therefore, the Phocians elected him general with full powers (Diod. 16.24.1) and Philomelus occupied Delphi in July 356.

A major part of their duties was related to diplomacy and public relations. They headed important embassies in which their rhetorical skill played an important role. An example is Philomelus's embassy to Sparta, where he reached

a secret pact with king Archidamus, under which he paid fifteen talents to recruit mercenaries and obtain the support of the Lacedaemonians in order to occupy Delphi and revoke the Amphictyonic decrees (Diod. 16.24.1–2). They also resorted to sending embassies of their friends: for example, after occupying the sanctuary, the Phocians sent emissaries to Athens, Sparta and other states to claim ancestral Phocian rights and assert that they had no intention of touching the sacred offerings, expressing their desire to remain on peaceful terms with all the Greeks (Diod. 16.24.4). They were also very good at making allies. For example, in the Phocian case, the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians and other Peloponnesians (Diod. 16.29.1) sent contingents to their aid, and the Achaeans dispatched fifteen hundred men (Diod. 16.30.4); they were also supported by Lycophron of Pherae (Diod. 16.35.1, 4) and the Corinthians (Diod. 16.50.2).

Thebans also took care to pursue a policy that would gain them support and prestige. Pelopidas presented himself in the North as a bringer of peace and the defender of Thessaly's liberty (Diod. 15.67.3, 80.6; Plut. *Pel.* 33–35), and Epameinondas repeatedly says that he was fighting to liberate Greece from Spartan tyranny (Nepos *Epam.* 8.4; Paus. 9.15.6). The diplomatic mission to Persia can also be included, organised by Pelopidas with great detail and pomp, crossing the Persian Empire very slowly, and telling everyone about the power of Thebes and its victories.⁵⁸ An important part of this policy of prestige was also, in the Theban case, founding cities. In addition to founding Megalopolis,⁵⁹ Epameinondas was considered the *oikistes* of Messene,⁶⁰ which helped to increase the prestige and glory of Thebes enormously.

They also used religious propaganda and the interpretation of auguries for example, to justify their occupation of Delphi, using the 'spontaneous' oracle spoken by the Pythia when prompted by Philomelus (Diod. 16.27.1) or the omens circulating amongst the Thebans before the battle of Leuctra.⁶¹ Occasionally, there is even evidence of a real and conscious separation of responsibilities: for example, from the spring of 369, Epameinondas concerned himself with the Peloponnese and Athens, and Pelopidas with the North of Greece (Diod. 15.71.2; Plut. *Pel.* 26.1).

58 Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33–36; Diod. 15.81.3; Plut. *Pel.* 27.1, 30.1–5; *Artax.* 22.8.

59 Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28–32; Diod. 15.47.7, 72.3–4, 94.2–3; 16.34.3, 39.1–7; Strabo 8.8.1; *Parian Marble*, *FGrH* 239 A73; Livy 35.27.13–30.8; Plut. *Ages.* 33.5–8; *DL* 3.23; Paus. 6.12.8; 8.27.1–7; 9.15.6, 16.6; Aelian *VH* 2.42; Polyæn. 1.41.5; Buckler 2003: 318–319.

60 Isocrates 5.49; 6.28; Deinarchos 1.73; Lyc. *Against Leocrates* 62; Diod. 15.65.5–66.1, 66.6, 67.1; Plut. *Pel.* 24.9; *Ages.* 34.1–2; Paus. 4.26.5–8, 32.1; 9.14.5; 10.10.5; *Syll*³ 161; Dio Chrysostomus 15.28; Roebuck 1945: 151–152; Buckler 1980: 86–87, 108, 269, 272; 2003: 309.

61 Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.7; Plut. *Pel.* 20.4–22.1; *Ag.* 6.6–11; Paus. 9.6.5–6, 13.4–6.

3 Military Developments and Innovations

As is well known, the military commanders of this period introduced major tactical changes that we can only summarize here as the oblique order of attack, an increase in the depth of the phalanx or the concentration of troops with the principal attack force on the left wing.⁶² Special emphasis should be given to the development of an elite corps, the combination of different weapons, heavy infantry, cavalry and light infantry, with much more careful planning of the battle and notable tactical control of the engagement itself. Another of their characteristics, perhaps not emphasized as much as it should be, is the high capacity for operational control, such as that demonstrated by Epameinondas in the preliminaries of the battle of Leuctra⁶³ or the strategy, adopted by Philomelus, once he had occupied the sanctuary of Delphi, of fighting enemies separately. He prevented them from joining forces and thus took advantage of his numerical superiority, and also took the advantage of the Phocians' central position against their enemies, which facilitated their movements. Therefore, in the same year, Philomelus prevented the enemy armies joining forces, and fought the Western Locrian, Thessalian and Boeotian armies separately, one after the other (Diod. 16.30.1–5).

These commanders tried to dominate a much larger region than the battlefield itself, and to distinguish where the enemy contingents were at all times. The speed of the troop movements under their command and their capacity to fight on several fronts at the same time should also be stressed. In this way, Philomelus, after an initial battle on the Phaedriadae Rocks above Delphi against the Locrians (Diod. 16.24.4; 25.3), was able to go from Naryca in Epicnemidian Locris, to Abae in Phocis, and then return to Naryca (Diod. 16.38.3–6).⁶⁴ In the same year, Onomarchus fought in Epicnemidian Locris where he occupied Thronium, and also in Hesperian Locris around Amphissa.⁶⁵ In addition, he ransacked Doris and invaded Boeotia, conquering Orchomenus (Diod. 16.32.2). The following year, he dispatched two expeditionary forces to Thessaly and invaded Boeotia, taking Coroneia (Diod. 16.35.1–6). Similarly, the Boeotians were able to take part in expeditions to the Peloponnese and Thessaly simultaneously. They also undertook campaigns

62 Summarized in Delbrück 1990: 165–172.

63 While Epameinondas was stationed with the main body of the army on the plain of Coroneia (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.3), he sent a Theban force under Chaereas, who was under orders to guard the passes of Mount Helicon (Paus. 9.13.3), and the seventh Boeotarch, whose name was Brachyllides, was guarding the pass by Cithaeron (Paus. 9.13.7).

64 Pascual 2013a: 176–182; 2013b: 493–494.

65 Pascual 2013a: 135–144; 2013b: 493.

outside their territory, sometimes in far off places, and dispatched various expeditions all over central Greece, Thessaly, Euboea and the Peloponnese. The Boeotians, as well as Macedonia, were capable of sending troops to Asia Minor under Pammenes, and to Egypt, led by Lacrates.

They understood the role of economic and psychological attrition in warfare, and could inflict repeated incursions, guerrilla warfare, devastation and pillage on enemy territory, resembling the Theban attacks on Boeotian cities and Lacedaemonian garrisons in the sixties or the repeated Phocian attacks that succeeded in reaching the very heart of the region, for example, the frontier between Coroneia and Haliartus,⁶⁶ at little more than a day's march from Thebes. The commanders managed to occupy what were in effect military marches to the west of Boeotia that could be used to defend Phocis and from which they could launch repeated incursions into Boeotian territory. Even in 346, when the Phocians were capitulating, they held Orchomenus, Coroneia and Chorsiae in Boeotia (Diod. 16.58.1).

There is also evidence of the much greater importance they gave to preparing for campaigns compared to the past—Onomarchus and Phayllus obtained supplies of bronze and iron weapons and minted a large quantity of gold and silver coins (Diod. 16.38.2; 36.1)—and of their skill in laying siege to cities. For example, Lacrates diverted the canal that surrounded Pelusium so that it would dry out and he could start the assault (Diod. 16.49.1–6). They also used siege engines, such as those deployed by Lacrates in Pelusium (Diod. 16.49.1) or Phalaecus in the siege against Cydonia in Crete (Diod. 16.53.3). Attention could also be drawn to their conscious policy of fortifying the territory. Thus, thanks to the work of Typaldou-Fakiris, it can be seen that most of the Phocian cities were fortified during the Third Sacred War with the intention of systematically organising the defence of Phocis as a homogeneous network.⁶⁷ Philomelus also constructed a wall around the shrine of Delphi (Diod. 16.25.1) and built a fortress near Abae (Diod. 16.58.4). Similarly, Fossey stated that in fourth century Boeotia, a complete fortification programme was adopted, which was designed to create a network of defences to keep watch over the whole region

66 Diod. 16.37.5 (Orchomenus and the river Cephisus). Coroneia: Diod. 16.35.3, 37.6, 56.2. Orchomenus and Chaeronea: Diod. 16.34.4. Chaeronea: Diod. 16.38.7, 39.8. Orchomenus, Chaeronea and Chorsiae: Diod. 16.58.1.

67 At least Charadra, Drymaea, Lilaia, Amphicleia, Teithronium, Triteis, Tithorea, Patronis, Elateia, Hyampolis, Panopeus, Daulis, Stiris, Anticyra, Medeon, Bulis, see Typaldou-Fakiris 2004: esp. 276 ff, 301–304.

and communicate with each other.⁶⁸ A feature that has perhaps received little attention is the heterogeneous nature of the troops under their command. In addition to the militia of their own polis from Thebes, for example, they also commanded the federal army, which was in practice an amalgamation of the militias of the poleis⁶⁹ that were members of the federal state, the allied expeditionary contingents and mercenaries.

4 Hegemony, Imperialism and Warlordism

At least in the Boeotian case, mention should be made of the development of hegemony in Greece, with repeated expeditions into central Greece and the North and into the Peloponnese, and the creation of a system of alliances that would serve Theban interests.⁷⁰ Pelopidas sent two expeditions and an embassy to the North of Greece. In the first expedition (summer/autumn of 369), and at the head of seven thousand men, he organised the Thessalians' *koinon*, made a pact with Alexander of Pherae and acted as arbitrator in the conflict between Alexander II and Ptolemy of Alorus in Macedonia, probably favouring the cause of Alexander, with whom he concluded a treaty of alliance.⁷¹ In the spring of 368, he led a Theban embassy with Hismenias the Younger, in order to address the Athenian involvement in Macedonia, the assassination of Alexander II and the activity of Alexander of Pherae. This resulted in Pelopidas and Hismenias entering into an alliance with Ptolemy.⁷² A little later, in order to put an end to the expansionism of Alexander of Pherae, the Thessalian confederacy once again turned to Boeotia. Pelopidas set out with seven thousand

68 Fossey 1992: 112, 123, 128; 1972 [= 1989: 169–184] and 1979 [= 1989: 185–200] (perhaps in the era of Theban hegemony). Also in Eastern Phocis: Fossey 1986: 121–141, esp. 135–141, and 1992: 123, (at the beginning of the decade of the fifties of the fourth century in relation with the Third Sacred War) and in Opuntian Locris in the latter part of the fourth century, immediately after 346 and the end of the Third Sacred War as a reaction 'to aggressive Phokian policies in the mid fourth century': Fossey 1990: 138–150, esp. 146–150, and 1992: 127–128.

69 Thucyd. 4.94.4; Feyel 1942: 206.

70 See Buckler 1980; 1982; Kelly 1982.

71 *IG* II² 116, 175; *SEG* 17 243; Aeschines 3.161; Dem. 2.11; Diod. 15.80.2; 17.4.1; Plut. *Pel.* 26.1–5; Justin 11.3.2; Westlake 1969: 135–137; Larsen 1968: 12–26; Buckler 1980: 110–118; 2003: 319–323; Georgiadou 1995: 190–195; Helly 1995: 39–68; Beck 1997: 128–134; MacKil 2013: 72–74, 79–80.

72 Aeschin. 2.26–29 and *scholia*; Plut. *Pel.* 27.1–28.12; Nepos *Iphicrates* 3.2; *Pel.* 4.3; Justin 7.5.4–5; Buckler 1980: 119–129; 2003: 323–327.

men (Diod. 15.80.2) at the end of July or beginning of August 364. He went into battle against Alexander at Cynoscephalae but, although the Boeotian army was victorious, Pelopidas was killed.⁷³ The fruits of the victory fell to the Boeotarchs, Malcitas and Diogeiton, who, in the autumn of 364, invaded Thessaly with seven thousand foot soldiers and eight hundred horsemen. They defeated Alexander and obliged him to sign a humiliating treaty.⁷⁴ During these years, Phthiotic Achaea and Magnesia were also allies of Boeotia.

Epameinondas exercised close control over Theban policy in the Peloponnese. His aim was two-fold: on the one hand, to prevent the recovery of Sparta, and on the other, to build a system of alliances and garrisons that would enable Thebes to impose its will on the hornet's nest of the Peloponnese. In order to do so, he led four expeditions to the Peloponnese, the first in the winter of 370, which continued until April 369,⁷⁵ the second in the summer/autumn of 369,⁷⁶ the third in the spring/early summer of 366,⁷⁷ and the fourth and last in the summer of 362.⁷⁸ He led the first two expeditions directly against Sparta, the first to attack its power base: Messenia, the cities of the *perioikoi*, the Lacedaemonian territory and the city itself. And the second against Sparta's few remaining allies in the Peloponnese: Epidaurus, Troezen, Sicyon, Pellene and Corinth. The last two campaigns were designed to consolidate the system of alliances, especially in Arcadia. By the time of his death, Thebes had many allies in the Peloponnese, but its system of alliances was far from consolidated and still needed several years of sustained military effort to become firmly established. However, Thebes had to rapidly abandon its presence in the Peloponnese at the beginning of the 350s, after the outbreak of the Third Sacred War (Paus. 8.27.9–10).

Since the Boeotians appear not to have demanded annual tribute, it was precisely the treaty of alliance, the fundamental core of Theban imperialism,

73 Diod. 15.80.1–81.1; Plut. *Pel.* 32.1–34.1; *Mor.* 192 D; Nepos *Pel.* 5.2–4; Strabo 9.5.6; Westlake 1969: 148; Georgiadou 1995: 211–216; Buckler 1980: 175–181; 2003: 340–341; MacKil 2013: 73.

74 Diod. 15.81.6; Plut. *Pel.* 35.1–3; Westlake 1969: 152; Buckler 2003: 341–342.

75 Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23–25, 32; 7.2.2; *Agésilas* 2.24; Isoc. 5.49; 6.28; Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F322; Diod. 15.62.5, 64.2; Plut. *Pel.* 24.2–4, 34.1–2; *Comparison of Pelopidas and Marcellus* 2.1–2; *Ages.* 31.1–2; *Comparison of Agésilas and Pompeius* 3.5; *Mor.* 788 A; Hamilton 1991: 227–228; Georgiadou 1995: 181–182; Buckler 1980: 70–89; 2003: 305–311.

76 Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.15–18, 25; 7.2.5–9, 11; Aen. *Tact.* 29.12; Diod. 15.67.2, 68.1–5, 72.1–2; Front. 2.5.26; Paus. 6.3.2; 9.15.4; Polyae. 2.3.9–10, 5.26; Buckler 1980: 90–101; 2003: 312–315; MacKil 2013: 74–75.

77 Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.41; Larsen 1968: 80–89; Beck 1997: 55–66; Buckler 1980: 185–192; 2003: 333–335.

78 Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.4–17; Diod. 15.82.3–4, 85–2; Buckler 1980: 203–208; 2003: 342–350; MacKil 2013: 81–82.

which included the prohibition on making a separate peace, and the requirement to furnish contingents of any Boeotian expedition (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.40), or if the treaty was advantageous to the ally, only in the case of an attack against Thebes (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.4). Since the treaty was the basis of Boeotian rule, the Boeotians demanded that it should be strictly adhered to; the most serious accusation that could be levelled at an ally was that it was breaking the alliance (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.39). Failure to honour pacts was branded as treason without hesitation and provoked immediate punitive action.⁷⁹ They also introduced garrisons under the command of Theban harmosts, as in Tegea, Messene, the cities of the Achaea in the Peloponnese and Oropus. Most information is about the garrison of Tegea, which consisted of three hundred Boeotian, and perhaps only Theban hoplites under the command of a Theban harmost (Xen. *Hell.* 7.11.3–4), and was probably a typical Boeotian garrison. Another harmost with a contingent of unknown size occupied the acropolis of Sicyon,⁸⁰ and another garrison was based in Messene.⁸¹ The harmosts established in the various Achaean cities could not have held their posts for more than a few days after the spring/mid-summer of 366 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.43). Finally, a garrison defended Oropus from the middle of the summer of 366 (Diod. 15.79.6).

But what is of most interest, as stated at the beginning, is the description of the impact of these commanders and warlords on their own states. The Boeotian confederacy that was recast in the seventies of the fourth century displayed very notable institutional innovations. In addition to the federal archonship (IG VII 2407, lin. 1–2; *Syll*³ 179), the main change was the establishment of a democratic regime whose main body was the federal assembly. Greatly attested by the name δᾶμος τῶν Βοιωτῶν,⁸² it would have been a primary democratic or non-representative assembly, open to all the Boeotians, irrespective of their wealth or background, which decided, as was standard practice in any Greek democracy, on legislative, diplomatic and military matters. It may also have elected some of the leading federal magistrates, such as the eponymous archon and the hipparch. These meetings of the federal assembly took place in Thebes, which must also have been the headquarters of all the Confederacy's institutions, such as the federal court. Taking into

79 Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.40: [Epameinondas said] τὸ γὰρ ἡμῶν δι' ὑμᾶς εἰς πόλεμον καταστάντων ὑμᾶς ἄνευ τῆς ἡμετέρας γνώμης εἰρήνην ποιείσθαι πῶς οὐκ ἂν δικαίως προδοσίαν τις ὑμῶν τοῦτο κατηγοροίη; εἰ δ' ἴστε, ἔφη, ὅτι ἡμεῖς καὶ στρατευσόμεθα εἰς τὴν Ἀρκαδίαν καὶ σὺν τοῖς τὰ ἡμέτερα φρονοῦσι πολεμήσομεν.

80 Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.44–4, 2.11; 3.4, 8–11; Diod. 15.70.3; Griffin 1982: 73–75; Buckler 2003: 313.

81 Diod. 15.67.1; Buckler 1980: 89.

82 IG VII 2407, lin. 3; 2408, lin. 1; Diod. 15.25.1, 90. 2; Beck and Ganter 2015: 148, 150.

account the population of Thebes, the largest city in Boeotia, which could easily attend the meetings, and, as seen later, the expulsion of the Plataeans and the foreseeable loss of the Thespians and the Orchomenians, the vote per head in the popular assembly would doubtless have favoured the Thebans, who later instigated the total destruction of troublesome cities such as Orchomenus and Thespieae.

The changes also affected the principal federal magistracy, the council of the Boeotarchs. In fact, the Boeotarchia is attested on many occasions and in various sources throughout this period and there are four cases, in four different Boeotian years, in which the names of the Boeotarchs and their exact number are known. These relate to the battle of Leuctra of 371 and three decrees granting federal proxeny that can be dated to between the 360s and '50s.⁸³ Thanks to these references, we know that the number of members of the council of Boeotarchs had declined from eleven, before 386, to seven, of whom three or four appear to have been Thebans. Perhaps it can be inferred that the system of districts adopted by the earlier confederacy⁸⁴ remained in place, although the number of Boeotarchs had dropped to seven. The four districts that were missing were perhaps those of Orchomenus and Thespieae. The council of Boeotarchs during the battle of Leuctra, in the summer of 371, provides information on this point. There were seven Boeotarchs in Leuctra at a time when Orchomenus did not belong to the federal organisation, but there were still seven after the Orchomenians joined the federal organisation the following year, 370 (Diod. 15.57.1). Both Thespieae and Orchomenus may have belonged to the new confederacy and continued to be poleis until the 360s, enjoying local autonomy but without participating in federal institutions.

Orchomenus could serve as a model of a city that had been defeated and forced to join the Confederacy in 370 after long and bitter opposition (Diod. 15.57.1); in fact, between 378 and 370, it accepted a Spartan garrison and strongly resisted Thebes. Between 370 and 364, it was included in the confederacy but had no political representation, the destruction of its walls probably explaining its easy conquest years later. In 364, the city was destroyed, part of its population expelled, another enslaved and its territory divided amongst its neighbours.⁸⁵ The situation of Thespieae must have been similar. Between 378 and 375, it became an essential base for Sparta to attack Thebes. After the Peace of 375 but before 371, and following the withdrawal of the Spartan garrison,

83 Paus. 9.13.6–7; IG VII 2407 lin. 13–16; 2408 lin. 13–16; Roesch 1984: 45–46. See also Larsen 1968: 175–177.

84 See Salmon 1978: 70–128; Beck and Ganter 2015: 148–149.

85 Diod. 15.79.3–4; Paus. 4.27.1; 9.15.6. Plut. *Comp. Pel. and Marc.* 1.

it was conquered by Thebes, incorporated as a *synteleia*,⁸⁶ that is, included in the Theban state, and lost its political representation. Thebes dismantled its walls, and Thespieae would have become a polis dependent on Thebes, although its population was not massacred, enslaved or expelled in mass from Boeotia but allowed to remain in the territory. However, later, around 366/5 the Thespians were driven out of Boeotia.⁸⁷ Plataea was also conquered in 373. Its inhabitants were expelled from Boeotia and its territory annexed by Thebes.⁸⁸ In summary, while in Greece, the Theban leaders of the time who were still subject to the restrictions that applied to a commander/magistrate, pursued a hegemonic policy, while in Boeotia their aim was decidedly imperialist in the sense that it could be said that the region was annexed, *de facto* or *de jure*, to the Theban polis. That is, the command of the great Theban generals of the period led to the extension of Theban power within the federal organisation, in such a way that a single polis came to have virtually absolute power over the confederacy. The words that Polybius (2.37.11) used to describe the Achaean confederacy in the Hellenistic period come to mind in relation to mid-century Thebes and Boeotia: 'The only difference between the entire Peloponnese and a single city is that its inhabitants are not contained within the same walls'.⁸⁹

Even before the occupation of the Delphian sanctuary, Philomelus brought together four thousand mercenaries and a thousand Phocians (Diod. 16.25.1; 28.1), an act which was symptomatic of the subsequent evolution and participation of the federal army, with the intention of always having a battle-ready army (Diod. 16.28.2). To begin with, he increased their pay by more than 50% over the normal rate (Diod. 16.25.1). Later, according to Diodorus (16.30.1–4), he doubled the mercenaries' pay and succeeded in forming an army of ten thousand men including infantry and cavalry. Onomarchus also recruited a large number of mercenaries amongst whom, Diodorus (16.32.4) mentions a large number of foreigners, with the result that in one year he was able to send Phayllus to Thessaly with seven thousand men (Diod. 16.35.1), and he himself followed later with twenty thousand foot soldiers and five hundred horsemen (Diod. 16.35.4). As mentioned above, Phocian federal troops do not appear to have been greatly involved. Phayllus also recruited mercenaries, and

86 Bakhuizen 1994: 307–330.

87 Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.5; 5.4.63; 6.1.1, 4.9; Dem. 16.4; 25.28; Isoc. 6.27; 14.8–9; Diod. 15.46.6, 51.3; Paus. 9.13.8, 14. 2–4; Polyæn. 2.3.2 and esp. Tuplin 1986.

88 Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.2–20; [Dem.] 49.14–15; Paus. 9.1.4–7.

89 Polyb. 2.37.11: καθόλου δὲ τούτῳ μόνῳ διαλλάττειν τοῦ μὴ μιᾶς πόλεως διάθεσιν ἔχειν σχεδὸν τὴν σύμπασαν Πελοπόννησον, τῷ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν περίβολον ὑπάρχειν τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν αὐτήν, τᾶλλα δ' εἶναι καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατὰ πόλεις ἐκάστοις ταῦτά καὶ παραπλήσια.

Phalaecus, after signing an armistice with Philip, withdrew with eight thousand mercenaries, which formed the main body of his army (Diod. 16.59.2–3).

In practice, independently of the federal organisation, an army consisting mainly of mercenaries, paid from the Delphian and not the federal treasury, was being created from the beginning (Diod. 16.36.1). It was organised by the Phocian warlords, whose soldiers were associated with and dependent on the loyalty of Phocian commanders. With the support of their mercenaries, the Phocian leaders succeeded in dominating the state and even Phalaecus, after being deposed by the assembly, was able to lead what amounted to a coup d'état to obtain his reinstatement (Diod. 16.56.3). In addition, they controlled the federal treasury and demanded contributions from cities, like those exacted by Philomelus from the Delphians (Diod. 16.28.2). Phalaecus negotiated the capitulation of the whole of Phocis with Philip in 346, apparently without the participation of federal institutions, resulting in the destruction of the Phocian cities and the exclusion of the Phocians from representative Amphictyonic bodies, and condemning them to pay a fine of ten thousand talents at sixty talents a year. The accusation made by some authors, particularly Aeschines (2.130, 135), that they were becoming true tyrants is not entirely without foundation. In fact, what happened in Phocis was that the magistrate commanders effectively became warlords. In summary, while it was a polis, Thebes, that effectively came to replace the Boeotian Confederacy, Phocis was a forerunner of what would be common in the Hellenistic era: a dynasty of warlords, their friends (*philoi*) and their military forces (*dynameis*) that came to virtually replace the federal state.

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The Network of Melqart: Tyre, Gadir, Carthage and the Founding God

*Manuel Álvarez Martí-Aguilar**

1 Introduction

This contribution for a volume devoted to warlordism, war and interstate relations in the ancient Mediterranean focuses on the latter from the viewpoint of identity. In the ancient world, war played a remarkable role in the genesis of ethnic and political identities not merely in terms of shaping group identity within a given community facing an adversary. War also encouraged and propitiated the development of solidarity and networks of mutual assistance between communities adopting a common identity. Phoenician communities in the second half of the first millennium BC constitute the case under study here.

Fresh approaches to the matter of cultural and ethnic identities in the ancient world are having both a relevant and positive impact on Phoenician studies. The chief innovation consists of abandoning essentialist standpoints regarding ethnic identity, which nowadays is perceived as an eminently subjective social phenomenon, constructed on the basis of the perception human groups have of themselves. Therefore, identity frameworks are viewed as dynamic structures, whose defining elements undergo constant construction, aggregation and change. A historical and changing nature is thus the essence of the phenomenon of ethnic identities. It is likewise considered commonplace that in the creation of a collective identity, the notion of the group's collective origin and the social construction of memory around a precise foundational moment plays a crucial part.¹

One of the most significant consequences of these developments in the study of identity in the Phoenician world is the emphasis on the fact that the ethnic term 'Phoenicians' itself is essentially a label external to the world it

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1 Barth 1994; Jones 1997; Hall 1997; Derks and Roymans 2009; Gruen 2005; 2011; Assmann 2011.

defines. It was a label created by the Greeks and Romans and applied to communities such as Tyre, Sidon, Byblos, Berytus, Arwad, etc. who did not seem to recognize themselves as Phoenicians until the Roman period. Greater knowledge of the forms of construction of collective identity amongst these communities reveals the significance of the civic framework and of the role of civic gods in the shaping of ethnicities.²

From this point of view, the role of Tyre and its chief god, Melqart, has prompted renewed interest in the assessment of the construction of ethnic identity against the backdrop of a colonial diaspora, amongst peoples who claimed a Tyrian origin.³ This paper intends to contribute to a better understanding of that 'colonial network',⁴ built around the symbolic references of Tyre as the mother-city and of Melqart as the god of the founding fathers, and their activation in times of war. The study cases, Gadir and Tyre, at each end of the Phoenician world, reveal the mechanisms at play in interstate solidarity within a colonial network and the role of ethnic identity connections in times of conflict.

2 Justin (44.5) Revisited

An improved knowledge of these dynamics may be gained based on a recently proposed new interpretation of the passage on the origins of the Carthaginian presence in the Iberian Peninsula, included in the last book of Justin's *Epitome* to Pompeius Trogus' *Historiae Philippicae*:

5 [1] *Post regna deinde Hispaniae primi Karthaginienses imperium provinciae occupavere.* [2] *Nam cum Gaditani a Tyro, unde et Karthaginiensibus origo est, sacra Herculis per quietem iussi in Hispaniam transtulissent urbemque ibi condidissent, invidentibus incrementis novae urbis finitimis Hispaniae populis ac propterea Gaditanos bello lacessentibus auxilium*

2 López Castro 2004; Lancelotti and Xella 2004; Bonnet 2005; 2008; 2009; 2011a; Delgado and Ferrer 2007; Álvarez 2012a; 2012b; Álvarez and Ferrer 2009; Ferrer and Álvarez 2009; Chaves 2009; Sommer 2010; Quinn 2011; 2012; Quinn and Vella 2014; Escacena 2011; Mora and Cruz 2012; Mora 2013.

3 López Castro 2004; Bonnet 2005; 2008; 2009; Malkin 2005; Álvarez 2014a; 2014b; Garbati 2012; 2015; Hirt 2015.

4 Curtin's concept of commercial diaspora (1984) was applied by Aubet (1987; 2001) to the case of the Phoenician colonial establishment in the West. A recent review of the network theory in the case of Phoenician colonial expansion in Sommer 2007; 2010. See also Horden and Purcell 2000: 134–135; and Bernardini 2013: 1–7.

consanguineis Karthaginienses misere. [3] Ibi felici expeditione et Gaditanos ab iniuria vindicaverunt et maiore iniuria partem provinciae imperio suo adiecerunt. [4] Postea quoque hortantibus primae expeditionis auspiciis Hamilcarem imperatorem cum manu magna ad occupandam provinciam misere ...

IUST. 44.5.1–4; ED. O. SEEL 1972

5 [1] After the Spanish dynasties it was the Carthaginians who first gained control of the country. [2] Following instructions given in a dream, the people of Gades brought the *sacra* of Hercules to Spain from Tyre (also the country of origin of the Carthaginians) and founded a city there, but the neighbouring peoples in Spain, envious of the progress made by the new city, made war on them. The Carthaginians therefore sent assistance to their relatives. [3] The expedition met with success; the Carthaginians both defended the people of Gades from aggression and also, by even greater aggression on their part, added an area of the country to their own empire. [4] Later, encouraged by the success of their first expedition, they also sent their general Hamilcar with a large force to seize the entire country ...

TRANSLATION ADAPTED FROM J.C. YARDLEY 1994

This new and radically different interpretation from that traditionally applied to the passage poses a shift in the understanding of the history of the western Phoenician world in the fourth and third centuries BC.⁵ Therefore, a synthesis of this new reading is presented here, incorporating it into a historical analysis of a colonial network based on Tyrian identity. The various reconstruction proposals of the events described in this passage of Justin's *Epitome* have always agreed that the trigger for the sequence was the foundation of Gadir by Tyrian colonists and the establishment of the cult of Melqart in the new city. In the traditional interpretation, there is a gap in the narration after this foundational episode, which is followed by a second occurrence, chronologically difficult to fit into the order of events, when the Gaditanians were attacked by some neighbouring peoples in Hispania, as a result of the rapid rise of the new city. This, in turn, would have provoked the arrival of a Carthaginian auxiliary expedition to aid their relatives. The north Africans' decision to settle in an area of Hispania closes the second part of the narration, and a further gap occurs before the third episode, which in this case can be externally dated: the second

5 Álvarez 2014a; see also Álvarez 2014b.

arrival of the Carthaginians with the military expedition led by Hamilcar Barca in 237 BC.

The passage has been the subject of extensive interpretation in the modern historiographic tradition, where the main points of contention have been the chronology, and the scope of the first Carthaginian expedition mentioned in the account.⁶ The main difficulty is the dating of the attack on the Gaditanians and Carthage's ensuing auxiliary expedition of assistance. This second scene of the account has generally been linked to the so-called 'crisis' or 'transition' of the sixth century BC, a period of change and transformation in both the Tartessian and Phoenician communities.⁷ More recently, it has been suggested that the episode should be dated to the middle fourth century BC, a moment when increased Carthaginian presence in the southwest of the Iberian Peninsula has been detected in the archaeological record.⁸ Yet, this would leave an enormous chronological gap implicit in Justin's narration, spanning over five centuries, from the initial foundational episode to the Carthaginian auxiliary expedition, if we accept that Gadir was founded in the ninth century BC.⁹

However, the text itself suggests that there was no significant gap at all. Justin's abridging technique does not consist of summarizing the information provided by the *Historiae Philippicae*, but simply of omitting various parts of Trogus's original narration.¹⁰ These omissions can be identified by the use Justin makes of certain expressions, to link the paragraphs he preserves with each other. As López Castro suggested, it is possible to identify the two places in the passage where omissions of Trogus's original text could have occurred.¹¹

The first omission can be detected in the words used at the beginning of the chapter: *Post regna deinde Hispaniae primi Karthaginienses ... Deinde* and the allusion to the subject of the previous chapter—the *regna Hispaniae*, in 44.4—are indications that Justin omitted certain content immediately prior to the matter of the *imperium* of the Carthaginians.¹² After this omission, the structure of the passage follows a well-defined sequence: in order to explain the origin of Carthaginian *imperium* in Hispania, the account goes back to a previous episode in time, the foundation of a city by the Gaditanians, resulting from a

6 Schulten 1924; García y Bellido 1942; Bendala 1987; López Castro 1992a; Ferrer and Pliego 2010; Domínguez 2012; Fernández 2013.

7 López Castro 1992a; Aubet 2001: 341–346; Martín 2007; Neville 2005: 159–170.

8 Ferrer and Pliego 2010.

9 Gener et al. 2014.

10 Forni and Angeli Bertinelli 1982; Alonso 1987; López Castro 1992a.

11 López Castro 1992a: 224.

12 Castiglioni 1925: 3; López Castro 1992a: 224.

dream oracle, which ordered some *sacra Herculis* to be transferred from Tyre. The narrative of events seemingly continues to flow uninterrupted until the appropriation of some *pars provinciae* by the Carthaginians. The second omission can be detected in the words used to open the fourth paragraph: *Postea quoque hortantibus primae expeditionis auspiciis* ... A new sequence of events starts by recounting the expedition of Hamilcar, prior to which Justin could have omitted content corresponding to an undetermined lapse of time, from the moment when the Carthaginians gained certain Iberian possessions up to 237 BC, when the Barcids arrived at Gadir.

Historical interpretation of this passage has never been fully satisfactory and this has generated uncertainty regarding its reliability as a source of information.¹³ Possibly, this is due to complications arising from the belief that the beginning describes the foundation of Gadir. This involves, in the first place, acknowledging a large lapse in time between the foundational episode described at the beginning of the account and the attack on the Gaditanians by 'neighbouring peoples'. If we accept that the ninth century BC¹⁴ was Gadir's foundation date, then the gap would span from three to five centuries, depending on whether the attack is dated to the sixth or to the fourth century BC.

On the other hand, should the attack on the Gaditanians and the arrival of the Carthaginians be dated to the sixth century BC, which has usually been the case, the link established in the text between the second expedition (Hamilcar's in the year 237 BC) and the first—occurring about three centuries earlier—would be totally inconsistent. This has led to the belief that continuity between both expeditions is attributable to Justin, who would have connected sections and skipped contents in between them, but not to Trogus himself, whose original narration would not contain a causal link between both missions.¹⁵

The proposed reading of the passage questions the starting point of the traditional interpretation, which assumes that the oracular order involving the transfer of the *sacra Herculis* and the foundation of a city in Hispania was given by Herakles-Melqart to the Tyrians and, consequently, that the city in question is Gadir. However, a more literal reading of the text makes the Gaditanians (explicitly stated), not the Tyrians, the recipients of the oracle, evidently after the foundation of their own city. Thus, the sequence of events does not start with the foundation of Gadir but of a colony created by the Gaditanians after receiving the god's dream oracle. The new foundation would then be a different

13 Domínguez 2012: 184–185.

14 Zamora et al. 2010; Gener et al. 2014.

15 López Castro 1992a: 225.

city not mentioned in the text, which according to the tradition compiled by Trogus, would have been founded in Iberia by the Gaditanians at an indeterminate point in their own history.

As already pointed out, Justin's epitomizing technique involves skipping contents rather than summarising them. No omission can be detected in the sequence of events starting with the oracle given to the Gaditanians—*Nam cum Gaditani ...* (44.5.1)—and ending with the appropriation of *pars provinciae* by the Carthaginians, after which the second of the omissions of part of Trogus's original account occurs. Therefore, it seems likely that the events described in the sequence, starting with the oracle and ending with the first Carthaginian conquest, are closely connected, both chronologically and causally. Consequently, all the events included within that section of the passage could have occurred within a relatively limited time frame. The oracle's reception would have been followed by the transfer of the *sacra* from Tyre, and the founding of a city, whose prosperity would stir envy amongst certain peoples of Iberia. The time lapse between the founding of the new city by the Gaditanians and the reaction of the neighbouring peoples against its success may not have been long. This hostility towards the Gaditanians could have been immediately followed by the Carthaginian auxiliary expedition and the subsequent appropriation of some Iberian territories.

If it is accepted that the initial episode in the narration is not linked to the foundation of Gadir, then the general chronology of the sequence of events is freed from a forced stretching and could easily range up to the year 237 BC. This date ought to be the starting point from which to reconstruct the entire sequence of events and to ponder on its possible beginning. Thus, the second omission in the passage could feasibly include Trogus' original contents, corresponding to a not too extensive period of time and therefore the two Carthaginian expeditions in Hispania would be linked both in time and cause in the original work, as the text states: 'Later, encouraged by the success of their first expedition ...' (Iust. 44.5.4). Finally, if the first Carthaginian expedition was not too distant in time from that led by Hamilcar, the foundation of the Gaditanian colony at the beginning of the sequence, which ends with the Carthaginian auxiliary expedition, could be chronologically placed not too far away from the year 237 BC.

In summary, according to the new interpretation of the text, the Gaditanians founded a colony at a moment in time not too distant from the year 237 BC with the participation of the sanctuary of Melqart of Tyre, whence the *sacra* were transferred for the occasion. Could we pinpoint the city founded by the Gaditanians? In order to answer this question, and to delve into the role played

by Tyre and its main god amongst its ancient colonies, let us review the foundational traditions and myths of origin within the framework of the Tyrian diaspora.

3 Foundational Traditions in the Tyrian Diaspora

3.1 *Tyre*

The first of the known legends about the foundation of Tyre appears in the preserved fragments of Philo of Byblos' *Phoenician History*. In Philo's account (Eusebius of Caesarea, *Praeparatio Evangelica* 1.10.9–11), the origin of Tyre is linked to two brothers of the mythical era, Samemroumos-Hypsouranios and Ousoos. Hypsouranios settled the town of Tyre while his brother Ousoos discovered the art of navigation. During a storm, the forests of Tyre were set alight by the friction of the trees. Ousoos took one tree, cut off its branches and ventured onto the sea for the first time. He then dedicated two *stelai* to Fire and Wind. According to Philo, after the death of the brothers, their descendants worshipped the *stelai* and celebrated, thenceforth, annual festivals in their honour (Eus. *PE* 1.10.10–11).¹⁶ The reference to these *stelai* in Philo, has been connected to Herodotus's famous testimony (2.44) of his visit to the sanctuary of Herakles in Tyre, where he describes two *stelai* made of gold and emerald respectively.¹⁷

Some elements in Philo's account are reproduced in another well known but much more articulate Tyrian foundation legend, included in Nonnus of Panopolis' fifth-century AD *Dionysiaca*.¹⁸ The circumstances of the origin of Tyre are explained in the account given by Herakles, the god of the city, to his illustrious visitor, Dionysus. Herakles begins by recalling an oracle given in dreams, whereby he instructed some 'earthborn folk' on how to proceed in the foundation of his city:

Now I cherished a passion of love for that city; so I took the shadowed form of a human face, and stayed my step overhanging the head of these earthborn folk, and spoke to them my oracle in words of inspiration ...

NONN. *D.* 40.439–442; TRANSL. ROUSE

16 Grottanelli 1972; Bonnet 1988: 27–31; Kaldellis and López-Ruiz 2010.

17 The emerald stele is later mentioned by Theophrastus (*De Lapidibus*, 25; also Pliny the Elder, *Naturalis Historia* 37.75).

18 On the founding of Tyre in Nonnus, see Bonnet 1988: 31–33; Chuvin 1994: 167–176.

Herakles's account is structured in two parts. The first is made up of the dream oracle, where the god gives his envoys details of the tasks they must complete: they shall build a ship and sail until they find 'two floating rocks, which Nature has named the Ambrosial Rocks' (40.467–469). On them they shall find an ever-burning olive tree—never consumed by the flames, with a snake coiled around its trunk; and an eagle and a vessel on top. Herakles states that the eagle must be sacrificed, after which the wandering rocks shall become fixed 'upon immovable foundations' on which his envoys shall found the city of Tyre (40.469–500). In the second part of the account, the envoys of the god follow the instructions given in dreams, helped by Herakles, who stresses his vocation: 'indulging my mood of founding cities, myself destined to be City holder ...' (40.505–506). His envoys build the ship and set sail, reaching the rocks where they prepare to hunt the eagle who dwelled in the olive tree. But the bird voluntarily submits to sacrifice. Its sprinkled blood 'rooted the seafaring rocks at the bottom near to Tyre on the sea'. Upon those 'unassailable rocks the Earthborn built up their deepbreasted nurse', the city of Tyre (40.521–534). Nonnus's account is dominated by Herakles's role as the genuine founder of the city. His envoys are the anonymous executors of the various acts leading to the foundation, the most remarkable being the stabilization of the Ambrosial Rocks that had been drifting until that moment. This act of cosmogonic connotations seems even more significant than the erecting of the city. To summarize, the story reveals an essential feature of Melqart of Tyre: his position as the founder of cities through an oracle given in dreams, using anonymous human executors.

While Nonnus writes his report in the early fifth century AD, certain Tyrian coin-types from the Imperial period allow us to consider that some structural elements from this tradition were part of the city's legendary heritage from earlier times. In a series of Tyrian coins from the third century AD, an olive tree and the Ambrosial Rocks are schematically depicted—identified by means of the inscription AMBPOΣIE ΠETPE or ΠETPAI.¹⁹ These depictions suggest that the passage in Nonnus contains ancient elements deeply rooted in Tyrian religiosity and civic identity. This thesis is supported by a passage in *Leucippe and Clitophon* (2.14) by Achilles Tatius, where reference is made to the existence in Tyre of a sacred area where a fire-related olive tree grows. This notion is confirmed by a relief on a small limestone plate, housed at the American University of Beirut and analysed by Ernest Will, who dates it to the

19 Cook 1940: 975–1015, esp. 978–983; Will 1950–1951; Naster 1986; Hirt 2015; Bijovsky 2005 suggests that in some coins of Gordian III, the scene with the *stelai*, the olive tree and a flaming altar, describe a specific site in Tyre, the sacred precinct of Melqart.

early Empire.²⁰ A distinct similarity can be noted between the elements on the relief and the components of Tyre's legendary tradition regarding its origin, as reported by Nonnus: a flaming tree, a snake coiled around its trunk and an eagle. While the exact meaning of the scene has not yet been deciphered, the relief constitutes the most direct indication that the Tyrian foundational myth related by Nonnus already existed in the early Empire.

3.2 *Gadir*

The great similarity in various respects between Tyre and Gadir has repeatedly been pointed out, in particular their respective sanctuaries of Melqart.²¹ Besides the insular topography, other aspects documented in the literary tradition highlight the fact that key elements from Tyre's foundational tradition also existed in Gadir. Pairs of *stelai* played a highly significant role, with foundational connotations in both sanctuaries. In the case of Tyre, these appear in Philo of Byblos's foundation account (Eus. *PE* 1.10.10–11) and in Herodotus's aforementioned testimony (2.44). These testimonies are accompanied by *stelai*-like representations of the Ambrosial Rocks on third-century coins from Tyre. Similarly for Gadir, pairs of *stelai* are mentioned by Strabo (3.5.5–6; as the possible Pillars of Herakles), Philostratus (*Vita Apollonii* 5.5) and Porphyry (*De abstinentia ab esu animalium* 1.25); and *columnae* are referred to by Latin sources (Plin. *NH* 2.242; Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae*. 14.6.7).

As already mentioned, the olive tree plays a central part in the myth of the foundation of Tyre in Nonnus (40.471 ff); it is also mentioned in the city, linked to a fire (Achilles Tatius *Leuc. et Cleit.* 2.14). It appears as a recurrent element on the coins from Tyre, linked to the Ambrosial Rocks, and as a prominent element in the relief of Beirut. In Gadir, Philostratus makes reference to 'the golden olive tree of Pygmalion' dedicated to Herakles in its temple, the Herakleion (VA 5.5); also one of the islands of the Gaditanian archipelago is known by ancient tradition as 'Cotinusa' (Plin. *NH* 4.120), a name derived from wild olive trees (*kotinos*). In Gadir, there are also references to altars with perpetual flames (Silius Italicus, *Punica* 3.29). Another parallel might be found in the possible existence of a tomb of the god, both in Tyre (Pseudo-Clemens, *Recognitiones* 10.24) and in Gadir, deducible from allusions to the death of the god in Hispania (Arnobius, *Adversus Nationes* 1.36; Sallustius, *Bellum Iugurthinum* 18.3) and to the presence there of the god's *ossa* (Pomponius Mela 3.46).

²⁰ Will 1950–1951.

²¹ Blázquez 1955; García y Bellido 1963; Bonnet 1988: 203–229; Mierse 2004; Marín and Jiménez 2004; Marín 2011.

All of these elements suggest similar foundation accounts for both cities.²² To explore this further, focus will be directed to the question of the foundation oracle. Regarding the oracular component of the sanctuary of Herakles-Melqart in Gadir, various testimonies suggest different scenarios.²³ In AD 215, Caecilius Aemilianus, proconsul of Baetica, consulted the oracle (and was executed by Caracalla as a result: Dio Cassius 78.20.4). In other instances, the oracle occurs in a seemingly spontaneous form, through dreams. A celebrated case is that of Caesar's incestuous dream on the occasion of his visit to the sanctuary during his quaestorship in the year 68 BC (Suetonius, *Iulius* 7.1–2; Dio 37.52.2; 41.24.2).

However, one case bears a great resemblance to Nonnus's report and points to the existence of a myth on the foundation of Gadir that reproduces the myth of Tyre. This account appears in Porphyry of Tyre's *De Abstinencia*, regarding an event that occurred during the siege on the Gaditanian Herakleion by Bogud, the King of Mauretania in the year 38 BC. Due to the siege and the lack of birds for sacrifice, a prodigy takes place which involves a dream oracle from the deity:

The same thing likewise happened at Gades. Bogud was a king of the Mauritanians, who was slain by Agrippa in Mothone. He in that place attacked the temple of Hercules, which was most rich. But it was the custom of the priests daily to sprinkle the altar with blood. That this, however, was not effected by the decision of men, but by that of divinity, the occasion at that time demonstrated. For, the siege being continued for a long time, victims were wanting. But the priest being dubious how he should act, had the following vision in a dream. He seemed to himself to be standing in the middle of the pillars of the temple of Hercules, and afterwards to see a bird sitting opposite to the altar, and endeavouring to fly to it, but which at length flew into his hands. He also saw that the altar was sprinkled with its blood. Seeing this, he rose as soon as it was day, and went to the altar, and standing on the turret, as he thought he did in his dream, he looked round, and saw the very bird which he had seen in his sleep. Hoping, therefore, that his dream would be fulfilled, he stood still, saw the bird fly to the altar and sit upon it, and deliver itself into

22 López Melero 1988; Ribichini 2000; López Pardo 2010; Marín 2011. Regarding the matter of the wandering islands, see Moret 1997 and 2011–2012.

23 García y Bellido 1963: 127–128; Bonnet 1988: 220–221; Hajjar 1990: 2279–2281; Marín and Jiménez 2004: 231–234.

the hands of the high priest. Thus the bird was sacrificed, and the altar sprinkled with blood.

ABS. 1.25; TRANSL. TAYLOR, ADAPTED

The structure of this episode bears a remarkable resemblance to Nonnus's report. In both cases, a revelation takes place in dreams; in Porphyry's story, Melqart also implicitly propitiates it, and both accounts revolve around the sacrifice of a bird that voluntarily submits to death.²⁴ The two reports repeat the same narrative arranged in two successive moments: firstly the oracular dream is related and secondly its fulfilment is described.

Porphyry's report is an indication of the existence in the Gaditanian Herakleion of a ritual based on the myth of the origin of the sanctuary, which could in turn reproduce Tyre's mythical origin in Nonnus's version. The meaning of the sacrifice of the bird in Porphyry's passage can be related to the meaning of the sacrifice of the eagle in the Tyrian myth. In both cases, the voluntary death of the bird could be linked to the rooting and stabilization of the island on which Gadir, like Tyre, was founded. It is therefore possible that Melqart was considered not only the main god of the city but its very founder, both in Gadir and in Tyre.

It is quite remarkable that Gadir's founders are seldom identified in the available sources on its origins. Reports of the foundation of the city and of the sanctuary of Herakles-Melqart generically refer to 'the Tyrians' (Velleius Paterculus 1.2.3; Pomponius Mela 3.46) or 'the Phoenicians' (Diodorus Siculus 5.20.1–3). There are two exceptions. The first one is a passage provided by Claudius Iolaus, who stated in his *Phoenician Histories* that 'Archaleus, son of Phoenix, founded the city and named it in the writing of the Phoenicians....' (*Etym. Mag.* 219.33, s.v. *Gadéira*; transl. López-Ruiz). In this case, however, it has also been suggested that the figure of Archaleus could actually refer to Herakles and, by extension, to Melqart.²⁵ The second exception is a brief reference made in the *scholia* to Dionysius Periegetes (454) stating that the Herakles who founded Gadir was the Phoenician Herakles, referred to as *archaiotatos*.²⁶ Both passages could then support the thesis of a twin foundational myth for both Tyre and Gadir, featuring Melqart and his dream oracle.

24 Bonnet 1988: 221; Ribichini 2000: 664, n. 12; Bijovsky: 832.

25 Roscher 1890; Jessen 1895; Ribichini 2000: 665, n. 20; Tsirkin 2007; López-Ruiz 2010; Álvarez 2014a.

26 'Very old' or 'the oldest', regarding the traditions about different Herakles in Gadir, the Egyptian, the Phoenician and the Theban.

The reinterpretation of Justin's passage has also an effect on the text, which has always been considered its parallel: Strabo's (3.5.5), concerning the foundation of Gadir based on Posidonius' testimony.²⁷ In this case, the account also starts with an oracle received by the Tyrians, although no reference to dreams is made:

In telling such stories about the founding of Gadeira, the Gadeirans remember a certain oracle, which, they say, ordered the Tyrians to send a settlement to the Pillars of Herakles ...

STR. 3.5.5; TRANSL. D.W. ROLLER

The account differs notably from what must have been the traditional version of the founding of Gadir, deducible from the texts of Justin, Porphyry and Nonnus. These differences could be explained by the dependence of Strabo's narration on the debate about the location of the Pillars of Herakles. The Tyrian envoys sent to fulfil the oracular order do not know the exact location of the Pillars (*stelai*) of Herakles. In an initial attempt, they assume the pillars are 'the end of the inhabited world and of the expedition of Herakles', a place they pinpoint as the Straits of Gibraltar. But the sacrifice carried out to the east of these *stelai*, 'which is now the city of the Exitanians', does not meet with divine approval and they return to Tyre. In a second attempt, the Tyrian envoys identify the *stelai* in a place to the west of the Straits, on 'an island sacred to Herakles, lying near the Iberian city of Onoba', but these sacrifices were not propitious either and once again they returned to Tyre. It was on their third expedition that the Tyrians founded Gadir, placing the city and sanctuary at each end of the island.

The main purpose of this account is to show that, of all the various locations attributed to the *stelai* of Herakles, Gadir was the genuine site sanctioned by the divinity. In the dense digression subsequently expounded by Strabo regarding the whereabouts of the *stelai*, he remarks that Posidonius himself accepted that the true *stelai* of Herakles were the two eight-cubit high bronze *stelai* found in the Gaditanian Herakleion. However, he also points out that, according to Posidonius, the history of the oracle and the many expeditions were a 'Phoenician falsehood' (Str. 3.5.5). Posidonius's judgement could refer not to the oracle as such but to its specific content, according to this story. The three successive journeys involve a significant variation on the Tyrian foundation myth as presented in Nonnus, Porphyry's account or indeed in Justin's passage. They suit the needs of the debate regarding which of the various *stelai*

27 Cruz 1994; López Melero 1988; Domínguez 2012.

of Herakles in the Straits of Gibraltar and thereabouts were the true ones,²⁸ but the specific content of the oracle, 'to send a settlement to the Pillars of Herakles', does not seem to respond to the logic of the Tyrian model, where *stelai* appear as a consequence of the foundational act, as a stylization of the wandering islands, which were steadied by Melqart.²⁹

The account given by Posidonius-Strabo could constitute a highly mystified variation of the original version of the founding of Gadir, which would on this reading be preserved in a less explicit manner, though one more faithful to the original Tyrian version in Porphyry's report and, indirectly, in Justin's. Nevertheless, in Strabo's account the foundation is also preceded by an oracle, Melqart of Tyre presides over the whole process of foundation and his envoys are but anonymous actors, an aspect consistent with the possibility that the god was considered the genuine founder of the city.

3.3 *Carthage*

This revision of foundation traditions in the Tyrian colonial diaspora highlights the exceptional nature of the account of the founding of Carthage, as opposed to what seems to be a standard model reproduced for Tyre, for Gadir and for the Gaditanian colony. Apart from possibly the case of Archaleus, the founders of Tyre, of Gadir and of the Gaditanian colony in Justin are mere anonymous executors of an initiative, promoted by the divinity through an oracle given in dreams. The consequence in the case of Tyre, and probably also in the case of Gadir, is that Melqart is considered the genuine founder.

The scenario in Carthage is strikingly different. There is no foundational dream oracle as in the other cases analysed here, and above all, there is one founder, Elissa-Dido, who plays a central role in the story.³⁰ Significantly, alternative versions do coincide in identifying *oikistai* for Carthage. Thus, for instance, according to the tradition reported by Philistus of Syracuse and by Eudoxus of Cnidus, both in the fourth century BC, the founders of Carthage were two Tyrians, Azoros and Karkhedon (FGrH 566 F47).³¹ Appian records this same version alongside the more canonical one featuring Dido, including a key element in all the accounts reviewed so far, the revelation during a dream: 'Dido, a Tyrian woman, whose husband had been slain clandestinely by Pygmalion, the ruler of Tyre. The murder being revealed to her in a dream, she embarked for Africa ...' (App. *Lyb.* 1.1; transl. H. White).

28 Álvarez 2014b.

29 Zanovello 1981.

30 Bonnet 1988: 165–166; 201b; Garbati 2015.

31 Lancel 1995: 20; Hoyos 2010: 6.

Justin's account (18.4–6) can be taken as the narrative of reference in order to pinpoint the nuances that differentiate the traditional version of the founding of Carthage and that of Tyre or Gadir. The account revolves around princess Elissa, the sister of King Pygmalion and wife to Acherbas, the priest of Hercules who is murdered by the monarch. In contrast to the previous cases, Elissa is the sole protagonist of the founding initiative. But the figure of Melqart is also present in the story. Before leaving for her exile, Elissa takes care of his *sacra*:

... *atque ita sacris Herculis, cuius sacerdos Acherbas fuerat, repetitis, exilio sedes quaerunt*

IUST. 18.4.15

... and so, after gathering the sacred objects of Hercules, whose priest Acherbas had been, they all proceeded on their search for a home in exile

TRANSL. YARDLEY

Once more, similarly to the story of the Gaditanian foundation, the *sacra* of Melqart are involved and, again, questions arise as to their exact nature. It has been commonly believed that they refer to the transfer to the new colony of certain sacred objects, gathered by Elissa and brought with her into exile for use in the new foundation, thus replicating the model of Tyre.³² But it has also been suggested that the expression *sacris Herculis ... repetitis* may allude to sacrifices made to Melqart before departing.³³ In a recent study, Giuseppe Garbati conducts a thorough analysis of the possible interpretations of the verb *repeto* in the passage.³⁴ In his opinion, the reference to the *sacra Herculis* ought to be construed in terms of a ritual, which 'recovered' or 'reinstated' them in Tyre itself, and therefore not as identifying artefacts that were moved to the new city. He links this new interpretation with the relationship, in terms of identity, developed by Carthage towards Tyre and Melqart, the god of the metropolis, but not the city's main deity or the central figure in shaping the community's identity, a role played by Baal Hammon and made apparent in such characteristic phenomena as the *tophet*.³⁵

32 Bonnet 1986: 212; 1988: 165; Marín 2011: 214–215.

33 Bunnens 1979: 175 n. 105, though he also admits that they could refer to sacred objects carried by the fugitives.

34 Garbati 2015. I sincerely appreciate G. Garbati allowing me to read his forthcoming papers as his approaches have been a genuine inspiration in my own work.

35 Garbati 2013; see also Bonnet 2011a; Quinn 2011.

Tyrian Melqart plays a significant role in the process of founding Carthage, but it is different from the one he played in Tyre and Gadir. No foundational oracle exists in this case, yet Melqart intervenes to secure the fulfilment of Elissa's founding mission. Pygmalion is set to persecute his sister 'with an impious war', though he is deterred 'by his mother's entreaties and by warnings from the gods; for inspired soothsayers predicted that he would not go unpunished if he impeded the growth of a city that has enjoyed the most auspicious foundation in the world' (*aegre precibus matris deorumque minis victus quievit; cui cum inspirati vates canerent non inpune laturum, si incrementa urbis toto orbe auspicatissimae interpellasset*. Iust. 18.5.6–7).³⁶

A link could be established between the *sacra Herculis repetita* by Elissa and the expression *urbis ... auspicatissima*. Elissa could have already initiated in Tyre, by means of certain *sacra Herculis* and legitimately as the wife of Melqart's priest, the founding procedure leading to the institution of the new community in Africa. The role of the *sacra* of Melqart in this case seems to be, as Garbati aptly states, some sort of 'Levantine prerequisite',³⁷ possibly associated to the legitimate Tyrian origin of the new city.

3.4 *The Colony of the Gaditanians in Justin (44.5.2)*

Traditional reports, regarding the founding of Tyre and Gadir in contrast to the origin of Carthage, provide a suitable framework to resume the account of the founding of the colony of the Gaditanians in Justin (44.5.2). This could be a further, and to date unknown, instance of a foundation, which takes place against the backdrop of the Tyrian diaspora after an oracle issued by Melqart is received in dreams, similarly to the case of Tyre and probably also the case of Gadir. The new interpretation of Justin's passage directly involves a reassessment of the role of Melqart's oracle and, in particular, of its dream component in foundation accounts within what could be described as the Tyrian *koine*.³⁸

Also in this case, the Gaditanians, as the 'earthborn folk' in Nonnus's account, played the part of anonymous executors of the deity's designs. It seems plausible to believe that, after founding the colony, the Gaditanians generated a narrative, which reproduced core elements of their own founding myth, directly inspired in turn by the Tyrian myth in Nonnus's version. On this occasion, the *sacra* of Melqart are indeed transferred from Tyre to Iberia and are directly linked to the founding of the city: *sacra Herculis ... in Hispaniam*

36 Justin uses the same term, *incrementum*, as in 44.5.2, regarding the development of the Gaditanians' colony.

37 Garbati 2015.

38 Álvarez 2014a.

transtulissent urbemque ibi condidissent. It is impossible to discern whether they consist of specific sacred objects or refer more broadly to the cult of Melqart.³⁹ At any rate, the reproduction of core elements in the Tyrian and Gaditanian myth, such as the dream oracle and the reference to the transfer of the *sacra* of the god from Tyre, might indicate that Melqart is perceived, also on this occasion, as the genuine founder of the city. A revision of traditional foundation reports in the Tyrian diaspora reveals, in short, a pattern: the founding of a city after receiving an oracle from Melqart in a dream; the city is consequently considered to have been founded by the god himself.

A hypothesis can be ventured about the identity of the city that conforms to the aforementioned pattern and to the historical and archaeological scenario of the Phoenicians in the Iberian Peninsula. If we contemplate the hypothesis that the Gaditanians could have promoted a colonial venture at a time in history prior to 237 BC, backed by the religious tutelage of the sanctuary of Melqart of Tyre, both archaeological data and literary tradition coincide in pointing to an *ex novo* foundation in a geographical and historical context, which could plausibly be linked to Gadir: Carteia, in the Bay of Algeciras, next to the Straits of Gibraltar. Archaeological work conducted since 1994 by researchers of the *Equipo Carteia*,⁴⁰ dates its founding levels to the mid-fourth century BC, perhaps earlier. The city was initially surrounded by a wall and underwent a second phase of monumentalization in the late third century, during the Barcid period. Amongst the findings yielded by the 'sacred area', there appears to be a foundational deposit linked to a series of Phoenician-Punic altars on which a temple was later built in the Roman colony.

A piece of information about Carteia in Strabo acquires new connotations after the revision of the traditional versions of mythical foundations in Tyrian diaspora:

At that point [the strait at the Pillars] there is a mountain belonging to those Iberians called the Bastetanians, also called the Bastoulians. It is Kalpe, whose circumference is not large but whose height is so large and steep that from a distance it appears to be an island. For someone sailing from Our Sea to the External, it is on the right, and near it, 40 stadia away,

39 The possibility that they may consist of relics attributed to the deity itself has been linked to Mela's reference (3.46) to the existence of *ossa* of Hercules in Gadir.

40 The *Equipo Carteia*, from the Universidad Autónoma of Madrid, has produced abundant bibliography; as main reference see Bendala, Blánquez and Roldán 2000; Roldán et al. 1998; 2003; 2006; Blánquez 2007; Blánquez, Bendala and Roldán 2009; Blánquez, Jiménez and Roldán 2012.

is the distinguished ancient city of Kalpe, which was once an Iberian naval station. To some it was a foundation of Herakles, among whom is Timosthenes, who says that it was called Herakleia in antiquity, and that its large circuit wall and shipsheds are still pointed out.

STR. 3.1.7; TRANSL. D.W. ROLLER

Strabo's Kalpe is unanimously identified with the city of Carteia. Timosthenes of Rhodes was admiral of the fleet of Ptolemy II Philadelphus. Early in the third century BC, the Rhodian wrote a *periplus* of the Mediterranean coastline paying particular attention to harbours. If Strabo is right, Timosthenes compiled this information less than a century after the city was founded. According to what has been said thus far, we might believe that Timosthenes' report does not originally refer to Greek Heracles but to Tyrian Melqart. Carteia was created as a Phoenician city and its proximity to the most significant sanctuary of Melqart in the West is a convincing indication that the version recorded by Timosthenes is a case of an *interpretatio graeca* of a vernacular legend whereby Melqart was the founder of the city. Yet, we could take one step beyond and propose that Carteia may have been the city founded by the Gaditanians as recorded in Justin's passage (44.5.2). The removal of the god's *sacra* from Tyre could be directly linked to Timosthenes' report that acknowledged Herakles (Melqart) as the founder of the city, as in the cases of Tyre and Gadir. A foundation of such high religious status, with the double participation of Melqart, both through his dream oracle and the transfer of his *sacra* from Phoenicia, provides a coherent context to explain the tradition that attributes the foundation of Carteia to Herakles, which was transmitted less than a century after the city was created.⁴¹

In the same passage, Strabo reports the tradition, which attributed the ancient name of *Herakleia* to Carteia. It has been suggested that the name may have been a translation of a Phoenician toponym designating it the 'city of Melqart' (*mlqrtyh*), and that *Carteia* was a result of its abbreviation.⁴² Ancient literary traditions about Carteia, its archaeology and toponymy, supports this

41 The difference between *transfere* (Iust. 44.5.2) and *repeto* (Iust. 18.4.15) could result from this question: the explicit reference to the transfer of the *sacra* from Tyre in the case of Carteia may be linked to the tradition whereby the city was Melqart's true foundation, unlike Carthage, where Melqart does not play that role.

42 Dietrich 1936: 15–16; Millás 1941: 317; Bonnet 1988: 231. One final argument in favour of the link between Gadir and Carteia resides in certain traditions whose meaning has yet to be fully elucidated and which, in various forms, identify ancient Tarteso both as Gadir and Carteia. See Alvar 1989; Álvarez 2007.

hypothesis identifying it as the city founded by the Gaditanians in Justin's account. Therefore, the ensuing question is whether it would be historically sound to suggest that Gadir promoted the founding of a city such as Carteia in the middle of fourth century BC. The researchers of *Equipo Carteia* have linked its creation to the parallel abandonment of the nearby Phoenician settlement of Cerro del Prado, whose origins go back to the seventh century BC. The new city could have originated due to the population, formerly settled in Cerro del Prado, moving to a larger location, closer to the sea and controlling access to an estuary, which was perfectly suited to host a port.⁴³ This option would be compatible with the new reading of Justin's text, which gives not only Gadir but also Tyre itself, a prominent role in its foundation.⁴⁴ It seems plausible to suggest that Gadir and its sanctuary of Melqart played an active part in the founding of a city so closely linked in literary tradition to Herakles. This does not preclude the possibility that the Phoenician population living in Cerro del Prado—whose origin in the seventh century BC had been linked to Gadir—may have participated in the constitution of the new community.

Identifying Carteia as the city founded by the Gaditanians in Justin's passage provides a chronological anchor for the other episodes described in the account. In the middle of the fourth century BC, according to this reading, Gadir promoted its foundation, but conflict arose with neighbouring peoples after the new city makes progresses. This situation justified the Carthaginian expedition to aid the Gaditanians, and this intervention finally resulted in the establishment of some stable Carthaginian bases in the Iberian Peninsula. This sequence can be directly correlated with our current knowledge of the fourth-century BC historical evolution and archaeological panorama in this zone.⁴⁵ During the fourth century BC, a remarkable expansion of Gaditanians productions is documented in the south-western coast of Iberia. This phenomenon, which intensifies in the second part of the century in the Algarve, is labelled as an indisputable 'gaditanização' by E. de Sousa and A.M. Arruda.⁴⁶ A similar process in the mouth of the river Guadalquivir and in the environment of the ancient *lacus Ligustinus* is documented, featuring an exponential increase in products from Gaditanian workshops.⁴⁷

On the other hand, in the middle of the fourth century BC, a change in production, trade and population trends has been detected in the Gaditanian

43 Blázquez et al. 2012.

44 Álvarez 2014a.

45 See various contributions in Ferrer 2010. Also Ferrer and Pliego 2010.

46 Sousa and Arruda 2010.

47 Ferrer, García and Escacena 2010.

region and its area of economic and political influence, known as the 'Circle of the Strait'.⁴⁸ These changes coincide with an escalation of Carthaginian trading towards the West,⁴⁹ and have been increasingly associated with the possible presence of Carthaginian military contingents in the area.⁵⁰ Consequently, numismatic evidence has led some scholars to defend the presence of Carthaginian garrisons in Turdetania, prior to the Barcid period.⁵¹ In processes such as the colonization of Gaditanian *campiña* in the fourth century BC, which had been directly associated by modern scholars with Carthage,⁵² two moments have been identified, which coincide with the timeline in Justin's new reading: an initial Gaditanian phase and a second phase when the Carthaginian vector takes over.⁵³

The possibility of a Carthaginian presence in the area could, finally, be linked to the signing of the second treaty between Rome and Carthage in 348 BC where, according to some scholars, reference is made to the Iberian Peninsula and, in particular, to the area of the Straits of Gibraltar.⁵⁴ According to Polybius (3.24.3), the treaty started alluding to the people of Carthage, of Tyre and of Utica. The inclusion of the Tyrians in the treaty could be related precisely with the prominent religious role that the metropolis appear to play among their old colonies in this period.⁵⁵ At any rate, the absence of Gadir in the treaty is remarkable, and could bear relation with the decision of Carthage to remain in Iberia after the military crisis, perhaps against the will of Gadir.

Finally, it could even be feasible to attribute references to Carthaginian exploratory and colonial ventures in the Atlantic and, in particular, the travels of Hanno and Himilco, to the period starting after the Carthaginian intervention in Iberia, in the middle of the fourth century BC. Some researchers attribute a late chronology to these travels, which would be in keeping⁵⁶ with the new historical and chronological framework resulting from the rereading of Justin's passage.⁵⁷

48 Tarradell 1967; Niveau 2001; Sáez, Díaz and Sáez 2004.

49 Ramón 2006.

50 López Castro 1992b; 2006; López Pardo and Suárez 2002; Ferrer and Pliego 2010; 2013.

51 Pliego 2003a; 2003b; Ferrer and Pliego 2010; 2011; 2013.

52 López Castro 1992b; Carretero 2007. 172–177.

53 Ferrer and Pliego 2010.

54 Ferrer and De la Bandera 1997; Ferrer 2008; see also Moret 2002.

55 See López Castro 2004: 157, who instead suggests that the Tyrians of the treaty refers to the Western Phoenicians, including the Gaditanians. See also Tsirkin 1996; Koch 2001.

56 Mederos and Escribano 2000.

57 An up-to-date account of the discussion in González 2008. All these arguments are delved into extensively in Álvarez 2014a.

4 Melqart and the Shaping of Tyrian Identities

The comparative analysis of traditions regarding the foundation of Tyre, Gadir and Carthage not only provides a context for Justin's revised account but also supports the identification of Carteia as the Gaditanian colony. The aforementioned traditions constitute a fundamental reference point for the study of the various forms of identity shaping that occur in the Tyrian colonial diaspora.⁵⁸ The revision of Justin's account provides further evidence for and elements to analyse within the process of shaping a religious and identity network around Tyre and Melqart in the sphere of the Phoenician colonial diaspora, whose study is a topic currently attracting great attention.⁵⁹ This interest is demonstrated by recent reflections on allusions to Melqart in Phoenician epigraphy in the West, and in particular, in a group of inscriptions with dedications to the Tyrian god, dating between the fourth and second centuries BC.⁶⁰

4.1 Archegetes

Bilingual inscriptions—in Phoenician and Greek—on the renowned twin *cippi* from Malta are the most remarkable instances in this group (*CIS* I, 122–122 bis = *ΚΑΙ* 47).⁶¹ In the Phoenician text, Melqart is called *b'l šr*, 'Lord of Tyre', while in the Greek version he becomes Herakles *archegetes*. Furthermore, in the Greek text, the dedicators explicitly identify themselves as 'Tyrians'. The equivalence between Melqart, *Baal of Tyre*, and Herakles *archegetes* in the inscriptions from Malta is both thought provoking and hard to explain. In the Greek world, *archegetes* is a title given to founders of colonies and civic institutions and an epiclesis applied to deities such as Dionysus, Athena, Hera, Herakles and, above all, to Apollo of Delphi, as the leader of colonial enterprises through his oracle.⁶² The term *archegetes* is particularly rich in semantic possibilities in connection with Melqart of Tyre, recently explored by C. Bonnet. The element *archè* conveys a dual concept: 'celui de fondation, dans le sens de début, de naissance, mais aussi celui de fondement, de socle'.⁶³ *Archegetes* might not only refer to the role as leader of Tyrian colonists in the Mediterranean, but

58 See excellent introductions to the issue in Bonnet 2009; and in Garbati 2012.

59 Malkin 2005; Bonnet 2005; 2009; Bonnet and Garbati 2009; Marín 2011; Garbati 2012; 2015.

60 Amadasi 2005a.

61 Zanolello 1981; Amadasi 2005a: 47–48; Bonnet 1988: 245; 2009: 300–305. Amadasi and Rossignani 2002: 23, for whom the formula and onomastics used in the texts link these inscriptions to the area of Tyre in the third and second centuries BC.

62 Malkin 1987: 241ff.; 2005; Bonnet 2009.

63 Bonnet 2009: 302–303.

also 'au processus d'appropriation culturelle du cosmos et d'espaces habitables par les communautés, tyriennes et diasporiques'.⁶⁴

4.2 *Melqart 'l hšr*

The study of Tyre's role as the epicentre of an identity network of communities who perceive it as their mother-city has been revived, thanks to the reinterpretation of a group of three inscriptions in Sardinia and one recently found in Ibiza, where reference is made to Melqart 'l hšr, that is, 'upon the rock'.⁶⁵ The inscription from Antas, dating from the fourth or third century BC, is etched on a bronze plate found in the temple of *Sid b'by* (*Sid/Sardus Pater*) and contains a dedication to 'the Lord, to Melqart 'l hšr'. The shaft of a column from Cagliari, discovered outside its original context, contains an inscription consisting of a dedication to Melqart followed by the same expression: 'l hšr. A text, also found out of context, dating from the third century BC and written on a black paving stone from Tharros, starts with a dedication 'To the Lord, the sacred god Melqart 'l hšr'. In all three cases, the term 'l hšr referring to Melqart has been translated as 'of the rock' or 'who stands upon the rock'. The concentration of inscriptions in Sardinia has led some to consider that šr could allude to a sanctuary on the island, such as the one in Antas,⁶⁶ or else it could be a toponym, šr, identifiable not as the Phoenician Tyre but as Tharros.⁶⁷

However, the recent find of a similar inscription in Ibiza, dating from the third century BC has redirected the debate.⁶⁸ The inscription from Ibiza is engraved on a cubic pedestal, probably the base of a statue and its text commemorates, also in this case, a dedication to Melqart 'l hšr. This inscription from Ibiza has prompted a reinterpretation of the meaning of the place-name šr.⁶⁹ Melqart 'l hšr is, in the first place, the one 'who stands upon the rock'. But šr is, at the same time, the name of Tyre, a city erected on a rocky isle whose foundational myth, as we have seen, revolves around the stabilization of formerly wandering drifting Ambrosial Rocks by Melqart. Finally, in the inscriptions from Malta, Melqart is called *b'l šr, Lord of Tyre*. According to Bonnet and Garbati, šr may designate not a Sardinian or Western toponym but Tyre itself. As a result, the dedications from Sardinia and Ibiza to Melqart, the god of the ancient metropolis, around the fourth or third century BC, could have

64 Bonnet 2009: 303.

65 Amadasi 2005a; 2005b; Bonnet 2009; Marín 2011; Garbati 2012.

66 Perceived as a 'rock': Garbini 1997.

67 Amadasi 2005a.

68 Amadasi 2005a; 2006; Ramón et al. 2010; Estanyol 2010.

69 Bonnet 2009; Garbati 2012.

significant implication.⁷⁰ According to Bonnet, the ethnic and religious identity of Phoenician communities settled in Tharros, Antas, Cagliari or Ibiza takes root in the cultural and cultic heritage of their metropolis. Tyre, 'the primordial rock', thus becomes a 'lieu de mémoire', the ancestral model of a 'sauvage' rock regained for civilization by the guardian god of their communities.⁷¹ Besides, Tyre could be the original reference point, the symbolic centre of a colonial network stretching towards the West: 'Di roccia in roccia, di promontorio in promontorio, i santuari segnano lo spazio fenicio e collegano sia la madre patria alle colonie ...'.⁷²

If we connect Melqart 'upon the rock/Tyre' from Sardinia and Ibiza with Melqart *archegetes* in the inscriptions from Malta, it becomes apparent that Tyre and Melqart constitute the focal point of representations of religion and identity in Tyre's old colonies. It has recently been argued that this evidence points to the existence of a 'Tyrian identity' built upon shared origins, namely Tyre and its god, Melqart. As Garbati states, 'Tyre, con Melqart, rappresenta il ricordo fondante, la figura simbolica (il "punto fisso") attorno al quale si coagula il passato'.⁷³

4.3 *Herakles para apoikois*

Carthage, in this sense, constitutes a special case. On the one hand, literary sources reporting its relationship with Tyre clearly reveal the intensity and endurance of ties between the metropolis and its colonies. But this case has its own unique features.⁷⁴ The evidence demonstrating Carthage's religious dependence on Tyre—with its economic and political nuances—is well known.⁷⁵ Herodotus describes the Phoenicians' refusal to take part in the campaign Cambyses II planned against Carthage after his conquest of Egypt in 525 BC, 'for they were bound, they said, by strong oaths, and if they sailed against their own progeny they would be doing an impious thing' (Hdt. 3.19.2; transl. A.D. Godley). Close enough in time is the episode of Mazeus-Malchus and his son Karthalo, a priest of Melqart, who had been sent to Tyre 'by the Carthaginians to bring Hercules tithes from the Sicilian plunder taken by his father' (Justin 18.7.1–5; transl. Yardley). One century later, similar information

70 Bonnet 2009; Garbati 2012.

71 'L'identité religieuse se bâtit donc par référence à un passé paradigmatique qui dessine le futur des « bourgeois » occidentaux', Bonnet 2009: 304.

72 Bonnet in Bonnet and Garbati 2009: 345; see also Garbati 2012.

73 Garbati 2012: 168.

74 Garbati 2015.

75 Elayi 1981; Bonnet 1988: 166–167; Ferjaoui 1993; Lancel 1995: 36–37.

is reported in the context of Himilco's campaign in Sicily. Diodorus (13.108.2–4) recounts that after taking Gela in 405 BC, Himilco sent to Tyre 'a bronze statue of Apollo of colossal size', which was erected on the outskirts of the city. This statue of Apollo plays a significant role in the accounts of Alexander's siege of Tyre. In one such mention, Curtius Rufus underlines the traditional relationship between the Carthaginians and Tyre: 'with many other spoils of the cities which they had captured they had adorned Tyre rather than Carthage.' (Curt. 4.3.22). The siege of Tyre by Alexander in 332 BC (Iust. 11.10.10–14; Arrian, *Anabasis of Alexander* 2.15–24; Curt. 4.2–4; Diod. 17.40–47; Plut. *Alexander* 24.2–25.3) is the source of plentiful stories concerning the links between Carthage and Tyre, as the Carthaginian envoys were present in the city on the occasion of a religious festival (Curt. 4.2.10; Arr. *An.* 2.24), perhaps the renowned *egersis* of Melqart.⁷⁶

At any rate, literary sources agree on the fact that the gathering was an opportunity to worship Melqart as god of the 'fatherland'. According to Arrian, the Carthaginian envoys had 'come to their mother-city to pay honour to Herakles, according to some ancient custom' (Arr. *An.* 2.24.5; transl. E. Iliff Robson). This notion is repeated in a particularly significant passage in Curtius:

Envoys of the Carthaginians had come at that time to celebrate an annual festival in the manner of their country; for the Tyrians founded Carthage and were always honoured as the forefathers of the Carthaginians.

CURT. 4.2.10⁷⁷

The same information is conveyed in the report about the statue of Apollo, which was captured in Sicily and sent to Tyre. In this respect, Curtius (4.3.22) states that the Carthaginians 'had placed it in their ancestral fatherland' (*et in maiore locaverant patria*).

It can be assumed from these sources that amongst the elements of the religious festival in Tyre, the celebration of Melqart as the god of the metropolis seems to have played a prominent role, as the god of the founding fathers who was present at the time of the creation of the colonies and who therefore continued to have a major influence over them. The essential connotations documented so far surrounding the figure of Melqart are combined and condensed in an inscription of Delos from 153/152 BC, containing a decree of the

⁷⁶ Amitay 2008: 96 ff.

⁷⁷ *Carthaginiensium legati ad celebrandum sacrum anniversarium more patrio tunc venerant: quippe Carthaginem Tyrii condiderunt, semper parentum loco culti*. Transl. Rolfe, Ed. Hedicke.

Herakleistai of Tyre.⁷⁸ This community of Tyrians, settled in Delos, describes Herakles (Melqart) as *archegos tes patridos*, 'founder of the fatherland'.⁷⁹ Such a title confirms the attribution of the foundation of Tyre to Melqart and consequently his relevance amongst the Tyrian communities outside Phoenicia.⁸⁰

While Melqart plays different roles in the past of Carthage and of Gadir and, consequently, in the shaping of their civic identity,⁸¹ the strength of the ties between the north African city and Melqart of Tyre is quite remarkable. This is dramatically evidenced a few years after the taking of Tyre, in 310 BC, when it was the Carthaginians who had to endure a siege laid by Agathocles. In the description of the episode, Diodorus reports that the Carthaginians attributed their misfortunes to the wrath of Tyrian Herakles:

The Carthaginians ... because they believed that Heracles, who aids colonists (*para tois apoikois*), was exceedingly angry with them ... sent a large sum of money and many of their most expensive offerings to Tyre. After having come to that city as colonists, it had been their custom in earlier times to send to the god a tenth of all that was paid into the public revenue; but later, when they had acquired great wealth, and were receiving more considerable revenues, they sent very little indeed, holding the divinity of little account.

DIOD. 20.14.1–2; following the adaptation of R.M. Geer's translation given in Quinn 2011

The meaning of the term *para apoikois* applied to Herakles (Melqart) is not fully defined. According to the text, the Carthaginians believed that the arrogance resulting from their recent affluence and the neglect of their duties towards Tyre triggers the rage of the gods. To try to placate the gods, they then turned to the original practises of their mother-city: 'But turning to repentance because of this misfortune, they bethought them of *all the gods of Tyre*' (Diod. 20.14.2; our italics). Numerous gifts were sent to Tyre to placate Melqart.⁸² Yet, according to Diodorus, Carthaginians also attributed their troubles to the wrath of Kronos (Baal Hammon), in this case because of irregularities in the

⁷⁸ ID 1519; Dürrbach 1921: 140–144.

⁷⁹ Bonnet 2009: 305–308; Hirt 2015: 202–203.

⁸⁰ See Bonnet 2009: 305–308 on the links between the figures of Melqart and Apollo in Delos.

⁸¹ See Garbati 2015; also Bonnet 1986.

⁸² Bonnet (2015) poses a suggestive connection between the Carthaginian *aphidrymata* sent to Tyre in 310 BC and the *sacra* involved in the founding of the city in Justin's account.

tradition of sacrifices of children offered to the divinity. In order to pacify the god, 200 children were publicly sacrificed in Carthage and no less than 300 spontaneously (Diod. 20.14.2). The account, as Garbati has pointed out, 'is anyway symptomatic, since different solutions are found in face of the anger of the two gods: in the case of Melqart, the Carthaginians have to go back to their motherland; with Baal, they manage the crisis within the borders of their city'.⁸³

In both cases, Carthaginians 'believed that they had neglected the honours of the gods that had been established by their fathers' (Diod. 20.14.5). Melqart (Herakles) *para apoikois*, the god who protects or looks after the colonists is, specifically, Melqart of Tyre, who can be directly associated with Melqart *ʾl ḥsr* mentioned in the inscriptions from Sardinia and Ibiza. Melqart remains vigilant and protective of the communities in the diaspora from Tyre itself. Besides, this image of Melqart is consistent with the image of Melqart as *archegos*, the founder of the mother-city, and as *archegetes*, the leader of colonial ventures. The presence of the god in the creation of colonies be it directly as the founder or as the founders' god, creates a manifold yet indissoluble link, associated with a certain level of apotropaic protection deployed from Tyre, the primordial rock.

4.4 *Origo and consanguinitas in Times of War*

This scenario, in which Tyre and Melqart play central roles in a colonial network created around Tyrian ethnic identity, provides a good framework to interpret the episode of the foundation of the colony of the Gaditanians in Justin 44.5.2. Remarkable chronological compatibility exists between the various historical elements at play. Identifying Carteia as the city founded by the Gaditanians in Justin's passage would place the episode in the middle of the fourth century BC. The inscriptions from Sardinia and Malta date from the fourth and third centuries BC. In 332 BC, the siege of Tyre reveals, through various data, the close connection between Carthage with the mother-city and Melqart. In addition, the episode of the Carthaginians resuming their formerly neglected traditions of worship of Melqart of Tyre, *para apoikois*, dates from 310 BC.

In order to create the new community, promoted by Gadir, an old colony of Tyre, certain *sacra* of Melqart had to be transferred from the ancient metropolis. While it is not possible to elucidate the specific nature of these *sacra Herculis*, the most relevant factor here is the extraordinary significance given to the Tyrian provenance of these elements, whether they consisted of actual objects or of the cult of the god or both. It seems that the worship of Melqart

83 Garbati 2015.

in the new community requires the purity or legitimacy, which can only be granted by the sanctuary of the god in Tyre. This becomes apparent in the fact that in Gadir itself there was a sanctuary of Melqart of unquestionable prominence. The Tyrian provenance of the *sacra* and the tutelage, provided by the Levantine Melqart in the foundational episode, would confirm the thesis that the toponym *sr* applied to Melqart 'upon the rock' refers to Tyre itself. All instances refer, indeed, to the relevance of Melqart of Tyre as the religious referent in the context of the network of old colonies.

The mention of Melqart of Tyre in the inscriptions from Sardinia and Ibiza has been understood as a way of recreating Tyrian identity, highlighting the existence of an element of 'fiction', of adaptive construction in local contexts.⁸⁴ The episode in Justin contributes certain nuances concerning the figure of Melqart as the active creator of identities. The view expressed by Corinne Bonnet that Melqart is 'il dio delle *fondamenta* (*arché* in greco) e delle *fondazioni*, quindi l'*archégétès*, il fondatore ...' would be confirmed.⁸⁵ The foundation of the colony of the Gaditanians might be some sort of action, captured 'live', carried out by Melqart of Tyre as *archegetes*, laying the foundations of the new community, actively building its origin, and also its past, and appearing as its genuine founder, as in the case of Gadir. The foundational ritual portrayed in the account may also involve the creation of a new Tyrian community in Carteia. Melqart's intervention propitiates the formation of a city with its own peculiar civic identity, which would unquestionably acknowledge its filial links with Gadir but which could also ultimately claim a Tyrian *origo*, as Carthage or Gadir did.

Another episode in Justin's passage provides a hint of the political significance of being incorporated, as a new and legitimate node, into the network of cities that shared the belief in a common Tyrian origin. One of the elements shaping Tyrian identity is the concept of kinship, the belief that all communities sharing the same Tyrian ancestry are linked by ties of brotherhood, wherefrom duties of mutual assistance and solidarity are also derived.⁸⁶ The existence of ties of brotherhood and solidarity amongst communities of Tyrian origin is reflected in a passage in Justin concerning Carthage and Utica. Soon after the arrival of Elissa and her followers in Africa, 'ambassadors from the people of Utica brought the Tyrians gifts, recognizing them as their relatives

84 Garbati 2012.

85 Bonnet 2008: 676.

86 A highly interesting comparative reference is that of Phocaean identity in the West: see Domínguez 2004.

(*consanguineis*), and urged them to found a city in that place where they had settled by chance' (Iust. 18.5.12).

The new interpretation of Justin (44.5.2–3) places the episode of the Carthaginian aid to Gadir at a much later time from that of the 'classic' colonial period, dated to the ninth and eighth century BC. Therefore, in the historical scenario proposed, soon after the foundation of the colony of the Gaditanians—Carteia, hypothesized here—hostility from some neighbouring peoples and the ensuing conflict cause Carthage to send military aid to Gadir: 'The Carthaginians therefore sent assistance to their relatives (*consanguineis*) ...'. The passage notably repeats the allusion to the same concept Justin uses in the instance of Utica and Carthage, *consanguinitas*, in this case connecting Gaditanians and Carthaginians because of their common Tyrian origin. It is first stated that Tyre is the common origin of both peoples (... *Gaditani a Tyro, unde et Karthaginiensibus origo est* ...), and next their ties of kinship are stressed (*Gaditanos ... consanguineis Karthaginienses*) as a context to explain the Carthaginian assistance. This repeated allusion to a Tyrian origin gains particular relevance when, as proposed, the helping expedition takes place soon after the foundation of what could have been perceived as a new node in the Tyrian network.

It could therefore be concluded that the *consanguinitas* resulting from the shared awareness of a Tyrian origin played a highly relevant part in this multipolar structure of communities, especially in times of war. In fact, it could even be considered as one of the reasons for the endurance and strength of Tyrian ethnic identity. We are still far from knowing what practices consolidated this kinship in time. It would be interesting to speculate that the religious festival, celebrated in Tyre in 332 BC in the presence of Carthaginian envoys, was also attended by representatives from other Tyrian communities, but evidence of this is lacking. The fact that the *sacra* of Melqart were transferred from Tyre to found the Gaditanian colony indicates, in any event, that communication between Tyre and Gadir during the fourth and third century BC must have been much more intense and fluid than we had so far suspected.⁸⁷

It would be inappropriate, however, to idealize the nature of solidarity between nodes within the Tyrian network. Carthaginian prominence in the south of the Peninsula, after their military intervention in the zone, was not necessarily a situation sought by the Gaditanians. Underlying tension between the two cities can indeed be noted at a later period in time.⁸⁸ Whatever the level of Carthaginian presence in Iberia may have been after they sent

87 Marín 2011: 219.

88 Pérez 2003; Mederos and Escribano 2000; Chaves 2009; Álvarez 2012a.

assistance to Gadir, it seems to have been seriously affected at some stage between the middle of the fourth century and the year 237 BC. This possibility is supported by the renowned passage in Polybius (2.1.6), who explicitly states that Hamilcar 'set about recovering (*anektato*) the Carthaginian possessions (*pragmata*) in Iberia'. The possible role played by Gadir in the loss of Carthaginian control over some *pragmata* in Iberia is yet to be elucidated, but the situation by the end of the Second Punic War, with Gadir's defection to the Roman side in 206 BC, suggests that duties resulting from Tyrian *consanguinitas* did have their limits. The defection of Utica, another node in the Tyrian network, in the framework of the 'Truceless War', is a further instance in this respect.⁸⁹ But the best example is the very relationship between Carthage and Tyre, the central node in the network. Despite the intensity and long endurance of their maternal-filial bond, it has been shown that it did suffer ups and downs, and the lack of military support from Carthage to the metropolis during Alexander's siege is clear evidence of this.⁹⁰ It could be concluded that Tyrian *consanguinitas* constitutes a potential framework of solidarity and mutual assistance subject to the economic, political and military circumstances prevailing at the time.

5 Melqart of Tyre, between Polarity and Multipolarity

J.M. Hall, in his classic study, proposed viewing ethnic identity as 'the operation of socially dynamic relationships, which are constructed on the basis of a putative shared ancestral heritage'.⁹¹ Based on this definition, the elements analysed in this paper confirm the existence of a Tyrian identity shared by a group of communities that place the city of Tyre and its god Melqart at the centre of their 'shared ancestral heritage'.⁹² The revision confirms the intensity of this framework of identity based on the awareness of a Tyrian origin, long after the moment of foundation of the main nodes in the colonial network, and in particular, Gadir and Carthage. The probable reference to Melqart of Tyre in the inscriptions from Sardinia and Ibiza, the allusions to him as *para apoikois* (Diod. 20.14.1), or the episode of the foundation of the Gaditanian colony in Justin (44.5.2), support the notion of the extraordinary significance Tyre and Melqart had in the sphere of religion and identity for a whole group

89 Hoyos 2007.

90 Elayi 1981.

91 Hall 1997: 16.

92 Bonnet 2009; Garbati 2012; 2015.

of communities, from the eastern Mediterranean to the Atlantic in the fourth and third centuries BC. Melqart's central part in this identity network seems to essentially rest on his position as the founder and lord of Tyre, as the main deity of the mother-city, and as the god of the founding fathers of the colonies. In the context of identity, Melqart is the god of the origins, appropriately placed to allow and facilitate a link with Tyre and between the various nodes of the network.

On the other hand, it could be asserted that what guarantees the true Tyrian ancestry of a new community is not only the Tyrian origin of its founders but the presence of Melqart *of Tyre* in the colony's foundational protocols. In the cases reviewed in this chapter—Tyre itself, Gadir, Carthage and the Gaditanian colony in Justin—the presence of Melqart, although in different forms, is essential in creating a link with the metropolis and in establishing Tyrian ethnic legitimacy. This Tyrian identity is doubly important, because it also serves as the basis for a network of communities linked by ties of fraternity, of *consanguinitas*. Likewise, subtle differences in terms of Melqart's participation in foundation processes contribute to developing civic identities in new communities where Melqart plays different roles. These identity-building processes take place, as Bonnet aptly describes, following 'modalités à géométrie variable'.⁹³

In Carthage, Melqart of Tyre is the god of the mother-city and of founders, but he does not appear to be the main religious referent for the creation of civic identity, at least during the period of time dealt with in this chapter. Carthage's civic identity is shaped, conversely, around Baal Hammon and Tinnit, which may be closely connected with the phenomenon of the *tophet*.⁹⁴ In Gadir, Melqart is not only the god of the mother-city but as in Tyre, the genuine founder of the city and the indisputable protagonist in the shaping of its civic identity. In fact, Gadir constitutes a very peculiar case, a mimetic transfer of Tyre itself in many aspects, reproducing in the far west the mythical topography of the metropolis. Melqart's role in Gadir, as in Tyre, has connotations beyond the mere foundational process. His participation is, to some extent, cosmogonical: he is the one who stabilizes and consolidates the island on which his city and sanctuary are built. Due to this, Melqart in Gadir plays an apotropaic and protective role towards the community, navigation and essentially, the *oikoumene*, parallel to the part played by Melqart in Tyre.⁹⁵

93 Bonnet 2009: 295.

94 Lancel 1995: 227–256; Quinn 2011; Bonnet 2011a; Garbati 2012; 2013; 2015.

95 Marín 2011: 220.

The Gaditanian colony in Justin's account is, without doubt, a singular instance. The participation of Melqart of Tyre in its foundation may be understood, in terms of identity, as the guarantor of its legitimate Tyrian nature, which would facilitate its incorporation into a network stretching to both sides of the known world. But the possibility of identifying the city mentioned in the account as Carteia opens up new perspectives of interpretation. It allows us to think that, as in the case of Tyre itself or Gadir, the new community was considered as having been directly founded by the god. Should the tradition about the name *Herakleia* correspond to a Phoenician toponym, which includes the name of Melqart, the foundation of the Gaditanians would appear to be particularly extraordinary. When assessing Melqart's possible leading role in Carteia, we ought to bear in mind the ability of the Tyrian god to create networks not only amongst the colonies of Tyre. We should also bear in mind the fact that Melqart-Herakles was traditionally connected with instances of negotiation in inter-cultural encounters in the 'middle grounds'.⁹⁶

Amongst the communities shaping the Tyrian colonial diaspora, links with the period of the origins and with the mother-city unquestionably involve a primordial source of prestige and legitimacy. This particularly applies to communities such as Gadir due to the special role attributed to Melqart in its founding. Ties with Tyre must have been a key factor in the construction of the discourse of power of local aristocracies, especially of sacerdotal elites.⁹⁷ Besides, connections with Tyre in a war scenario must have been the essential argument to activate interstate solidarity within a network of communities linked by the figure of Melqart. In conclusion, Melqart appears to be a deity with tendencies towards both polarity and multi-polarity. The power of Melqart of Tyre as a reference for the colonial diaspora is extraordinarily intense. Furthermore, at the same time, the god multiplies himself by being present in new sites within the network and propitiating a radial link of solidarity between its nodes on the basis of a common Tyrian identity.

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⁹⁶ See Malkin 2005 and the case of Heraklea-Minoa in Sicily.

⁹⁷ López Castro 1998 regarding the case of Gadir-Gades and its role during the Empire; also López Castro 2004; Álvarez 2012b.

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Warlords, Carthage and the Limits of Hegemony

Louis Rawlings

In the multipolar Mediterranean of the fifth–third centuries BC, Carthage stands out as one of the major players, and, at times, *the* major player in the West. It was a trans-regional power, with territories and interests in Africa, Sicily, Sardinia and Spain. A significant and somewhat unpredictable dynamic in the development of Carthaginian hegemony across this extended sphere of interest was the interaction between the Republic and a host of local, but powerful individuals, whose personal military resources had the potential to help or hinder its interests. Tyrants, mercenary captains, tribal chieftains, and their rivals, at times played pivotal roles in determining the success of Carthaginian hegemonic aspirations. The methods of Carthaginian diplomatic activity and foreign policy in dealing with such warlords have tended to be appreciated in the particular; the capacity of Carthage to play local politics, seen from a broader perspective, has been relatively understudied. This chapter will suggest that the Carthaginians (either the organs of government such as the assembly and council, or its representatives such as individual magistrates, generals or ‘kings’) drew on a more or less standard repertoire of approaches to deal with warlords. Because these occur across a wide range of geographical and temporal contexts they might be considered as instruments in a ‘toolbox’ of hegemony. The problems and opportunities Carthage encountered when dealing with warlords, and the solutions that Carthage applied, allow us insight into the flexibility, durability and limitations of the hegemony that it developed. Such insights will also be relevant to developing a broader understanding of how ancient states dealt with warlords and, indeed, for assessing this fundamental element of interstate or, rather, asymmetrical state-personality dynamics that are one of the concerns of this volume. Consequently, this discussion contributes not only to understanding a vital aspect of Carthaginian foreign policy, but engages with issues that help inform our understanding of ‘multipolar’ interactions within and beyond states in antiquity.

The discussion will begin with a brief overview of the regional contexts of warlordism in the Western Mediterranean, before turning to consider the advantages derived by the Carthaginians of engaging with warlords and the inducements that were offered to ensure co-operation with the Carthaginian state. Such men were not passive tools to be used or set aside, they were independent and self-interested operators; consequently, there will be a consideration of the ways in which they manipulated relations with Carthage for their

own benefit. Finally, an assessment will be made of the shortcomings of these relationships for Carthaginian hegemony, in the competitive multipolar environment of the Western Mediterranean.

The Contexts of Warlordism

This chapter will consider three regions in which the Carthaginians were particularly active in projecting their hegemonic power. It will concentrate on communities that were dominated by military autocrats.¹ In Sicily, warlordism most obviously manifested as tyranny in Greek states. Much could be said of Sicilian tyranny that lies beyond the scope of this chapter. We are concerned with the ways in which the Carthaginians engaged with such men, primarily in the military sphere, and how such interactions exhibit the methods and limitations of Carthaginian hegemony in a regional environment of competitive and autonomous city-states.² The evidence for analogous Elymian and Siceliote warlordism is limited. The Sicel leader Ducetius flourished during a period (c. 460–440 BC) when the Carthaginians appear to have been conspicuously uninvolved in Sicily. Whether it is a coincidence or a by-product of this absence is unclear. From the 410–241 BC, when Carthage became more or less regularly involved in Sicily, Sicel and Sicanian military leaders rarely appear in the literary sources, with the notable exception of Agyris of Agyrium, ‘who possessed the strongest force of any of the tyrants at that time after Dionysius, since he was lord of all the neighbouring fortified communities’ (Diodorus Siculus 15.95.4).

Within a somewhat local multipolar environment of autonomous Sicilian communities, there were nevertheless moments of bipolar rivalry between Carthage and Syracuse that dominated other relationships on the island. In response to acts of aggression from Syracusan tyrants, Carthaginian hegemonic

1 Sardinia and Italy are omitted from this analysis. It appears that Carthage enjoyed an unchallenged primary status in Sardinia from the end of the sixth century and was able to consolidate this in the centuries that followed, until the revolt of 238 BC. The island seems relatively demilitarised, in the sense that it rarely supplied troops to Carthaginian campaigns, but predominantly supplies, and only in the Second Punic War do we hear of war-leaders, Hampsichora and his son Hostus, who, with Punic support, fomented revolt from Rome, Livy 23.32; 40–1. Hannibal’s relationships with Italian states and elites in Italy 218–203 BC have been the subject of study by Fronda 2010, who has illustrated the potential for understanding the dynamics and limitations of Hannibal’s policy and diplomacy towards communities driven by their own internal agendas and rivalries; see also Fronda and Gauthier in this volume.

2 On tyranny in Sicily see, for instance, Luraghi 1994; Mossé 2004.

influence in the west of the island appears gradually to have hardened into an imperial territory, the *epikrateia* or *eparchia*.³ Serious and destructive as it sometimes could be, the rivalry with Syracuse and its allies generally remained a regional conflict that rarely spilled over into other spheres of Carthaginian interest, except insofar as it required Carthage to raise money, supplies and military forces from beyond theatre.⁴

North Africa and Spain present a different context, for the warlords that Carthage encountered operated within tribal systems of power and competition. Our picture of these regions is clearest in the 3rd century, when they both played pivotal roles in the Second Punic War. Carthaginian interest in Spain intensified dramatically and violently in the aftermath of the First Punic War with Rome. Carthaginian campaigns in Spain from 237–206 BC were the actions of an external hegemonic, even imperialist aggressor, on a multipolar Iberian tribal system. In particular, Hamilcar Barca and his family engaged in assimilating, overawing or eliminating tribal war-leaders as part of an expansionist policy in the region.⁵ Barcid control was facilitated by the cultural and political organisation of tribes in Spain. Though many tribes possessed urban centres, they were nevertheless often politically organised so that chieftains, individually or jointly, were in control.⁶ Consequently the political relationships of the tribes with Carthage were predominantly conditioned by the Barcid approach to Iberian chieftains.

In Africa, Carthage had initially dealt with Libyan tribes, whose 'kings' we dimly perceive in the historical narratives of the fifth and fourth centuries. The Libyan population increasingly came to be subject to the will of Carthage, as the Republic increased the core territory that it administered and exploited

3 Whittaker 1978: 62; Miles 2010: 131–6, 138; see Cataldi 2003 for the terms *eparchia* and *epikrateia*.

4 The one exception is the invasion by Agathocles of the Carthaginian *chora* 310–307 BC. The planned invasion of Pyrrhus in 276 came to naught, partly due to Sicilian defections to Carthage, Plutarch *Pyrrhus* 23.5.

5 The only non-Barcid general who commanded in the region was Hasdrubal son of Gisco (214–206 BC), who nevertheless commanded alongside Hasdrubal and Mago, sons of Hamilcar Barca.

6 E.g. Liv. 29.3; Ruiz and Molinos 1998: 283. On Iberian society see, for instance, Ruiz 1997: 182–9; Ruiz and Molinos 1998: 280–3; Moret 2002–3; Quesada Sanz 2003: esp. 117, 125; Riera and Principal 2015: 60–3. Gsell 1928, vol.2: 313–4 notes that the Spanish leaders left in power under the Barcids, were called by Greek and Roman writers variously: *dynastai*, *basileis*, *tyrannoi*, *principes*, *duces*, *reguli*; see López Domech 1986. Fanning 2011: 44–47, notes that *regulus* is used interchangeably with *rex* in Livy, but also occurs in contexts where there were multiple leaders within a tribe, especially where tribes (or peoples) had internal divisions.

directly.⁷ By the third century BC, this extended up to 120 miles inland from the city. With the expansion of Carthaginian imperial control into the interior, Carthage attempted to impose its hegemonic influence over various independent Numidian tribes, sometimes by warfare, at other times through alliance. Numidian internal organisation often appears fragmented, dominated by war-leaders whose power rested on a combination of inherited standing, kinship, martial prowess and generosity to followers.⁸ At the time of the Second Punic War, if not earlier, the tribes came to be loosely formed into two major confederations of the Massyli and Masaesyli. These were dominated by overlords who styled themselves as kings and princes, but who nevertheless had to impose themselves on other chieftains.⁹

Beyond these regional variations, a further type of warlordism to note is that of captains of mercenary bands, whom Carthage recruited. M. Trundle has explored the crucial role that mercenary *condottieri* played in acting as conduits for state-employer contractual bargaining, military integration, command and loyalty in the Greek world.¹⁰ Such aspects can be identified in the western Mediterranean and in the Carthaginian system, although the evidence is unfortunately limited. It is unclear, for instance, how Clinon and his Greek horsemen came to be in service against the Numidian tribe of Zuphrones or what motivated this force to fight so gallantly against Agathocles' troops in that same campaign (Diod. 20. 38.1–6). Yet, at certain crisis points, notably during the Truceless War (241–237 BC), the careers of some mercenary leaders and the issues surrounding their employment become available for analysis.¹¹

7 Manfredi 2003.

8 Appian, *Punica* 10. *Ibid.* 11 suggests that Massinissa's power rested on a combination of inherited status and followers attracted to his service in return for booty. Liv. 29.29 notes the rivalry of Mazaetullus to the family of Gaia, his 'royal blood', combined with his own influence and authority with the Massyli, was sufficient to induce him to challenge Capussa in battle. After his victory, he attempted to integrate the followers of Gaia by allowing the young Lacumazes nominally to be called king. His marriage to the widow of Oezalces, former king (and brother of Gaia), strengthened his standing not just in the tribe, but with the Carthaginians, for she was the niece of Hannibal Barca. On the broader anthropological perspective of warlords and tribal power see Giustozzi and Ullah 2010: 134.

9 E.g. Liv. 29.29, Capussa's youth and lack of authority among the Massyli led to a military challenge from Mazaetullus. On Massinissa's treatment of opponents from within his own tribe see Polybius 15.3.6; App. *Pun.* 26.

10 Trundle 2004.

11 Hoyos 2007: 8–9, 48–9 examines the dynamics of mercenary leadership before and during the Truceless War (241–237 BC). When the soldiers became disenchanted with their leaders and killed those thought too closely implicated with the Carthaginians, they elected

The pan-Mediterranean reach of Carthage touched on warlords who were ethnically diverse, with attendant particularities of culture, politics and ethos, yet these men all possessed the quintessential ability to raise military forces for their personal ambitions, predominantly from their own resources. In this sense, such individuals possessed or sought *military legitimacy*.¹² In other words, their right to command was based on recognition by their followers (and, perhaps, among the wider population) of their martial attributes: their prowess, leadership and success in warfare.¹³ Also important were their personal economic, political and social resources, which allowed them to mobilise and maintain armed followers (through clientage or employment). Giustozzi has argued that such military power stands in contrast to *political legitimacy*, which focuses on the attributes and resources that lead to and stem from the holding of civic offices within the community.¹⁴ However, warlords can also acquire control of political and institutional organs, which may lead to them holding official offices, allowing them to co-opt the military resources of the community.¹⁵ This might allow them to transition from warlords to communal leaders.¹⁶ In many cases in antiquity, however, such definition was probably moot, since warlords tended to flourish where the organs of state were underdeveloped, weak or had been compromised, so that there was only a limited capacity to hold their operations and ambitions in check. Indeed, DeVries argued that it was through their martial attributes that many warlords acquired

replacements from their own ranks (or junior officers, perhaps). These continued negotiations with the generals and were evidently treated in the same fashion as their predecessors by the Carthaginian authorities, Polyb. 1.69.9–70.4. Diod. 22.69.3 notes that, in 307 BC, the troops abandoned by Agathocles in Africa first killed his sons, then elected new generals who came to terms with the Carthaginians, one clause being the opportunity for enlistment in Punic service.

12 DeVries 2001; Giustozzi 2005.

13 Weber 1994: 312–5; Marten 2006/7: 47–8.

14 Giustozzi 2005: 9, 13–14.

15 Morris 2009: 160–1 notes the use by Sicilian tyrants of wealth to hire mercenaries to coerce internal and external rivals. Dramatic enhancements of military power through financial exploitation of their personal and state resources allowed such men to pose a threat to Punic friends or allied states. Thus Gelon and Theron gained the upper hand against Terillus and Anaxilas, and then Carthage, by raising large armies in this way. Dionysius' vast expenditure of resources in c. 397 BC allowed him to sack Motya with 80,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry and 200 warships, Diod. 14.47.7.

16 Marten 2006/7: 47.

their political positions within their communities and maintained their right to rule.¹⁷

We should be prepared to recognise that the status and *legitimacies* of warlords might be mutable depending on the political and military context, but that where their power continues to rely, to a significant degree, on personal resources and military leadership, they remain, *in essence*, warlords. Two examples can illustrate this variability of politico-military standing in our period. One Syracusan exile, Agathocles, a man seemingly from humble or industrial background (Diod. 19.2.7), gathered together his own army to campaign in Southern Italy (c. 330 BC, Diod. 19.4.2). This *condottiero* later moved to the Sicilian interior, maintaining himself by raiding both Syracusan and Carthaginian allies (Diod. 19.5.4). In 316 BC, with Carthaginian help, he returned to his home city and became its tyrant, being conferred the title 'general with absolute power' (*stratēgos autokrator*) by the *demos* of Syracuse (Diod. 19.9.4; Justin 22.2.1–12); while from 305 BC he called himself 'king' (*basileus*).¹⁸ Similar mutability surrounds Massinissa, a Numidian officer in the Carthaginian army serving in Carthage and Spain from 210 BC, a prince in the succession politics of the Massyli (in 206), who after defeat by Syphax, leader of the Masaesyli, lived as a 'bandit' (205 BC).¹⁹ His prospects improved with the arrival of the Romans in Africa in 204 BC and, with a combination of military success and continued Roman blessing, he came to rule an enlarged territory as 'king' from 202–148 BC.²⁰ The constant in both of these careers was the ability to access and use personal military force, which, while serving their own interests, could potentially help or harm those of the Carthaginians.

Consequently, it was in the Carthaginian interest to try to co-opt or deflect the military potential of such men. While it might have seemed like playing with fire, and, in some cases, Carthaginian interests were severely compromised by the actions of such men, on numerous other occasions the Carthaginians proved quite adept at using warlords to their own advantage.

17 DeVries 2001: 67.

18 For Agathocles' career see Consolo Langher 2000. Zambon 2006: 78–84 focuses on his transition from tyrant to king. Berger 1992: 94–5 analyses the position of *stratēgos autokrator* concluding that 'It is almost impossible to draw the line between what was sanctioned through election by the assembly and what exceeded legal limits. Furthermore, it was impossible to distinguish between the real power of the tyrant, with which he could in any event seize power, and the legal authority of the *stratēgos autokrator*'.

19 Massinissa at Carthage, Liv. 27.5; App. *Pun.* 10; Spain: Liv. 25.34; 27.20; 28.13; succession: Liv. 29.30; life as a bandit (*latro*): Liv. 29.31–2; 33, see Rawlings 2016: 207–8; Walsh 1965.

20 Sallust *Bellum Jugurthinum* 5; Valerius Maximus 9 ext 2; Liv. 30.15; 31.11. Walsh 1965: 151–2.

The Fruits of Co-operation

The benefits to Carthage can be broadly categorised as material or hegemonic. The former includes military and economic resources obtained by Carthage, while the latter includes political and diplomatic advantage and the enhancement of Carthaginian power and influence.

Military alliance or alignment enabled the Carthaginians to exploit the forces of warlords either directly, through incorporation or close co-operation on campaign, or indirectly by using warlords as buffers or proxies. The potential military contributions of warlords to Carthage were obviously constrained by their power and resources. At the upper end were the armies of Syphax, apparently numbering in the tens of thousands, (though such figures may be grossly over-exaggerated), and the various Spanish warrior chieftains who might bring not only their own war-bands, but be able to mobilise whole communities as field armies for the Carthaginians (App. *Hispanica* 37: Indibilis had over 20,000). More typical, perhaps, were the contributions of men such as Naravas, Tychaeus, and Deinocrates, whose contingents were in the order of a couple of thousand warriors, or those of Mesotullus (App. *Pun.* 33) or Clinon (Diod. 20.38.6; 39.5), each numbering around 1,000. Rarely do our sources mention individuals who brought less, though in all likelihood the troops of lesser chieftains who dropped below this threshold of notoriety may well have been subsumed in the grand totals reported by the sources.

Direct Carthaginian military co-operation with warlords involved some delicate issues of trust and respect. The collaboration of Mago and Hicetas of Leontini against Timoleon appears to have foundered on Mago's fear of treachery, so that he abandoned their joint siege of Ortygia in Syracuse.²¹ Where warlords thought themselves to be equal to the Carthaginians, and were powerful enough to maintain their own field armies, they might march and camp separately, as Hiero II and the Carthaginians did at Messana in 264 BC (Diod. 23.1.3), or Syphax and Hasdrubal Gisco in 204 BC (Liv. 29.35; 30.7–8). We can perceive this as, on the one hand, prudent caution between competitors acting in their common interest, but on the other, as an inhibition to successful collaboration. The danger that poor communication and a failure to concentrate force effectively might hand the advantage to the enemy is evident on both occasions. At Messana (264 BC), the Romans attacked Hiero II and the Carthaginians separately, forcing each to withdraw to their own territories (Polyb. 1.11.7–12.3, 15). In Africa, the Romans were able to set fire to the camp of Syphax and, during the

21 Plut. *Timoleon* 20.2–11, Warmington 1960: 121–2.

confusion, also to surprise the Carthaginians as they attempted to come to the aid of their allies (Polyb. 14.4–5; Liv. 30.4–6).

Better, then, to be able to amalgamate forces. Close integration of any warlord's troops into the field armies of Carthage required the relationship of power to be negotiated. Of course, mercenary captains were hired under contract and so expected to take orders from the Carthaginian general, though they led their own men on campaign and in battle. Thus we find the mercenary commanders of the first line addressing their own men prior to the advance at Zama (Polyb. 15.11.4, Liv. 30.33). However, any warlord needed to be accorded due respect to ensure their co-operation. During the Truceless War, when Naravas, 'a Numidian of high rank and full of martial spirit', entered the camp of Hamilcar Barca, offering to bring his 2,000 cavalry to the Carthaginian side, he gained the honour of a betrothal to Hamilcar's daughter (Polyb. 1.78.1–10).²² In some cases, war-band leaders were approached directly by Carthaginian commanders: before Zama, Hannibal sent for Tychoaeus and his 2,000 horse (apparently 'the best cavalry in Africa'), 'begging him to help and join in saving the situation'.²³ Moeniciptus and Vismarus were among the Gallic chieftains reportedly recruited by Mago (to fall in battle in Spain in 213 BC, Liv. 24.42). In other cases, however, it is unclear how the Republic sent out the call. In 407 BC, it is reported that the Carthaginians had 'summoned soldiers from the peoples and chieftains who were their allies, Maurusians and Numidians and certain peoples who dwell in the regions toward Cyrene' (Diod. 13.80.3). Although we rarely have anything but hints of how such military alliances worked in practice, the sources generally represent these relationships as asymmetrical. The reality must be that in most, if not all, of such instances, Carthage was the dominant partner. We find warlords acting as subordinates to Punic commanders in a variety of contexts. At the battle of Zama, Tychoaeus, Mesotullus and an anonymous chieftain of the Areacidae fought for Hannibal.²⁴ In Spain, Massiva, nephew of Massinissa, served under Hasdrubal Barca at Baecula (Liv. 27.18.7, 19.9). Various Iberian chieftains such as Indibilis (Polyb. 3.76.6; Liv. 21.60, 25.34), Edeco (Liv. 27.17) and Attenes (Liv. 28.15) are also reported as campaigning with their followers in the armies of Carthage. Indeed, in the early 220s BC, the Spanish chieftains had hailed Hasdrubal as *stratēgos autokrator*,

22 Loreto 1995: 154–5; Hoyos 2003: 38; 2007: 146–53.

23 Polyb. 15.3.5–7; App. *Pun.* 33; Walbank 1967 (vol. 2): 444; Hoyos 2003: 172.

24 App. *Pun.* 33. Appian's Mesotullus is probably the pro-Carthaginian Mazaetullus reported in Liv. 29.29, though in 29.30 he is represented as having been reconciled with Massinissa prior to Zama. Hannibal also expected to be joined by Vermina, son of Syphax, but he only reached Carthaginian territory sometime after the battle, Liv. 30.36.

an acknowledgement of a Barcid military primacy earned through victory in the field (Diod. 25.12).²⁵

The most effective warlords were given considerable responsibility within the Carthaginian military system. Massinissa acted as a senior Carthaginian cavalry commander in Spain for several years, successfully raiding anti-Punic Iberian tribes and harassing Roman armies with 3,000 'of the best cavalry' (Liv. 27.20). Deinocrates, who brought his mounted troops to the Carthaginians, became the overall cavalry commander in the campaign against Agathocles in Sicily.²⁶ Similarly when Bithyas defected from Gulussa with 800 horse in 148 BC, he was soon given full command of the Carthaginian cavalry.²⁷ The prominence of Naravas in Polybius' narrative indicates his important role and status in the campaigns of the Truceless War (Polyb. 1.78.11, 82.13, 84.4, 86.1). Evidently the Carthaginians were willing to work with and rely upon the military qualities of such men, a stance perhaps exemplified by Xanthippus' contribution to the victory over Regulus in 255 BC.²⁸ The advice and intelligence offered by warlords often proved valuable; it even seems that a Boian chieftain, Magalus, personally guided Hannibal through the Alps (Liv. 21.29). Such co-operation and trust is striking, though as we shall see later, there were potential risks.

Encouraging a warlord in their martial ambitions might benefit Carthage by tying down an enemy in a proxy war. In 213 BC, the Carthaginians persuaded the Massylian Gaia to send his seventeen-year-old son, Massinissa, to wage war against Syphax, who had recently allied with the Romans.²⁹ The raiding conducted by Indibilis, a 'former' chief of Ilergetes, with his brother Mandonius, on pro-Roman Spanish territories (Liv. 22.21, 217 BC), could be

25 Hoyos 2003: 74–5. Troops might also be acquired through the defeat of enemy generals, especially those killed in battle, whose military legitimacy would, in effect, be appropriated by the Carthaginian general. Thus after killing Istolatus, 'stratēgos of the Celts', and many notable *hēgemones* in battle, Hamilcar enrolled 3,000 surviving warriors in his army, Diod. 25.10.1. When Agathocles abandoned his soldiers in Africa, many re-enlisted in Carthaginian service, Diod. 22.69.3.

26 Diod. 19.103; 20.29.5; Berger 1992: 50–1, 80.

27 App. *Pun.* 111, 114 and 120; Gsell 1928 (vol. 2): 392 n. 2.

28 Diod. 23.15.5 calls Xanthippus a *stratēgos*, see 23.15.7, though Polybius (1.32–6) does not. Even if Xanthippus may not have been a mercenary captain, he appeared to have experience of command. His status notwithstanding, he provides an example of the openness of the Carthaginian high command to recommendations from non-Punic subordinates serving in the Carthaginian army, see Polyb. 1.48.2–4.

29 Liv. 24.48–9. An early battle was apparently won with the aid of Carthaginian troops, but, afterwards, Massinissa prosecuted the war without their presence.

viewed in a similar light.³⁰ Such warfare placed much of the risk on the warlord; it was within the hands of the Carthaginians to intervene or otherwise shore up the situation, should it take an adverse turn. In such cases, direct intervention provided opportunities for the expansion of Carthaginian hegemony. Thus when Hicetas of Leontini called on the Republic for aid in his war against Dionysius II, it provided a real chance for Carthage to obtain considerable leverage in Syracuse. Indeed, when the energetic Timoleon weighed in against Hicetas, the Carthaginians were able to insert a considerable force into Syracuse, only for Mago to squander the chance by prematurely withdrawing from the city.³¹

Although the evidence is sparse, it is worth noting that positive relations with warlords might bring economic reward. Simply establishing that warlords would not target Carthaginian interests had obvious economic benefits, ensuring the stability and integrity of borders and enabling agriculture and trade to flourish. After severe depredations by Numidian tribes in the 250s BC (Polyb. 1.31.2–5), followed by their hostile participation in the Truceless War (Polyb. 1.65.3; 77.3–7), Carthage took active steps to concern itself in the affairs of the Numidian kings. An alliance with Naravas had helped to bring Carthaginian victory in the Truceless War. Thereafter, the security of the *chora* required peace with the neighbouring Massyli, which came through relations with its dominant chief, Gaia, who may have been Naravas' brother.³² Additional effort was therefore expended in binding this family to the Carthaginian cause.³³ Gaia's younger brother, Oezalces, married Hamilcar Barca's granddaughter, perhaps the daughter of the woman whom Hamilcar had betrothed to Naravas.³⁴ Consequently, Carthaginian territory in Africa appears to have been relatively safe from Massylian molestation, at least until the breakdown of the relationship with the family during the succession crisis of 206 BC (Liv. 29.31–2).

30 It is also possible that the appearance in Carthaginian territory in the 150s BC of Arcobarzanes, the son of Vermina, with an army of Numidians (Liv. *Periochae* 48), was to conduct a proxy campaign against Massinissa, since Carthage at the time may technically have been unable to wage war without Roman permission, that is, *if* this clause of the treaty is reliably reported in Liv. 42.23.3–4; for doubts see Walsh 1965: 156 n. 79 and Burton 2011: 308 n.145 with references.

31 Diod. 16.67.1–69.5; Plut. *Tim.* 11.4, 17.1; Westlake 1952: 12–14.

32 Naravas seems to be the Nrwt son of Zililsan mentioned in an inscription erected c. 129/8 BC, *KAI* 141. He may have thus been the brother of Gaia, son of Zililsan mentioned in *RII* 2 (c. 138 BC), Camps 1961: 283–4; Février 1964–65: 85; Hoyos 2003: 226.

33 Thompson 1981.

34 Alternatively, Hoyos 2003: 223 has tentatively identified her as the daughter of Hannibal's sister who was married to Bomilcar.

Active economic exploitation was also a possibility. The marriage of Hasdrubal and Hannibal to the daughters of Iberian chieftains contributed to cementing their control over the rich silver-producing region of Cástulo, the mines of which were a significant contributor to the power of the Barcids in Spain.³⁵ Defeated enemies certainly paid war indemnities and, perhaps, longer term tribute. Financial contributions from various chieftains in Spain was therefore perhaps a feature of Carthaginian rule, though we hear little about it; according to Polybius the demands for money from allies, Indibilis and Mandonius, contributed to their disaffection.³⁶ On the whole, however, Carthage appears to have imposed tribute on tribes and communities, rather than individuals,³⁷ probably because it spread accountability and could outlive the rule of any individual strongman.

Beyond the material contribution of warlords to Carthaginian military endeavours, their acceptance of Carthaginian friendship and support enhanced the Carthaginian hegemonic position. Polybius (2.36.2, see Liv. 21.2), for instance, observed that Hasdrubal 'had largely increased the power of Carthage, not so much by military action as by friendly intercourse with the chiefs'. Political support offered to warlords could be a cost-effective way for the Carthaginians to extend influence at the expense of other players in the community or other hegemonic rivals beyond. It appears to be a common pattern of relations between greater and lesser powers, in a competitive interstate anarchy, that the latter seek security and protection from peers by turning to the former.³⁸ Thus Tychoaeus acceded to Hannibal's request for military aid because he 'knew well that, if the Carthaginians won, he could retain his principality, but if the Romans were victors, he would risk losing his life too, owing to Massinissa's greed of power' (Polyb. 15.3.6). In 206 BC Mazaetullus sought Carthaginian support for his claim to rule the Massyli through marriage with Hannibal's niece. The Carthaginian involvement in the Massylian succession in 206 BC appears aimed at maintaining Carthaginian influence in a context in which there was *potential* Roman interest and *actual* interference from the Masaesyli and Mauri (Liv. 29.29–32). Although the pro-Carthaginian Mazaetullus made himself briefly pre-eminent, with the success of Massinissa, whose connections with Rome were probably a concern, Hasdrubal Gisco was forced to turn to the Masaesylian Syphax to launch a proxy campaign against

35 Ruiz and Molinos 1993: 287; Hoyos 2003: 225.

36 Polyb. 10.35.6, see Liv. 27.17; Gsell 1928 (vol. 2): 314.

37 E.g. Polyb. 3. 13.7; Liv. 23.28; on Sicily see Diod. 13.114.1, Whittaker 1978: 72–3.

38 Eckstein 2006: 160, 178–180.

the Massyli.³⁹ The dependence of some Sicilian tyrants on Carthaginian support is made clear when, as a condition of peace with Timoleon, it was withdrawn. Pro-Punic tyrants, including Mamercus of Catane and Hippo of Messina, were consequently unable to resist Timoleon's campaigns (Plut. *Tim.* 34.2–7; Diod. 16.82.4).

Carthaginian backing of warlords could also destabilise potentially powerful communities by perpetuating internal division and compromising political institutions. Carthaginian interference in the internal affairs of Syracuse during the fourth century, for example, often came in the form of support for individuals, or the factions opposed to them, in order to keep the state from posing a threat. In 357 BC, Synalus (or Paralus), Carthaginian governor of Minoa, helped Dion to drive out the tyrant Dionysius II (Diod. 16.9.4–5; Plut. *Dion* 25–6, 29); in c. 344/3 BC, Hicetas of Leontini was sent a large Punic force to prevent Dionysius II and then Timoleon from seizing Syracuse (Diod. 16.66–9; Plut. *Tim.* 17–20). In 316 BC, the Carthaginians switched their backing from the oligarchic faction in Syracuse to Agathocles, apparently lending him 5,000 African troops (according to Justin 22.2.5–9).⁴⁰ If the expectation that further instability would be created by this sudden change of support, it was misplaced, for Agathocles proved more adept and dangerous than his more recent predecessors, and subsequent Carthaginian attempts to sponsor agitation against him came to nothing (*P. Oxy.* 24.2399, coll. II–IV).⁴¹

Besides Agathocles (Justin 22.2.9), other warlords such as Mamercus of Catana (Plut. *Tim.* 34) and Syphax (App. *Pun.* 12) are reported to have received troops from the Carthaginians to prosecute their own operations. Hicetas may also have had use of 'small detachments' prior to the arrival of Mago's army and fleet.⁴² Clearly, the Carthaginians were happy to provide direct military support in order to secure the co-operation of warlords. When the raiding by Indibilis and Mandonius on pro-Roman Spanish tribes in 217 BC had drawn a direct military response from the Romans, Hasdrubal Barca marched to protect them (Liv. 22.21); they remained loyal for much of the next decade. As we have seen, Mago was able to enter Syracuse with a large army and fleet in support of Hicetas of Leontini (Diod. 16.68–70; Plut. *Tim.* 16–20, esp. 17). Massinissa and Carthaginian troops combined to defeat Syphax 'in a great battle' in 213 BC (Liv. 24.49). Such military support, however, might

39 Eckstein 1987: 234–40.

40 Consolo Langher 2000: 52–4.

41 Berger 1992: 50–1, 80.

42 Plut. *Tim.* 17.11, Westlake 1952: 14 n.3; see Plut. *Tim.* 12.2–4 which, when taken with 17.11, might suggest the presence of some Punic troops in the army of Hicetas at Adranum.

sometimes undermine the military legitimacy of the warlord and could be perceived as a loss of independence. The Carthaginian presence in Syracuse in support of Hicetas proved to be unpalatable and provided fuel for Timoleon's anti-tyrannical and anti-Punic rhetoric, much of which was directed initially at Hicetas's own followers (Plut. *Tim.* 20).

The financial resources of Carthage were considerable and these could be deployed to obtain the co-operation of militarily significant individuals. The reaction of the Agrigentines to the failure of their generals in an operation during the siege of their city (406 BC) was immediately to accuse them of receiving bribes from the Carthaginians, and to stone four of them to death (Diod. 13.87.3, 5). Diodorus notes that there were also rumours that the Carthaginians had bribed Dexippus, a Lacedaemonian *condottiero* of 1,500 mercenaries in the city, with 15 talents (Diod. 13.85.3, 88.6). Even if such accusations were false, they reveal an expectation that the Carthaginians could use such measures (see Diod. 13.94.3). One Carthaginian general bribed Dionysius I with 400 talents to let him and the Carthaginian citizen contingent slip through Syracusan fingers, while the rest of the hapless Punic army was abandoned to its fate (396 BC, Diod. 14.75.3). Hannibal's passage through Southern Gaul in 218 BC was secured by bribing the leaders of various Gallic tribes (Liv. 21.24, 26; 23.28), the transit of his brother Hasdrubal in 207 BC was also secured with gold (Liv. 27.36). It is unclear whether warlords who brought their troops to Carthaginian armies as allies received payment; those who were deemed mercenaries most likely received agreed rates of pay, along with their troops (Diod. 22.69.3), and bonuses might be offered at times of crisis. In the foiled mutiny at Lilybaeum in 250 BC, some commanders were privately offered lavish gifts and favours for their continued support, prior to a general offer to the men (Polyb. 1.43.3).

The Personal Touch

The personal motives of warlords loom large in their policies and decision-making.⁴³ The Carthaginians sometimes played on this by dangling the prospect of a substantial enhancement of power and status for those who treated with the Republic. Plutarch's accusation that Hicetas schemed with the Carthaginians, because he hoped that they would help him to obtain the tyranny over Syracuse, may not have been far from the mark (Plut. *Tim.* 2). Carthaginian support for Agathocles in 316 BC ensured his return to Syracuse, which he was

43 Giustozzi 2005: 5–6, 14; Marten 2006/7: 48; Morris 2009: 160.

able, violently, to consolidate.⁴⁴ Formal dealings with the Republic might have helped confer political legitimacy or, at least, entrench a warlord's position within their own community. Thus the treaty with the Carthaginians in 405 BC appears to have strengthened the autocracy of Dionysius I in Syracuse, since it was a formal, external, recognition of his power to treat on behalf of the city (Diod. 13.113–4). Indeed, the treaty appears to have stipulated 'that the Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius'. Hannibal intervened in the politics of several peoples, at one point installing Brancus over his brother in their local play for control of the Allobroges (218 BC, Liv. 21.31); in Italy he also sponsored powerful members of local elites in order to promote friendly regimes.⁴⁵

It is hardly surprising to find that, despite their military prowess and personal bravery, warlords also showed a prudent concern for their own survival. Consequently, in times of adversity, Carthage acted as a safe haven. Thus Amuscius of the Ausetani, Lacumazes and Mazaetullus of the Massyli escaped to their Carthaginian allies when faced with defeat at the hands of their enemies (Liv. 21.61; 29.30). Aasis and Suba, two taxiarchs of Massinissa who had personal differences with his sons, deserted to Hamilcar with their 6,000 cavalry (c. 150 BC, App. *Pun.* 70), though, on another occasion, Aphther's flight into Carthaginian territory was not sanctioned and Massinissa was granted permission to pursue this fugitive chieftain (c. 165 BC, Polyb. 32.2.7; Liv. 34.62.10). The Republic might also protect the family of a warlord: Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, put his wife and children in Carthaginian hands to protect them from his enemies.⁴⁶ A less friendly variation on family 'protection' was the taking of hostages. These acted as a personal form of leverage to ensure loyalty, but in Spain, at least, this policy caused some resentment (Polyb. 10.35.6–8).⁴⁷ Nevertheless, such a practice could also foster closer relationships. As the son of Gaia, chief of the Massyli, Massinissa spent some of his youth in Carthage, where he was educated and acquired a lifelong fondness for Punic culture. He also made many friends there, before campaigning in the Carthaginian army (App. *Pun.* 10).

44 Berger 1992: 49–50, 81.

45 E.g. Lucius Bantius of Nola (Liv. 23.15–16; Rawlings 2011: 308); Pacuvius Calavius of Capua (Liv. 23.2–4); Staius Trebius of Compsa (Liv. 23.1). Fronda 2010: 32–3, 103–8; Lomas 2011: 350–1. In Spain, a policy of political intervention also appears to have occurred, Riera and Principal 2015: 63–5 suggest that Hannibal had colluded with Indibilis in 219/18 to establish his position as the chief of the Ilergetes. He subsequently lost power, but by 210 was back in, owing to his support for the Carthaginians and they for him (Polyb. 9.11.3).

46 Herodotus 7. 165; Luraghi 1994: 305–6.

47 García Riaza 1997; 1998–9: 201–5; Riera and Principal 2015: 63, 65.

Guest-friendship was a common feature of international relations in the ancient Mediterranean.⁴⁸ The Carthaginians were involved in it just as much as warlords such as Massinissa.⁴⁹ Even before his military alliance with Hamilcar Barca, Naravas had been well disposed to the Carthaginians because of 'ancestral ties of friendship'.⁵⁰ Livy (21.2, see Polyb. 2.36.2) notes that, in Spain, Hasdrubal, on succeeding Hamilcar Barca, won over tribes to the Carthaginian state by creating guest-friendships with the chieftains (*hospitiis regulorum*) and friendships with the leading men (*amicitiam principum*). Hasdrubal Gisco and Syphax became guest-friends in 206 BC, later the Numidian was enticed to ally formally with the Carthaginians (Liv. 29.23). This was a relationship which probably facilitated joint operations against the Romans in 204–3 BC. It was natural therefore that when Dion, with a force brought from Corinth, landed in Sicily in 357 BC, he turned to his guest-friend Synalus, the Carthaginian governor at Minoa, for support. In 480 BC, it was reportedly the *xenia* that existed between Terillus and Hamilcar that led the exiled tyrant of Himera to ask for Carthaginian help in re-establishing his regime.⁵¹

Personal relationships could also be enhanced by wedlock. Manfredi notes the importance of intermarriage for Carthaginian alliance-making and relationship-building.⁵² Hamilcar Barca betrothed daughters to close political allies Hasdrubal and Bomilcar in Carthage, and, beyond the city, to Naravas. Hamilcar's son-in-law, Hasdrubal, also married a Spanish princess, as did Hamilcar's son, Hannibal. These Spanish wives appear to have enhanced Barcid relations with the Oretani and provided access to the silver of Cástulo.⁵³ Marriages with Numidian chieftains in the third and second centuries were also significant. Along with Naravas' betrothal to Hannibal's sister (Polyb. 1.78.8), Oezalces and then Mazaetullus were married to Hannibal's niece (Liv. 29.29).⁵⁴

48 Konstan 1997: 83–87; Burton 2011: 22, 25–6.

49 Whittaker 1978: 76–8. Guest-friendship was equally common among the western tribes of the Mediterranean. In 206/5 BC the Massylian chieftain Mazaetullus possessed and renewed a guest-friendship with Syphax of the Masaesyli (Liv. 29.29). Livy (21.12–14) reports an attempted mediation between the Carthaginians and Saguntines through one of Hannibal's Spanish soldiers, a certain Alorcus, who was a guest-friend of the city. This suggests an elite status, though it is unclear if Alorcus commanded his own contingent in Hannibal's army.

50 Polyb. 1.78.1; Walbank 1957 (vol. 1): 143.

51 Hdt. 7.165; Ameling 1993: 36–9.

52 Manfredi 2003: 497; see Gsell 1928 (vol. 2): 257, 313.

53 Hasdrubal: Diod. 25.12; Hannibal: Liv. 24.41. Ruiz and Molinos 1993: 287; Richardson 2004: 19; Hoyos 2003: 88.

54 Hoyos 2003: 153, 223.

Both Massinissa and Syphax were apparently betrothed to Sophoniba, daughter of Hasdrubal Gisco, the latter because alliance with Syphax became critical to Carthaginian plans for resisting a Roman invasion of Africa.⁵⁵ Massinissa also married his daughter to a Carthaginian (App. *Pun.* 93, 111). So potent were such relationships, and it might be said that the sisters and daughters of Carthaginian grandees were so desirable *and* influential, that, after Syphax was overthrown and his wife fell into Massinissa's hands, Scipio Africanus intervened, demanding that Massinissa have no more to do with Sophoniba.⁵⁶ Immediate political connection made through marriage could be long-standing and have long-term, even generational, benefits. Hippocrates and Epicydes, who had a Carthaginian mother and were grandsons of a Syracusan exile, were sent to Syracuse in 214 BC firstly to make an agreement with Hieronymus and then, as the situation developed, to destabilise the city and bring it into the war on Hannibal's side.⁵⁷ Most strikingly, a grandson of Massinissa, Hasdrubal, was the general of a Carthaginian army in the Third Punic War (App. *Pun.* 93, 111; Liv. *Per.* 50).

Such relationships were intimate enough that it was sometimes difficult to disentangle personal and public motivations. Accusations of *dynasteia* levelled at the Barcids in Spain, who freely married local princesses, may have problematised their relationship with home authorities.⁵⁸ Yet it is likely, perhaps inevitable, that appointed commanders exploited such relationships as much as they could, attempting to align personal and state interests as far as possible. The suggestion that, for example, Hasdrubal's campaign in support of his *xenos* Terillus was a private endeavour might not necessarily be in conflict with his position as 'king' of Carthage and leader of an officially sanctioned expedition to Sicily.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, there were a number of occasions when

55 Sophoniba had apparently been first promised to Massinissa, then to Syphax, by her father, the Carthaginian general Hasdrubal Gisco, Diod. 27.7; App. *Hisp.* 37, *Pun.* 10; Zonaras 9.11ff; Liv. 29.23; Polyb. 14.7.6; Walsh 1965: 149 n. 1.

56 Liv. 30.12–15; Diod. 27.7; App. *Pun.* 27–8, emphasise Sophoniba's persuasiveness and advocacy of the Carthaginian cause. On the active influence of women in political marriages in the Hellenistic period see Carney 2011: 208; Beck 2015: 63.

57 Polyb. 7.2.3–4; Liv. 24.6; Walbank 1967 (vol. 2): 32–3.

58 Polyb. 3.8.2, reporting the view of Fabius Pictor, Ameling 1993: 101–7; Hoyos 1994; 2003: 75–8.

59 Ameling 1993: 33–44. Morris 2009: 160 notes the importance of Sicilian tyrants' personal concerns and actions in power building. That Hamilcar would appear to have been operating within this Sicilian framework seems a typical Carthaginian practice in this period. Justin 18.7–19.2 notes that other members of the Magonid family played significant roles in Carthaginian campaigns in the sixth–fifth centuries. These would have possessed

personal entanglements with a warlord led to suspicion and reproach. An intercepted letter from Suniatus to Dionysius I warning him of the approach of a Carthaginian army commanded by a political rival even led to a ban on learning Greek,⁶⁰ while Hamilcar Rhodanus was supposedly executed for his dealings with Alexander the Great (Justin 21.6). There appear to have been several points when dangerously ambitious Carthaginians attempted to enhance their domestic power by enlisting the aid of warlords.⁶¹ Another Hamilcar secretly agreed that 'whatever assistance he furnished Agathocles against the Syracusans, he himself should receive as much for the augmentation of his power at home'.⁶² The plot came to naught because Hamilcar died soon afterwards, but the conspiracy of a certain Hanno with a 'king of the Moors' in order to seize power in Carthage ended in execution (Justin 21.4.7).

A Dangerous Strategy?

The interplay between private and public international networks raises the issue of how far warlords might try to use connections in Carthage for their own purposes, drawing the Republic into actions that may not have enhanced its hegemonic position. Though direct evidence of interference by warlords in Carthaginian internal affairs is limited, deputations from such men were undoubtedly dispatched to the city (e.g. Dion by Dionysius II, Plut. *Dion* 5.8, 6.5, see 14.4). Shenanigans may have occurred behind the scenes, as the involvement of certain warlords in the plots of Hanno and Hamilcar suggest. There were clearly risks with trusting warlords too much. Despite the evidence of frequent military co-operation, and the willingness to collaborate and delegate operations to their allies, Carthaginian commanders needed to remain on their guard against treachery, disaffection and deception. In 217 BC, Bostar naively allowed himself to be persuaded by a certain Abelux to return Spanish hostages to their families. However, the chieftain had secretly planned to let them fall into the hands of the Romans, who gained the credit for their

various personal connections with Greeks in Sicily: the head of the dynasty, Mago had married a Syracusan, for Hdt. 7.166 notes that Hamilcar had a Syracusan mother.

60 Justin 20.5, which must have been temporary if not fictional, Hoyos 2011: 136, 170.

61 Whittaker 1978: 78–9.

62 Justin 22.2.6, see the warnings sent to the Carthaginians that Hamilcar's treachery 'would shortly come home to themselves, and that they would feel what mischief they had brought, not more upon Sicily than upon Africa itself', 22.3.5. Pearson 1987: 41; Miles 2010: 147–8.

subsequent release (Liv. 22.22). More dramatically, Diodorus reports that Hamilcar Barca met his end through the deception of the king of the Orissi who arrived at the siege of Helice feigning friendship and alliance, but who suddenly routed the Carthaginians.⁶³ Some commanders showed excessive caution, however. The relationship of trust between Mago and Hicetas broke down when the Carthaginian witnessed the Greeks fraternising with Timoleon's men; he withdrew from Syracuse fearing treachery, much to Hicetas' despair (Plut. *Tim.* 20.2–11). Mago's caution, however, was regarded as shameful and cowardly. Though he committed suicide on his return home, the Carthaginians still angrily crucified his body (Plut. *Tim.* 22.8).

Some warlords might choose openly to oppose Carthage, in the expectation that it would enhance their personal power and their claims to military and political legitimacy within their own communities. In 409/8 Hermocrates employed his personal wealth to hire a mercenary force, using operations against Punic territory from Selinus as a springboard for an attempted return to Syracuse.⁶⁴ A few years later, his supporter, Dionysius, exploited a military reputation earned during the conflict with Carthage to gain an appointment as general (406 BC, Diod. 13.92.1). He played on the fears of Carthaginian bribery of his fellow generals to have them removed and to be elected *stratēgos autokrator*.⁶⁵ Some Greek tyrants adopted a policy of conspicuous advertisement of their military achievements against the Carthaginians, as Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, had done after his victory at Himera 480 BC, with his dedication and inscription in the pan-Hellenic sanctuary of Delphi.⁶⁶ Agathocles minted coins depicting Herakles in an elephant scalp, a simultaneous reference to the legacy of Alexander (in imitation of the coins of Ptolemy I) and the success of his own campaign in Africa.⁶⁷ Such warlords, at times even claimed to act as liberators of the Greeks from the barbarians, or, rather, to 'use fear of Carthage to master the other cities without risk' (Diod. 13.112.1–2), in which they exploited a Greek perception of Punic otherness, constructing or emphasising stereotypes of cruelty and impiety, which became recurring motifs in Greek anti-Carthaginian propaganda.⁶⁸

63 Diod. 25.10.3–4; Hoyos 2003: 70–1; Walbank 1957 (vol. 1): 152.

64 Diod. 13.63.2, 5–6; Berger 1993: 40.

65 Diod. 13.94.1–95.1; Berger 1992: 41–2.

66 *Syll³*. 34a = Meiggs and Lewis 1988, no. 28. Prag 2010: 55–9 notes that commemorating victory over Carthage was just one strand in Gelon's wider programme of military aggrandisement, but that a stronger anti-Carthaginian discourse began to develop under Hiero I.

67 Stewart 1993: 266–9.

68 Prag 2010: 55, 61–66.

Africans too appeared willing to oppose the Carthaginians where it suited their ambitions. The relationship Carthage had with the Numidian Massyli and Masaesyli seesawed as the leaders of the rival confederations sought advantage against the other, either through opposition or alliance with Carthage. Thus when Syphax fell out with the Republic in 213 BC, Gaia provided troops for a campaign against him and conducted a proxy war with Carthaginian encouragement. Massinissa may, in part, have defected to Rome because of the prospect of Carthaginian alliance with Syphax (friendship with Hasdrubal Gisco from 206 BC, but a formal alliance between Carthage and Syphax 'to have the same friends and enemies' in 204 BC, Liv. 29.23), with the possible added spice of a broken engagement.⁶⁹ In 241 BC, the leaders of the mercenary revolt allied with elements of the Libyan population, including a contingent led by a certain Zarzas (Polyb. 1.84.3; 85.2). They contributed essential supplies, money and men for the subsequent campaign. Some of the coinage issued by these rebels during the Truceless War was engraved with Punic letters: A, M, or Z. These may have stood for the main leaders: Autharitos, Mathos and Zarzas.⁷⁰ The coins appear to have played to an audience that was both mercenary and African for they also proclaimed the term LIBYWN, 'the Libyans'. This was a bold formulation of a collective identity stated in opposition to Carthage, and one that the rebel leaders appear keen to promulgate.⁷¹

The policy of opposition could do real damage to Carthaginian interests. Dionysius and Agathocles became such powerful tyrants that on several occasions they interfered in the Carthaginian *epikrateia* in Western Sicily.⁷² Agathocles audaciously sailed to Africa to wage a three-year war in the Carthaginian hinterland, where, among the defection of cities, he was (albeit temporarily) joined by Aelymas, a Libyan 'king' (Diod. 20.17.1; 18.3).⁷³ Seventy years later, rebellious war-leaders ensured that the Truceless War was a long and bitter struggle that forced the Republic to dig deep in order to survive. Some thirty years on again and the defection of Massinissa played an important part in the Roman victory in Africa, which ended the Second Punic War.

69 See above n. 55.

70 Huss 1988, though other possibilities exist, see Loreto 1995: 111–2; Hoyos 2007: 141–3.

71 Hoyos 2007: 79; Loreto 1995: 87–113, esp. 92.

72 Dionysius 1: Diod. 14.7.5–8.1; 47–53; 54.4. Agathocles: Justin 22.3.2; 8.3; Diod. 20.71.1–5; Consolo Langher 1997.

73 In this foreign venture, Agathocles attracted another Greek warlord, Ophellas, who marched with an army overland all of the way from Cyrene. Agathocles killed him and assimilated his army, Diod. 20.40–42; Consolo Langher 2000: 175–91.

However, while opposition to Carthage might play on the sentiments of those who found Carthaginian power and Punic presence irksome, it was a dangerous strategy, for, despite short-term advantage, often the Carthaginians retaliated. It was unsurprising that Agathocles' interference in Agrigentum and the *eparchia* would face a strong counter in 310 BC, resulting in a Carthaginian siege of Syracuse.⁷⁴ While he enjoyed considerable success during his campaign in Africa, this too eventually faltered and was defeated (Diod. 22.67–69.3). Similarly, Dionysius I found himself on the receiving end of a siege (in 396 BC) and defeats in the field (Catana 396, Cromium 376 and Lilybaeum 368 BC), though both he and Agathocles survived by being able to hold onto Syracuse and prudently making peace. Other warlords were not so fortunate, for the Carthaginians could be ruthless in eliminating those who angered them. While some might be killed in battle, such as Istolatus, '*stratēgos* of the Celts', his brother and many notable leaders of the Tartessians in their defeat to Hamilcar in 237/6 BC,⁷⁵ others, such as Indortes, who had raised an army against Barca soon after, might be captured, tortured and crucified as a lesson to others (Diod. 25.10.2). Similarly after the bitter and protracted fight-back by Carthage, the rebel war-leaders of the Truceless War were all treated to exemplary punishment.⁷⁶ Warlords therefore had a calculation to make about the likelihood of Punic retaliation and the potential consequences. Some, like the Sicel warlord, Agyris, appear to have been strong enough not only to refuse Mago's 'friendship' in 392 BC, but to subject his army to guerilla harassment (Diod. 15.95.2–96.1), or, like Timoleon, could choose to ignore Carthaginian warnings and trust to their own talents (Diod. 16.66.5–7; 68.4–7; Plut. *Tim.* 9–10). Others might decide that Carthaginian threats were merely posturing, as Andromachus of Tauromenium is reported to have done.⁷⁷ However, some found even an initial confrontation risky. Hicetas II of Syracuse, appears to

74 Consolo Langher 2000: 109–23; Evans 2009: 97–100.

75 Diod. 25.10.1. Hoyos 2003: 57 plausibly suggests that Istolatus, '*stratēgos* of the Celts' was a mercenary *condottiero* in Tartessian service. In 229/8 BC, Hasdrubal avenged the death of his father-in-law, Hamilcar, waging war on the king of the Orissi and 'killing all who had been responsible for Hamilcar's rout', presumably including the faithless king, Diod. 25.12.1.

76 Polyb. 1.86.4; 88.5; Diod. 25.5.2; Hoyos 2007: 222, 246. A precedent for such treatment can be seen in the aftermath of Agathocles' invasion of Africa (307 BC) when the Carthaginians crucified the leaders of any garrisoned cities that had tried to hold out, Diod. 20.69.4–5.

77 When the gunboat diplomacy of an envoy to Andromachus of Tauromenium failed to deliver Timoleon into the Carthaginian's hands, he turned his open palm face down—a threat to turn the city upside down. Andromachus, however, made the same gesture, a threat to capsize the Carthaginian ambassador's warship. Tauromenium never appears

have been badly discredited by his failed attack on the *eparchia* and defeat at the Terias; he was overthrown by internal forces in 279 BC (Diod. 22.2.2, 7.2).

The Limits of Hegemony

Conflict with powerful rivals further exposed the frailties of a Carthaginian hegemony partly built on personal relationships. When a credible alternative existed, a warlord might not just remove his support, or choose to oppose Carthage directly, but defect to the enemy, as Attenes, chieftain of the Turdetani, deserted to the Romans 'with large numbers of his native troops' after the Carthaginian defeat at Baecula (Liv. 28.15). Here the erosion of Carthaginian military credibility or, rather, its transference to Rome, appears to have been a significant factor. At other times, the mishandling of personal relationships of trust and respect might precipitate defection to a military rival. The desertion to the Romans of the Liby-Phoenician, Muttines, an officer who commanded the Numidian forces based at Agrigentum in 210 BC, is a case in point. The loyalty he inspired in the troops derived from his military capabilities and a string of successes, but his achievements aroused the jealousy of the senior Carthaginian general in Sicily, who attempted to replace Muttines and foist his own son on the Numidians. However, the men would countenance no replacement, Muttines defected, bringing the Numidians with him, and betraying the strategically vital city of Agrigentum to the Romans (210 BC, Liv 26.40).⁷⁸

We see the combination of desertion, military credibility, personal trust and relationship-management at play at Lilybaeum in 250 BC. Some mercenary leaders had expected their men to join them in deserting to the Romans. They met with the Roman commander, intending to betray the city to the besiegers, but their plot was foiled by the timely intervention of a loyal Greek soldier named Alexon. The city was saved by the willingness of the Carthaginian commander, Himilco, to follow Alexon's advice to meet with and reward the remaining leaders and to use them to supplant the defectors in the affections of their men. In this case, Himilco also employed a trusted Carthaginian officer to persuade the troops, Hannibal, who had previously commanded the Gallic contingent, and thus was a man who possessed some military legitimacy with the warriors. These measures were so successful that when the deserters approached the walls from the Roman camp and called out to 'their men', the

to have suffered Carthaginian reprisals for the stance it took here or for Andromachus' military support for Timoleon thereafter, Plut. *Tim.* 11; see Diod. 16.68.4.

78 On Muttines see López-Sánchez: 2010.

answer that they received from them was a showering of missiles (Polyb. 1.43). Himilco's decisiveness should not diminish the danger of the desertion; the potential betrayal of such a strategically and defensively significant city would have severely diminished Carthaginian prospects in Sicily and in the First Punic War.⁷⁹

The methods that Carthage employed to manipulate warlords were readily available to others. A strong Syracuse played the same game as Carthage in Sicily, capitalising on the significance of warlords in lesser communities. Thus Dionysius made inroads into the Carthaginian control in the west and centre of the island by allying with friendly regimes, such as with Agyris in 392 BC (Diod. 15.95.4–96.1). Agathocles lured one time Carthaginian cavalry commander, Deinocrates, into alliance, making him general of part of his army (Diod. 20.90). Pyrrhus gained early successes in Sicily by allying with warlords such as Tyndarion, the tyrant of Tauromenium, Sosistratus of Agrigentum and Heracleides of Leontini, bolstering his army with their troops for the campaign against Carthaginian territory in western Sicily (Diod. 22.8.3–5, 10.1). Hiero II's alliance with Carthage against Rome in 264 BC came to very little and the Romans were able to encourage the tyrant to make a long-standing and fruitful peace, broken only during the reign of his grandson Hieronymus. Timoleon was also willing to work with other warlords, such as Hicetas of Leontini and Mamercus of Catana, but once peace was secured with Carthage he had no qualms about alienating and eliminating them,⁸⁰ for Timoleon

79 Unfortunately, the military legitimacy of the remaining officers appears to have been squandered when Carthage found itself unable to pay its army the back-pay and bonuses it owed at the end of the war (Polyb. 1.67.13). Those implicated most closely with the Carthaginians were, it seems, lynched by their own men (Polyb. 1.69.11; Hoyos 2007: 67). Nevertheless, the subsequent selection of Gisco to negotiate with these veterans at Tunis was due to the fact that he had earlier commanded them in Sicily, indeed the veterans chose him as mediator (Polyb. 1.68.13). He also held private meetings with officers, as Himilco had done at Lilybaeum (Polyb. 1.69.1; Hoyos 2007: 71). Unfortunately, the damage had already been done and new more hard-line 'generals' had been elected by the men from among the mercenaries: the Gallic Autaritos, Libyan Mathos and Campanian Spendius, who took command of the various warbands and contingents (Gauls, Ligurians, Iberians, Libyans, and *Mixellenes*)—and who orchestrated the bitter revolt in which much of the Libyan subject population of Carthage also defected to the rebel veterans.

80 The initial defection of Mamercus, tyrant of Catana, brought Timoleon considerable numbers of men, Diod. 16.69.16; Plut. *Tim.* 13.2. Hicetas supplied troops for Timoleon's campaign at Crimisus, Diod. 16.77.5. Later Mamercus allied with Hicetas and Carthage, Plut. *Tim.* 30.4. Timoleon's elimination of Hicetas, Mamercus and Hippo of Messina: Diod. 16.82.4; Plut. *Tim.* 31–2, 4. Overthrow of other Sicilian tyrants: Diod. 16.72.2–5, 82.4. Westlake 1952; Talbert 1974: 94–7.

exploited recent Carthaginian support for tyrants to promote regime change among the Greeks (Diod. 16.67.1). After military successes against both pro-Carthaginian tyrants and the Carthaginian army itself at Crimisus, many cities appear to have joined this anti-tyrannical bandwagon.⁸¹ Such examples demonstrate the volatility of the system within which the Carthaginians and their rivals operated.

Ultimately, the inherent fragility and transience of personal power structures contributed to the failure of the wider Carthaginian hegemonic system during the Second Punic War. The Romans exploited the dependence on personalities to unpick Carthaginian alliances, for instance, in the use of Numidian 'envoys' (Liv. 24.48) and 300 Spanish 'noble men' (24.49) to induce desertion from Carthaginian armies in Spain and Italy respectively. In Spain, Rome encountered a tribal system that had been effectively exploited by the Barcids, whose methods of rule, as we have seen, centred on personal relationships, principally between the Barcid family and various Iberian chieftains, manifested in marriage alliances, hostage-taking, and military support and co-operation.⁸² The Roman Senate appears to have shown some awareness of the power of personal and familial relationships in Spain by retaining the Scipios in command in the region from 218–206 BC (with a brief hiatus after the death of P. and Cn. Cornelius Scipio in battles in 211). These provided an alternative to the continuity of the Barcid *dynasteia*. The Scipio family courted both Spanish and Numidian chieftains, winning some over through personal charisma and generosity. After Baecula, for example, Scipio distributed 'gifts' among Spanish chiefs and princes, notably Indibilis, who was given 300 horses (Liv. 27.19). The Carthaginian position had begun significantly to unravel when the younger Scipio liberated 300 Iberian hostages, gathered from various tribes, who had been held in New Carthage in 209 BC. He used the liberation as currency to establish personal connections with various chieftains, such as Edeco, inducing them to desert the Carthaginian cause.⁸³ Others were won over by Roman military success, such as Attenes after Baecula, and evident in the Spanish tribes hailing of Scipio in 206 as *rex*, in a manner reminiscent of the acknowledgement of Hasdrubal as *stratēgos autokrator*. Though Scipio preferred the more politic term *imperator*, the salutation appears to be a manifestation both of 'big man' thinking by the Spanish tribes (Liv. 27.19) and, in

81 Talbert 1974.

82 Richardson 2004: 19–20, 58–9.

83 Polyb. 10.34.2–35.8; Liv. 27.17; see also 26.49–50; García Riaza 1997; Burton 2011, 155–6; Riera and Principal 2015: 65 (on Indibilis).

their eyes, the creation of his personal military legitimacy after victories in the field.⁸⁴

In Africa, the Scipios were also able to present Rome as an alternative to the Carthaginians. Earlier in the war (213 BC), they had sent military advisors to Syphax, centurions who arranged an alliance and trained his infantry (Liv. 24.48), showing a willingness to give resources in support of a proxy war with Carthage. A few years later, the younger Scipio sent envoys to Syphax in Africa to encourage defection from the Carthaginians (Liv. 27.4.9). Direct military co-operation came during the Roman invasion, when Laelius conducted a joint campaign with Massinissa against the now hostile Syphax, capturing him in battle near Cirta (Liv. 30.9; 11–12). The Romans subsequently supported Massinissa's conquest of Masaesylian lands, providing ten cohorts of Roman cavalry and infantry, with legates (Polyb. 15.4.4).⁸⁵ The military collaboration with Numidian chieftains such as Massinissa and Dacamas provided the Roman invasion with much needed support.⁸⁶ Although Massinissa initially could bring only 200 cavalry to Scipio, with Roman aid his successes mounted, so that he was able to raise 10,000 warriors for the battle of Zama in 202 BC (Polyb. 15.5.12). In particular, Massinissa's contribution of 4,000 cavalry to the Roman forces in the engagement was significant, if not decisive.

These attempts to collaborate with Numidian chieftains were accompanied by the creation of personal friendships (*amicitia*). Indeed, it has recently been argued that *amicitia* was a core feature of Roman imperialism and a means by which Romans 'enmeshed themselves in the affairs of other states'.⁸⁷ This, of course, was facilitated by the pre-existing disposition of much of the rest of the Mediterranean world, including Carthage, to conduct foreign and domestic

84 Rawlings 1996: 91–2; Richardson 2004: 59–60. Note that on rumours of his death in 206 the tribes became restive, Liv. 28.24; as they also did on his departure from Spain in 205 BC, Liv. 29.1–3, further indications of their personal relationship with Scipio, rather than with Rome; Goldsworthy 2000: 284–5.

85 The Romans later recognised Vermina, son of Syphax, as king of the Western Numidians, perhaps as a possible counterweight to any ambitions of Massinissa in the direction of the Mauri, Liv. 31.19.6.

86 Appian *Pun.* 41 on Dacamas, who joined Scipio at Zama with 1,600 horse. Whether these were subsumed in the totals of Massinissa's force given by Liv. 30.29 and Polyb. 15.5.12 is unclear, but it nevertheless suggests that even if there was an acknowledgement of the overlordship of Massinissa, other chieftains possessed their own contingents. This is confirmed by the various Numidian leaders listed on the Carthaginian side at this battle, Tychaeus, Mesotullus and the chief of the Areacidae, App. *Pun.* 33.

87 Burton 2011: 2.

relations in such a personal and informal fashion.⁸⁸ Scipio had apparently charmed Syphax during a visit to Siga in 206 BC;⁸⁹ he had to share a couch at dinner with Hasdrubal Gisco, who eventually trumped his personal magnetism with a marriage alliance. Scipio's courting of Massinissa appears to have begun in Spain in 208 BC, when Scipio returned his nephew, Massiva, with gifts, after the latter had been captured at Baecula (Liv. 27.19). Later, the two apparently met near Gades in 206 BC,⁹⁰ prior to Massinissa's return to Africa to stake a claim to control the Massyli, in the teeth of opposition from Carthaginian-backed rivals (Liv. 29.30). When Scipio landed in Africa in 204 BC, Massinissa was ready to join him with his own forces (Liv. 29.29). As we have seen, the intervention by Scipio in the marriage politics of Massinissa in 202 BC (demanding the surrender of Syphax's wife Sophoniba), demonstrated a Roman appreciation of the interpersonal dynamics of warlordism, especially the role of elite Carthaginian women in fostering or retrieving Punic influence and hegemony.⁹¹

Just as Massinissa had made connections with the Punic elite, during his youth in Carthage, over the course of time, a number of prominent Romans became his friends.⁹² Arguably such interpersonal connections allowed Massinissa to play politics in Rome in the succeeding decades, insofar as he was able to secure Roman support for occasional seizures of Carthaginian territory, while acting the loyal ally by sending military aid and grain.⁹³ Indeed, Massinissa proved more adept than the Carthaginians, who were unable to overcome the fears and suspicions of the Romans towards them in the post-war period.

Conclusion

The success and eventual failure of Carthage as a 'great power' was not solely about the military campaigns it conducted, but about the nature of its hegemonic and imperial structures, and the methods that it employed in obtaining the co-operation and loyalty of the communities and regions within its orbit.

88 *Ibid.* 26.

89 Polyb. 11.24; Liv. 28.17–18; App. *Hisp.* 29–30, *Pun.* 10.

90 Liv. 28.35, Burton 2011: 1–2, 158, doubted by Eckstein 1987: 235 n. 7 on logistical grounds.

91 See above, n. 56.

92 P. Scipio Africanus and his brother Lucius; Q. Laelius, Q. Minucius Thermus, Veturius Philo, M. Marcius Rallia, Q. Fulvius Gillo, L. Baebius Dives; see Walsh 1965: 151 n. 23.

93 Walsh 1965: 154, 158–9.

Within a patchwork of polarities and power networks, individuals possessing personal military power were a significant and somewhat unpredictable dynamic. The Carthaginians dealt with men who possessed their own military resources and who sometimes could mobilise those of their communities for their own interests. An important conduit was the interpersonal relationships formed between members of the Carthaginian elite and warlords, manifested in alliances, friendships and marriages. These, for the most part, appeared to be effective at mobilising military resources and in extending Carthaginian influence, being a manifestation of a Mediterranean system of international relationships that often, if not predominantly, operated through the personal contacts of powerful elites. There was an element of mutuality, in that the Punic generals needed to recognise the respect that was due to each captain or chieftain; in return, the most successful Carthaginian commanders created a measure of personal military legitimacy in the eyes of warlords and their followers. This is especially clear in Spain, where successive Barcid leaders were able to motivate and coerce the chieftains within their orbit. On the other hand, a failure in respect might be catastrophic, as in the case of Muttines.

Beside the positive inducements of friendship and respect were also the threats of compulsion or opposition. After all, Carthage could always direct its gaze to rivals and the Republic provided an alternative and potent supporter in local politics and power plays. Indeed, on one occasion, when offered a choice, the citizens of Enna preferred the direct presence of a Carthaginian garrison to the prospect of Phintias taking power (Diod. 22.10.1). There was always the possibility that Carthage might exert leverage through the threat of favouring local rivals, with the actual promotion of enemies a practical way of destabilising those who might be too independent and powerful. Warlords therefore had to consider whether the advantage to be gained from a stance of opposition outweighed the potential likelihood that Carthage would be provoked. There was plenty of scope for miscalculation, because, for the most part, the decisions of warlords were rooted in their particular contexts, where personal and local concerns often loomed larger than the sometimes less tangible touch of Carthaginian hegemony. Except, that is, when the Carthaginians were on the warpath.

Although warlords sometimes tried to 'play' Carthage for their own domestic and international purposes and ambitions, the Republic found working with warlords beneficial in a variety of ways. Principally, such warlords provided the Carthaginians with 'hard power' in the form of military forces that might operate with or within the Carthaginian military system. Allied warlords might also be seen as manifestations of Carthaginian 'soft power', by destabilising rival communities, or, more positively, by providing local support to enable

the projection of Punic power and influence, extending hegemony without the need to develop the financial, administrative and military structures of imperial government. Such engagement with warlords, because it was indirect influence or rule by proxy, was often convenient for hegemony. However, it was structurally more problematic for empire building, precisely because it limited the development of mechanisms for the direct rule and exploitation of territory in the form of provincial administration. Additionally, because of the inherent instability of personal forms of power that define warlords, in the context of multifocal communities or regions, Carthage could find its influence dramatically waning at potential power transition moments, such as succession or internal challenge.⁹⁴ Sometimes warlords simply changed their minds about the relationship and saw advantage in a different course. The Carthaginians also encountered severe problems with the 'system' when other external actors became involved. However, to exploit the structural instability of Carthaginian hegemony on a system-wide level required a contender to challenge Carthage across its pan-Mediterranean interests. This was something that only the Romans were able, with tremendous effort, to achieve during the Hannibalic War. Their methods were, at times, strikingly similar to those of the Carthaginians. The parallel in the approaches of the Barcids and Scipios in Spain have often been observed, but both families, and indeed states, worked with warlords because warlords needed to be worked with. Because the Roman Republic proved equally adept at employing much of the same toolkit of hegemony as the Carthaginian Republic (though without the need for intermarriage, at least beyond Italy) it was able to fashion an alternative to the Carthaginians, first in Sicily, then in Spain and Africa.

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94 But note too that Rome's alliance with the Hieronids failed with the succession of Hieronymus in 215 BC, to Carthage's advantage.

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PART 2

The Hellenistic World and Rome



Galatians in Macedonia (280–277 BC): Invasion or Invitation?

Fernando López Sánchez

The Importance of Justin's Narrative and the Gaulish 'Sacred Spring' of 280 BC

Our understanding of the Galatian incursions into Macedonia and Greece in the years between 280 and 277 BC¹ depends on the narratives of this episode by Polybius, Diodorus Siculus, Memnon, Livy, Justin, Trogus, Appian and Pausanias.² By far the most important of these are those of Pausanias and Justin, which differ from one another in a number of ways.³ On the one hand, the detailed narrative of Pausanias (1.4; 10.19–23) reflects concern for the freedom and dignity of Greece in the face of the Gaulish barbarians. Pausanias portrays the Gaulish invasion of Greece as a catastrophe and an event described as fundamentally alien to the internal vicissitudes of the Macedonian kingdom. For Pausanias, as for other sophistic authors of the second century AD, humanity is clearly divided into 'Hellenes' and 'Barbarians'.⁴ At the beginning of his *ta Hellenika*, Pausanias feels the need to explain that, to him, Greece's battle for freedom had always been fundamental to the Greek psyche.⁵ The Celtic invasion of the Balkans thus form part of the age-old struggle for freedom to which the Greeks had become accustomed since the Persian invasion of 480, a struggle that was to continue later. His historical and topographic vision is thoroughly Hellenocentric,⁶ and, in his view, the Gauls that invaded Greece in 280 were pushed back, as much by the courage of the Hellenes themselves as by divine assistance.⁷ On the other hand and in marked contrast with

1 All dates are BC unless indicated otherwise.

2 Polybius, *Historia Universalis* 4.45–52; Diodorus Siculus, 22.3–5; 22.9; Memnon, *De Heracleae Fr.* 11 = Photius, *Bibliotheca*, *Cod.* 224, 227 b; Livy, *Ab urbe condita* 38. 16. 1–9; Iunianus Iustinus, *Historiarum Philippicarum Pompei Trogi Epitome* 24.4–8; 25.1–2; Appian, *Illyrica* 8–14; Pausanias, *Descriptio Graeciae* 4.1–6, 10.19.5–12.

3 Vulić 1926: 77.

4 Paus. 1. 16.2, 21.5; 5.22.2; 8.25.13; 9.40.7; Swain 1996: 350.

5 Paus. 1.4; 10.19–23; Swain 1996: 352.

6 Swain 1996: 353.

7 Paus. 1.4.4, 10.22.12, Swain 1996: 334 n. 16, 335; Paus. 10. 3.4 on the Phocians who fought against the Gauls during the Lamnian war at Chaeronea; Paus. 10.20.1–5, for a comparison between

Pausanias' approach, the Gallic invasion of Macedonia and Greece is integrated by Justin in his complete and coherent account of the events, which occurred in Macedonia after the year 301, and this account is repeated, abbreviated and at times supplemented, in those of Pompeius Trogus' prologues, which have survived.⁸ Justin inserts his narrative of the Gallic invasion of Greece well within the crises that affected the stability of the Macedonian kingdom, paying particular attention to the Macedonian national army on which its power was based. Justin's narrative, rich and even dramatic at times, constitutes the only source of information, which enables the modern historian to understand the role that the Gauls could have played in the complex bid for the Macedonian throne, in the wake of Lysimachus' death in February 281 at Corupedium, in Asia Minor.⁹ Given Justin's predilection for dissecting the changes within the Macedonian monarchy and the Macedonian army as a method of historical reporting, the Galatian invasion of Greece is viewed as the consequence of the crimes of Ptolemy Ceraunus,¹⁰ the new king of the realm, that is, as a logical punishment to the latter's actions against Lysimachus' family, and not as an external event outside the Macedonian politics of the time.¹¹

Out of these two Classical views on the Galatian incursions between the years 280 and 277, Pausanias is the one that has been preferred by a uniquely overwhelming majority of modern historians.¹² The Celtic incursions into Greece are thus characterised today as a true invasion, the result of a 'clash of civilisations'¹³ which led to the defeat of the Thracians, the Getae and the Macedonians, the devastation of Greece and the establishment of a Gaulish state in Anatolia. However, it is also true that the last forty years have seen a partial retreat of migrationist paradigms in all fields of history,¹⁴ though European historians, who popularised these paradigms in the nineteenth and

those who fought against the Persians and those who went to war against the Gauls; Paus. 10.22.13 on the Greeks who fought against the Gauls at Delphi.

8 Timaeus, Hyeronimus of Cardia and Agatharchides of Cnidus have all been suggested as his primary source, among other writers, Julian I 1920: 301, n. 6.

9 Death of Lysimachus in Memnon *FGrH* 434 F. 57.

10 Justin 24.3.9; Yardley 1994: 186.

11 Carney 2013: 50.

12 The date of this 'attack of three detachments' remains unknown, though it has been suggested that it took place during the winter of 280–79, or the spring of 280 or 279, Campbell 2009: 176.

13 Most famous phrase and concept developed in length by Huntington 1993. The phrase itself was earlier used by Lewis 1990 and Mathews 1926: 196.

14 The development of the migrationist and invasionist paradigm reached its peak during the period between 1920 and 1960; Campbell 2009: 59–64, with extensive comment on

the twentieth centuries, have more recently been reluctant to fully abandon them, partly perhaps because they have found partial confirmation of this view in the literary legacy of antiquity.¹⁵ Nevertheless, migration should not be viewed as an answer to the overpopulation of a territory, but rather as a social strategy through which certain population groups believe they can improve their status. Justin, in fact, explicitly states that the Gaulish ‘invasion’ of the Balkans was a ‘sacred spring’ (*ver sacrum*), that is, a posting of young warriors to the south, with a very clear military objective.¹⁶ The numbers, weapons, methods of combat and strategy of these Gauls, who entered Macedonia and Greece during this period, remain unknown (Paus. 10.19.10; Diod. 22.9.1). Given their success against experienced national armies however, this ‘sacred spring’ must be regarded as being in possession of a highly organised military structure¹⁷ and a disciplined approach to military affairs. It was certainly in no way a disorganised horde of warriors and barbarians.¹⁸

In this regard, it may be noted that the interpretation of the sack of Rome proposed by Cornell, involving the reinterpretation of a biased Livy text referring to the year 390, also re-evaluates the Celtic ‘invasion’ of Italy as a ‘sacred spring’ with a clear cause. According to Livy, a horde of Celts (Senones) from the Po valley crossed the Apennines into northern Etruria, reaching the outskirts of Rome and defeating a Roman army on the banks of the river Allia. A few days later, these Celts managed to enter the city of Rome and sacked it. In Livy’s narrative, the purpose of this invasion was to find arable land for settlement, with other ancient sources supporting this claim.¹⁹ However, according to Cornell, this story as presented by Livy is rather unsatisfactory, and is even described by the author as ‘nonsensical’.²⁰ He points out that a migratory tribe would not have advanced from beyond the Alps as far south as Rome, considering it much more likely that the Gauls were intervening in an internal conflict in the city of Clusium, after being employed as mercenaries in the service of

this topic and an interesting bibliography that criticizes the most commonly accepted model.

15 Burns 2003: 86.

16 Justin 24.4.1, Campbell 2009: 64 n. 29.

17 This Gaulish army was a mixed force of infantry and cavalry (Paus. 10.19.4), which was divided into three detachments with different routes into the country, so as not to seriously deplete the country’s resources, in exactly the same way as an experienced Hellenistic army would have done.

18 Campbell 2009: 190.

19 Polyb. 2.17; Dionysius of Halicarnassus 13.10–11; Plutarch *Camillus* 15.

20 Cornell 1995: 314–5.

one of the parties in this conflict.²¹ Justin himself also recounts how Dionysius of Syracuse recruited a large number of Gaulish mercenaries a few months after the sack of Rome (Justin 20.5.1–6), and the Italian *mezzogiorno* and Sicily, not Rome, may have been the final destination of those Gauls who plundered the Latian city. A number of other Gaulish attacks in the region surrounding Rome do indeed appear to have also been orchestrated by Dionysius.²² The Caeretan port of Pyrgi was taken by a Syracusan fleet (Diod. 15.14.3), and the battle of the Trausian Plain, where a large contingent of Gauls came from the south to fight an army from Caere (Diod. 14.117.7; Strabo 5.2.3), appears to have coincided precisely with the arrival of the Syracusan fleet. If the arrival of the Gauls from the south was indeed orchestrated by Dionysius of Syracuse, as it appears to be, then their arrival should be interpreted as part of the joint operation planned by the Sicilian tyrant to destroy the power of Caere, a city allied to Rome.²³

The merit of Cornell's reinterpretation of the sack of Rome in 390 is that it is based fundamentally on common sense, emphasising the important role played by a group of young mercenaries organized as a 'sacred spring' and directed by Dionysius of Syracuse throughout Italy. As can be seen in this case, the hypothetical Gauls' search for cultivable land in the Balkans may also be in need of re-examination.²⁴ Although many authors, including Strobel, have argued that the first objective of the Gaulish move towards the civilized world of Greece was not driven by the desire for plunder but by the need for arable land, competition for land is viewed in ancient sources as chronologically subsequent to other forms of payments of a more portable nature.²⁵ Only the failure to fulfill earlier promises, or the disappearance of one of the parties involved—Gaulish, Greek or Macedonian—appear to have led to *a posteriori* solutions where land ownership was discussed. Thus, for example, according to Plutarch, Pyrrhos explicitly granted his Celtic mercenaries permission to

21 Cornell 1995: 316 n. 61, 460.

22 Alföldi 1963: 355–365 shares this view with Cornell and emphasizes how, before the sack of Rome 'the sea power of Syracuse was expanding successfully into the coastal regions of the Adriatic sea, its connections with the Gauls became even closer. Ankon, the present Ancona was his foundation' (358–9).

23 Cornell 1995: 316.

24 Campbell 2009: 58; Allen 1983: 138; Walbank 1988: 252; Tarn 1913: 139; Mitchell 2003: 289 and Mitchell 1993: 15.

25 Strobel 1994; *ibid.* 1996: 10, 55–115, 263–4. Strabo 12.5.1 C566; Justin 25.2.11; Coşkun 2013: 78, 93 n. 33, and in 83 notes in this regard that Livy (38.10–12), who indicates that the Gauls also conquered land for themselves without waiting for it to be granted to them by any king or city, is a reliable source.

plunder cities and lands in the Balkans in 274, because otherwise he had ‘no money’ to pay them (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26.2). The unearthing and looting of the very tombs of the kings of Macedonia should therefore be viewed not as the initiative of a band of brutish Gauls, but as the only way a Hellenistic king could indirectly pay his Galatian troops (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26.6). Therefore, the looting of cities and sanctuaries or the occupation of land by the Gauls, should not be seen as clear evidence of the fierce character or the poverty of the Galatians, but rather as evidence of the economic difficulties of their contractors, or, otherwise, as a result of the non-fulfillment of previous agreements that forced these Celts to obtain the promised rewards by other means. According to this model, it might be hypothesized *a priori* that the fury shown by the Gallic chieftain Brennus during the sack of Delphi, could not only be attributed to a barbarian’s uncontrolled desire for plunder, but also to a Hellenistic recruiting agent’s defaulting on an earlier contract.

Returning to Justin, it is not only the mercenary phenomenon of the ‘sacred spring’,²⁶ which he uses to explain the Gaulish penetration into the Balkans between the years 280 and 277. In his detailed text, he also implies that it was a series of Macedonian errors that caused the situation to get out of hand, even though the Gauls were in fact always inclined to avoid this. Memnon proves also not only that the Galatians repeatedly offered agreements to various kings in Macedonia in order to contain the situation, but that other Hellenistic rulers proposed agreements, such as Nikomedes I in Bithynia, who urged the Gauls to be ‘friends with his friends and enemies to those who were not his friends’.²⁷ In line with these approaches to events, the following pages favour Justin’s version over that of Pausanias, and constitute an attempt to revise the paradigm of the Gaulish penetration into the Balkans in 280–277. They try to understand the motivations and resources deployed in this region by a variety of actors within the context of total chaos following the death of King Lysimachus in Corupedium in February 281.

The ‘Core-periphery’ Phenomenon in the Balkans and the Existence of an Autaratic-Scordiscian Confederation before 281

Modern studies focusing on the relationship between the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’ maintain that a political or economical centre dominates a series of subordinate outlying communities. New developments and changes occur

²⁶ Campbell 2009: 58.

²⁷ *FGrH* 434 F. 11; Launey 1987: 502–3.

first at the centre and then spread out to the periphery.²⁸ An ancient parallel to this idea of the link between centre and periphery is to be found in the Polybian concept of *symplokê*, or interconnectedness, recently explained with great adroitness by Eckstein.²⁹ The Polybian idea of interconnectedness, not so much based on economic factors as on political ones between states or human groups, is especially important in a Hellenistic world characterised by a series of relationships already in themselves unstable and often marked by aggression, with the weakness of a state usually inviting intervention by other stronger states or foreign groups. Such interventions frequently occurred after an explicit request for help from at least one local faction negatively affected by the weakness of the State.³⁰ This response, involving the military intervention of the stronger power in the affairs of the weaker, normally led to what is known generally as imperialism, described by certain modern geopolitical analysts as the 'pericentric model'.³¹

It should, however, be understood that the relationship between 'core' and 'periphery', or between broken State and stronger State or foreign group, did not always lead to the further spread of the 'pericentric model' or 'imperialism'. The reverse case could also have occurred, and it is precisely the existence of this reverse type of intervention, that of a weak group on a stronger one, which to date has not been adequately studied. It is understandable that this phenomenon was ignored in ancient times: neither Livy nor Justin could, given the times they lived in, be expected to have examined with the necessary objectivity the important role played by the Gauls in the affairs of the first Hellenistic powers. In modern times, the absence of such an analysis may also be explained by the sometimes, excessive dependence on certain ancient textual sources. However, the most important reason for the denial of such a phenomenon appears to be the fixation on the study of imperialism or pericentrism from the perspective of the stronger power. In any case, the failure to detect that there may have been military interventions of weaker groups with regard to their stronger counterparts, has led to a lack of understanding of episodes such as the Celtic penetration into the Balkans between the years 280 and 277. When we refer to the reverse of the pericentric model, we do not mean so much the intervention of foreign elements in the affairs of ultimately

28 Quinn 2012.

29 Eckstein 2006; 2008.

30 It is the work of Champion 2007, which highlights most clearly the idea of 'empire by invitation' in the Greek and Roman worlds.

31 Robinson, Gallagher and Denny 1961: 80–6 is the best-known exponent of the pericentric approach.

failed States, but to military intervention carried out by forces belonging to the periphery of a strong State. This represents the flowering of a peripheral phenomenon within the heart of a strong state that may be characterised as 'warlordism'.

It may be noted in this regard that in the Balkans a 'core' and a 'periphery' had effectively been coalescing during the fourth and third centuries. The 'core' was evidently the kingdom of Macedonia, and the 'periphery' a series of states and groups located immediately to the north. The interconnection that existed between this centre and its periphery by the early third century was such that the death of the Macedonian king Lysimachus in February of 281 could have produced the conditions for the leaders of some neighbouring states to try to restore order, in an effort to upset the balance of power at the heart of the Macedonian state. More than fifty years before this great collapse, Alexander the Great had already led a large Macedonian army to the Danube to fight the Getae and the Triballi, and in the year 335, Arrian, at the start of his *Anabasis* (1. 5. 1–5 A10), clearly describes for the first time in history, both the Balkan Celts and the Illyrian tribe of the Autariatae. Both of these groups are presented by Arrian as being on very friendly terms with the Macedonian royal house of Alexander the Great, and the trilateral wartime meetings between the Autariatae, the Gauls and the Macedonians seem to have already led at that point to something more than a mere formal meeting between neighbours.³² It is reasonable to consider therefore, that both Celts and Autariatae Illyrians may have served as allies of the Macedonian king against the Triballi and the Getae in 335 BC.³³ The possibility that some of the 7,000 Balkanic auxiliary soldiers who accompanied Alexander to the East on his Persian expedition were Autariatae, or even Gauls, can also certainly not be ruled out.³⁴

The settling of 20,000 Autariatae and their families around the river Orbelus (Diod. 20.19. 1. A 16) appears to have been in any case the just result of an agreement arranged and agreed upon by the Macedonian kings, in return for military service previously provided. In the year 310, Justin (15. 2.1 A17) also states that 'Cassander came upon the Autariatae (...) accepted them as allies and assigned

32 Papazoglu 1978: 100.

33 Since these tribes were represented in the embassy received by Alexander before his departure (at which time they also took an oath of allegiance and he granted them their requests, Arrian 1.4.6), it may be assumed that the Galatae formed part of his mercenary army, Campbell 2009: 276.

34 Many of them are named as 'Illyrian': Diod. 17.17.3–4 (T.36); Papazoglu 1978: 42.

to them the most remote territory of Macedonia'.³⁵ Cassander also seems to have quarrelled with what may well have been momentarily rebellious Gallic allies, and there is no doubt that he fought against them near Haemus Mons, where they suffered a resounding defeat.³⁶ Shortly afterwards, during the winter of 302/301, there are references to the use of Autariatae mercenaries by the Macedonian king Lysimachus.³⁷ According to Diodorus (20.113.3 A21), on the eve of the battle of Ipsus, when the armies of Lysimachus and Cassander were already in Asia Minor, 'some of Lysimachus' soldiers—two thousand Autariatae and about eight hundred Lycians and Pamphlynians—fled from their winter quarters to go to Antigonos Gonatas. Antigonos, behaving with humanity towards them, gave them the pay that they said Lysimachus owed them, and also honoured them with gifts'.³⁸ On another occasion chronologically close to this, Lysimachus also killed 5,000 Autaritae who were in his service, because of the Illyrians having lost 'all their train and baggage' in the midst of combat against Demetrius at Lampsacus. Lysimachus, who feared a revolt of the Autaritae against the central Macedonian army because of their sudden impoverishment, decided to make a pre-emptive attack, thus eliminating foreseeable internal issues in his army: Polyæn. 4.12.1 (A 22). Although it is not known whether Autaritae were enlisted in Lysimachus' army as a result of campaigns in the Lower Danube against the Getae, as Papazoglu suggests,³⁹ what does seem clear is that the migration of the Autaritae Illyrians in the Lower Danube is closely connected to the Macedonian intention to settle them between the Getae and the Triballi.⁴⁰

The Autaritae and the Gauls are in any case depicted as two highly connected groups in both Arrian (335), and even more so in Appian, in his Illyrian Wars.⁴¹ According to the latter, the very name of Illyria derives from Illyrius, son of Polyphemus and his wife Galatea. Not only does 'Galatia' have Illyrian

35 Yardley 1994: 138–9; Orosius 3.23.26 (A 18).

36 Pliny *Naturalis Historia* 31.5.30; Seneca *Naturales Quaestiones* 3.11.3; Paus. 10.19.5; Papazoglu 1978: 115.

37 Papazoglu 1978: 466.

38 Papazoglu 1978: 122.

39 Papazoglu 1978: 123.

40 In the book of Hoddinott 1981: 90, the mountainous lands between the Danube and the Adriatic were in the late fourth and early third centuries populated by a growing conglomerate of Illyrian tribes and 'proto-Celtic' elements, with Etruscan, Greek and Thracian influences as well as the constant invasion of 'Celts' from central Europe, Campbell 2009: 97–8.

41 See also Justin 8.6 and 9.2–3 for interaction between Philip II and Lysimachus and the Dardanians, the Scythians, the Triballi and the Getae. With regard to this latter group,

connotations, but tribal names in the area are also derived from the sons and daughters of Illyrius (Autarieus, Dardanus, etc). Given that two of Autarieus's grandchildren were called Scordiscus and Triballus (App. *Illyr.* 10.2), the author converts a tribe commonly associated with the Celts in the Balkans, the Scordisci, into an Illyrian one (*Illyr.* 10.5).⁴² Interestingly, Tarn points out that the Scordisci were also known as Galatae,⁴³ and, as it was most likely, the Scordisci who in the years 280–277 received the name 'Gauls or 'Celts', it may also be understood that they formed part of the Autariatae.⁴⁴ In another very interesting and much discussed passage from Appian (*Illyr.* 4. A19),⁴⁵ it is stated that the Autaritae attacked Delphi 'together with Molistomus and the Celts called Cimbri' (App, *Illyr.* 4; Diod. 20. 19). Since the participation of the Autaritae in an attack on Delphi appears to be essentially correct information on the part of Appian, this attack could have been carried out either in 279 (in Papazoglu's opinion) or in the year 310 or 113.⁴⁶ This information in Appian does not make it clear whether this Molistomus, about whom nothing else is known outside the context of this mention as regards Delphi, was a leader of the Autariate or of the Scordisci Celts, though the latter seems to be more likely. Although crucially, the union between the Autariatae Illyrians and the Scordisci Celts in the context of the sack of Delphi in 279 is presented in Appian as a solid fact. The understanding that the Illyrian Autaritae and the Gauls could have marched together in a number of ventures between 335 and at least to the year 279, helps in any case to understand the role played by various 'warlords' of the Macedonian periphery in the decomposition of the kingdom after Lysimachus' death. A full understanding of exactly how the Macedonian kingdom unravelled from the beginning of the year 281 is also a key factor in comprehending the interconnection of the different Balkanic

there is some evidence of a formal agreement for mutual assistance between Rhitomaces and Lysimachus.

42 Campbell 2009: 104.

43 Tarn 1913: 143 n. 19.

44 Campbell 2009: 107, Papazoglu 1978: 125–125 and Hoddinott 1981: 131 on the Scordisci's occupation of Banat, Oltenia and north-western Bulgaria after defeating the Getae and Triballi shortly after (or simultaneously with?) the famous Celtic invasion of Greece in 280–277.

45 See also Diod. 20 19.1 (A16).

46 The chronological possibilities for this raid (310, 279 and 113) depend on either the association in this text of the Autaritae with the plague of frogs (in the year 310), or with their participation in the sack of Delphi (in principle, linked to the year 279) or with the name of the Cimbri and their raids in the Balkans (in the year 114); see in this regard Papazoglu 1978: 116–21.

powers of the time (*symplokê*) that led to the subsequent Gaulish invasion of Macedonia and Greece.

The Illyrians, the Gauls and the Bid for the Throne in Macedonia after February 281

A few months after Seleucus' victory over Lysimachus at Corupedium in February 281 (Memnon *FGrH* 434 F. 57), the former crossed the Hellespont (late in the year 281) in order to seize the European possessions of the kingdom of Lysimachus. Ptolemy Ceraunus accompanied him and his army, and near Lysimacheia in Thrace, Ceraunus, despite having previously been a beneficiary of his patronage, took Seleucus by surprise and stabbed him to death,⁴⁷ an act which in the words of Pausanias earned him the epithet 'Ceraunus,' which means 'thunderbolt' in Greek (Paus. 10.19.7). After the murder, Ceraunus headed for Lysimacheia, where he donned the royal crown and, after acquiring a bodyguard, met Seleucus's army, which recognised him as king (Memnon *FGrH* 434 F. 8.3). Ceraunus managed later, with the aid of the fleet of Lysimachus (Memnon *FGrH* 434 F. 8.4–6; Justin 24.1.8), to consolidate his control of the Macedonian kingdom by repelling Antigonos Gonatas Lysimachus, and also negotiated pacts with Seleucus's son, Antiochus, with Ptolemy II in Egypt and with Pyrrhos (Justin 17.2.9). After dealing with the most imminent external threats to his new-found position in this way, Ceraunus could then, in the winter of 281/280, concentrate on the difficult domestic situation that still awaited him in Macedonia, which involved Arsinoë and her sons, the family of the late King Lysimachus, not accepting him as the new king and claiming for themselves the throne of Macedonia.

Arsinoë, the widow of Lysimachus, had left Ephesus in February 281 and moved to Cassandreia, a city in central Macedonia, where she stayed for seven months.⁴⁸ It remains unknown whether her sons were with her in Ephesus in February 281, accompanying her from Asia to Europe, or whether they met up with her in Cassandreia. In any case, judging by the words of Dion, one of her 'agents' (Justin 24.27), Arsinoë and her sons were never alone in the Macedonian city, but were surrounded by *philoï* to protect them. When he arrived in Cassandreia, with the aim of undermining the opposition of the family of the late king Lysimachus, Ceraunus asked for the hand of Arsinoë, who was

47 App. Syr. 62–63; Justin 17.2.4–5; Strab. 13.4.1 624b.

48 Diodorus 17.2 also remarks that Ceraunus became king seven months after the death of Lysimachus in February 281, after killing Seleucus.

in fact his stepsister (Justin 17.2.6–8). Ceraunus promised his stepsister that if she married him he would adopt and protect her two young children in return, although he did ask her to guarantee that her children would give up all claim to work against him, once they were married. Behind these requests there was, it can be imagined, the tacit acceptance of Ceraunus that Arsinoë possessed a significant amount of power in Macedonia, which she exercised through her considerable personal and military influence. Given that Ceraunus was apparently unable to enter the city of Cassandreia for seven long months without proposing marriage to his stepsister, Arsinoë must have enjoyed the support of significant armed forces. However, this force was not necessarily made up of Macedonian regular soldiers, nor was it necessarily stationed in the city of Cassandreia.⁴⁹ However, this force was not necessarily composed of Macedonian regular soldiers. Neither were they necessarily stationed in the city of Cassandreia. But it is, perhaps, significant that during the summer of 279, Diodorus (22.8) mentions a contingent of Galatians inside the walls of the city alongside the local tyrant, Apollodorus. Their presence in Cassandreia precedes Brennus' expedition into Greece, following the death of Ceraunus. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine whether any Gauls were present in the city in 280, although not impossible to assume there was a number of them that may have prevented Ceraunus' troops from entering the city. In any case, Ceraunus's promise to Arsinoë that after marriage he would not make war on her children (Justin 24.2.4) does constitute irrefutable proof that there was indeed an armed conflict before this marriage proposal.⁵⁰

There can be little doubt that Arsinoë and her sons may have been in direct command of a certain number of mercenaries, which may have thus ensured the loyalty of Cassandreia and other Macedonian cities in the months following February 281 (Trogus *Prol.* 24). Ultimately, her two young sons had as much or more right than Ptolemy Ceraunus to be recognised as kings of Macedonia, especially since Arsinoë's third son, Lysimachus's eldest son, was at that time about eighteen years old (Justin 24.2.10) and was, by any standards, the best candidate to be the rightful king of Macedonia. The ensuing war against Ceraunus, as described in the *Prologues* of Pompeius Trogus, which makes it clear that Lymisachus's son, Ptolemy, enjoyed the support of the troops of the Illyrian king Monunius (*bellum quod Ptolomaeus Ceraunus in Macedonia cum Monunio Illyrio et Ptolomaeo, Lysimachi filio habuit*), provides solid proof

49 Carney 2013: 52 n. 9, 155; Lund 1992, 173; Burton 1995: 124.

50 Ritter 1965: 112. See also Baray 2017, 217 n. 4.

that, even without a Macedonian army on her side, Arsinoë's family was quite able to cast in doubt the position of the new king within Macedonia itself.⁵¹

It is true that there is no evidence that Arsinoë's and Lysimachus' eldest son, Ptolemy, was ever proclaimed king of Macedonia.⁵² However, this does not in any way imply that he did not try to be, which also provides a satisfactory explanation for Ceraunus's almost desperate attempts to marry Arsinoë and for Trogus' mentions of war in Macedonia after Ceraunus was acclaimed by the troops in Lysimacheia.⁵³ Since Ptolemy, the son of Lysimachus, was apparently not to be found in Cassandreia when Ceraunus entered the city to kill Arsinoë's two other young children, it must be he who should be considered the true enemy of Ceraunus. In fact, it is also perfectly possible to argue that Ceraunus's violence towards Arsinoë's young children stemmed from the failure of this 'son of Lysimachus' to approve Ceraunus' plan to become the undisputed king of all Macedonia.

The extreme confidence and indeed arrogance shown by Ceraunus in his overtures to the Gauls immediately after his entry in Cassandreia⁵⁴ may, however, be better understood in the context of the security he felt, now that his legitimacy had somehow been confirmed (Justin 24.3.3). Ceraunus's insulting attitude towards the Dardanian chief, who offered him 20,000 soldiers to be on his side after his entrance in Cassandreia, and whom he compared unfavourably to the '(Macedonian) soldiers under his command (...) the sons of the men who had served victoriously under Alexander the world over', was matched by a still greater contempt for the Gallic commander Bolgius, who approached him to 'buy peace'. It is of little importance whether the Illyrian Monunius, who provided Lysimachus's son with assistance in the fight against Ceraunus and the Illyrian Dardanian chief who wanted to offer his 20,000 men to Ceraunus, were in fact the same person or not.⁵⁵ The main point to be drawn from this passage from Justin is that the attitude to Ceraunus of the Dardanians and the Gauls, emphasises his newly found status as legitimate king of the Macedonian kingdom and of its military periphery.⁵⁶ It may in

51 Papazoglu 1978: 140; Yardley 1994: 'the war fought in Asia between Antigonos Gonatas and Antiochus, son of Seleucus, and that waged in Macedonia by Ptolemy Ceraunus against Monunius the Illyrian and Ptolemy, son of Lysimachus (280)'.

52 Walbank 1988.

53 Justin 24.2.2 states that the Macedonian kingdom was the rightful heritage of the sons of Lysimachus.

54 Justin 24.3.1–9; Yardley 1994: 185–6.

55 As Sekunda 2013: 45 appears to suggest.

56 Paus. 10.19.7 claims that a number of Illyrians fought alongside the Macedonians of Ptolemy Ceraunus against Bolgius, which seems to imply that Ceraunus was less contemptuous of them than Justin indicates.

fact be assumed from Justin's narrative that neither the Dardanian Illyrians nor the Gauls of Bolgius had recognized Ceraunus as king before his arrival in Cassandreia, which explains Ceraunus's arrogant attitude towards the Dardanians: at the very least, these 20,000 Dardanians had not helped him in his war against Lysimachus's son, who did have a significant Illyrian faction on his side. Ptolemy Ceraunus's reaction to the Gauls of Bolgius is even more logical.⁵⁷ These same Gauls—or others of similar characteristics—may indeed have been involved in the Macedonian civil war on the Illyrian side, even if they are not individualised as such in classical sources from before the end of the year 280. If we are to believe Appian, the 'Celts', 'Gauls' or 'Galatae' were simply a violent and efficient sub-group of the Autariatae Illyrians⁵⁸ and there is no reason why they would have left any distinctive traces of their activity either in the textual sources before 280 or in the archaeological records after this year.⁵⁹ These Gauls (or 'Scordisci') were integrated in every sense in the pro-Macedonian Illyrian world of the time and can be considered as part of the Macedonian military periphery.⁶⁰

If Appian's narrative in his *Illyrica* 4, where he refers to Autaritae Illyrians and Gauls joining forces to sack Delphi in the year 279,⁶¹ is correct, it is then perfectly reasonable to consider that the Gaulish ambassadors who came to meet Ceraunus at the end of 280 could have come precisely from that semi-Illyrian part of the Balkan world that had been partially integrated into the structures

57 This request was made just after his arrival in Cassandreia (24.3.3), and may also imply that the royal treasury was in the city.

58 It is believed that the root *kel- is possibly the same as that of the Latin words *percellare*, *procella* or *clades*, meaning 'to hit, knock down' and that *gal- may relate to the concepts of 'power' and 'courage'. If this is indeed the case, then *Galli*, *Celtae* and *Galatae* are not so much groups that are ethnically distinct from the rest but associations of warriors within their societies, or simply what would perhaps be called 'armies' in modern languages. In this regard, see Flobert 1996: 266–7, Caesar *Bellum Gallicum* 1.1.1 for *Gallus*; Strab. 4.1.14 for *Celtae*; Polyb. 1.6.4–6 for *Galatae*.

59 There is no clear archaeological evidence of any 'Celtic' invasion or presence in the region, or even of the existence of the 'Gauls' as a distinct human group, Campbell 2009: 102.

60 In a similar way, the Romans could think of the Batavi and other Barbarian groups of the first century AD as integrated into the Roman forces. The consideration of the Batavian uprising of Iulius Civilis in AD 68–70 as a *bellum externum* by Tacitus (*Hist.* 1.1), and not as a part of the Roman civil war, which it really was (see López Sánchez and Hollard 2010: 60), is not without parallels to the Pausanias' presentation of the Illyrian and Celtic forces of 280–277.

61 According to Strabo 7.5.6, the Scordisci and the Boii were known as Galatae, and among the Illyrians the tribal names Autariatae, Ardiaeia and Dardanii were used. While it is true that Strabo wrote long after the events that occurred in the Balkans in the years 280–277, he does mention the fact that the Illyrians and the 'Galatae' lived together.

of Macedonian power since the time of Alexander the Great. Similarly, it is quite possible that Monunius and his 20,000 Dardanian Illyrians formed a very important part of Lysimachus's son's non-Macedonian army, which fought against Ceraunus, and it is an equally serious possibility that the Gauls who appeared before Ceraunus to negotiate their affiliation with the new king, were either part of the Illyrian contingent (Autaritae or Dardanians), which fought against him, or else they waited, biding their time, without taking sides.

280–277: No Clash of Civilizations, but Motley Macedonian Kings and Gaulish Warlords

It is well known that the ideology of demonisation of the Gauls became established in Hellenistic times as a way for many kings to legitimise their status. The repeated demonisation of the Galatians however, can be regarded as the result of clear opportunism on the part of various monarchies in some very specific situations. The kings of Macedonian ancestry and the cities of Hellenic affiliation always considered themselves to be separate political entities, and, although they were able to come to successful understandings, they usually had different agendas for action. Panegyric poetry, the sculptures exhibited in the most celebrated shrines and the rituals to honour the saviour-kings, were always aimed at the audience of the Greek civic world, and not towards the monarchical audiences that were much smaller in number and naturally less hesitant in its appreciation of royal deeds. Among the practices that the Greek public always liked least was the typically monarchical one of recruiting troops from a variety of backgrounds to form foreign bodyguards. Since such behaviour could be labelled tyrannical by their Hellenic subjects,⁶² Hellenistic monarchs were occasionally willing to demonise those same foreign troops that served them, and it is true that if they did not have money to pay their Gallic mercenaries, the Hellenistic kings had a certain tendency to sacrifice them without thinking twice about it. The public glorification of victories over defeated Galatians seems though, to have been primarily the result of the monarch having one eye on a public that feared them.

This ambivalent and deeply opportunistic attitude of the Hellenistic monarchies, widely practised after the year 280, is precisely the same as that expressed in the writings of Justin and Pompeius Trogus, who are certainly critical of the Gauls that came into Greece, but whose view of them is more nuanced than that of Pausanias, Polybius and Livy. It is significant, for example,

62 Billows 1995: 56, 59.

that the equally barbarian Illyrians are described with so little condemnation by Justin and Pompeius Trogus: though they are also foreigners, Monunius's Illyrians and the 20,000 Dardanians offered to Ceraunus are presented by these authors as quasi-regular forces involved in a Macedonian civil war. His more condemnatory attitude towards the Gauls follows precisely the same reasoning, but in reverse: the Gauls, or rather 'some Gauls', tried to integrate themselves into Ceraunus's Macedonian military structure, but were not accepted by the new king, and it is for this reason that they became a source of danger to the Hellenic world. In fact, the same 'Gaulish' ethnicity of certain Gallic contingents, very possibly integrated in the Illyrian forces of 281–280, may have been completely ignored by Justin and Pompeius Trogus before the encounter with Ceraunus, lacking as it did any importance in their narratives. Whether the Gaulish troops were ethnically or militarily differentiated from the Illyrians is a very interesting question, but nevertheless, secondary to the more fundamental issue, namely that the full recognition of Ptolemy Ceraunus as king of Macedonia was the cause of profound dissatisfaction in a number of Gaulish groups. One of these, the group commanded by Bolgius, intended to kill him, whereas another, according to Appian (*Illyr.* 4), even more clearly Celto-Illyrian than the former, sought to vent its frustration and dissatisfaction with this situation in the sacking of Delphi.

The failure of negotiations between Bolgius and Ceraunus, and the subsequent sacking of Delphi by Brennus, is an indication that changes in Gaulish attitudes in the Greco-Macedonian Balkans after the year 279 could be attributable primarily to a series of failed relationships between a number of Gaulish chiefs and several Macedonian kings or aspirants. In the same way that there was no Macedonian bloc in the years 280–277, it would also be a mistake to believe that there was any kind of undifferentiated Celtic, or Celto-Illyrian, identity. We do not know for certain, for example, the chronological sequence of the movements of the four main Gaulish chiefs and three major detachments, which seem to have operated in the Balkans between the years 280 and 277, as described by Pausanias, though it is known that Kerethrios led a Gaulish army against the Thracians and the Triballi, that Brennus and Akichorios did the same with another, first against Delphi and later in Paeonia, and that Bolgius did kill Ceraunus and returned home after the death of the Macedonian king (Paus. 10.19.4; Justin 24.7.9). If this really was the case, then the Gaulish incursions in the Balkans were very far from being a coordinated barbarian attack, and indeed each Celtic army may have had its own goals, not necessarily aligned with those of the others. Brennus, the chief who reached Delphi in 279, is not recorded in Justin or Pausanias as having established direct contact with either the deceased king Ceraunus or the future king Antigonus

Gonatas. This Gaulish chief's attack on Delphi does, in fact, suggest that this may have been the direct result of his dissatisfaction with the election of the new Macedonian king, after the decline in influence of Ptolemy, Lysimachus's son. Brennus was never able or willing to recognise either Ceraunus (as Bolgius did) or Gonatas (as Kerethrios appears to have done). If this was the case, then Brennus could have been a Gaulish chief who was the recipient of the trust of Lysimachus's son, Ptolemy. It could also have been he who was in fact in charge of the first Gaulish incursion into Macedonia, in conjunction with the Illyrian forces led by Monunios, shortly after the death of Lysimachus in February 281.⁶³ In this regard, Porphyry recounts how the succession to the Macedonian throne happened quickly, amidst much conflict and confusion (*FGrH* 260: F. 3.10). Meleager, the brother of Ceraunus, seems to have reigned for two months, though Diodorus grants him only a few days' reign, just before the almost equally brief one of Antipater, son of Philip and grandson of Cassander (40–45 days: Diod. 22.4).

Meanwhile, the Macedonian general Sosthenes refused the crown, though he did assume supreme control of the Macedonian army between the years 278/7 and 276/5 (Justin 24.5.12–14), and it was indeed he who managed to repel Brennus in Central Greece.⁶⁴ However, another Ptolemy is also named by Porphyry as an aspirant to the Macedonian throne at exactly this time,⁶⁵ and it is highly tempting to consider him as Lysimachus's son, Ptolemy, who had been active in Macedonia in the year 281/280 (Diod. 22.4; Porphyry *FGrH* 260 F. 3.10–11). If, as it seems, Arsinoë was indeed present in Samothrace in the years between 280 and 277, then her continued residence on the borders of Macedonia may be linked to the still active presence in Greece of Lysimachus's son and the aspirations of both to recover the Macedonian throne. Given that Ptolemy, the son of Lysimachus, enjoyed the support of Illyrian and quite possibly also Gaulish troops before the death of Ceraunus, it is tempting to view Brennus as the Celtic chief who backed his candidacy to the Macedonian throne. This possibility would also help us to understand the conflict between the Gauls of Brennus and the Macedonians of Sosthenes as a continuation of the unresolved conflict between the supporters of Ceraunus and Meleager and those of

63 According to Porphyry (*FGrH* 260, F. 3.9), Ptolemy Ceraunus reigned for a year and five months, Schoene 1967: 237; see also Campbell 2009: 178–83 for discussion of the exact date of his death.

64 Porphyry in Eusebius, *Chronicorum* 1, Schoene 1967: 235, Yardley 1994: 187.

65 *Chronicorum* 1, Schoene 1967: 'After Sosthenes, there was anarchy in Macedonia, because the followers of Antipater and Ptolemaeus and Aridaeus were competing for the control of the state, but no-one was completely in charge' (235).

Ptolemy, Lysimachus's son. If the confused events in the Balkans between the years 280 and 277 are not interpreted as a collision between the Gaulish and Greco-Macedonian worlds, but as the continuation of a bloody civil war for the Macedonian throne, which began early in the year 281, then it is also easy to understand why it could have been precisely the death of Brennus, which could have marked the end of the royal aspirations of Lysimachus's son. After the death of the Gaulish chief, the latter would no longer have had an army with which to continue his fight for the throne, as he did not have any before the adhesion of Monunios to his cause. Also, it was shortly afterwards in 277, that Antigonos Gonatas, his main enemy in the region, managed to attract some Gaulish troops to his side.

Like many other Macedonian sovereigns, Antigonos Gonatas also had his chosen mercenaries. He too may have had direct links with another Gaulish chief, named Kerethrios, who could have been the figure who, according to Justin, sent 'ambassadors to Antigonos to offer him peace if he would pay for it (...)', just as Bolgius did with Ceraunus (Justin 25.1–2). Significantly, Kerethrios had previously been a subordinate to Brennus, and he assumed command of the latter's army after his death. Kerethrios marched on Thrace, from where he attacked the Triballi, in the year 277,⁶⁶ and he is therefore the ideal candidate to have made contact with Antigonos Gonatas in Lysimacheia in the year 277, after having left his base in Thrace (Paus. 10.19.7). Unlike Ceraunus with regard to Bolgius in 280, Gonatas did accept the Gauls' offer to be his mercenaries, and rather than treating them with indifference, did so 'with royal munificence (...) and (...) with a sumptuous display of luxuries'. This information from Justin is, however, difficult to reconcile with another passage by the same author in which he claims that Antigonos Gonatas defeated a Gaulish army (the same?) at a crucial battle in Lysimacheia in the year 277.⁶⁷ Leaving aside the doubts about the very existence of this battle, or whether it occurred at the same time that the Gauls of Thrace were offering their support to Gonatas, the key element in this passage is the incontrovertible fact that the new Macedonian king left Lysimacheia with his position as king strengthened, precisely due to his strong links with the Gauls and in exactly the same location where a few years

66 Polyb. 4.45.10–4.46.2; Campbell 2009: 267.

67 The comment by Diogenes Laertius (2141–2), echoing a decree pronounced by Menedemos for Antigonos Gonatas regarding a victory over the 'barbarians' at around this time, does not confirm that the defeated Gauls were necessarily those from Lysimacheia. On the inconsistencies concerning the 'victory' of Gonatas over the Gauls in Lysimacheia, see Justin 25.1–2.7; Walbank 1988: 257.

before, Ceraunus received the recognition of the Macedonian troops.⁶⁸ It was also another Gaulish contingent, led by Lonorios and Lutarios and presumably an offshoot of Kerethrios' army, which was recruited by Nikomedes I of Bythinia in Byzantion in 278 BC,⁶⁹ with a view to securing his throne in the face of his brother and rival Zipoëtes. The Galatians were invited to cross the Bosphorus by Nikomedes under terms which included the proviso that they would be 'friends with his friends and enemies to those who were not his friends' (*FGrH* 434 F. 11), a clause which implies a service almost like an elite corps or corps of bodyguards provided to the Hellenistic king, a description that fits in well with the typical behaviour of many Hellenistic kings, and which may be closer to the reality of what might have happened between Gonatas and Kerethrios in Lysimacheia in the year 277.

From all the above examples, it may therefore be inferred that the fate of a considerable number of Macedonian kings between February 281 and the year 277 was dependent, among others, on the wishes of certain Gaulish chiefs. In modern and more rigorous scholarship, the term 'warlord' refers in principle not only to military commanders of great power and personal charisma, but also to a kind of 'big boss' with a regional base, who occasionally took political control at the political core of the system, where he was inserted if he considered it necessary. This control or political influence of the periphery on the centre became particularly evident by warlords in contemporary times, during times of great volatility or of disintegration of central states. The Gaulish chiefs alluded to here, who played a key role in the Balkans, would perhaps not *a priori* be strictly considered 'warlords', as they did not belong to the Macedonian kingdom that appears to have disintegrated between the years 281 and 277. However, there is no doubt that warlords are in principle lords that form part of the political system in which they take part, and are not complete foreigners. They typically exert their influence over regions affected by conflict, where they are often the ultimate authority, or else they exercise from the periphery their influence on the centre of the State, which they theoretically obey. Based on this definition, and on a strictly Macedonian understanding of the events that took place in the Balkans in the years 280–277,⁷⁰ the label 'warlords' could perhaps nevertheless be applied to Gaulish chiefs

68 Usener 1874; Sekunda 2013: 45 n. 64 for a detailed bibliography, which questions the battle of Lysimacheia and Gonatas' 'victory' against the Gauls there.

69 Coşkun 2013: 73; Campbell 2009: 272.

70 When Antigonos Gonatas first hired the services of his Gauls in the year 277, he undertook not only to pay each one of them in Macedonian gold, but he also gave them aristocratic hostages as security, Polyæn. *Strat.* 4.6.17.

like Brennus, Bolgius, Kerethrios, Lonorios or Lutarios. If it is understood that in the time of Lysimachus, Ptolemy Ceraunus and Ptolemy, the son of Lysimachus, such tribal chiefs formed an integral part of the military, and to some degree, the political machinery of the kingdom of Macedonia, then such a definition should not necessarily be uncomfortable to the contemporary historian. These Gaulish chiefs or warlords also appear to have acted independently, lending their support to different candidates to the Macedonian throne, depending on agreements and contexts that are too complex to be fully understood. There can be no doubt however that they contributed for over three years to the spread of instability in the kingdom of Macedonia, owing to their different or changing affiliations. In a political context that was as unstable as that of Macedonia after March of the year 281, it may be the case that the Illyrian and Celtic periphery of the kingdom intervened to restore order, which had broken down. Here, we have argued that a variety of different Gaulish or Celto-Illyrian warlords were considered to be sufficiently integrated into the machinery of Macedonian power to play a role in the struggle for the throne, which erupted after the death of Lysimachus. From this perspective, we should perhaps view the Galatian incursions in the Balkans as more the product of integration, and even accept that they may have been invited to intervene by the key actors of the kingdom. This process may well have begun with the death of Lysimachus in the year 281, and not a year later, shortly before Ceraunus's death.

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Prolegomena to the Study of ‘Warlordism in Later Hellenistic Anatolia’

Altay Coşkun

1 Multipolarity, Warlordism, and Later Hellenistic Anatolia— A First Approach

As with the application of most modern concepts to antiquity, the study of *Multipolarity and Warlordism in the Ancient Mediterranean* poses a variety of obstacles: it is quite difficult to come up with adequate definitions that not only fit ancient phenomena and conditions, but also remain sufficiently sharp to allow for meaningful observations and conclusions.

At the first sight, the concept of ‘multipolarity’ does not seem to be as problematic though, given that a number of studies have shown that its original context, ‘Realist’ Political Theory, can be applied with some success especially to the anarchic world that Alexander the Great left behind.¹ This said, some qualifications are in place for the Later Hellenistic world.

First, it is uncertain whether we may still speak of a multipolar structure for the period following the defeats of the Carthaginians (202), of Philip V of Macedon (197) and of the Seleukid king Antiochos III (191 and 190).² Thus no major player other than the Romans had a say north and west of the Tauros Mountains anymore. While it is true that the senate was not yet in a position to impose its will on every dynast of the Eastern Mediterranean at all times after the Battle of Magnesia (190),³ it is hard to ignore the amount of power at its disposal: if this potential alone was not enough to encourage compliance with its wishes, resistance could and mostly would sooner or later be crushed by an alliance of the willing, Roman legions only being the last resort. Accordingly, Later Hellenistic Asia Minor would appear as part of a monopolar world.

1 All dates in this chapter are BC, unless stated otherwise. See esp. Eckstein 2006 and 2008, as well as his article included in this volume. For alternative (constructivist) methodological frameworks, see also, e.g., Tröster and Coşkun 2003; Burton 2011.

2 With a particular view to conditions in Asia Minor, we should add that, by 200/197, the same Antiochos had ousted the Ptolemies as players from Anatolian affairs as well.

3 We should thus be hesitant to speak of a Roman Empire yet; see the definitions by Doyle as presented by Fronda and Gauthier in this volume (p. 309–10).

This said, alternative perspectives can still be adopted: one may well consider middle powers such as the Attalids, Tolistobogioi, Bithynians and Mithradatids as poles influencing the events in Asia Minor, even though all of these rival kingdoms were 'friends' or even 'friends and allies' of the Romans.⁴ Exceptions to this rule are marginal and either relate to Mithradates VI Eupator (c. 116–63), although he, too, was a 'friend' of the Romans for around half of his rule, or to the Parthians in the generation after Crassus' defeat at Karrhai (53). On balance, however, actual threats to Roman Asia Minor remained ephemeral after 190.

There is another reservation as to the employment of 'Realist' theory: while modern nation states are mostly pluralistic internally, they tend to pursue foreign affairs as one subject and with a certain degree of consistency even in times of government changes. In contrast, the Roman Republic was not only repeatedly paralysed by civil war towards its end (133, 122/21, 100, [90–88], 88–73, 63–62, 49–45, 44–30) but, even beyond such extreme crises, there were several situations in which representatives of the Roman state counteracted each other. As a result, different groups of senators supported opposing rivals competing for the same thrones of Mediterranean kingdoms, and some (pro-) magistrates dared to wage war against the explicit will of the senate. Most prominent are the rulings first of Lucullus (73–66) and then of Pompey (66–62) in the East: the former seemed to endlessly protract the war, and therewith his command, while the latter had been granted nearly unlimited powers; both caused dismay among the senators, who eagerly sought to subvert their actions however beneficial they might have been.⁵ Against this background, for much of the second and first centuries, multipolarity in the Mediterranean is perhaps best explained with rivalling Roman factions, a situation that changed dramatically and for good with the Battle of Actium (31).

Be this as it may, 'multipolarity' as the first key notion of the Barcelona conference will be paid attention to in the current study only insofar as it may help us understand the conditions under which 'warlordism' was likely to flourish or, on the contrary, to be curbed. The exploration of what it may have meant to be a 'warlord' in (Later) Hellenistic Asia Minor forms the core of this chapter. The

4 For a study of the self-representation of such middle powers in the earlier Hellenistic world, see Koehn 2007. An excellent study that ponders the agency of those middle powers after Apameia is Payen 2016: he assesses the influence of the Romans slightly lower than I have done, and rightly cautions that—at least in the first generation after 188 BC—the Seleukids were still reckoned with.

5 Gruen 1974; Hillman 1989; Tröster 2005; Coşkun 2007, besides the according sections in Broughton, *MRR* (vols. 2–3).

lively debates that the conference sparked at the *Catalan Institute for Research and Advanced Studies* attest to the vivid associations that scholars of the early 21st centuries tend to have: it is not only our fresh memories of the wars in Afghanistan and Irak (that have been re-ignited while I have been working on this paper), or of the havoc that most Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries affected by the Arab Spring have been going through to this date; in the short period after the conference, we have been reported countless brutal revolts also from central Africa, to which the violent independent movements in Eastern Ukraine and the countless atrocities of the self-proclaimed 'Islamic State' (ISIS or ISIL) have to be added. Typical of all those crises are the many self-declared military leaders who recklessly do away with (admittedly for the most part quite dysfunctional) political and legal structures, who swiftly extend their power bases not only by resorting to shocking degrees of violence that finds its opponents widely unprepared, if not paralysed, but also by enlisting thousands of volunteers that had been deeply dissatisfied by the previous government and now see a vigorous opportunity for change, even if at a high price.

'Warlordism' would thus appear as a universal phenomenon characteristic of times of political break-downs, or, if we should be willing to concede a more constructive role to those whom their enemies blame as 'criminals' and 'terrorists', such 'warlords' seem to play important roles not in all, but in many processes of radically restructuring political systems, potentially leading to a complete 'rebooting' also of the social, economic, legal, religious or cultural landscapes. The topic is thus not only intriguing for the many historical 'action thrillers' that vivid historiography on 'warlords' of all times can yield, but it seems to emerge as a concept worthy of academic reflection.

And yet, despite its overall appeal, 'warlordism' as a historical concept has turned out to be rather 'fishy' for antiquity: after days of lively debates in Barcelona, we were still far from agreeing on a clear-cut definition that was neither over- nor underdetermined. As a preliminary descriptor, I suggested describing a 'warlord' as a *ruler who draws on military force and somehow lacks legitimacy*. While none of the conference participants enthusiastically embraced this equation (no one shouted *heureka*), it had and still has the advantage that, even if somehow incomplete, nothing can be found seriously wrong with it.

I shall thus take this lowest common denominator once more as my starting point and work through the powerful men of second and first century Asia Minor that fulfill the two criteria (below in section 2). Thereafter, I shall discuss the implications of the term 'warlord' on a more abstract level (in section 3), before drawing some conclusions on the applicability of the concept and its

potential interrelation with a 'multipolar' environment (section 4). An appendix that systematically lists the potential 'warlords' of Later Hellenistic Asia Minor completes this contribution (section 5).

2 Some Types of Potential 'Warlords' in Later Hellenistic Asia Minor

If we concede the existence of 'warlords' in antiquity at large and in the Hellenistic age in particular, one may want to start with the Diadochs, who fought for the spoils of Alexander's Empire with minimal degrees of legitimacy, using the family of the deceased king rather as a pawn for their self-promotion than with a genuine interest in preserving the unity of the Argead kingdom for the brother and sons of Alexander. However, the Diadochs and Epigonoi are beyond the chronological scope of this study.

A. Let us therefore begin with less spectacular figures: rulers of petty territories with a reputation for violence and contested legitimacy. As the prototype of this group, I have chosen *Antipatros of Derbe*, whom Strabo calls a 'robber' (*lēstēs*). Not much is known about him other than the Geographer's disdain, and that King Amyntas defeated him to integrate his Lykaonian territory, which included Derbe and Laranda, into the new but likewise short-lived Galatian kingdom.⁶ It appears that Amyntas acted at the order of Mark Antony. We can take for granted that Antipatros' heydays postdate Pompey's reorganization of Asia Minor in c. 64, but since he is neither mentioned in Cicero's letters from Kilikia (51/50), it is safe to say that his career started in the course of the civil war in or after 49. He may well have exploited the weakness of Roman authority after the unexpected defeat of Pompey at Pharsalos or following the invasion of Pharnakes in 48, unless it was the renewed crisis of Caesarian rule over Asia Minor after the death of Mithradates of Pergamon in Kolchis or during the revolt of the Republican Bassus in Syrian Apameia. Accordingly, he probably cooperated with C. Cassius Longinus and was thus punished by Antony after Philippi, for otherwise he would have been in a good position to negotiate a peace with the Triumvir. Whichever be the case, Antipatros owed his position to three factors: the deep but temporary crisis of Roman imperial rule in the East, the limited accessibility of Lykaonia from the Mediterranean, and his local power base in Derbe.

⁶ Main sources: Strab. 12.1.4; 12.6.3 (30s BC); with Hoben 1969: 40; 128ff; 135ff; Sullivan 1990: 172 and 393 n. 94.

B. Our next two examples were rulers of middle-sized territories. I start with the aforementioned *Amyntas* (42/41–26/25): as the former secretary of the Galatian King Deiotaros, he ingratiated himself to Antony at the Battle of Philippi and was hence rewarded with the realm of Pisidia. Initially, this comprised only the northern parts around Antioch, but he steadily extended his rule into the valleys to the south as well as into Phrygia Paroreios, Lykaonia and Pamphylia; in the course of the 30s, he was further appointed king and tetrarch of the three Galatian territories after the sudden death of Brigatos, the successor of Deiotaros Philorhomaïos. Amyntas was a highly efficient ‘terminator’ for the Romans, extinguishing all anti-Roman forces in central and southern Anatolia. As a result, at least part of their resources was made serviceable to the campaigns of Antony.⁷

The decision to consider Amyntas among the potential ‘warlords’ may, on the one hand, be challenged, since no ancient source questions the legitimacy of his rule. On the other hand, objections will be put forward only hesitantly, given Strabo’s description of his efficacy as a warrior, which left the city of Kremna in Pisidia completely depopulated. At any rate, according to our definition, we are only entitled to include him into the preliminary list of ancient ‘warlords’, if we can specify his lack of legitimacy. This will be a decisive obstacle to all those who require explicit traces for the fact that his legitimacy was questioned (and do not count fierce resistance to his conquest or even his assassination by the already defeated Homonadeis). Likewise hesitant may be those who consider Roman hegemony over Asia Minor so well-established in the second half of the first century that decisions by Antony, the most powerful representative of the Roman Empire, provided a sufficient moral and legal base for conquest and rule. However, it is worthwhile noting that Amyntas lacked dynastic legitimacy in all of his territories; even in the heartland of Galatia he could solidify his position only by intermarrying with a descendent of Deiotaros. Moreover, some of the areas he got into his possession had so far never accepted Roman (or Galatian) supremacy. As a result, denying Amyntas’ illegitimacy would imply acknowledging a superpower’s right to make decisions about the rule over all territories in their sphere of interest—which I am reluctant to do.

The second example of this category is the aforementioned *Deiotaros I Philorhomaïos* (100/94–41/40). While his career resembles that of Amyntas in many ways, it differs in that Deiotaros inherited a dynastic claim over the Galatian Tolistobogioi from his father the tetrarch Sinorix. His position was further enhanced through his staunch resistance to Mithradates VI, an attitude which

7 Main sources: Strab. 12.5.1, 4; 12.6.1–6; with APR s.v.; also Mitchell 1994; Coşkun 2008.

was congruent with his persistent pro-Roman agenda. We see him fighting side by side with the Romans as early as in Sulla's (anti-Mithradatic) campaign in Kappadokia in 94, but much of his charisma was based on his successful liberation of Galatia from Pontic occupation during the First Mithradatic War (89–84). In the Second Mithradatic War (82–80), he was the most powerful ally of Murena, and in the Third (73–63), he not only warded off the Pontic invaders at the outbreak of the conflict, but also provided the most effective support to Lucullus and Pompey. Decades of singular service to Rome earned him not only the diadem, but also substantial extensions of his realm mostly in Eastern Pontos.⁸

Why, then, have I included the most famous king of the Galatians into the list of potential 'warlords'? Would it be sufficient to surmise *guerrillero* practices during the period of the First Mithradatic War? Or is it because freedom fighters (at least in antiquity) rarely fought for the value of freedom itself, but rather for their own freedom, whereas they tended to be less concerned about the freedom of others? Or is it for the excessive violence that he might have displayed in combat, which modern scholars have been too happy to posit?⁹ The main reason for listing Deiotaros here is that there are (mostly) modern accusations that he illegitimately took possession of the Trokmian (53 and again 44) and Tektosagen (42/41) tetrarchies. What has rarely been pointed out though is that Deiotaros, while furthering his own dynastic ambitions, very closely respected the rulings and interests of the Romans, also in those three instances. The only explicit reproach of holding some Galatian territories voiced in our surviving sources is contained in the pro-Caesarian *De bello Alexandrino*: in this book, the questionable appointment of Mithradates of Pergamon, a close supporter of the Dictator, as tetrarch of the Trokmoi receives some elusive justification at the cost of Deiotaros. Not surprisingly, in his speech of defence for the king, Cicero explains the reallocation of the Trokmian territory not in legal terms, but simply spells out the political convenience it offered to Caesar.

C. Let us now move on to representatives of major royal houses of the Hellenistic world, whether their kingdoms were ascending (potentially even to become a superpower on par with Rome) or whether they had shrunk, on

⁸ Main sources: Strab. 12.3.13; 12.5.1–3; Cicero, *Pro Rege Deiotaro*, see below; also, Syme 1995; Coşkun 2005; 2007; APR s.v.

⁹ His bad press is mainly based on Strabo's report (12.5.3) on his murdering his son-in-law Kastor Tarkondarios together with his daughter (42/41), though we should not forget that Deiotaros acted in revenge for Kastor's intrigue designed to eliminate his father-in-law (45). See Coşkun 2005 and 2007.

the contrary, to a petty territory (such as Pontos in the later first century and Seleukid Kilikia respectively in the early first century).

With *Mithradates VI Eupator of Pontos*, I am considering to include one of the most powerful and charismatic kings of Asia Minor into the list of potential 'warlords', and this despite his being a scion of the distinguished royal lineage of the Mithradatids, whose bloodline was ennobled by intermarriage with the Seleukids and allegedly also by descent from the Achaemenids. I do not want to argue his nature as a 'warlord' on the mere basis that he was a rival or, later, an enemy of the hegemonial power; nor would it be sufficient to point to his occupation of the many areas of Asia Minor and the Black Sea coast that had never belonged to a king of Pontos beforehand. In fact, he was welcomed widely as a defender of the Greeks from barbarian incursions or Roman exploitation. But where he was not received enthusiastically or where previous loyalty was fading away in the face of Roman advances, he displayed singular cruelty in punishing dissidents: he had no scruples about extinguishing the elites of whole cities or tribes in order to discourage further desertion, not yet mentioned the spectacular war crime of murdering tens of thousands of Roman citizens in the so-called Asiatic Vespers. These offences, however, are not the only limitations of his legitimacy: the continuous defeats inflicted on him by the Romans, which led to the loss of Pontos, the heartland of his kingdom, as well as the exhaustion of the remaining territories shook his royal prestige to a degree that even his own sons Machares and later Pharnakes revolted against him.¹⁰ His contemporaries must at some point have gained the impression that he was waging war for the sake of war.

While Mithradates Eupator thus exemplifies the once-glorious king who over time lost his legitimacy to rule, the latest Seleukids stand for a whole royal house that, despite its most noble history, failed to re-establish a durable kingdom to be passed on safely to their natural heirs. After the loss of Mesopotamia under Demetrios II (139/38) and again under Antiochos VII Sidetes (129), the territories that their rivalling scions controlled had shrunk to petty kingdoms, and for about three generations the fiercest enemies had been arising from their own kin—a condition that Mithradates had to face only in the last few years of his half-century rule.¹¹ One may refer to *Seleukos VI*, son of Antiochos VIII Grypos, and his brother *Demetrios III*: they were based in Seleukeia at the Kalykadnos, and perished near Mopsuestia (97/96–c. 94) at the hands of their own brothers *Antiochos XI Epiphanes Philadelphos* (94–93)

10 Main source: Appian *Mithratika*, see below. See Ballesteros Pastor 1996 and 2013; also Günther 2006 and Niebergall 2008 on the First Mithradatic War and the Asiatic Vespers.

11 Sources collected and discussed by Ehling 2008.

and *Philip I Epiphanes Philadelphos* (94–83/75?), who also sacked the city that had hosted their rival brothers. Eleven years later, the same Philip, together with his son *Philip II Philorhomaïos Barypous* had to take refuge to Olba in Kilikia. Lucullus allowed the latter to recapture Syrian Antioch (67), but only to be deposed by Pompey (65, †56).

D. I would like to address three further sub-groups, even though they somewhat overlap with the preceding major three categories.

a) Priests or high priests of major temples in Asia Minor are not—and should not—normally be regarded as 'warlords'. Despite the amount of material and human resources some of them could draw on and their occasional dynastic position that could be passed on over many generations, there is no evidence that such (high) priests got regularly involved in direct warfare. The degree to which they were expected to support the wars of their patron kings or of Roman generals cannot be ascertained, but as far as I see, there is no example of an individual priest who 'terrorized' his neighbourhood or waged war in order to conquer adjacent territories.¹² This said, there are two aspects that deserve to be mentioned here. First, the wealth and prestige of certain temples made them desirable objects for kings, dynasts, robbers or even cities, so that there are frequent reports on violent encroachments, at times even expulsions of the priest, such as in the case of Pessinous in 58 and 56, although it needs to be pointed out that our sources represent the priests as passive, as subjects of violence or as deserving protection.¹³

Second, in some instances, we know of individuals who qualify to be listed among the potential 'warlords' of Later Hellenistic Asia Minor and who were also priests of regional sanctuaries, positions with which leading Roman politicians rewarded their services: *Archelaos Sisines*, son of the most-trusted homonymous commander in Mithradates' army during the First Mithradatic War, became priest of Komana Pontike under Pompey; no 'crimes' committed by him in Asia Minor are on record, but the fact that he first offered his service to A. Gabinius against the Parthians (57) and then seized the opportunity of marrying Queen Berenike, revolting daughter of Ptolemy XII Auletes, betrays his desire to fight and gamble for a kingdom. He thus died as short-lived king of Egypt during its conquest by Gabinius in 55.¹⁴

12 In general, see Boffo 1985 and 2007; also Magie 1950.—Our assessment should be different though for the Maccabees, the high priests and rulers of Judaea (152–37).

13 See APR s.v. Brogitaros; Tsetschladze 2009; Coşkun c. 2017.

14 APR s.v.

An even better case may be *Kleon of Gordiokome* (which he later renamed *Juliopolis*). Strabo calls him a 'leader of robbers', but Mark Antony somehow legalized his position in recognition of his loyal services. Changing sides at Actium, he was not only spared by the Young Caesar, but even appointed ruler of Morene and Abrettenne in Mysia, including the priesthood of Zeus Abrettenos, but later he also became high priest of Komana Pontika.¹⁵

Such careers notwithstanding, it remains inconclusive if an additional sub-type for potential 'warlords' is required, since none of the trespasses on record were committed in a clear connection with any of the priesthoods. The examples rather illustrate that criminals or potential 'warlords' can be found in any position, including priesthoods and kingships.

b) Next, powerful citizens of Greek poleis should be taken into consideration as well, even though the time for *caudillos* seems to have been over after 200: Attalid rule under Roman hegemony or, since 133, Roman direct control left little room for such adventures. In times of need, wealthy citizens continued to take action, even military action to protect their city, if needed, but the most widespread pattern of serving one's hometown was lobbying with influential Roman senators or governors. Arguably the most successful among such civic noblemen was Theophanes of Mytilene, whose services to Pompey were rewarded with the grant of freedom to his home community, which established a divine cult in his honour in return.¹⁶

However, through their loyalty to Rome in times of crisis and their readiness to take up arms, two citizens of Greek poleis are known to have been rewarded with a realm: the service of *Mithradates of Pergamon* to Caesar in his Alexandrian War was paid for with the kingship over the Trokmoi and also the nominal rule over the Bosporan kingdom which was yet to be conquered—an attempt at which he failed though (47–46).¹⁷ *Polemon* was the son of Zenon, an orator of Laodikeia on the Lykos, who distinguished himself by organizing the resistance against the Parthian invasion (40); Mark Antony felt obliged to his son, in whom he likewise recognized military prowess, and appointed him as the first (and only) tetrarch of Lykaonia (c. 41); his loyal assistance persuaded the Triumvir to promote Polemon to become king of Pontos (by 36). Through a combination of skill and ruthlessness, he extended his rule even into Armenia

15 Strab. 12.8.8f.; APR S.V.

16 APR S.V.

17 Note, however, that his ability to support Caesar and his dynastic ambitions may root in his mother's Trokmian descent: she was the sister of King Brogitaros. See Heinen 1994; APR S.V. Adobogiona 1; Brogitaros Philorhomaioi; Mithradates VII of Pergamon.

Minor and found recognition also under Augustus (31/26), who later ordered him to occupy the Bosporan Kingdom (15/14). He was killed when attempting to further subdue the revolting Aspurgianoï on the eastern coast of the Black Sea (8).¹⁸ No need to say that both Mithradates and Polemon blatantly lacked dynastic legitimacy despite the backing of Rome: the former's lineage ended when he was killed while plundering Kolchis, whereas the latter was able to pass on royalty to many of his descendants.

c) A third sub-group that can be singled out is closely related to the preceding one: ship captains who went beyond a required military service to their home town and ventured risky campaigns for Romans involved in civil wars, such as for Sulla and the Triumvirs. While no direct military activity in Asia Minor is attested for such individuals, these are at least possible, and the kinds of rewards seem to imply dynastic or quasi-dynastic positions gained through the favour of their Roman patrons. A single inscription mentions the honorary decree passed by the senate for three allies of Sulla,¹⁹ whereas a whole epigraphic dossier has been preserved for *Seleukos of Rhosos*, a protégé of the Young Caesar.²⁰ At any rate, their cases remain ultimately inconclusive.

E. This list would remain seriously incomplete, unless our preliminary definition were also tested on Roman military leaders. I am not attempting to stress that all 'imperialist' wars, whether or not they lead to a direct extension of territorial rule, are to be seen as illegitimate per se. Such a definition would compel us to regard most Roman magistrates or promagistrates active in Asia Minor prior to the Principate as potential 'warlords', and thus water down the specificities of the term. In fact, our preliminary definition is sufficient to fence off such an attempt, since we need not concede that a short-term governor sent out and recalled from the centre of the empire be regarded as ruler. Whom we should take into consideration though are those Roman commanders who, while holding a nominal or effective command in Asia Minor, found their legitimacy challenged, if not shattered, back home by the Romans themselves. They were thus drawing most or all of their resources from the area they controlled. Up to nine individuals can be named between Sulla's consulate (88) and the

18 App. *Bellum Civile* 5.35.319; Strab. 12.6.1; Plin. *Naturalis Historia* 5.40.95; see also Hoben 1969: 36–53; Sullivan 1990: 161–3; 389; Sartre 1995: 135; Coşkun 2015: 176–7.

19 Sher 1969: no. 22, with APR s.vv. Asklepiades of Klazomenai; Meniskos of Miletos; Polystratos of Karystos.

20 Raggi 2006.

Battle of Actium (31), after which a century of stability within the Roman command structure followed. Various sub-types may be distinguished:²¹

- a) a (pro-) magistrate who reached Asia Minor with a legitimate *imperium* to lead an army and also with a mandate by the assembly of the people or the senate to wage a specific war, but who was later recalled, if not declared *hostis*, back in Rome (*L. Cornelius Sulla* cos. 88, procos. 87–83/79);
- b) those who held *imperium* without having been legally assigned a province in Asia Minor (*P. Cornelius Dolabella* cos. 44, procos. Syriae 43; *C. Cassius Longinus* praet. 44, appointment as procos. Syriae with *imperium maius* for the east only after its conquest, though soon revoked by the Triumviri, 43–42);
- c) those who had usurped power in Rome or its provinces, whether they then held a formally valid *imperium* together with a legal attribution of a province (*C. Iulius Caesar*, cos. 48, dict. 48/47, procos. 47; *M. Antonius*, III-vir 43/42–31/30) or not (*C. Flavius Fimbria*, leg. 86–84, usurped command of two legions in 86, defeated by Sulla 85/84; *Q. Labienus*, son of Titus [leg. 42] 40–39);
- d) less certain is the inclusion of those politicians whose election or the vote on whose mandates resulted in a very high strain on the political system, whence their appointments or re-appointments—and thus many of their deeds—remained contested (most prominent are the cases of *L. Licinius Lucullus*, cos. 74, procos. 73–66/63, and *Cn. Pompeius Magnus*, procos. 67–62/61).²²

21 For source references on the Roman candidates, see Broughton 1952–1986 (vol. 2–3); also, e.g. Magie 1950; Gruen 1974; Bringmann 2007.

22 On these two Romans, see above, with n. 5.—One might also think of *C. Marius*, procos. 90–88: his command against Mithradates was secured under highly questionable circumstances, which triggered the revolt of Sulla; but he did not make it to Asia Minor. Another possible candidate would be *M. Licinius Crassus*, cos. 55, procos. Syr. 54–53, since, after the highly contested assignation of the province of Syria (which implied the Parthian War), he marched through and recruited in Asia Minor, though did not fight there.

3 Some Terminological Cautions Regarding 'Kriegsherr' and 'Warlord'

If the preceding sample of warrior dynasts did anything to contribute to an understanding of what kind of rulers 'warlords' in Later Hellenistic Asia Minor may have been, then they made it apparent that the two preliminary criteria are insufficient and too unspecific as to differentiate a 'warlord' from an illegitimate ruler. Moreover, there does not even seem to be an uncontestable dividing line between a legitimate and an illegitimate ruler, not least because both of them would claim some legitimacy and deploy power, occasionally exerting violence. Their classification thus mainly depends on the perspective: quite often, one's own involvement or interests in an area or conflict decided on this perspective.

On closer inspection, however, the difficulty of coming to grips with terms and classifications is not confined to antiquity alone. As will be shown, the modern term 'warlord' includes similarly different shades of grey. In my first approach, I compared the entries in Wikipedia in a couple of Western European languages, in order to find a solid starting point for what the term nowadays means to fellow citizens of the European Union or friends from Northern America. I found out that there is not only a high degree of consistency beyond the borders of modern nation states in the abovementioned areas, but also attempts at precision that can compete with any of the well-established general encyclopaedias. I shall start with the entry in *Wikipedia.de*, since the German term 'Kriegsherr' is acknowledged to be the origin of 'warlord':

Kriegsherr ist im veralteten deutschen Sprachgebrauch der Monarch, wenn er das Recht zur Kriegserklärung aus eigenem Entschluss hatte. Der deutsche Kaiser bezeichnete sich als „oberster Kriegsherr“. Daraus [...] abgeleitet und mit neuer Wortbedeutung bezeichnet „Kriegsherr“ (bzw. engl. Warlord) heute einen militärischen Anführer, der in einem mehr oder weniger begrenzten Gebiet, das zumeist formal Teil eines größeren Staates ist, zugleich eine absolute politische Macht ausübt. [...]

This definition, as far as quoted here, implies the difficulty of pinpointing the dividing line between legitimate and illegitimate rulers, and it likewise agrees with my previous choice of examples in that the size of the territory under the control of a warlord ultimately does not matter. The main difference, however, emerges in regards to its 'mostly being a formal part of a larger state'. This

aspect,²³ with all its ramifications, is dealt with in more detail in *Wikipedia.com*, to whose definition we shall now turn:

A warlord is a person with power who has both military and civil control over a subnational area due to armed forces loyal to the warlord and not to a central authority. The term can also mean one who espouses the ideal that war is necessary, and has the means and authority to engage in war. Today, the word has a strong connotation that the person exercises far more power than his official title or rank legitimately permits. [...] Warlordism appears in so-called failed states: states in which central government and nationwide authorities have collapsed or exist merely formally without actual control over the state territory. They are usually defined by a high level of clientelism, low bureaucratic control and a high motivation in prolonging war for the maintenance of their economic system, mainly based on the extraction of natural resources.

In fact, only the first sentence appears to be a definition of what a 'warlord' actually is, with all the rest indicating what he may also be, namely of a militaristic or violent attitude. Or it is stated which the most decisive of his qualities is, i.e. his lack of legitimacy, whereby legitimacy is regarded to root in a 'central authority' of a 'nation' or 'state'. As a result of this rift, the 'warlord' thus defined controls a 'subnational area', whose overarching political framework has effectively ceased to exist, or is, in other words, a 'failed state'. In more positive terms, the new territory cut out of the larger one does have or at least starts to develop its own means of political, administrative and economic organization, even if not yet at the normal level of a functional nation state. While not stated explicitly in this definition, it is still implied that the territory controlled by the 'warlord' may one day develop into a new state, unless the previous central authority manages to re-establish itself or yet another power ends up taking control. A 'warlord' would thus appear as a more or less normal phenomenon in the process of the disintegration of a political entity, or in the transition from one polity to another.²⁴

23 See also Marten 2006–7: 41: 'Warlordism plagues many weak and failed states, and the parochial and often brutal rule of warlords deprives countries of the chance for lasting security and economic growth'. For other definitions that emphasize the economic aspects see Marten 2006–7: 46–8.

24 This continues to be true, even if a warlord intends to block the transition, i.e. to maintain the near-to-anarchic condition to perpetuate his power; see also Marten 2006–7: 46–48 et al.

Interestingly, most of the so-called failed 'failed states' vexed by 'warlordism' in the early twenty-first century, as we see them today in Central and Northern Africa as well as in the Near and Middle East, had never been nation states at all, at least if the standards currently in place among Europeans and Northern Americans were applied. Without claiming much, if any, authority in the field of Political Sciences, I would adopt Max Weber's criteria to explain what a state is: namely, a political entity circumscribed by a clearly-determined territory in which the government holds a monopoly of physical power and a high degree of legitimacy, whose rule is based on generally applicable laws and aided by a bureaucracy.²⁵ A 'nation state' would further imply that the citizenry consists of either a single ethnic or of multiple ethnics with equal rights and obligations, plus a certain degree of respect for and solidarity with other ethnics united under the same nationality.

Behind this background, it would be much fairer to address the aforementioned 'failed states' rather as 'post-colonial states' whose nation-building process had been aborted prematurely and whose administration had tended to remain dysfunctional. As a result, such political entities had always suffered from a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of many of their citizens (or indeed subjects)—a fact which has become most apparent when the crisis of political institutions quickly turned into their complete breakdown. 'Warlordism' is thus part of a terminological framework that is problematic at least in two regards: first, it presupposes the previous existence of a nation-state where such had not even been the case, and, second, it is one-sided in ascribing legitimacy to central authorities and denying it to local ones, even though the latter might be based (at least occasionally) on older traditions or broader consent.²⁶

How much more problematic is it then to transpose the concept of 'warlordism' into antiquity for which neither Weberian states nor nation states can reasonably be posited at all? Conceptual difficulties might perhaps be bridged for Late Antiquity, when the Roman state had become contiguous with the borders of the Empire and legitimacy or perhaps rather acceptance of Roman rule was relatively high; but the adoption of the same concept for the Hellenistic period would require us to ascribe legitimacy to the rapacious Hellenistic kingdoms or the hegemonial Roman Republic, which would be both partisan and anachronistic.

25 Weber 1980: 821–5; Swedberg and Agevall 2005: 265–7: 'A state ... is an organization that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a specific territory' (265).

26 For similar ideas, Marten 2006–7: 42ff. For a concise discussion of legitimacy, see Swedberg and Agevall 2005: 147–9.

Most other features that have been suggested as additional criteria for 'warlords', whether ancient or modern, either imply yet other kinds of problems or share the same basic difficulties. This is most striking, if villainy and a violent nature are posited as characteristics. The reproach of the former is most outspokenly partisan and a typical behaviour among enemies: those fighters that sided with the victors (the Romans or the Caesarians), such as Amyntas and finally also Deiotaros, were more likely to find a benevolent press, figuring as 'kings' or 'friends and allies', whereas defeated enemies were more likely to be called 'robbers' or 'tyrants', such as Antipatros or Mithradates Eupator.

Of course, such black-and-white patterns were not always followed rigidly: a pirate captain who surrendered at the right moment, such as Tarkondimotos, could still become 'king', and despite being one of the arch-enemies of Rome, Mithradates was still conceded a monumental funeral by Pompey, and his royal rank did not befall the *damnatio memoriae*, since descent from him would convey dynastic legitimacy to his offspring in the Bosporan kingdom (and ephemerally also in Pontos), hence, to allies of the Romans for some further generations to come.²⁷ Just as 'warlord', 'terrorist' or 'freedom-fighter', any kind of aggrandizing or denigrating political terminology is perhaps less indicative of legal conditions or moral values than subject to political opportunity.

Yet other aspects have been considered by my colleagues as being typical of 'warlords'—and are thus reflected in their contributions to this conference volume. E.g., B. Rankov suggests charismatic leadership as characteristic.²⁸ On the one hand, I am inclined to agree, since the lack of institutional authority may indeed imply a stronger need of personal trust, charm or persuasiveness; on the other hand, the violent rejection of the established order went along with a very high potential for loot, allotment of farmland or personal promotion, so that ruthlessness would often have been sufficient to inspire hopes of success and rewards. At any rate, I do not see how charisma is anyhow limited to either legitimate or illegitimate rulers or even their ministers, and would thus renounce to using it as a distinctive feature of a 'warlord'.

Ch. Tuplin discusses (though ultimately rejects) the possibility that most 'warlords' were commanders of mercenaries. While, of course, any such leader could, under certain historical (or political) circumstances, develop into a 'warlord', most did not. Moreover, most individuals listed among the potential 'warlords' of later Hellenistic Asia Minor clearly do not fit that descriptor either, even though most kings and cities involved in warfare in that period would have mercenaries in their camps. This said, the dividing line between

²⁷ Heinen 2006: 28–58.

²⁸ On charismatic leadership and warlordism, see also Marten 2006–7: 46f.

mercenaries and soldiers recruited from among one's allies, subjects or citizen body became ever more elusive with long-distance campaigns, settlements of soldiers or veterans and a professionalization of warfare that did not even stop before the gates of Roman Republican army camps. However, the discussion what a mercenary was in the Later Hellenistic period would yield sufficient debates for a different conference.

Yet another criterion has been put forward by A. Eckstein: namely, that 'warlords' tend to establish themselves in areas that are somehow 'remote' or in any sense difficult to access. Antipatros of Derbe would have been a good example for this type of usurper, and the pirates of Rough Kilikia or Crete could neatly be added. However, those same examples do show a willingness of such warriors to extend their spheres of influence, when opportunities arose. At the same time, distance or ease of access were no constant entities, but rather depended on a ruler's reflection of the resources at his disposal, of the challenges threatening his position and of the priorities he had to set. A king or the senate had to calculate not only the costs of sending out a commander against remote revolts (which were to be balanced against other actual or potential menaces), but also the collateral consequences of both a victory or a defeat of their general. It was rather such a complex calculus that, e.g., held back the Romans from interfering against the aggressions of Prusias I against the Attalids, or against the turmoil that Mithradates had been stirring up in Anatolian kingdoms while Italy was under threat from German tribes. At the same time, I would concede that some opponents of the Romans took up arms based on the assumption that the particular circumstances would render a violent reaction unlikely. And, indeed, some got away with their venture, others did not, and yet others paid the price only later. But, again, it is not easy to see that the Romans would have made a terminological difference as to distance or topography, and this does not seem to be current practice either.

4 Conclusions and Outlook: 'Warlordism' and the Rhetoric of Legitimate Rule

In the end, I have to admit that my study of 'warlordism' in Later Hellenistic Asia Minor has failed, since I have been unable to commit myself to any precise definition. Trying to overcome the difficulties, I have chosen an inductive approach, collecting and classifying several *rulers who drew on military force and somehow lacked legitimacy*. Such men I grouped in five categories: examples were given for (A) rulers of minor territories, and those in particular whom the ancients might have called *tyrannos*, *lēstēs* or *pirata* in Greek, or

usurpator (also *tyrannus*), *praedo* (or *latro*) and *pirata* respectively in Latin; however, the larger part of the examples were actually kings, part of whom ruled middle-powers (B), while others were scions of major royal houses, whether their claims were effective or more of a nominal nature (C); a miscellaneous group followed that included priests and citizens of Greek poleis (D); finally those Roman commanders-in-chief with contested authority were listed (E).

The heterogeneity of this sample was mirrored by the terminological difficulties that the discussion of modern definitions has brought to light. As a result of all the problematic implications, it is not only unclear to me what a 'warlord' is supposed to have been in antiquity, but I now feel even uncertain as to what a 'warlord' actually is today (something I was still thinking to know while attending the conference in Barcelona three years ago). Of course, the term evokes a wealth of (antipathetic) associations, but it remains that the term is either over- or under-defined and thus of little value as an analytical tool.

And yet, despite the *aporia* surrounding the question what a 'warlord' *is*, it has become quite clear to me that the term is normally employed to deny legitimacy to a leader of a militia or even of a more-or-less effective ruler (mostly, though not necessarily) of a petty territory. The fact that we Europeans and Northern Americans have (at least for the most part) accepted the monopoly of the state to use physical violence implies our inclination to regard all other violence as illegitimate (with the notable exception of self-defence in an emergency situation). This may well be appropriate in a functional state, where laws are passed by a legitimate authority and a central government is willing and capable of enforcing them. We should, however, be somewhat less certain for areas where the framework does not warrant the same degree of legitimacy and functionality of the central state. And we should further be aware that the qualification of any political player in such contexts as 'warlord' is partisan—whether or not this terminological choice occurs deliberately.

This somewhat failed study of 'warlordism' in (an important part of) the ancient world may thus be seen as an encouragement to look more closely at how legitimacy of rule or, alternatively, of the use of violence is constituted, denied or negotiated, and how partisan interests of individual adventurers, of whole ethnics or nations, or of imperialistic super-powers manipulate the representation of legitimacy. This could, for instance, lead up to a more systematic study of the rhetoric inherent in both the representation of oneself (or one's nation or government) and of the inimical other: which are the categories that are accepted as sources of legitimacy, such as genealogical claims to rule, the right versus the wrong political constitution, the true religion or divine grace,

moral qualities or mere efficiency and victoriousness,²⁹ to name but the most influential categories? How are they intertwined with each other, how balanced against each other? And how stable do these patterns remain when they no longer align with one's own political goals, economic interests or religious beliefs? How do they change geographically and throughout history?

Once the discussion has moved into such a direction, the initial concern to learn more about the interdependence of interstate polarity and the phenomenon of 'warlordism' appears in a somewhat different light. Of course, there will be little surprise that, in a monopolar environment, the number of potential 'warlords' tends to be much smaller than in a multipolar world, at least if 'warlordism' is understood as a phenomenon of political instability and disintegration and the Augustan Empire is viewed as a monopolar world par excellence: highly capable in military as much as political terms. No wonder then that, under such conditions, potential 'warlords' of the type of Antipatros of Derbe gradually disappeared (in fact, the overlordship of Mark Antony over the Eastern Mediterranean was sufficient to bring his elimination about). To use modern notions, 'organized criminality' at a high level or major 'no-go areas' were less likely to reappear in the Mediterranean as long as the imperial authority provided living conditions acceptable to the vast majority of the population and maintained its capability to quell resistance whether morally justified or not.

But there is another side to this—somewhat tautological—balance sheet: the reduction of 'warlord'-like figures in an increasingly monopolar Roman world also went along with terminological deceit: the pirate-chief Tarkondimotos made friends with Pompey, who elevated him to kingship in Kilikia Pedias and drew on his support in his war against Caesar; Antony was less concerned with dynastic legitimacy and diplomatic niceties, but had an outstanding predilection for highly efficient 'terminators' such as Amyntas and Polemon in Asia Minor (to which may be added Herod in Judaea and Kleopatra in Egypt); Augustus did not hesitate to bestow distinguished priest-hoods on the robber-prince Kleon, and enjoyed Gordiukome being renamed as Juliopolis.³⁰

Some might call such cases illustrious examples of conflict resolution and integration, others perhaps prefer to point out that even the resources of superpowers had their limitations, and thus compromises were inescapable. Yet

29 On the latter category, see Mehl 1980–1.

30 For interesting modern parallels, such as the support of some warlords against others by the US government or the inclusion of certain warlords in coalition governments approved by the UN, see Marten 2006–7: 45f.

others would rather want to castigate the opportunistic attitude of Roman rulers revealed in such questionable appointments: they curbed the potential harm for the imperial administration by clearly circumscribing the territories of such appointees, they made a huge amount of resources available through such highly obliged appointees, and they avoided the blame for the continuing mistreatment of the unhappy few to fall upon the Romans. This way, the Roman leaders of the later first century gradually increased the desire among the denizens of the Mediterranean world to become directly subjected to Roman imperial rule. The latter turned out to be a highly important result of Roman imperial politics without having been a purposeful strategy.³¹

5 Appendix: List of Potential 'Warlords' in Late Hellenistic Asia Minor, or of Rulers That Waged War in Asia Minor and Occupied Parts of It with Dubious Legitimacy

In this appendix, I have collected further examples grouped according to the patterns established above in section 2. Normally, rulers whose control did not extend west of the Euphrates are not included. There is no claim of completeness. References have been kept short and preference is given to according articles in APR, wherever they exist.³²

A *Rulers of Minor Territories (Type: Antipatros of Derbe)*

a) *Kilikia and Lykaonia*

- Anonymous leaders of pirates.³³
- Tarkondimotos I Philantonios, former pirate captain, appointed king of Kilikia Pedias by Pompey (c. 66–31).³⁴
- Antipatros of Derbe (and Laranda), ruled parts of Lykaonia 48/42–35/32.³⁵

31 For the benefits of Roman provincial rule over living as subjects of Roman 'friends', see the discussions of, e.g., Ando 2000; Baltrusch 2002; 2008; Coşkun 2008.

32 For further reference works that cover the kings and dynasts as well as the wars of Hellenistic Asia Minor, see also Magie 1950; Will 1979–81; Sherwin-White 1984; Sullivan 1990; Sartre 1995; Syme 1995; Erskine 2003; Errington 2008; also Chaniotis 2005.

33 Plut. *Pomp.* 26; 28; App. *Mithr.* 96; (1300 ships). The problems of piracy, i.e. criminal activities on sea and in coastal areas, or the representation of any kinds of economic activities as piracy, are not considered much further in this article (other than below in section D. c), but see the seminal work by de Souza 1999; also Ehling 2008: 263–268.

34 APR s.v.; Wright 2008.

35 Hoben 1969: 40; 128f.; 135f., and see above.

- b) *Galatian Tektosages*³⁶
 - Kastor I Tarkondarios, tetrarch of the Tektosages (?86–41), who probably also occupied the territory of the Tosiopoi. (APR s.v.)
- c) *Galatian Trokmoi*
 - Brogitaros Philorhomaioi, tetrarch (by 88) and king (58–53), who, though with the backing of P. Clodius tr. pl. 58, violently occupied the temple state of Pessinus, which was taken back by force by Deiotaros I in 56. (APR s.v.)
 - Mithradates VII of Pergamon, son of Menodotos, nephew of King Brogitaros, who played a major role in saving Caesar when trapped in Alexandria in 47, was rewarded with the position of king of the Trokmoi and king designate of Kolchis and Bosporos, but was killed when plundering Kolchis in 46.³⁷
- d) *Other Galatian rulers established as petty rulers in Asia Minor after Philippi*
The available information on them is minimal, and only in two cases warrants inclusion in this list:³⁸
 - Adiatrix, Tyrant of Herakleia Pontike, where he was established by Mark Antony (41) and slaughtered all Roman settlers (31); he was executed by the Young Caesar (29). (APR s.v.)
 - Straton, Tyrant of Amisos, established under Mark Antony. (APR s.v.)
- e) *Kibyra*
 - ? Moagetes of Kibyra (deposed by Murena in 84). (Strab. 13.4.17; see also Polybius 21.34; Livy 38.14.3f. on his homonymous ancestor around 189)

B *Nominal or Effective Rulers of Middle Powers (Types: Amyntas and Deiotaros I)*

- a) *Attalids of Pergamon*
Unless the extension of their territory after 190/188 by the Romans is regarded as illegitimate, only one potential 'warlord' remains:³⁹
 - Aristonikos = Eumenes III (133–130).⁴⁰
- b) *Prusiads of Bithynia*
Since the Battle of Kouroupedion, the kings of Bithynia were tumultuous, being involved in wars with their neighbours and with internal pretenders for

36 Only the Tolistobogioi are considered as middle power here. For further references on the Galatians, see below, n. 33.

37 APR s.v.—see also below.

38 But see also APR s.v. Ateporix; s.v. Dyteutos; s.v. Kastor of Paphlagonia; s.v. Zmertorix of Eumeneia.

39 See in general Hansen 1971; Evans 2012; Thonemann 2013.

40 Daubner 2003; Coşkun 2011b.

much of the time. I here confine myself to the most unruly representative of the second century and a pretender of the first century:⁴¹

- Prusias II (182–149).⁴²
- Sokrates Chrestos, usurper around 90.⁴³
- c) *Kappadokia*
Listed are only the kings or usurpers that were most contested:⁴⁴
 - Orophernes Nikephoros, usurper (158–154). (APR s.v.)
 - Ariarathes IX Eusebes Philopator, usurper and king (c. 101–c. 86). (APR s.v.)
 - Ariobarzanes I Philorhomaïos (96–c. 63). (APR s.v.)
 - Archelaos I Sisines (37–AD 17). (APR s.v.)
- d) *Kings (and Tetrarchs) of the Galatian Tolistobogioi*
While there is no evidence that their rule over the Tolistobogioi was ever particularly violent or contested or (with the exception of Amyntas) not based on dynastic rights, they all appear to have been belligerent neighbours and avid of extending their territorial control:⁴⁵
 - Ortiagon, king (†c. 182).⁴⁶
 - Solovettios, *regulus* (c. 167). (APR s.v.)
 - Sinorix, tetrarch (c. 100).⁴⁷
 - Deiotaros I Philorhomaïos, tetrarch (by 94), king of Pontic and Microarmenian territories (†40).⁴⁸
 - Amyntas (I), King of Pisidia (41–26/25); in the course of the 30s, Galatia, Lykaonia and Pamphylia were added to his territory.⁴⁹

41 See in general Michels 2009; also Gabelko 2005 (which I could not read, since it is in Russian).

42 Michels 2009: 72–77.

43 APR s.v. Mithradates VI; Sullivan 1990: 33–35.

44 See in general Hoben 1969; Ballesteros Pastor 2008; Michels 2009.

45 A major study on the Tolistobogian Kingdom (third to first centuries) is in preparation. For the time being, see Coşkun 2007; 2008; 2011a and the entries in APR, besides the traditional accounts by Magie 1950 and Mitchell 1993. Three kings of the Tolistobogioi have not been included: Kassignatos, successor of Ortiagon, (†c. 168), who is only attested to have fought as an ally of Pergamon in the Third Macedonian War (see APR s.v. Solovettios); Deiotaros II and his son Brigatos, for whom no relevant conflict is recorded (see APR s.vv.).

46 Mitchell 1993, vol. 1.

47 Mitchell 1993, vol. 1.

48 APR s.v.; see also Hoben 1969; Syme 1995; Coşkun 2005; 2007.

49 APR s.v.; see also Mitchell 1994 and Coşkun 2008.

C *Rulers of Kingdoms on the Verge from Middle to Great Powers (or Vice Versa) (Types: Mithradates Eupator or Seleukos VI)*

This category lists members of major established royal houses who waged war in Asia Minor to either extend their realm or resurrect their ancestral rule. Not considered are Ptolemies and Antigonids who had lost their Anatolian possessions by 197 and no longer played significant roles in Asia Minor. Nor did the Parthians qualify for inclusion, since their military presence west of the Euphrates was not only ephemeral, but should probably be regarded as acts of retaliation rather than the attempt at establishing their rule (under King Orodes II and Prince Pakoros in 53–50 and 40–39).

a) *Mithradatid Kings of Pontos (and the Kimmerian Bosphoros)*⁵⁰

- Pharnakes I (c. 196–c. 155). (APR s.v.)
- Mithradates V Euergetes (c. 150–120). (APR s.v.)
- Mithradates VI Eupator (120/16–66/63). (APR s.v.)
- Pharnakes II (63/48–47). (APR s.v.)

b) *Artaxiad Kings of Armenia*

Although their ancestral kingdom is located east of the Euphrates, and thus beyond the geographical limits of this catalogue, two members of the royal house also ruled and fought west of the river:⁵¹

- Tigranes I (or II) (c. 95–55). (APR s.v.)
- Tigranes, son of Tigranes I (or II), usurper in Armenia (66–65) and King of Sophene (65–c. 64, †58). (APR s.v.)

c) *The Later Seleukids (in Kilikia)*

The legitimacy of all kings from Demetrios I (162–150) onwards was contested, but listed are only those kings attested to have waged war in Kilikia; all Seleukids after Antiochos VIII Grypos (125–98/97) were only nominal representatives of a Great Power:⁵²

- Seleukos VI, son of Antiochos VIII Grypos and brother of Demetrios III: first base at Seleukeia on the Kalykadnos, perished in Mopsuestia (97/96–c. 94).
- Antiochos XI Epiphanes Philadelphos (94–93) and Philip I Epiphanes Philadelphos (94–83/75?), brothers of Seleukos VI and Demetrios III (sacked Mopsuestia).

⁵⁰ See in general Ballesteros Pastor 1996; Heinen 2006: 28–58; Michels 2009.

⁵¹ See in general Sullivan 1990; Prantl 2008.

⁵² See in general Grainger 1997; 2015; Ehling 2008; a major monograph is in preparation by Adrian Dumitru, Bucharest.—Antiochos XIII Philadelphos *Asiatikos*, son of Antiochos X Eusebes and Kleopatra Selene (84–73, 69–67, 65–64), is not attested to have fought in Asia Minor. See also APR s.v.; Ehling 2008, 231–278.

- Philip I Epiphanes Philadelphos (94–83/75?) and his son Philip II Philorhomaïos Barypous (83–67) took refuge to Olba, whence the latter recaptured Antioch (67–65, †56). (APR s.v. Philip II)

D *Uncertain and Overlapping Categories (Types: Kleon, Polemon and Seleukos of Rhosos)*

*a) Priest Dynasts*⁵³

- Archelaos Sisines, priest of Komana Pontike (since 63), King of Egypt (56–55). (APR s.v.)
- Kleon of Gordiokome/Iuliopolis, friend first of Mark Antony and later of the Young Caesar, who appointed him priest of Zeus Abrattenos in Mysia and High Priest of Komana Pontike (40s to 20s). (APR s.v.)

*b) Citizens of Greek Cities*⁵⁴

- Polemon of Laodikeia, son of Zenon, tetrarch of Lykaonia (c. 41–36), king of Pontos and the Bosphoros (36/15–8).⁵⁵
- Mithradates VII of Pergamon, son of Menodotos, nephew of King Brogitaros. (APR s.v.—see also above)

c) Ship Captains

- Asklepiades of Klazomenai, pro-Sullan ship captain (c. 83–78). (APR s.v.)
- Meniskos of Miletos, pro-Sullan ship captain (c. 83–78). (APR s.v.)
- Polystratos of Karystos, pro-Sullan ship captain (c. 83–78). (APR s.v.)
- Seleukos of Rhosos, supporter of the Triumvirs at Philippi.⁵⁶

53 In general, see Boffo 1985 and 2007. See also Hoben 1969: 44 on Lykomedes, High Priest of Komana Pontike in the 30s.

54 There were several further civic magnates that managed to establish quasi-dynastic positions in the course of the first century, but the sources are silent about the use of arms in their direct environment. Potential candidates are nevertheless: first, the offspring of Chairemon of Nysa: his son Pythodoros of Tralleis and his further offspring Pythodoris Queen of Pontos and the Bosporan Kingdom (Günther 2006: 161f.; APR s.vv. Pythodoris and Pythodoros I–III); the Galatian dynasty of Fulvia / Eumeneia (APR s.vv. Zmertorix; Kastoris; Valerios Zmertorix); the Epikratids of Miletus (Günther 2006: 166–70).

55 Hoben 1969: 36–53; Sullivan 1990: 161–163; 389; Coşkun 2015.

56 Raggi 2006.

E *Roman Commanders-in-Chief with Usurped or Contested Authority (Type Sulla)*

Depending on the perspective, potentially all Romans who waged war in Asia Minor prior to the Young Caesar/Augustus might be regarded as 'warlords', for, only after Actium, monarchical rule was no longer contested and 'voluntary submissions' followed throughout the Mediterranean world, so that legitimacy of Roman rule was at least higher than anytime before. However, in the narrow sense, Romans who waged war in Asia Minor without the backing of the republican constitution are the following:⁵⁷

- L. Cornelius Sulla, cos. 88, procos. 87–83/79
- C. Flavius Fimbria, leg. 86–84, usurped command of two legions in 86, defeated by Sulla 85/84
- (perhaps L. Licinius Lucullus, cos. 74, procos. 73–66/63)
- (perhaps Cn. Pompeius Magnus, procos. 67–62/61, 49–48)
- C. Iulius Caesar, cos. 48, dict. 48/47, procos. 47
- P. Cornelius Dolabella, cos. 44, procos. Syriae (!) 43
- C. Cassius Longinus, praet. 44, procos. Syriae (with *imperium maius*) 43–42
- M. Antonius, Triumvir 43/42–31/30
- Q. Labienus, son of Titus (leg. 42) 40–39 (or rather labelled as Parthian?)

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Rome, Empire, and the Hellenistic State-system

Arthur M. Eckstein

Interstate politics in the ancient Mediterranean was for centuries what political scientists term a multipolar anarchy. The interstate world consisted of a plurality of independent states, all contending with each other for survival and (if possible) hegemony. The most successful of these was of course Rome. But did the tremendous victories of 196 and 188 BC over the Antigonid monarchy and then the Seleucid monarchy—which followed the defeat in 201 of the Carthage in the West—mean that Rome had established an empire in the eastern Mediterranean? That the Roman Republic established an empire in the Greek East from 188 BC is asserted by some scholars.¹ I will argue here that such a conclusion is based on an insufficiently rigorous attention to what political scientists tell us an empire is (and is not), combined with the misinterpretation of important facts. The emergence of Rome as a true imperial metropole was in fact haphazard and long-delayed. After the defeat of Carthage, Macedon and the Seleucids, Rome by 188 had certainly achieved what political scientists term ‘unipolarity’: in the Mediterranean system of states the preponderance of power was now in the hands of a single entity.² But does the emergence of even great interstate asymmetry of power equal the establishment of an ‘empire’? This is the complicated question I will address.

The modern study of empire began as the study of legal structures of administration, and if one restricts oneself to legal structures of administration there are no ambiguities: either you are in the empire and are administered directly by the metropole, or you are not.³ In our period, the Roman Republic had such a formal or legal empire, that is, provinces ruled directly by Roman governors and garrisoned by Roman troops. But these provinces existed only in the West: the provinces of Sicily, Sardinia-Corsica, Nearer Spain, and Further Spain. All of them had emerged as by-products of Rome’s wars with Carthage, and were originally created primarily for strategic reasons, as a way to deprive a (temporarily) defeated enemy of valuable resources and bases of operations.⁴ But in the Greek world east of the Adriatic Sea, such formal Roman administration and rule did not exist in 188 BC. And it did not emerge for another

1 See, e.g., Derow 1979; Derow 1991; Derow 2003; Mandell 1989; Mandell 1991.

2 This definition of unipolarity (admittedly imprecise): see Mastanduno 1997: 52.

3 Baumgart 1982.

4 Sherwin-White 1977: 66.

half-century. Taking a formal legal-administrative perspective, the answer in the East to our question is clearly: No.⁵

But many modern scholars do not restrict the term 'empire' to a situation where there exists a formal-legal apparatus of rule and administration. They underline instead a broader definition of empire: the 'effective control, whether formal *or* informal, of a subordinated society by an imperial society'.⁶ This is the theory of 'informal empire'. The theory is set out in the most detail by Michael Doyle.⁷ Examination of Doyle's schema will help us to conceptualize and categorize the political situation that existed in the Greek East after 188 BC. And examination is necessary, because there are real dangers of misunderstanding when one leaps to use of the term 'empire' as if it means simple gross inequality of power.

Doyle argues that any situation that is less than one state's effective political control over a subordinate state's internal policies as well as its external policies, a control that can be achieved (to be sure) either through formal or informal means, is not empire but something less. When a metropole controls continuously the foreign relations of weaker neighbors, but not their internal structures or politics, Doyle describes this as 'hegemony'. When a metropole desires neither to interfere in weaker states' internal structures or politics, nor to control continuously their foreign relations, but merely to establish certain limits on those foreign relations, Doyle describes this less oppressive situation as a 'sphere of influence'. He emphasizes that proper political analysis requires us to distinguish each of these situations from empire, as well as to distinguish them one from another; politically, they are not the same.⁸ To be sure, in historical reality it is not as easy as in political-science theory to distinguish each of these stations along the spectrum of increasing subordination—i.e., to separate historically a situation of 'sphere of influence' from one of 'hegemony' from one of (informal) 'empire'. This is because the geopolitical situations that exist in the actual world are both highly complex and constantly shifting.

5 On the long and hesitant process by which a formal Roman administrative apparatus eventually emerged in European Greece and western Asia Minor, see Morstein-Marx 1995.

6 Doyle 1986: 30 (emphasis added), 45.

7 For Doyle's wide influence, see, e.g. Rosen 2003: 211. Explicit statement of the concept of 'informal empire' goes back to Gallagher and Robinson 1953; the ultimate source is probably Lenin 1920.

8 Doyle 1986: 30–47; see esp. the chart on p. 44. On one stage of informal but effective subordination as seeking merely to 'set limits' on another state's foreign relations, see the groundbreaking discussion of Murphy 1961.

Moreover, there is a problem even with the employment of the term 'control'. There are differing varieties of 'control', and differing areas of 'control', as well as differing intensities of 'control'. And the conceptual problem becomes especially acute if such 'control' is exercised only informally: what, then, are we talking about? This problem has not been well understood by scholars of antiquity, who often use the term 'Roman control' in the East as if its meaning were both self-evident and totalizing.⁹ But as the political scientist J. Donnelly stresses, the political life of a hegemonized state that nevertheless has complete power over its own internal policies and structures is very different from that of an imperialized polity that does not. Moreover, while a metropole may exercise influence over weaker states, influence of greater or lesser intensity depending on the area of policy involved and the period under study, 'influence is simply not rule'. Let me repeat that: 'influence is not rule'.¹⁰ Even where there exists great asymmetries of power, then, polities may retain power over their own internal affairs and even over their foreign relations. Asymmetries of power may create uncomfortable situations for these lesser states, but nevertheless this is not empire.¹¹

In short, modern political scientists emphasize that not every interstate asymmetry of power, and not every limit placed upon a polity's actions, amounts to empire. Rather, there is both a spectrum and a continuum of increasing asymmetry of power that may make the actual relationship of states at any given moment difficult to define. This is especially so because some asymmetry of power is normal in all interstate relationships.¹²

And there is another complication when we think about 'empire'. In the real world, interstate hierarchy—from mere sphere of influence all the way to direct administration by an external entity—is a dyadic relationship. That is, hierarchy is always a relationship between two polities. This hierarchical relationship varies, sometimes widely, across pairs within a system. That is, a single powerful state may possess sharply varying degrees of hierarchy across many dyadic relationships at the same time.¹³ The variation across the many dyadic

9 Thus scholars of antiquity often refer to Roman methods of both direct and indirect 'control' with no attempt to define what is meant (and the implication is often that control is total): see Badian 1965: 11; Dahlheim, 1977: 122; Harris 1979: 162; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 502–3; Derow 2003: 66 concerning Roman 'rule' in the East from 188 BC, and now Dmitriev 2011: 329, 331, 337. But the policy-area(s) of control, and the intensity of that control, may vary widely: see Lake, 2007: 56–61.

10 Donnelly 2006: 158.

11 Watson 1992: 15–6; Donnelly 2006: 154 (chart) and 156; see also Lake 2007: 47–61.

12 Doyle 1986: 45.

13 Lake 2007: 56 n. 27.

relationships simultaneously possessed by a powerful state works against generalization in any situation short of formal-legal empire (governors, provinces, garrisons).

Such natural variation—variations which arise because of the different ways and different historical circumstances in which states establish their varied relationships with each other—is an important fact of all interstate life. But variations in individual relationships are rarely emphasized in modern discussions of Rome and the East in our period. But this means that to define the general relationship between Rome and the dozens of states, large and small, in the East in c. 200–168 BC as one of control, or empire, or even informal empire, runs the risk of simplifying the actualities on the ground.¹⁴

To take some obvious examples of variation: the Kingdom of Pergamum was an old comrade in arms of Rome, but it was not a formal ally with a treaty, and it was a powerful and expansionist state in its own right, as its neighbors in Asia Minor could well attest. The Achaean League was a somewhat less powerful but still substantial, ally of Rome; unlike Pergamum, it did possess a formal treaty of alliance; and certain political problems in its hegemony in the Peloponnese (especially regarding Sparta) were sometimes brought to the Senate, whereas problems involving the hegemony of Pergamum in Ionia never were. Like Pergamum, Athens was an old comrade in arms of Rome and, like Pergamum, this was without treaty; but Athens was not militarily powerful, as Pergamum was. The Aetolian League was a militarily powerful ally, which from the Roman point of view had betrayed the Romans and become an enemy and was therefore punished (including a treaty that specially restricted its conduct). The Seleucid monarchy was a former major enemy of Rome that had become a friend (*amicus/philos*) via a peace treaty (but not a treaty of alliance); but this ‘friend’ was geographically very far away, and rarely contacted. The island state of Pharos in the Adriatic was similarly a friend of Rome (*amicus/philos*), but without a treaty and geographically much closer; at some point its government had performed *deditio* (absolute surrender) to the Roman People, but Pharos had then been set free, and it engaged in interstate relations (with Paros, with Athens) as an independent entity. Rome had all these widely differing relationships with all these widely differing polities *simultaneously*. The relationships—the degrees of authority enjoyed by Rome, if any—were not the same. Generalization is not impossible; but one should be careful about making broad claims.

Furthermore, the interstate configuration of power called ‘unipolarity’ by political scientists—in which one state is ‘the sole remaining superpower’, the

14 For examples, see the scholarship in n. 9 above.

powerful polity to which almost everyone in a system looks (as Rome was the center of the Mediterranean state-system after 188)—is not the same as a situation even of hegemony, or sphere of influence, let alone empire.¹⁵ And the stages along the spectrum of growing asymmetry of power from full interstate independence to interdependence on through to unipolarity (in Realist terms) or sphere of influence (in Doyle's terms), on through hegemony, to informal and then to formal 'empire' are themselves unstable. These are flexible and changeable *relationships*, not concrete things. Depending on prevailing internal political conditions and prevailing external geopolitical conditions, a situation of 'unipolarity' can revert back towards 'normal asymmetry of power' and multipolarity. It need not proceed forward into 'hegemony' and eventually empire—and indeed, it often does not.¹⁶ Similarly, depending on prevailing internal political conditions and external geopolitical conditions, a situation of hegemony (that is, further along the spectrum) can revert back towards 'unipolarity' or 'sphere of influence'; it need not proceed inevitably forward towards empire itself.¹⁷ Polybius understood this fluidity in power-relationships well: he narrated the establishment of Macedonian hegemony over his own Achaean League in the 220s BC in Book 2 of his *Histories*, but then traced the increasing freedom of internal and external policy gained by the Achaeans as the Macedonian hold over Achaea gradually weakened after 210 BC. The situation changed because of the difficulties of Macedon's own wars (external geopolitical conditions) and because of the revival of independent Achaean military power under the leadership of the Achaean statesman Philopoemen (internal conditions).¹⁸

15 On situations of 'unipolarity—a geopolitical configuration of power much studied of late—see, e.g., Kapstein and Mastanduno 2002.

16 Unipolarity is itself a rare phenomenon. Except for the American situation after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, unipolarity has not existed in the modern geopolitical world: not for 19th century Britain, which always had rivals, nor for Napoleonic France (it came close on the European Continent, but it too always had rivals), nor for Habsburg Spain in the 16th century (the same). And American unipolarity did not last very long; geopolitics from c. 2010 has reverted towards multipolarity (see below, n. 36). China enjoyed unipolarity at various times from the Qin dynasty onwards. Rome stands exceptional after 188 BC in the Mediterranean, and its eventual conversion of the unipolar situation into formal empire is equally exceptional. Even so, if one takes a somewhat broader geographical view, by the 70s BC Iranian Parthia was making the geopolitical structure bipolar in the Levant.

17 On the instability of unipolarity and hegemony, see esp. Wilkinson 1999.

18 On the changing power-relationship between Achaea and Macedon, see Eckstein 1995: 199–200. Similarly, the British, under increasing strategic pressures as well as increasing

In short, empire is something specific, and analytically we must be careful how we employ the term. Rome had certainly achieved a situation we might call 'unipolarity' in the Mediterranean by 188 BC, thanks to the stunning victories over Carthage, Macedon and the Seleucid Empire. But the general situation was politically complex and fluid; there was great variation among the many dyadic relationships that Rome had gained in the East during the wars of the 190s, and which made up the complex and fluid general situation. I will argue that in European Greece for the first 20 years after these great victories Rome had achieved merely a 'sphere of influence', and that east of the Aegean the Roman presence was hardly felt at all. The situation was unstable, and this was not empire.

The Ambiguities of Unipolarity

Three phenomena constitute the foundation of the overall relationship between Rome and the Greek states in the 20 years after 188.

First, the Roman Republic emerged from the great wars of 218–188 BC as by far the strongest single state in the Mediterranean. Carthage, Macedon and the Seleucid empire, its great rivals, had all been decisively defeated. The armies of Rome had formed the irreplaceable core of the forces that defeated these states; that was obviously true in the West, but also true in the East, for without Rome there would have been little chance that the second-tier Greek states (Pergamum, Rhodes, the Aetolian League, a weakened Egypt) could have brought either of the conquering kings Philip V of Macedon or Antiochus III the great Seleucid monarch to heel. Treaties of peace now stripped each defeated great power of much territory and significantly reduced its military capabilities. And the Senate certainly intended that the new interstate hierarchy with Rome at the top, established in these hard-fought and exhausting wars, would be long-lasting.

Egyptian resistance, reduced their rule in Egypt via the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance of 1936: the Egyptian government regained control over internal and (theoretically) over external affairs; the British High Commissioner reverted to being an ambassador. A similar development, for similar reasons, happened in Iraq with the 1936 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance. Both developments were reversed during the crisis of World War II, when the British seized back full control of both these states, but after the war the trend reversed again and the push towards real independence resumed. See conveniently James 1994: 392, 403–4.

Second, both the war against Philip v of Macedon and the victory over Antiochus III had been won by Rome at the head of a large voluntary coalition of Greek states. This was crucial: the alliances with the Greeks were not merely for show. Ironical as it may now seem, Rome had entered the East as a counter-hegemonic power—the champion of second-tier states against the aggressions of the great monarchies. At Cynoscephalae in 197, a significant role in the victory was played by the forces of the Aetolian League. The great naval victory at Myonessus over Antiochus III in 190 could not have been won without the fleet of Rhodes. And at Magnesia in 189, the battle that ruined Antiochus, a decisive role was played by the cavalry of the Greek kingdom of Pergamum, whose attack started the collapse of the Seleucid army. The Romans provided the most important military forces that defeated Philip and Antiochus; but they fought these wars depending significantly on their Greek allies.¹⁹

That the Romans were able to establish such a successful military coalition with states that were culturally different from Rome and did not even speak the Romans' language was a tremendous diplomatic achievement. And one key to this diplomatic success was that the Romans listened to and often accepted the advice of their Greek friends. This was true regarding strategy both during the wars and in the creation of geopolitical outcomes congenial to all once victory was achieved. It was a real alliance.²⁰

The third crucial factor in relations between Rome and the Greek states after 188 was the total withdrawal of the Romans back to Italy. No generals, no troops, no governors, no political overseers, not even any Roman diplomats were left behind in the Greek world. Having disposed of what the Senate saw as the major strategic threats to Rome posed by King Philip and then by King Antiochus, and having established instead what the Senate viewed as a congenial international environment of 'friendly states' of various sorts in the East, the Romans then left the Greeks to themselves.

This Roman attitude can be seen in the senatorial allocation of *provinciae* for magistrates over the next decades. The annual debate in the Senate on the allocation of provinces was clearly the most regular encounter with foreign

19 The statement of Derow 2003: 65 that for Rome the Antiochene War 'had not been fought alongside allies' is simply wrong.

20 On Greek influence over both war strategy and geopolitical results against both Philip and then Antiochus, see conveniently Errington 1989: 267 (on the peace negotiations of winter 198/197), 270 (influence of Rhodes and Pergamum on Roman relations with Antiochus), 276 (Greek influence in the war against Nabis of Sparta in 195), 286 (Eumenes II's influence on Roman strategy against Antiochus), and 287 (influence of Rhodes and Pergamum on the peace settlement in Asia Minor in 188).

and imperial affairs for the men, the senators, who determined Roman actions in the interstate world. And the fact is that no Roman *provincia* was assigned east of the Adriatic between 187 and 171, i.e., for 16 years, and after the war with Macedon that began in 171 and ended with the return to Rome of L. Aemilius Paullus in 167, no *provincia* was assigned in the Greek East again until 150, i.e., not for another 17 years. *Provinciae* were overwhelmingly assigned in the West, or in Italy itself. This surely tells us much about how the Senate understood Rome's relationship with the Greek East.²¹

In 188, the Romans left behind in the East only two states bound strongly to Rome by formal treaty: the peace treaty with the defeated Aetolian League (189) included statements of Aetolian submission to future senatorial wishes; the treaty of alliance between Rome and the Achaean League contained mutual assurances of support in any future wars.²² Otherwise, the Romans had only informal friendships east of the Adriatic. The Senate thus depended mostly on informal influence to have its wishes followed in the East. But here another fact obtrudes: after 188 the Senate had few such wishes (a point to which we will return). Such a system of informal influence only works when the political desires of the unipolar power are actually minimal—when the goal of the metropole is primarily to prevent the rise of major threats, rather than to shape continually the interstate relations of other polities (let alone their internal policies).²³

Undeniably, the wars of 218 to 188 BC had led to a seismic shift towards Rome in the distribution of power across the Mediterranean state-system. Rome's superior military capabilities allowed the Senate to advance Roman interests strongly anywhere and on whatever issues it wished.²⁴ This was a systemic shock that affected all actors; and the new reality was obvious to Greek

21 See the comments of Sherwin-White 1984: 11–3.

22 The Roman treaty of peace with the Aetolian League was unique, at the time and later, in containing a clause requiring the Aetolians henceforth to support 'the *dynasteia* and *arché* of the Roman people' (Polyb. 21.32.2). There was also a clause, traditional in treaties among Greek states, that the Aetolians would have the same friends and enemies as the major partner (Polyb. 21.32.4): on this quite traditional clause, see Gruen 1984: 27–8, Van Wees, 2004: 14 and n. 35. The special strictures on Aetolia arose from the fact that from the Roman point of view the League had not merely been an enemy state but a treacherous ally. The Roman treaty of alliance with the Achaean League was sworn ca. 192: see Badian 1952: 76–80.

23 Murphy 1961.

24 For this typical impact of unipolarity, see Mastanduno and Kapstein 1999: 1.

statesmen, as numerous statements in Polybius and other sources indicate.²⁵ Recent assertions, however, that already after 188 there was nothing left for the Greeks to do but to obey Rome, or that from 188 onwards Rome was ‘the controller of the Greek states’, are highly exaggerated.²⁶

For one thing, Polybius himself—our most sophisticated surviving contemporary observer—places the emergence of the latter situation only a generation later: after 168/167.²⁷ Rome in 188 had significant direct administrative responsibilities in the West; but it still had few interests in the East, where there now existed a constellation of friendly but independent states, and so the Romans in general were content to remain on the periphery of Greek events.²⁸ If they had any overall stance, it was to maintain the highly-varied status quo situations in power distribution among independent Greek states which they had been instrumental in creating by 188. This left them free to deal with what they saw as more pressing military needs in the West.²⁹

Moreover, victory over Antiochus had increased the power of the states that had been Rome’s comrades in arms. This was true of Pergamum, Rhodes, and the Achaean League, all of which had gained large increases in territory and resources by 188; it was true even of Macedon, which sided with Rome against Antiochus in the allied coalition of 191–188, and received territorial rewards that partly compensated for its losses of territory at Roman and allied hands in 196. Even the cynical P. Derow has to admit what the ancient sources say: that many Greek statesmen in the period after the war with Antiochus sought to interact with Rome on a basis of *isologia* (equality).³⁰ Some of them were successful. And if one compared the strategic situation the second-tier states

25 See Polyb. 21.23.4; 22.3.2; 22.24.11–13; see also Plutarch *Flamininus* 16.4, with Richardson 1979: 7, Gruen 1984: 329–34.

26 Derow 2003: 65–6; Hammond 1988: 502–3 (the quote). Mandell 1989 puts the establishment of unbreakable Roman rule even earlier: with (paradoxically) Flamininus’s proclamation of the Freedom of the Greeks in 196, at the end of the war against Philip. Harris 1979: 161 n. 3 asserts that violence and threat were the foundation of Roman policy in Greece—true enough, as far as it goes; but since it was also true of almost all ancient states, including those with which Rome interacted—see Eckstein 2006—it is misleading in terms of the complexities and ambiguities of our period. To be sure, coercion is at the heart of any hierarchical interstate order: see Lake 2007: 50–3.

27 Polyb. 3.4.2–3, see also 1.1.5 and 6.2.3.

28 On the consistent Roman avoidance of commitment in the East, see Gruen 1984: Chs. 1 and 2, Eckstein 2008: Chs. 2–3, 7 and 9.

29 For the policy of maintaining balances of power by a peripheral great power, see Sheehan 1996: 7. Sherwin-White 1977.

30 Derow 2003: 66.

had faced in 200 BC, when they had to confront the onrushing aggressions of Philip V and Antiochus III, with the situation that had emerged by 188, it is clear that while Rome had obviously gained greatly in security relative both to Macedon and to the Seleucids, so had everyone else. The immediate security problems facing many Greek states in 188 were simply far less pressing than in 200.³¹

The Absence of Greek Balancing against Rome

In sum, a variety of independent Greek states existed in the East after 188; some were strong, some less so, but their general security situation had improved relative to the previous period. Rome may be said to have achieved a situation of unipolarity in the Mediterranean—but Rome was far away. Here it is important that situations of unipolarity have, historically, often been temporary (in the sense of lasting only 15 or 20 years), tending to revert back into multipolarity far more commonly than to proceed forward into situations of hegemony and then empire.³² One of the primary propositions of the leading international-relations theorist K. Waltz is in fact that unipolarity tends to be brief because the achieved preponderance of one state tends to provoke balancing behavior on the part of other states. ‘Balancing’, says the Waltzian theorist Ch. Layne, ‘is the most ubiquitous form of great power grand strategic behavior’.³³ This is alleged to occur in part because any large gain in security by one state, through increased power, influence and prestige, necessarily makes other governments feel more insecure; and they react by seeking to rectify the situation.³⁴

But we have already suggested that Greek governments after 188 felt more secure than previously, not less. Indeed, political scientists in the late 1990s came to question the idea of inherent balancing against unipolarity, for it seemed

31 On ‘bandwagoning’ with a world power as a means for somewhat lesser states to increase their own (regional) power, see Mowle and Sacko 2007: 71–2. A parallel is the situation of lesser states after the Cold War: see Schweller 1999: 37. Even Seleucid military power eventually revived, as Antiochus IV’s invasions of Ptolemaic Egypt in 169 and 168 proved. And we have already noted above that Antigonid Macedon, defeated in 196, soon regained a significant capacity for action.

32 Discussion in Wilkinson 1999. The proposed time-scale of the alleged ‘unipolar moment’: see Layne 2006: 264, n. 1, with references to earlier studies.

33 Waltz 1979 and Waltz 1993; Layne 1993; Layne 2006; Posen and Ross 1996: 42–3, 52. The quote: Layne 2006: 143.

34 See Jervis 1978: 167–214 and Schweller 1999.

that little balancing was occurring against the unipolar position achieved by the United States through the victory of its alliance-system over the Soviet Union in the Cold War. Contrary to Waltz, these scholars asserted that unipolarity, once achieved, was relatively easy to maintain.³⁵ If so, then the Roman achievement after 188 BC first in preserving a unipolar position for 20 years and then expanding it into hegemony and then empire would still be very substantial. But it would also be a lesser (and less mysterious) achievement than if Waltz's balancing hypothesis is correct and unipolarity is difficult to maintain.

Today the situation looks quite different. In part because of what seem major policy errors by the administration of G.W. Bush (especially the war in Iraq), American power appears to many political scientists (not all) to be weakening across the global system, and balancing behavior against the United States (led by Russia, China, and Iran) is becoming an important factor in international relations.³⁶ This interpretation of recent events is still controversial.³⁷ But I think the current international situation tends to support Waltz's hypothesis that serious counterbalancing is frequent in situations of unipolarity. If so, then the Roman achievement after 188 appears far greater than if the preservation of unipolarity, once achieved, is easy. The recent American experience that unipolarity may be unstable thus raises the question of why effective counterbalancing did not occur against Rome in the period of still-unstable unipolarity that existed from 188 BC down at least to 168/167 BC.

It is clear that some Greeks hoped after 188 that either a Greek state would arise as a peer competitor to Rome, or that a coalition would emerge to balance Roman power.³⁸ By the 170s a reinvigorated Macedon in fact had emerged as a candidate for the role of peer competitor, at least in the Aegean—and the result was another war between Macedon and Rome. But after the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy in the war of 171–168, and even more clearly after the cataclysmic events in Greece in the 140s, Rome achieved what has been called the 'imperial threshold': the point where the power of the strongest

35 See, e.g. Wohlforth 1999: 5–41, Wohlforth 2002: 98–118 and the articles in Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999. A late entry here: Mowle and Sacko 2007: Chs. 1–3.

36 The Waltzian theorist Ch. Layne (1993: 7) predicted that U.S. unipolarity would give way to multipolarity by 2010. Mastanduno (1997: 88) warned that American attempts to exercise power unilaterally and arbitrarily could call forth balancing conduct; the quality of decision-making counts.

37 For arguments that serious balancing against American unipolar power is not occurring, see Lieber and Alexander 2005.

38 This is the prophecy attributed by Phlegon of Tralles (second century AD) to Antisthenes the Peripatetic at the time of the Antiochene War; sources and discussion in Gauger 1980: 223–61.

state becomes so strong that the costs of military counterbalancing seem prohibitive. Once such a situation emerges, political opposition to the hegemonic power begins itself to appear useless: the 'imperial threshold'.³⁹ But my argument is that for a generation after 188, this did not appear to the Greeks to be the case—which explains the reemergence of Macedon as a peer-competitor of Rome in the first place.⁴⁰

But while one can argue that the reality of Roman preponderance was recognized, and was uncomfortable, and that insecurity in terms of Rome had increased, the security problem created by Roman power was balanced (as we have said) by the fact that unipolarity itself made all Greek states within it more secure against local threats and competitors—and it was local threats and competitors that had always been their main concern. It was not accidental that great wars between the Greek powers were much less frequent after 188 than before. Such wars did not disappear altogether. But it is striking that the farther a region was from Rome, and hence the less interest the Senate took in that region, the more frequent and destructive such wars were. Greece received more Roman diplomatic attention after 188 than the areas farther east, and was quite peaceful: the decline in frequency of warfare in the 180s BC compared with (say) the situation in the 280s BC is very striking. On the other hand, Asia Minor after 188, where Roman interest was barely visible, saw widespread warfare, just as it had in the third century.⁴¹

This increased local security is one of the benefits that a unipolar power or hegemon can bring to an interstate system. It constitutes part of the 'social exchange' between the dominant state and the lesser states that results at least in passive acquiescence from the latter; widespread acquiescence, in turn, helps to give hegemony its stability. To be sure, hegemony is ultimately based on coercion, and the Romans had demonstrated their military power; but it is also a contingent relationship based in part on a hegemon's ability to provide 'social goods', in this case interstate order.⁴² Here it is worth noting that while the Greek political heritage of balancing was very strong (see below), there also

39 See Wohlforth, 2002: 103–4.

40 For the concept of 'peer-competitor', see Posen and Ross 1996: 32.

41 On these large-scale wars in Asia Minor, see Eckstein 2008: 353–4.

42 On the receding of wars between powerful states as a characteristic of unipolarity, see Mastanduno and Kapstein 1999: 22. On how this phenomenon of increased order and stability can lead to acquiescence by the lesser states, see Lake 2007: 53–4, 69–77; Mowle and Sacko 2007: Ch. 2. On Greece compared to Asia Minor in the 180s, see Eckstein 2008: Chap. 9.

was an intellectual tradition that recognized the benefits which orderliness in interstate affairs backed by a hegemonic power could bring.⁴³

The existence of large-scale wars in Asia Minor—as well as in the Levant—shows that Greek states still maintained significant capacity for independent action. Sometimes this was achieved through the mustering of internal military resources, a process political scientists call ‘internal balancing’. Polybius praises Philopoemen for reinvigorating the Achaean army after 210 BC, for it created greater Achaean leverage against the then-existing Macedonian hegemony; conversely, he praises Philip V for following such a policy from 196 BC onwards, for it significantly strengthened Macedon.⁴⁴ Or governments could seek some room for maneuver through the cultivation of regional alliances—such as the one between Achaea and Ptolemaic Egypt.⁴⁵ Indeed, in 185 Apollonidas of Sicyon could say in Achaea that ‘most of our debates, and the most important of them, concern our differences with the kings’ (Polyb. 22.8.6). The statement shows that for at least some Greek statesmen the world after 188 was still not yet Rome-dominated, the monarchs being personages to be respected and even feared. But not too much: in short, the Romans were providing a significant systemic good without (in this period) being over-bearing.⁴⁶

The Senate in this period increasingly desired that disputes between Greek states be referred to itself—and Polybius was not pleased with this development, evidently seeing it as a threat to Greek independence (23.17.3–4). Further, the *Patres* expected to be deferred to by Greek governments if Rome had specific wishes, wishes that were expressed in letters or (less frequently) via embassies sent east—and if deference was not shown, there was resentment. But except in a single case (Macedon), Roman resentment of Greek behavior never led to a decision for military intervention. Similarly, the Roman People, meeting in assembly, only formally declared war on one Greek state in this period (again, only with Macedon in 171). By contrast, the American government intervened militarily in Caribbean and Central American states more

43 See Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.2.35 and 7.5.27, with Dillery 1995: 27–38; Van Wees 2004: 7–8.

44 See Polyb. 10.21–21; 25.10. On the phenomenon of ‘internal balancing’, see Waltz 1979: 118, 168.

45 On the renewal of the Achaean-Ptolemaic treaty of alliance, see Polyb. 22.7–9. On coalition-building as ‘external balancing’, see Waltz 1979: 118, 168; Layne 2006, 143. Alliances independent of the unipolar power as an indicator of state independence: see Lake 2007 62–3.

46 On Polyb. 22.8.6, see Walbank 1979: 189.

than thirty times between 1890 and 1945. The difference here in the quality of the relationship between great power and smaller powers should be obvious.⁴⁷

Many Greek statesmen knew they were walking a tightrope—complying with Roman wishes when necessary, but retaining as much freedom of action as possible. Polybius addresses this delicate political problem in his depiction of a debate c. 184 BC between the Achaean statesmen Philopoemen and Aristaenus on how to retain Achaean honor and independence when dealing with the Romans (24.11–13). Aristaenus urges giving in immediately whenever the Achaean League is faced by a Roman request or demand: resistance to Rome will ultimately not work (the Achaeans will have to give in if the Romans really insist), and so it will only anger the Romans—and to no purpose (since the Achaeans would ultimately have to give in). Philopoemen is instead for fighting for one's legal rights under Achaia's formal treaty of alliance with Rome, and only bending to Roman demands at the last moment, if the Romans are really serious about something. Polybius definitely prefers Philopoemen's position, but he does not think Aristaenus's stance dishonorable, since its ultimate goal, too, is to retain as much Achaean independence as possible (24.13.8–10).⁴⁸ And he praises those Greek leaders who can accomplish the difficult task of maintaining their state's independence while accepting the occasional acts of compliance which might be required by Roman preponderance.⁴⁹

Conversely, Rome as the unipolar power faced the problem of how to pursue its own interests without triggering the creation of a backlash coalition against it. As the most important player in the system, its primary goal in this period was to maintain the status quo, to maintain its unipolar position—that is, to maintain the congenial interstate environment for Rome that the great wars of 218–188 BC had created. This task was accomplished; eventually Roman unipolarity became a stable fact of interstate life.⁵⁰ The question again is: how did

47 On American military interventions in the Caribbean and Central America, and the nature of American hegemony in the region (but, even so, not empire as political scientists define the term), see Lake 2007: 57.

48 For the proper understanding of Polybius' description of the position of Aristaenus as εὐσχήμων, see Eckstein 1995: 202–3.

49 For the conundrum faced by weaker states in a unipolar structure who nevertheless wish to remain independent, see Mastanduno and Kapstein 1999: 6. For Polybius's praise of Greek statesmen able to walk the tightrope, see Eckstein 1995: chap. 7. On the date and authenticity of the debate in Polyb. 24.11–13, see Walbank 1979: 264–5.

50 For the goal of the unipolar power in such situations, see Mastanduno and Kapstein 1999: 6–7.

Rome do it? How did Rome avoid Greek counterbalancing at a point when unipolarity was still relatively fragile?⁵¹

One explanation is that counterbalancing against a unipolar power is inherently difficult. Different states have different and often conflicting interests; it is hard for them to coordinate efforts against a potential hegemon in a timely fashion; it is hard for them even to overcome local quarrels—local quarrels which ordinarily loom larger in the minds of governing elites than do the actions of a potential but far-away hegemon.⁵² Thus Macedon, Pergamum, Rhodes and the Achaean League were the dominant local powers in the Aegean in the 180s–170s, and if they had cooperated they might have formed a significant counterweight to Rome. But the recent growth in the power of Pergamum, Rhodes and Achaea was owed in great part to having been allies of Rome itself, so the benefits of a good relationship with Rome were obvious. Moreover, the Achaean League after 198 had bad relations with Macedon, while Rhodes, Pergamum and Macedon were all hereditary enemies of each other. Achaeans such as Polybius considered rising Macedonian power in the 170s to be as great a threat to Achaean independence as Rome was. Coalition-building among such states was not easy.⁵³

Yet despite the difficulties inherent in coalition-building, successful counterbalancing behavior against rising hegemons had been common in Greece over the previous 250 years: against Athens in the fifth century, against Sparta and Thebes in the fourth century, against Macedon in the late fourth and in the third century, and against the coalition of Philip v and Antiochus III after 203/202 BC.⁵⁴ In the latter case, the threat of aggression had been so obvious that even the bitter hereditary rivals Pergamum and Rhodes had been driven into alliance in order to defend themselves against it. Indeed, Rhodes, Pergamum and Aetolia did not seek to counterbalance against Rome in the years after 200 BC precisely because they wanted the coalition headed by Rome to defeat the threat posed by Philip v; and Rhodes, Pergamum and Philip v did not seek to counterbalance against Rome in the period of the Antiochene

51 To repeat: if unipolarity is inherently unstable because it calls forth counterbalancing (so Waltz), then this is a tremendous Roman political achievement. And even if unipolarity tends to be relatively stable, the Roman achievement is still significant, for the Romans made it work.

52 On the difficulties inherent in counterbalancing, see Mearsheimer 2001: 341–5; the essays in Kaufman, Little and Wohlforth 2007; Mowle and Sacko 2007: 68. On the importance of local rivalries as an obstacle to counterbalancing, see Mearsheimer 2001: 155–62; Wohlforth 1999: 107; Mowle and Sacko 2007: 68.

53 On Polybius' attitude towards Macedon, see Walbank 1970.

54 Discussions in Eckstein 2006: Chaps. 3–4; Eckstein 2008: Chaps. 4–6.

War precisely because they wanted the coalition headed by Rome to defeat the threat posed by Antiochus III and Aetolia. Thus serious counterbalancing *did* occur in this period—aimed against Philip and Antiochus. The difficulties in creating counterbalancing coalitions are thus not enough to explain the lack of counterbalancing against Rome.

Several other explanations offer themselves. First, unlike Greek hegemons of the past, Rome was physically distant, far beyond the Adriatic Sea to the west. The sheer distance separating Italy from the Aegean perhaps made the Romans appear less directly threatening to the second-tier major powers than would otherwise have been the case.⁵⁵ Indeed, because of the primitiveness of ancient transport technology, the distances involved here between Rome and the Greeks seemed far larger to the ancients than they do even to us—and rightly. So this issue of distance was not merely a matter of perception.⁵⁶ Conversely, the instinctive stance of the Senate towards Greece after 188 was what political scientists call ‘off-shore’ or ‘long-distance’ balancing, rather than constant entanglement in Greek politics. The Romans avoided most such entanglements. Moreover, the general stance of the Senate towards the Greeks after 188 was passive rather than proactive; that is, the *Patres* only dealt with Greek issues when Greek embassies came to Rome to complain about other Greeks. And the Senate’s responses even then were often minimal. Thus the Senate remonstrated several times with the government of Achaëa about its oppression of Sparta, to some (but not complete) effect; and Rome tried to mediate several wars among the states of Asia Minor (to much less effect); and it remonstrated with Rhodes over its oppression of Lycia, given to Rhodes by the Treaty of Apamea in 188—to no effect.⁵⁷ Indeed, weaker Greek states sometimes complained to the Senate that it was too far away and unconcerned with Greek affairs to help them against local bullies; they wanted more Roman involvement, not less.⁵⁸

Meanwhile, the absence of an obvious Greek peer-competitor after 188 allowed the Roman governing elite to decide without hindrance which issues among the Greeks were important to them and which were not, which might

55 The link of geographical proximity to counterbalancing, Walt 1987: 22–6; Wohlforth 1999. See also briefly Lampela 1998: 114.

56 Heather 2005: 25.

57 Discussion: Eckstein 2008: Chap. 9.

58 See Livy 39.25.11: *procul enim abesse libertatis auctores Romanos; lateri adhaerere gravem dominum* [i.e. Philip V of Macedon]. Polybian derivation of this passage: see Nissen 1863: 222–3. See also Liv. 35.25.11–12, and 39.36.10–11 (*cum vos [Romani] procul estis ...*), both passages based on Polybian material: Nissen, 1863: 171, 224.

require diplomatic or even military intervention and which did not. Military intervention, as we have said, happened only once.⁵⁹ Distance, again, may have reduced the incentives for Roman intervention: events were happening very far away, and projection of power over long distances in antiquity was difficult and expensive.⁶⁰ Only when Aegean politics appeared to be on the verge of producing a peer-competitor once more, with the rise of Macedonian power in Greece in the late 170s, did Rome intervene militarily. Even then, it was a Greek complaint to the Senate against Macedon, coming from the King of Pergamum, that precipitated the Macedonian crisis—not Roman activity.⁶¹ And after that, the Senate once more resorted for almost 20 years (167–150 BC) to dealing with the Greeks at long distance.

Second, this generally lackadaisical stance taken by the Senate meant that despite Roman power, Roman diplomatic interventions in Greek affairs were neither very frequent nor very forceful. If one calculated correctly, then, Roman remonstrances and warnings need not be followed; the Senate's bark was often worse than its bite. Polybius notes this to his readers, in the advice he has his father Lycortas give to the Achaeans in the late 180s (24.8.1–5). This is why Philopoemen in Achaia in 184 recommended not responding with panic every time a letter from the Senate arrived (24.11–13). The Romans' lack of military intervention in Greece in the years after 188 might suggest that Philopoemen was calculating correctly.

Third, Rome supported the existing status quo among the Greek states—not surprisingly, since Rome had been the major force behind creating it. So Rome was not only sometimes a disturbing factor of Greek interstate conditions but also a guarantor of them, and thus for many Greeks (as I have noted) the provider of an important public good to the system. The basic Roman stance in favor of the status quo is another fact helping to explain why Greek resentment at occasional Roman diplomatic interference did not develop into outright coalition-building.⁶²

59 Such freedom to decide whether to intervene in local issues is typical of unipolar power: see Waltz 2000. On the contrast with the great frequency of American military interventions, see above. One should add that American military interventions since 1990, in the period of American unipolarity, have not been rare.

60 On the impact of distance (especially overseas distance) in lessening the desires of the unipolar power for direct control, see Levy 2004: 42.

61 Discussion of Eumenes II's visit to Rome in 172, and the impact of his appearance before the Senate, Hanson 1971: 109–112.

62 For the link between unipolar stability and the unipolar power as a bringer of system-wide order and other public goods, see Gilpin 1981: 144–5; Mandelbaum 2005; Lake 2007; Mowle and Sacko 2007: Chap. 2. Yet awareness of the collective goods brought by the unipolar

Of course, this status quo among the Greek states perpetuated divisions in the Aegean world. And these divisions were clearly as the Senate wished: it had rewarded a series of allies well for their important contributions in the great wars, but it was not willing to see a large concentration of power in the hands of any one Greek state. Since opposition to the concentration of power in any one Greek state had also been the traditional stance of all the Greek second-tier major states—the most spectacular instance being the appeal of four Greek states to Rome against Philip and Antiochus in 200 BC—the Roman elite could expect widespread Greek support here. One can see the Greek attitude in Polybius' deeply suspicious view of Macedon—or in the fact that Eumenes II of Pergamum was the leading advocate of a Roman war against a revived Macedon in the late 170s.⁶³ But in any case the Senate was determined not to let a new Greek peer competitor arise, and when the *Patres* became convinced (especially by Eumenes) that this was occurring, then there was an energetic Roman military response. That response, in turn, was a strong reminder of Roman military might—and hence of Roman political authority.

But in the almost 40 years between 188 and 150 BC there was only one such war, against Macedon (171–168 BC), which was again followed by the withdrawal of all Roman military and diplomatic presence back to Italy for almost two decades. This was a situation different from the direct and continual interference in the affairs of weaker states by Greek hegemons in the past (including garrisons, taxes, and political overseers), both in the Classical and the Hellenistic period: the kind of direct and continual interference that in turn had brought on Greek counterbalancing against them. Macedon and the Seleucids had directly threatened the independence of the second-tier states, but the situation with Rome appeared more ambiguous; in an interstate order led by Rome the interests of the weaker states in the 180s and 170s appeared at least somewhat protected. In short, the combination of Roman power and Roman restraint meant that the expected value to be gained from attempting the difficulties of counterbalancing against Roman unipolarity was for many governments reduced—while the risks of such attempts at balancing remained obviously high.⁶⁴

power does not mean that the elites of less powerful polities are necessarily satisfied with the relative distribution of power in the system: Grieco 1988: 500; Lake 2007: 54.

63 On Eumenes, see above, and Hanson 1971: 109–112.

64 On 'expected value' and balancing behavior, see Lieber and Alexander 2005: 109–39. Attempts at balancing as always a 'high-cost policy' in any case: Mowle and Sacko 2007: 69–70.

But this restraint was not the result of a clever plot or ploy by the Romans. It was, rather, because, after 188 as before, the interest of the Senate in the East, and the extent of Rome's concrete interests there, remained limited. That meant that Rome's political goals in the region could also be limited, and hence its means could be limited as well. After 188 as before, Rome might suddenly use serious violence in a military crisis to re-establish its political authority. During the substantial periods of equilibrium, however, this gave way once more in the East to distant and informal relations with the Greeks. Nor did Rome intervene in the internal politics of the Greek states in this period—which explains the complaints the Senate received in 180 from Callicrates of Leontium that Rome was not bothering even to support its most willing advocates among the Greeks (Polyb. 24.8–10).

Conclusion

Polybius, a sharp observer of international affairs, considered the situation in the years after Apamea to be one where the Greeks could exercise equality with Rome (*isologia*)—at least if they were tough enough in their attitudes and in their diplomacy. Even more impressive is the similar opinion of the Roman statesman Cato the Elder. Looking back at the 180s and 170s following the war that destroyed the Macedonian monarchy in 171–168, Cato indicated that up to that time the Greek states had enjoyed *libertas*. Hence he defended the decision of Rome's old comrade in arms the Republic of Rhodes not to aid either Rome or Macedon in the war of 171–168: it was a decision the Rhodians made in order to preserve the *libertas* that had been existing among the Greeks—a *libertas* threatened by the emergence from the new war of a single power (either Rome or Macedon) that would be too overwhelming.⁶⁵

The argument presented here is therefore that a workable *modus vivendi* was in place in the Greek world after 188, with Rome in a geostrategic situation that modern political scientists call unipolarity. It was not a condition of empire, a term which requires analytical rigor and specificity, and which it is dangerous—even if emotionally satisfying—to employ as a mere metaphor for international inequality of power. To be sure, Rome enjoyed that inequality of power, and had sacrificed much to achieve it. And the Senate was concerned

65 Gellius 6.3.15–16 = Cato *Orations*, frg. 164M. The Romans saw no contradiction between *libertas* and the natural respect of the weaker for the *auctoritas* of the powerful, and thus hierarchy in their view did not necessarily eliminate *libertas*: see the good discussion of Yoshimura 1984: 1–3.

to place certain limits on the foreign relations of Greek states, specifically to prevent the rise of a peer competitor. But other than that, Roman diplomatic interventions in Greek foreign relations were relatively infrequent and not always effective, Roman military interventions were exceedingly rare, and Roman interventions in the internal politics of Greek states minimal. There was of course the basic asymmetry of power. But the situation we have been describing corresponds more or less to the concept of unipolarity—or to the characteristics of what Doyle terms ‘sphere of influence’. It was a *modus vivendi* that Cato later called *libertas*, and which Polybius described as a situation where the Greek friends of Rome could talk to Rome on a basis of equality (24.10.3–10). I think this evaluation of the geopolitical situation in the years after 188, coming from both the Roman Cato and the Greek Polybius, from two experienced politicians and sophisticated intellectuals, is one we should take seriously.

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Conquest, Liberation, Protectionism, or Enslavement? Mid-Republican Rome from a Greek Perspective

Craig B. Champion

Quid eorum, Cn. Manli, factum est, ut istud publicum populi Romani bellum et non tuum privatum latrocinium ducamus?

Which of these things was done, Gnaeus Manlius, so that we can consider this a public war of the Roman People, and not your own private piratical expedition?

LIVY, *AB URBE CONDITA*, 38.45.7

...

Thus a council of the cities of Sicily is called at Syracuse or Messana or Lilybaeum. The Roman praetor attends the meeting (*conventus agit*); at his command (*eo imperio*) those who have been called convene. They see him on a lofty platform (*excelso in suggestu*) [referring to a tribunal, discussed below], handing out haughty pronouncements, surrounded by lictors (*stipatum lictoribus*); the rods threaten their back, the axes their necks. And yearly they are assigned by lot one lord after another (*alium atque alium dominum*).

LIV. 31.29.8–10

∴

As we have stressed in the Introduction to this volume, viewing international relations through the analytical lenses of ‘warlordism’ and multipolarity is a two-edged sword. Their conceptual grounds furnish us with new and fruitful ways in which to understand ancient Mediterranean societies, but as early twenty-first century intellectual constructs, fashioned primarily for analyzing the world in which we currently live, and to some degree presupposing the existence of the nation-state, high-speed telecommunications, and relatively sophisticated mechanisms for recognizing and legitimating applications of

military force, they also invite the danger of grossly anachronistic historical distortions.

There is no need to rehearse these problems at any length here, but I must reiterate and assert one crucial distinction for the discussion that follows: there is never any omniscient, disinterested observer, who can regard things like empire, legitimate states, 'warlords', or international criminality—in short, questions of interstate legitimacy—objectively and dispassionately; but rather that such things are ideologically and emotionally loaded categories, always open to contestation, which shift and transform themselves as a function of what we might call the focalization of human subjectivities. In this paper I would like to focalize (if I may be permitted to use the term in such a way) Roman military and diplomatic behaviors during the Middle Republic through the eyes of Greek statesmen who experienced them, and make out a case for the idea that from that perspective, individual Roman commanders frequently would have seemed like 'warlords', as I shall loosely use that term.

The first order of business, then, is to set the definitional term for 'warlord', as I shall use it here. In an important study (cited repeatedly in this volume), K. Marten has placed 'warlordism' in a comparative perspective by considering the phenomenon in medieval Europe, early twentieth-century republican China, and contemporary Somalia and Afghanistan.¹ Her concerns are very much oriented to U.S. policy at the time of her composition, as she argues that American economic and military support to warlords in both Somalia and Afghanistan was misguided, because their authority threatened the well-being of civilian populations, was inimical to international security, and obstructed the emergence of functioning states. Martin employs her case studies to arrive inductively at a 'rigorous and generalizable definition' of warlordism. This inductive definition has four main components:

- (1) Trained armed men seize control of relatively small areas in the wake of the collapse of central authority.
- (2) Their actions are based solely on self-interest, not ideology.
- (3) Their authority and legitimacy are based on charisma and personal connections to their followers.
- (4) Such 'personalistic rule' leads to political and economic disintegration across the country, 'disrupting the free flow of trade and making commerce and investment unpredictable'.

¹ Marten 2006/2007. All dates are BC.

While Marten's definition was a decided improvement on more vague formulations of other political scientists and international relations theorists, it can hardly be applied to the study of the ancient Mediterranean world in general, or to the Roman Republic in particular. While we might perhaps be able to consider some of the components of this definition (such as #2), we could not use others in any meaningful sense in the case of Roman hegemony in Greek lands in the second century (such as #4). Consequently, it is necessary to begin with a quite different, and looser, definition for 'warlord' (and 'warlordism'). For our purposes, a 'warlord' will simply be an individual with the military force to compel obedience and submission of civilian populations, whose behaviors are peremptory, unpredictable, inconsistent, and often incalculable in the eyes of those who are subjected to them.

The theme for our conference in Barcelona, *Multipolarity and Warlordism in the Ancient World*, is especially relevant—perhaps in a counterintuitive way—for the history of the growth of the Roman Republic in the second century. This may be a surprising statement, if, along with Polybius, we adopt a teleological historical perspective. After all, as he put it, the Roman state at this time had achieved something without historical parallel, the subjugation of the known, inhabited world, or *oikoumene*, within the short compass of fifty-three years. For Polybius, though he of course could not have expressed it in these terms, both warlordism and multipolarity were significantly curtailed, if not well on the way to extinction, with the establishment of Roman hegemony (at least until the terminal date of his original conception of the history, 168).²

Modern scholars, with varying emphases, have echoed Polybius' general notion of an interstate system that from roughly 220–150 moved from one characterized by fragmentation and plurality to a more unified, ordered, unipolar international composition under Roman hegemonic control.³ A.M. Eckstein, in particular, has employed analytical categories and conceptions of political scientists and international relations theorists in order to help us see the rise of Roman power in the ancient Mediterranean world in a new way. Rather than focusing almost exclusively on the Roman Republic—its political structure, its military organization, its aristocratic value-system, and so on—in order to explain Roman domination, he encourages us to view the interstate system of the ancient Mediterranean powers as a brutally competitive, highly-militarized, international anarchy. On this view, all states were bellicose and aggressive,

2 For Polybius' 'change of plan' to extend the work down to 146, a more troubled time in which the universal rule of Rome indeed seemed to be on shakier foundations, see Champion 2004a: 11 and n. 19.

3 See, for example, Gruen 1984; Morstein-Marx 1995; Eckstein 2006; Eckstein 2008.

seeking to maximize their power and security in a relentlessly unforgiving, zero-sum struggle for survival. Everyone played the same game; the Romans were simply better at it, in terms of utilizing their formidable demographic resources and applying their highly-developed organizational skills.

The result has been a re-enlivened debate about the nature of Roman imperialism, providing fresh perspectives to complement the insights of classic studies on the nature and characteristics of the Republic, which were informed by what some political scientists would call a metrocentric approach. And Eckstein's systemic approach is not the only alternative for reevaluating certain historical junctures in the development of Roman interstate power. We might also employ the so-called pericentric approach, expounded in Robinson and Gallagher's famous study of European imperialists in Africa.⁴ In this analytical orientation, we should attend to the imperial periphery, since peripheral, weaker states struggling internally or with neighbors may practically invite the intervention of a stronger, imperial center, and thereby (unwittingly) further the extension of its power. I have employed this approach in two studies over the last several years, one concerning the Mamertine crisis in 264, and another examining Roman intervention in Achaean Dyme in 144/43.⁵ A.M. Eckstein and I canvassed these political science and international relations theories and the exciting potential they hold for Roman history before either of us had published anything informed by them in the Introduction to my edited volume on Roman imperialism.⁶ These three approaches, the metrocentric, the pericentric, and the systemic (to use the political science terminology) all have their proper place in the study of Roman imperialism, and J.W. Rich is surely right when he contends that no mono-causal explanation can be sufficient for such a complex historical phenomenon.⁷

In this chapter, however, I want to adopt a different perspective, one that oddly supports the idea of multipolarity and warlordism, even for the period in which Polybius claims that the entire *oikoumene*, or inhabited world, fell under Roman sway.⁸ Historical reconstruction should operate on many levels, and my approach here will differ somewhat from the theoretical orientation that has given rise to this conference, even if I arrive at conclusions supporting it. The conceptual framework for our proceedings is fine for what we might call the macro-level, allowing us to interpret interstate (and rogue state) behaviors in

4 Robinson and Gallagher 1961.

5 Champion 2007 and Champion 2013.

6 Champion 2004b: 1–10.

7 Rich 1993.

8 See Polyb. 1.1.5–6, and assembled references at Champion 2004a: 19 n. 20.

a Mediterranean-wide system of states. For this purpose, analytical terms such as imperialism, hegemonialism, liberation, protectionism, annexationism, unipolarity—and, of course, multipolarity and warlordism—serve us well, but a potential problem with such conceptualizations comes into being when we reify them and proceed to use them as complete historical explanations, rather than as the partial and incomplete historical perspectives that they undoubtedly are. We should well heed the kind of salutary warning B. Adam puts forward in her book, *Time and Social Theory*, when she argues against discontinuous levels of analysis and mutually exclusive choices of explanation. She writes, ‘Physicists, like the phenomenologists before them, insist that reality is not revealed to us in some pure form; that we do not observe nature *per se* but nature exposed to our method of questioning. The observed ‘hierarchy’ needs therefore to be recognized as part of the framework of observation and as soon as it gets in the way of conceptualising mutually implicating connections we need to discard it and replace it with a non-hierarchical conceptual framework’.⁹

We need not go so far; that is, we should not jettison the aforementioned approaches in studying Rome’s rise to power, but we must make room for other perspectives. In attempting to understand the development of Roman interstate power, and especially in trying to understand the Roman Republic as part of a system of states whose default condition, following the Neo-Realists, was one of international anarchy, it is easy to gloss over historical nuances and particularities. Moreover, following Polybius, our principal and by far most important source for this period, we can easily begin to see the Roman Republic as being firmly under the control of the Senate, which is frequently represented as being far more unified and monolithic than it actually was. Such ideas as I have canvassed thus far are not so helpful for the problem I have set for this chapter: to understand the lived experience of people on the ground at the time of the discrete events that comprised what we later see collectively as sweeping historical processes. In particular I want to consider Greek statesmen’s perceptions of Rome and the exercise of Roman power from the beginnings of Roman overseas expansion until the cataclysmic year 146, when Rome destroyed the cities of Carthage and Corinth. This is, of course, the period covered by Polybius.

The nature and structure of the Roman Senate are the logical place to begin, since this was the governing body at Rome among whom Greek diplomats generally sought to air their grievances and concerns. From a Greek statesman’s perspective, the Senate was capricious, often obtuse or indecisive, enigmatic,

9 Adam 1990: 162.

and inconsistent. A striking illustration of these qualities is provided by the senatorial deliberations on the eve of the First Punic War, concerning Roman intervention in Sicilian Messana. Even Polybius, who tends to represent the Senate as a monolithic governing body, cannot conceal the fractious nature of these debates and the divisiveness over the question at hand.

In studying Roman imperialism, historians rightly stress the determination in 264 to campaign in Sicily. This decision marked the first step in Rome's transition from a powerful state confined to the Italian peninsula to one of world history's most successful, largest, and longest-lasting hegemonic empires. Yet the decision-making processes ultimately leading to Mediterranean-wide domination are in Polybius' version shrouded in obscurity. The historical issue concerned the strategically important town of Messana, and Syracusan and Carthaginian interventions there. The so-called Mamertines (Campanian mercenaries) seized Messana and made a large part of northeastern Sicily insecure by their marauding activities.¹⁰ Under pressure from King Hiero II of Syracuse, the Mamertines appealed to both Carthage and Rome for aid. According to Polybius, the senators feared Carthage would acquire a bridgehead at Messana for invading Italy, but the questionable morality of assisting the treacherous Mamertine usurpers gave them pause (Polyb. 1.11.1; 3.26.6).

Chapters 10 and 11 of the first book comprise our only detailed narrative of the momentous Roman resolution to become involved in Sicilian affairs—a resolution which eventually led to the First Punic War. The preliminaries to the war in Polybius' account are well known; only a brief summary is required here (Polyb. 1.7–10). Italian Rhegium, fearing both Pyrrhus' designs on Italy and Carthaginian naval power, appealed to Rome for a protective garrison. Around the time of Pyrrhus' crossing to Italy, the Romans sent to Rhegium a group of 4,000 Campanian mercenaries under the command of a certain Decius. These Campanians forcibly took control of Rhegium, much as the Campanians in Sicily had treacherously occupied Messana. In Sicily, Hiero defeated the Mamertines nearby the Longanus river, and then returned to Syracuse, where he was named king (Polyb. 1.8.3–9.8). In Italy, a Roman expedition subdued and punished the treacherous mercenaries at Rhegium. The Mamertines now found themselves in a difficult situation, since they were deprived of the support of their compatriots at Rhegium. They had been so weakened by their defeat at Hiero's hands that they could no longer pursue warlike activities with their own resources. They were forced to seek outside assistance, but disagreed as to whom they should appeal. One party sent for help to the Carthaginians, entrusting themselves and their defenses to them. Others went to Rome,

10 Polyb. 1.8.1–2; see Diodorus 22.13.1; 23.1.4; Plutarch *Pyrrhus* 23.1, 5.

offering to place Messana under Roman protection and begging for assistance on the grounds of kinship. This embassy caused the senatorial quandary at Rome. How could the senators provide aid to the Mamertine usurpers, when they had made a demonstration of how they treated lawless aggressors in punishing the mercenaries at Rhegium, whose ringleaders were publicly beheaded in the Roman Forum? The inconsistency of such action weighed heavily on their minds, but in the end fear of a Carthaginian outpost on the Straits of Messana trumped this moral quandary. A relief force was sent out—Rome's first overseas military action—though Polybius obfuscates the fact that the Senate took the decision.¹¹ And, as Eckstein has shown, the commander Appius Claudius Caudex had extraordinary leeway for individual initiative in the field.¹²

As this episode indicates, the Senate was rarely unanimous in its deliberations. The outbreak of the so-called Second Macedonian War is another case in point. In 200, a war-weary centuriate assembly rejected a proposal by the consul Publius Sulpicius Galba for war against King Philip v of Macedonia. Historians rightly interpret the overturning of that initial decision as a demonstration of the oligarchic nature of the Republic: the Senate forced a war decision on an unwilling populace (Liv. 31.6.1–8.4). But it also indicates serious fracture lines in the Senate on the war rogation. Despite Livy's representation, it is unlikely that the tribune Quintus Baebius, who spoke against the proposal before the People, was a lone-wolf dissenter; it is much more likely that he had the backing of powerful members of the Senate. And the frequency of Greek statesmen's experiencing the mercurial nature of senatorial deliberation and decision-making quickened in the early second century and accelerated through the ensuing decades.¹³

Many Greek statesmen dealt with Roman power in Greece, rather than before meetings of the Senate in Rome. In order to appreciate what this experience often was, we must bear in mind the enormous autonomy which the Roman commander in the field of operations enjoyed. A particularly interesting case of the independent decision-making powers of the commander is provided by the treaty—not ratified by the Senate and People—made with Gades in 206 by Scipio's legate, Lucius Marcius, which apparently enjoined upon the Gaditanes the presence of a Roman *praefectus* and garrison in their city.¹⁴ Another startling example from Spain of the general's individual

11 See now Champion 2013.

12 Eckstein 1987: 73–101.

13 See Polyb. 23.1.1–4.16.

14 Liv. 28.37.10; 32.2.5; see also Cicero *Pro Balbo* 15.34, 17.39.

autonomy is the consul Gaius Hostilius Mancinus' disastrous brokering—through his quaestor Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus' agency—of a treaty with the Numantines in 137, which the Senate later repudiated, to Mancinus' chagrin and disgrace. As John Richardson observed in his study of the origins and growth of Roman imperial power in Spain, 'Imperialism in the second century, just as much as in the period of Caesar and Pompey, was the product of individual initiative *in situ*'.¹⁵

In terms of communications between Rome and *provinciae*, Spain was a far-off province, but it was not a unique case for the commander's nearly complete autonomy. At the conclusion of the Second Macedonian War, Titus Quinctius Flamininus acted with a relatively free hand in Greece in the aftermath of the battle at Cynoscephalae, and in the events leading up to his famous 'Isthmian Proclamation' at Corinth in 196. Unlike the philhellenic Flamininus, however, the consul Publius Licinius Crassus and the unscrupulous praetor Gaius Lucretius Gallus in 171 allowed their troops to commit outrages in Greek cities, even friendly ones; as did the praetor Lucius Hortensius in the following year.¹⁶ The commander's autonomy and independent decision-making powers therefore obtained at all times, regardless of his distance from Rome or the people among whom he found himself. Few scholars today would dispute that point, especially since the publication of Eckstein's magisterial study of the question.¹⁷

In the remainder of this paper, I shall briefly discuss several interactions with Roman authorities that Greek statesmen could only have perceived as bewilderingly inconsistent and frighteningly unpredictable abuses of power (by way of further illustration, and by no means an exhaustive list). These examples are well-known, mostly reported by Polybius, but taken together they underscore the inescapable impression that, for Greek statesmen, it was nearly impossible to understand Roman foreign policy and to predict Roman behavior. One of the most celebrated events in the history of Roman diplomacy during the Middle Republic is the 'Isthmian Proclamation' of Titus Quinctius Flamininus. Flamininus had defeated Philip V the year before, and Greece's fate was in the Roman commander's hands; many Greeks feared mass enslavement, or worse. To their disbelief and euphoria, Flamininus declared the Greek states to be free and autonomous, promising a complete military withdrawal of Roman

15 Richardson 1986: 178.

16 Liv. 42.63.3–12; 43.4.5–12; 43.7.5–8.10 (Crassus and Gallus); Liv. 43.4.8–13, 7.8–8.8 (Hortensius).

17 Eckstein 1987 *passim*.

troops, with no tribute imposed.¹⁸ Yet in the fighting of 200 and 199, the Romans had destroyed the Greek cities of Chalcis, Antipatreia, Andros, and Acanthus, and they had enslaved the entire population of Oreus.¹⁹ Publius Sulpicius Galba's campaign in Greece began with the sacking of Aegina and ended with that of Achaean Dyme. Flamininus himself sacked Thessalian Phaloria, and his liberationist stance came only after military means had failed (Liv. 32.15.1–3). In 194 his troops returned to Italy laden with spoils (Liv. 34.52.2).

Two famous examples of Roman imperiousness, relayed by Polybius, underscore the point. In summer 191, the consul Manius Acilius Glabrio received the Aetolians into a *deditio in fidem*.²⁰ At this time there was a famous interchange between Glabrio and the Aetolian *strategos* Phaeneas. Eckstein has argued that scholars have made too much of Glabrio's brutality in this interchange, and that in reporting the event Polybius stresses the consistency in Roman approaches to unconditional surrender.²¹ But there is no question that when Phaeneas hesitated, once he understood the Roman terms, Glabrio mocked him for his Hellenic airs and threatened him with forcible imprisonment. Following reports of the crushing Roman victory at Pydna in 168, the legate Gaius Popillius Laenas arrived in Egypt to end the conflict between the Seleucid and Ptolemaic monarchies. Laenas met King Antiochus IV Epiphanes on the outskirts of Alexandria, delivering a *senatus consultum* to the Hellenistic monarch. He refused traditional greetings until Antiochus should read the Senate's demand that he cease aggressions and evacuate Ptolemaic territory. When the king requested leave to discuss the matter with his council, Laenas drew a circle in the sand around him with a vine reed, demanding that he respond before stepping outside the circle.²²

In the aftermath of the Antiochene War, the special interventions of King Amyntander of Athamania, some Acarnanian representatives, the Lokrian Damoteles, and envoys from Athens and Rhodes barely saved the Ambraciots from the wrath of the consul Marcus Fulvius Nobilior. Phaeneas and Damoteles also approached Nobilior's half-brother, Gaius Valerius Laevinus, to appease the consul's anger. Fulvius later dictated peace terms to the Aetolians,

18 Polyb. 18.44–48; Liv. 33.30–35; Plut. *Flamininus* 10.4, 12.2; Appian *Macedonian Affairs* 9; Justin *Epitome* 30.4.17–18; Valerius Maximus 4.8.5; Zonaras 9.16, with Gruen 1984: 132–57.

19 Chalcis (Liv. 31.23.1–24.3); Antipatreia (Liv. 31.27.1–6); Andros (Liv. 31.45.1–8); Acanthus (Liv. 31.45.16); Oreus (Liv. 31.46.9–16).

20 Polyb. 20.9.1–10.17, with Champion 2004a: 157 n. 42.

21 Eckstein 1995.

22 Polyb. 29.27.1–13, with Gruen 1984: 659 n. 226.

rapaciously carried off precious artworks, and received a gift of one hundred and fifty talents. But back in Rome an angry populace was ready to reject the Aetolian peace arrangement, until the Rhodian Damon and the Athenian Leon exercised all of their oratorical skills to mollify its rage.²³ At roughly the same time, the other consul, Gnaeus Manlius Vulso, bullied Moagetes, tyrant of the Cibyran tetrapolis in southeastern Asia Minor. Moagetes offered fifteen talents of gold to Vulso's legate Gaius Helvius in an attempt to secure himself against Roman violence. The consul vehemently ranted against Moagetes' envoys, and Moagetes then abased himself before the consul. In the end, Vulso extorted one hundred talents and ten thousand *medimnoi* of grain from Moagetes in return for his safety.²⁴

Following the Roman victory over King Perseus at Pydna, Lucius Aemilius Paullus savagely plundered Epirus on the return trip, sacking some seventy cities and enslaving about 150,000 people.²⁵ When the legate Appius Claudius Cento requested military support for operations in Epirus from the Achaean cavalry-commander (and future historian) Polybius, the consul Quintus Marcius Philippus instructed Polybius not to comply. This placed the Greek statesman in a difficult diplomatic quandary; he eventually appealed to Achaean legalities, informing Cento that the Achaean Confederation could only honor requests sanctioned by *senatus consulta* (Polyb. 28.13.1–14). And, of course, despite Polybius' own policy of political neutrality, he ended up as one of the Achaean hostages at Rome, with an inflexible Senate refusing repeated embassies appealing for their repatriation, until suddenly and unexpectedly it relented in 151/50.²⁶ Some twenty years later, in a fit of exasperation and to the utter consternation of the Greeks, the commander Lucius Mummius destroyed Corinth, the 'bright star of Greece', as the poets called it.²⁷ In the disturbed times following the Achaean War, the praetorian proconsul Quintus Fabius Maximus Servilianus arbitrarily intervened in the internal affairs of Achaean Dyme, allowing the execution of two Dymaeen statesmen, and the arrest and extradition to Rome of a third.²⁸

The fate of the Greek states in the Middle Roman Republican period, then, hinged on the actions of the Roman Senate and the behaviors of individual

23 Polyb. 21.29.1–32.5; Liv. 38.9.3–11.9.

24 Polyb. 21.34.3–13; Liv. 38.14.1–14.

25 Liv. 45.34.1–6; Polyb. 30.15, and further references at Champion 2004a: 54 n. 84.

26 Champion 2004a: 17 and n. 9.

27 See *ILS* 20; Diod. 32.26.2, with Gruen 1976; Champion 2004a: 227 and n. 74.

28 *Syll.*³ 684, with Champion 2007, and literature cited there.

Roman commanders in the field of military operations. Within the Senate, senators often worked at cross purposes, and the ephemeral political alignments there, which we can by no means call anything like parties or even factions, were nearly impossible to read. In the field, Roman generals were frequently inconsistent and unpredictable, and they too could work against one another and give baffling, contradictory signals. To frame the situation—somewhat paradoxically—within the theme of our conference, and from the perspective of the Greek statesmen who had to deal with Roman power, the Senate must have often looked like a kaleidoscopic and mercurial multipolarity, and nothing like the monolithic governing bloc of an imperial metropole, with a set foreign policy; and individual Roman commanders must have seemed like so many warlords, whose unexpected leniency or pugnacious aggression could hardly be divined.

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Warlords and the Roman Republic

John W. Rich

1 Defining Warlords

This paper considers the value of the concept ‘warlord’ for the understanding of the Roman Republic. As several contributors to this volume note, the term itself presents some problems of definition, with which I accordingly start.

The word ‘warlord’ (at first usually hyphenated) came into occasional use in English from the mid nineteenth century.¹ The first contemporary figure to whom it was applied was the Kaiser, translating the title of *Oberster Kriegsherr* (Supreme Warlord) which designated his role as supreme commander of the German armies and navy. The word is still sometimes used of national leaders as commanders in war, for example in the titles of some biographies of Churchill.²

‘Warlord’ was used in a very different way by Max Weber’s translators as an English equivalent for the term *Kriegsfürst*, which he deployed in connection with his concept of ‘charismatic authority’, one of his three types of ‘legitimate domination’. Weber held that in early times such authority had belonged either to the magician or prophet or to the leader in war, or ‘war hero’ (*Kriegsheld*), and he cited the ‘warlord’ (*Kriegsfürst*) as one of the main forms taken by such war leadership. Thus, in *Economy and Society*, the king and his precursor the chieftain is characterized as the ‘warlord’ in his capacity as the ‘charismatic leader in hunt and war’,³ while in Weber’s 1919 lecture on ‘Politics as Vocation’ charismatic leaders include ‘the elected warlord (*Kriegsfürst*), the band leader (*Bandenführer*) and the *condottiere*’.⁴

The usage of the term ‘warlord’ by today’s political scientists originated in the context of the anarchy prevailing in China after the overthrow of the

1 The earliest citation in the *Oxford English Dictionary* is Emerson 1856: 176, discussing the shifting origins of the English aristocracy (‘Piracy and war gave place to trade, politics and letters; the war-lord to the law-lord; the law-lord to the merchant and the mill-owner; but the privilege was kept, whilst the measures of obtaining it were changed.’)

2 Lewin 1973; D’Este 2008.

3 Weber 1978: 1141–2 (= Weber 1980: 675); see also Weber 1978: 243 (= Weber 1980: 140).

4 Weber 1946: 80 (= Weber 1971: 399). (The translator’s ‘gang leader’ for *Bandenführer* is clearly erroneous). However, translators of Weber’s posthumously published paper on ‘Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft’, in which the early German duke (*Herzog*) is given as an example (Weber 1973: 483), render *Kriegsfürst* by ‘military prince’ (Weber 1958: 7; 2004: 140).

Manchu Empire in 1911, and especially from 1916 up to the establishment of the Nationalist government in 1928. During those twelve years the central government had very little control, and effective power devolved to numerous local army commanders, both the *tuchüns*, the provincial military commanders, and those with lesser commands. These commanders contracted alliances with each other and fought frequent wars. They came to be known pejoratively by the Chinese word usually transliterated as *jūnfā*, implying that they were militarists and concerned only for their own advancement, and contemporary writers in English adopted the word 'warlord' as its translation.⁵ The word *jūnfā* was in fact a neologism in Chinese, reflecting the influence of western conceptions of militarism and violence in the aftermath of the First World War.⁶

The term 'warlord' has subsequently come into established usage to designate figures perceived as comparable to this Chinese model in contemporary Third World countries. Since the 1980s, interest in such warlords has greatly increased, as their activities in states like Afghanistan and Somalia have come to be of heightened concern to major powers, and a substantial political science literature on the topic has resulted.⁷ Much of this writing has been devoted to issues about how warlords should be defined. There is general agreement that warlords occur in states where the authority of the central government has weakened or collapsed and they are able to act with effective autonomy, and that the warlord's power is based primarily on his command of a military force, whose members are bound to him through coercion and/or personal loyalty and rewards. Most writers add as a further defining characteristic that each warlord has effective control of a territorial region.⁸ A good sample definition is that provided by K. Marten: "warlords" are individuals who control small slices of territory, in defiance of genuine state authority, through a combination of patronage and force'.⁹ Some further points remain in dispute. While

5 Accounts of the Warlord Era in post-imperial China include Pye 1971; Sheridan 1975; McCord 1993.

6 Waldron 1991.

7 Recent studies of contemporary warlordism include Reno 1998; MacKinlay 2000; Jackson 2003; Rich P.B. 2004; Lezhnev 2005; Giustozzi 2005, 2009; Vinci 2007; Marten 2006/7, 2011, 2012.

8 For insistence (against doubters) that a warlord must have a territorial base see Giustozzi 2005: 8. Vinci 2007: 318–21 prefers to speak of the warlord as controlling a 'fiefdom' comprising a community rather than a territory.

9 Marten 2011: 303. See also Marten 2006/7: 48; 2012: 3–7. Others offering definitions for 'warlord' include Sheridan 1975: 57 ('a commander of a personal army, ruling or seeking to rule territory, and acting more or less independently'); Vinci 2007: 328 ('the leader of an armed group that uses military power and economic exploitation to maintain fiefdoms which are

some writers insist that warlord rule is invariably purely exploitative, others hold that, although always primarily concerned for their own interests rather than a superior cause, warlords sometimes consider it in their interest to advance their subjects' welfare and are not necessarily indifferent to ideology. Specialists also disagree as to whether the exceptional warlord who secures control of the central government, like Charles Taylor in Liberia, may still be designated by the term or should be considered merely a former warlord.¹⁰ Some scholars have, more radically, raised doubts about the analytic value of the warlord concept itself, and there is indeed a risk of distortion arising from the pejorative associations of the term and its application to such diverse figures as the Afghans Rashid Dostum and Ismail Khan, the Somali Farad Aideed, and the Angolan Jonas Savimbi.¹¹

Issues about the validity of the term warlord are even more liable to arise when applied to individuals in earlier societies. One important factor here is the character of the present-day international order. The inhabited world today is configured as a universe of nation states, each of which, if well ordered, has the monopoly of force within its borders, with warlords and other non-state forces occurring in states where government authority is weak or has collapsed. The term warlord may therefore have a somewhat different application for earlier societies at a less evolved stage of state development.¹²

Conditions comparable to those in post-imperial China have occurred in earlier periods when an empire or other state with strong central government experienced a weakening of central control, for example at several earlier points in Chinese history and in 16th century Japan, and the term warlord has thus come to be used for local, effectively autonomous military leaders in such periods. The term has also, however, been widely applied to roving non-state

autonomous and independent from the state and society'); Giustozzi 2009: 5 ('a legitimate, charismatic and patrimonial military leader with autonomous control over a military force capable of achieving/maintaining a monopoly of large scale violence over a sizeable territory', who 'has little or no political legitimacy, but nonetheless exercises patrimonial political power over such territory, where central authority has either collapsed or has weakened or was never there in the first place').

10 Warlords purely exploitative, and Taylor a continuing warlord: Reno 1998. Critiques of these views: Giustozzi 2005; Marten 2006/7, 2011.

11 See the doubts about the warlord concept expressed for Somalia by Compagnon 1998: 74, and for Afghanistan by Stanski 2009.

12 See also Marten 2011: 303: 'in the era before modern states emerged, the informal system of warlord rule can be seen as a competitor to the abstract, bureaucratic rule of state systems; but today warlords often feed off weak states'.

agents with military force at their disposal but lacking a territorial base, for example the mercenary captains who played so prominent a part in the warfare of late medieval and early modern Europe. In Italy these were known as *condottieri* (literally, 'contractors', from the *condotte*, 'contracts', to provide troops for payment which they concluded with their employers), and *condottieri* are now sometimes defined as mercenary warlords.¹³ Other leaders also often spoken of as warlords are the warrior chieftains of Dark Age Northern Europe.¹⁴

To embrace these widely varying current applications, the word 'warlord' must be regarded as a broad, generic term to denote any individual non-state agent with military force at his control and able to act with effective autonomy. Such individuals may occur because central state control has weakened or because it has not yet fully developed or (as with *condottieri*) because it suits state authorities to co-operate with them. So defined, its breadth necessarily limits the term's analytic value, but with care it may still prove serviceable.

There is an obvious parallel to the situation in post-imperial China in the Later Roman Empire, where the imperial government's control became greatly weakened in the fifth century and collapsed in the West. Warlordism under the Later Roman Empire has accordingly been discussed by several recent writers, although not without some disagreement about its causes or the identification of individual warlords. Thus W. Liebeschuetz has questioned the linkage between warlords and landlords posited by C.R. Whittaker, insisting that it was always military commanders who acquired the 'degree of irregular and personal power that allows us to classify them as warlords', while, as R.W. Burgess notes, several of the individuals covered in the monograph on late imperial warlords by P. MacGeorge were in fact commanders of what remained of the imperial army rather than acting independently of it, and so can hardly be classed as warlords.¹⁵

We must now turn to consider what part, if any, may have been played by figures who may be validly identified as warlords in earlier periods of Roman history.

13 E.g. Santosuosso 2004: 192, 279. However, Parrott (2012: 22 and *passim*), following Redlich 1968, prefers to speak of the mercenary contractors as 'military enterprisers' and to reserve 'warlords' for the rulers to whom they undertook to supply troops.

14 E.g. Smyth 1984; Simms 1987; Coupland 1998.

15 Whittaker 1993, 1994: 243–78; MacGeorge 2002; Burgess 2003; Liebeschuetz 2007. On warlordism and the Later Roman Empire see further Wijnendaele 2015 and in this volume.

2 Warlords and Archaic Rome

The accounts (in their detail largely fictitious) of warfare in early Rome given by Livy and Dionysius represent the Romans' campaigns as invariably conducted by the armies of the Roman people under the command of their kings or, later, the chief magistrates, generally in response to enemy aggression, often in the form of plunder raids. In reality, it is likely that much of the fighting which took place between the Romans and their neighbours in archaic times will have been private rather than public, taking the form of raiding and reprisals by individuals and groups. Conflicts originating in this way will, however, often have come to involve the community, and the pressures of warfare and the need to mobilize armies are in any case likely to have stimulated state formation and the development of communal institutions.¹⁶ The community in its turn may have sought to control private violence, and an instance of this may be afforded by the ritual of the fetial priests (an institution which the Romans shared with at least some of their neighbours). Accounts of the fetials' procedure for declaring war often represent them as presenting a demand for the surrender of 'the plunder and the plunderers' (*rapta et raptores*), and it seems likely that the ritual originated as a communal response to private raiding with the offenders' community being required either to make good the offence by handing over the raiders and their booty or to accept the responsibility collectively.¹⁷

Private warfare in archaic Rome has often been held to have been conducted chiefly by the members of individual clans (*gentes*) and their dependents and to have focused on the defence and expansion of their landholdings. There may be substance in this view, but the role and importance of the *gentes* in early times remains obscure. The only evidence for a *gens* engaging in warfare on its own is the story of the disaster suffered by the Fabii at the river Cremera during the republic's first war with Veii. According to most accounts, the Fabii undertook to garrison a fort there, but were ambushed in 477, with only one Fabius surviving. Though much embellished, the episode must derive from an authentic memory of a Fabian disaster. It is often supposed that the Fabii in fact suffered their defeat while conducting a private war from their own

16 On private and public warfare in archaic Rome and its role in state formation see Cornell 1988; Timpe 1990; Zimmermann 2007: 61–2, 2010: 32–4.

17 See Rich 2011: 215–7, with further bibliography. Armstrong 2013a suggests that the triumph too may have originated as a means of bringing successful private warfare under the control of the community.

landholding, a late survival of independent gentilicial warfare, but alternatively the tradition may be correct to represent it as an episode in a public war.¹⁸

In recent years it has come to be widely accepted that, as Cornell puts it, 'one of the most important features of the society of central Italy in the archaic period (was) the presence of *condottieri*—aristocratic warlords whose power rested on the support of armed personal dependants' and 'these armed bands formed what were essentially private armies, operating independently of state governments, moving freely across state frontiers, and frequently changing their allegiances'.¹⁹

The catalyst for this hypothesis was the discovery in 1977 of a late sixth century inscription in Latin or a related language recording a dedication at the sanctuary of Mater Matuta at Satricum, a site in the Pontine Plain whose possession shifted between the Latins and the Volscians. The text reads: [...] *iei steterai popliosio valesiosio suodales Mamartei*. Apart from the incomplete first word, this has usually been interpreted as: 'The comrades of Poplios Valesios set this up to Mamars (i.e. Mars)'. Much about the inscription remains in dispute including Poplios Valesios himself, whom it is tempting to identify as P. Valerius Publicola, according to later tradition the dominant figure of the first years of the Roman Republic, or as another member of his family. However, since the first publication most scholars have agreed that the dedicating *sodales* (to use the classical Latin form) should be interpreted as a warrior band led by Poplios Valesios.²⁰

In the light of this discovery, various elements in the ancient tradition have been interpreted as further evidence for warlords and their retinues in archaic central Italy. The earliest are the brothers Caeles and Aulus Vibenna from Vulci and their associate Mastarna. Tales about the Vibennae survived in both Roman and Etruscan traditions, and a sixth-century vase from Veii inscribed and perhaps dedicated by 'Avile Vippiennas' confirms that they were historical personages. Roman antiquarian sources report that Caeles Vibenna brought aid to a Roman king, variously named as Romulus or Tarquinius Priscus, and

18 The garrison version: Livy 2.48–50; Dion. Hal. 9.15–22; Ovid *Fasti* 2.195–242. Our earliest source, Diodorus 11.53.6, reports merely heavy losses by the Fabii in a pitched battle. Discussions include Richard 1990a, 1990b; Welwei 1993; Smith 2006: 281–98.

19 Cornell 1995: 143–4. For similar views see Momigliano 1984: 418–20 (= 1989: 97–9); Cornell 1988: 95, 1989: 292, 2003; Rawlings 1999; Torelli 1999: 16–17; Zaccaria Ruggiu 2003: 118–23; Wiseman 2004: 40–8, 66–7; Forsythe 2005: 198–200; Rich 2007: 15–16; MacMullen 2011: 51, 89; Serrati 2011: 12–16; Armstrong 2013a, 2013b, 2016; Drogula 2015: 21–3.

20 See especially Versnel 1980: 108–27, 1982; Bremmer 1982. For recent work on the inscription see Gnade 2012, with references.

settled with his men on the Caelian hill, giving it his name, while the tale that the Capitol got its name from the discovery there of the head of one Olus (the *caput Oli*) appears to relate to Aulus Vibenna.²¹ The brothers were prominent in Etruscan art, most notably in the celebrated François tomb from Vulci, where they appear in paired scenes with other warriors including 'Macstrna' (shown as freeing the captive 'Caile Vipinas') and 'Cneve Tarchunies Rumach' (i.e. Gnaeus Tarquinius of Rome). The emperor Claudius, in a speech to the senate recorded on an inscription, claimed that Etruscan sources identified Mastarna with none other than the Roman king Servius Tullius and that in their version he had been 'the most faithful comrade (*sodalis*) of Caelius Vivenna and companion in all his adventures', and 'driven out by changed fortune, he left Etruria with all the survivors of Caelius' army, occupied the Caelian hill, naming it thus after his leader Caelius', and then, changing his name, attained the kingship.²² Fortunately, we need not concern ourselves here with the much discussed issues posed by this identification of Servius Tullius.²³

Various figures from the Roman tradition on the early years of the Republic have also been interpreted as warlords at the head of warrior bands: Lars Porsenna, traditionally described as king of Clusium and as having besieged (or in one version captured) Rome on behalf of the expelled Tarquin; Attus Clausus, said to have come over from the Sabines to Rome in 504 with a large following, so establishing the Claudii at Rome; Coriolanus, according to the tradition a war hero exiled for his opposition to the plebeians who then led the Volsci against Rome; and the Sabine Appius Herdonius, reported to have briefly seized the Capitol in 460.

The term most widely used in this connection is *condottiere*, and scholars have applied it to Caeles Vibenna ever since Niebuhr, the first modern historian of early Rome and the first to draw attention to Claudius' report of the Etruscan tradition on Servius Tullius. Niebuhr used the term in its strict sense, to draw a parallel with the mercenary captains of Renaissance Italy, observing that in both the Roman and the Etruscan stories Caeles Vibenna 'appears as

21 The Caelian from Caeles Vibenna: Varro *Lingua Latina* 5.46; Dion. Hal. 2.36.2; Tacitus *Annales* 4.65.1–2; Festus 486 L; Paul. Fest. 38 L. The association of the *caput Oli* story with Aulus Vibenna depends on Arnobius' description of Olus as from Vulci (*Adversus Nationes* 6.7, on which see now Cornell et al. 2013: 3.45–7).

22 *ILS* 212.19–22: *Caeli quondam Vivennae sodalis fidelissimus omnisque eius casus comes, postquam varia fortuna exactus cum omnibus reliquis Caeliani exercitus Etruria excessit, montem Caelium occupavit et a duce suo Caelio ita appellavit (appellavit is the likely correction for the engraver's appellitatus).*

23 See especially Alföldi 1965: 212–31; Thomsen 1980: 57–114; Coarelli 1983; Cornell 1995: 133–41.

the leader of an army raised by himself, and not belonging to any state, like the bands of the *condottieri*, sometimes serving a master for pay, at others pillaging and exacting contributions on their own score.²⁴ This is anachronistic: if Caeles Vibenna ever did bring help on his own account to a king of Rome, he would surely have done so as a guest-friend rather than as a mercenary.²⁵ For the current conception of him and his like, the more elastic term 'warlord' is preferable, at least in English.²⁶

The picture which recent scholars have painted of aristocratic warlords and their retinues roaming between the communities of archaic central Italy has plausibility, but caution is nonetheless in order.²⁷ Each of the elements on which the doctrine is based is speculative, including the interpretation of the Satricum inscription as a warrior band dedication. In later times *sodalitates* were just friendship associations, and in archaic Rome and its neighbours they are likely to have been aristocratic groupings bonding primarily through banqueting, like the Greek *hetaireiai*, and may not necessarily have had a shared involvement in warfare.²⁸ There were also cult *sodalitates*, and some scholars have taken the dative 'Mamartei' not as indicating the recipient of the dedication, but together with 'suodales', indicating that they were an association for the cult of Mamars.²⁹ The reference to Mamars = Mars, however it is to be explained, does not necessarily link the dedication to warfare, since in archaic times Mars was not exclusively a war god.³⁰ In any case, if Poplios Valesios and his *sodales* were a warrior band, they may have fought together in the wars of their community rather than (or as well as) in private operations.³¹

Nothing can be ascertained with confidence about the Vibenna brothers from the later traditions relating to them, and the tales associating them with Rome may have arisen just through attempts to explain Roman place-names, while the historical reality behind what we are told of the other putative warlords from Porsenna to Herdonius is scarcely less obscure. Much has

24 Niebuhr 1828: 423–4 = Niebuhr 1831: 376.

25 *Contra* Thomsen 1980: 102, who envisages Etruscan hoplite mercenary forces being hired by Roman kings before the adoption of hoplite methods in their own army.

26 First used in this context by Cornell (1995: 143–4, 293, 428, 439). Cornell also uses 'adventurer' (1995: 139–40, 143, 157); on this word see below, n. 47.

27 See also the circumspect remarks of Drummond 1989a: 157–8, 1989b: 99–100.

28 For *sodales* and banqueting in archaic central Italy see Zaccaria Ruggiu 2003; Habinek 2005: 36–44.

29 Guarducci 1980; Coarelli 1995: 210–1; Levi 1995.

30 Scholz 1970.

31 See De Waele 1996, suggesting that the dedication commemorated shared service at the battle of Lake Regillus.

sometimes been made of references in our sources, particularly Dionysius, to clients and friends accompanying these figures on their enterprises, but these are probably just literary elaborations, and unlikely to derive from authentic traditions.³²

Thus, for all its attraction, the now conventional account of warlords in archaic central Italy should not be accepted as established beyond question. Private land warfare may in any case have become exceptional at Rome by the fifth century, and, when Roman expansion got under way in the fourth century, the Republic's wars will all have been conducted by its armies under the command of the chief magistrates.³³ The sea will have continued to provide scope for private enterprise: there is some evidence for fourth century Roman involvement in piracy, and it was only with the appointment of the first *duumviri navales* in 311 that the Roman state launched its first (small) fleets.³⁴

3 The Middle Republic

The Romans' conquest of central and southern Italy in the years 343–265 BC was followed by the progressive expansion overseas which came to a halt only with the death of Augustus. Most of those with whom they dealt as enemies or allies were states of diverse kinds, ranging from kings, cities and city-leagues to tribally organized peoples. However, they had significant encounters with some non-state actors for whom the term warlord seems not inappropriate.

One such who played a prominent role in the Romans' early expansion across the Adriatic was Demetrius of Pharos. At the start of the First Illyrian War in 229, Demetrius was the Illyrian queen Teuta's governor in Corcyra, but he switched sides to the Romans and was rewarded with a substantial domain

32 So Dionysius for Attus Clausus, Coriolanus and Herdonius: 5.40.3; 7.19.2, 21.3, 64.3; 10.14.1 (Plut. *Coriolanus* 13.5 is following Dionysius). Livy (2.16.4) mentions clients accompanying Attus Clausus' migration, but not in the other cases. Dionysius (9.15.3) has the Fabii accompanied to the Cremera by 4000 men mostly comprising clients and *hetairoi* (clients also at Servius *Aeneid* 6.845); however, Livy (2.49.5) portrays the Fabii as going on their own, with their kinsmen and *sodales* merely watching their departure.

33 Recent reinterpretations of the chief magistrates of the early Republic as gentilicial warlords, informally selected by their peers, seem to me wholly unconvincing: so Holloway 2008 (the consular tribunes); Drogula 2015: 20–34 (the *praetores* who replaced the kings); Armstrong 2016 (both the *praetores* and the kings themselves).

34 See Harris 1990: 500–1; Armstrong 2016: 269–72. I am not persuaded by Steinby 2007: 29–77 that Roman naval activity was more extensive before the First Punic War than usually supposed. On the *duumviri navales* see now Dart 2012.

within the Illyrian kingdom, and may later also have become regent for the boy king. In the following years, he acted with increasing independence, assisting the Macedonian king in the Peloponnese and undertaking land and sea enterprises which in 219 led the Romans to intervene to expel him, after which he took refuge at the Macedonian court.³⁵

At the same time as the consuls were expelling Demetrius, Hannibal in Spain was laying siege to Saguntum, an action which the Romans regarded as grounds for war. Hannibal had succeeded his father Hamilcar and his brother-in-law Hasdrubal as Carthaginian commander in Spain, and all three had operated there with effective autonomy and aroused the hostility of some leading figures at Carthage. Some Romans appear to have believed that Hannibal's action did not have the backing of the home government (as the first Roman historian, Fabius Pictor, was later to claim), and this shaped the Roman response. An embassy was sent to Carthage in 218 requiring its government to choose between handing over Hannibal and his advisers or accepting war. This ultimatum was evidently modelled on the ancient fetial demand for the surrender of raiders and their booty: in effect, the Carthaginians were being invited to disown Hannibal as a warlord. The offer was rejected: they accepted war.³⁶

Having expelled the Carthaginians from the Iberian peninsula in the Second Punic War, the Romans gradually brought the whole region under their control, a protracted enterprise not finally completed until the reign of Augustus. Most of those against whom they waged war there were tribal communities with traditional authority structures, but they also encountered some leaders whom they regarded as bandits, using terms like *latrones*. Such designations were normally pejorative, but Romans came to hold an idealized view of their most successful opponent Viriathus, who achieved a charismatic leadership of the Lusitani. Several sources characterize him as having been successively a shepherd, hunter, bandit and general, a conception probably originating with Posidonius.³⁷ Local conditions, including the prevalence of guerrilla-style

35 For Demetrius' activity to 219 see Polyb. 2.11, 65–6, 3.16, 18–19; Appian *Illyrica* 7–8; Cassius Dio fr. 49.7, 53; Zonaras 8.19.5–7, 20.11–13; Gruen 1984: 367–73; Coppola 1993; Eckstein 2008: 41–76.

36 For this interpretation of the Roman ultimatum see Rich 1976: 109–115; 1996: 30–33; 2011: 231–2. Fabius Pictor's view: Polyb. 3.8 (= F22 Cornell).

37 Diod. 33.1; Livy *Per.* 52 (*primum ex pastore venator, ex venatore latro, mox iusti quoque exercitus dux factus*); Florus 1.33.15; Dio fr. 73.1; Eutropius 4.16; Orosius 5.4.1; *de viris illustribus* 71.1. On the perception of Viriathus as a bandit see Grünewald 2004: 33–47; Sánchez-Moreno 2006 and in this volume. Reputed Lusitanian banditry and guerrilla fighting:

fighting, may have facilitated his rise. It was a model from which in the next century dissident Romans were able to profit.

Although the Romans engaged with leaders with warlord qualities as enemies or allies as their power expanded, in its prime the Republic's own institutions and ethos kept it secure from warlordism.³⁸

The armies which fought the Republic's wars were commanded by its magistrates and pro-magistrates and composed of citizen legions and auxiliary contingents supplied by allied states. Thus, as Polybius noted (6.52), the Romans, unlike the Carthaginians, had no need of mercenaries. Small forces were sometimes used for duties like garrisoning, and a contingent of Campanians, commanded by their compatriot Decius Vibellius, which had been sent to garrison Rhegium around the time of the Pyrrhic War, broke loose and seized the city for themselves, but this was a wholly exceptional incident and the Campanians were sternly punished when the Romans eventually recovered control.³⁹ The Romans themselves reverted to private warfare in the closing years of the First Punic War in response to the heavy demands of the naval campaigning on which they had then embarked for the first time: after the destruction of successive publicly manned fleets, they undertook no public naval activity from 248 to 243, but permitted private individuals to undertake privateering raids on the African coast using the state's old ships.⁴⁰ However, there was no further need for this expedient from 242/1, when the launching of another public fleet (albeit one funded by private loans) brought the decisive victory.

Overseas warfare from the First Punic War on and the consequent acquisition of permanent overseas commitments (first in Sicily and Sardinia, then in Spain and subsequently further afield) led to elite Romans being stationed overseas as provincial commanders for terms often extending over several years. While in post they had effective freedom to act as they saw fit, and sanctions were only rarely enforced against them on return. These commands were often very lucrative, through war booty and the proceeds (legitimate

Sallust *Historiae* 2.88; Diod. 5.34.6–7; Strabo 3.3.5–6; App. *Iberica* 59, 71. Appian mentions other Lusitanian bandit leaders at *Iber.* 56, 68.

38 See further the contributions in this volume by Coşkun for other warlords encountered by Rome in the East and Rosenstein on the Roman aristocratic ethos as protecting the Republic against warlordism.

39 The sources relating to this episode present complex problems: see further Bleckmann 1999 (interpreting the Campanian contingent as a mercenary band, not a Roman garrison).

40 Zonar. 8.16.3–4, 8; Bleckmann 2002: 209–11; Zimmermann 2007: 62, 2010: 33.

or otherwise) of government, and success in war also brought military glory. Supersession sometimes became politically contentious, as commanders like Scipio and Flamininus intrigued to remain in post to win the glory of completing their wars, while incoming consuls sought to take their place. However, commanders had no wish to retain their posts indefinitely, and herein lay the Republic's security against warlordism. Each aspired after a successful command to return to Rome to resume his place among his peers and capitalize on the rewards of this success—to claim a triumph; to enjoy his newly enhanced wealth; if a praetorian, to seek a consulship; if a consular, to bask in the respect due to a *princeps civitatis* (an elder statesman), and sometimes also to go on to a censorship or another consulship. As long as the ambitions of the Roman elite remained centred on Rome, there was no danger that the Republic's empire would break up into the fiefdoms of warlords.

4 Warlords and the Fall of the Roman Republic

From the later second century BC the Republic lost stability. Initially, disorders occurred merely within the city, through the activities of tribunes and their opponents. However, in the 80s, in the aftermath of the Social War, the first civil wars broke out, and, after civil war recurred in 49, it continued with only brief intermissions until Octavian's final victory in 30 established the monarchy of the emperors.

In recent years it has become quite common for the leaders in these civil wars—Sulla, Pompey, Caesar, Antony and Octavian—to be described as warlords, both in works designed for a general readership and in more academic studies.⁴¹ Keaveney has protested against such a characterization of Sulla, but is happy to apply the term to the triumvirs Antony and Octavian.⁴² We must, therefore, now consider whether, in the light of our previous discussion, the term warlord is appropriate for these men before, during or after the civil wars in which they were the protagonists.

Merely being the leader in a civil war would not in itself be sufficient for an individual to be deemed a warlord: to extend the term that far would deprive it of all analytic value. Those who apply it to the leading figures in the Roman

41 A notable example is Fields 2008, where Caesar and Pompey are dubbed warlords both in the title and *passim*. For some further recent instances see Holland 2004: 90–1, 315, 353, 380, 410; Sheppard 2006: 7, 29; Mackay 2009: 337; Capogrossi Colognesi 2014: 214; Zarecki 2014: 162; Rankov, in this volume.

42 Keaveney 2005; 2007: 4–7, 35, 41, 97.

civil war generally do so without explanation, but the usage appears to reflect common conceptions both of these commanders themselves and of their relationship to their troops. The civil war leaders, it is implied, were effectively free of any state control or allegiance and concerned only to promote their own interests and maximize their power, while their troops were motivated solely by personal loyalty to their commanders and hopes of reward in cash and land.

Although there is a good deal of truth in such conceptions, the realities were much more complex. Both before and during the wars, the leaders generally held offices conferred on them by the Roman state. They presented themselves throughout as acting in the public interest and with right on their side, and such claims should not be dismissed as merely hypocritical. The soldiers were Roman citizens serving in the Roman people's legions. Their commanders urged the justice of their cause in addresses to the assembled troops, and at least some of their hearers will not have been indifferent to such considerations. There was no novelty in Rome's soldiers looking for material rewards from war, and, although levying methods had changed, it is likely that (contrary to what has traditionally been supposed) the civil war armies were not greatly different in their composition from those of earlier centuries, being recruited mainly from the peasantry.⁴³

The Roman civil war leaders of the first century BC were in fact radically different in their circumstances from the warlords of post-imperial China or their recent successors. The latter control military forces and local power bases as a result of the collapse of central state authority. By contrast, there was no collapse of central state authority under the Roman Republic. Instead, control of its government was repeatedly contested, and the civil wars were fought to resolve those contests. Commands of provinces and the armies stationed there played a part in the origins of several of the wars. However, like earlier provincial commanders, the civil war leaders had no wish to retain their provinces permanently, and civil wars sometimes broke out not because commanders sought to hold on to their provinces, but when the time came to lay them down.

Sulla in 88 BC was consul and was assigned the command in the Mithridatic War by due process, but Sulpicius and Marius deprived him of it by a coup. Sulla's army was already in being, since it had been serving under him in the Social War, and Sulla took advantage of this to march on Rome, claiming, Appian tells us (*Bellum Civile* 1.57), that he did so 'to free the fatherland from tyrants'. After he had gone to the East to fight Mithridates as the appointed proconsul, Sulla's opponents seized power again at Rome, attempting

43 On the recruitment, character and motivation of the legionaries see Gruen 1974: 365–84; Rich 1983; Brunt 1988: 240–80; Keaveney 2005; De Blois 2007; Cadiou 2009.

unsuccessfully to have him superseded. Far from seeking to stay on in the East, Sulla finished the war with Mithridates as rapidly as he could (giving the king relatively generous terms) so that he could return home to confront his opponents. As victor in the ensuing civil war, Sulla exacted a terrible revenge, but claimed—and no doubt sincerely believed—to have restored constitutional legitimacy and set the republic to rights through the legislation he carried as dictator.

When Sulla returned to Italy in 83, several supporters joined him with privately raised forces. The most prominent of these was the young Pompey, who amassed three legions. Pompey's ability to raise such an army was then exploited by Sulla and, after his death, the Sullan senate to help crush opponents of the regime. Thus it is not inappropriate to speak of Pompey beginning his career as a warlord.⁴⁴ However, grants of *imperium* gave him legitimacy, and this was sealed in 70 by his election to the consulship (uniquely, his first magistracy). From 67 to 62, Pompey held great commands in the East against successively the pirates and Mithridates, conferred by the novel expedient of special laws carried by tribunes and granting him unprecedentedly wide-ranging powers. However, he held the commands legitimately, as a proconsul, and there is no reason at this stage to deem him a warlord.⁴⁵ Pompey on his return signalled his wish to take his place as an elder statesman by the conciliatory gesture of dismissing his army on arrival in Italy. However, the conservative senators did not reciprocate, opposing his eastern settlement and thwarting his wish to procure a land settlement for his veterans, and so impelled him (along with Crassus) to support Caesar in his radical consulship in 59.

Caesar's reward was another special command, in the Gauls and Illyricum, and he seized the opportunity to bring all the Gauls north of the Alps under the empire of the Roman people, so winning for himself glory and wealth to equal Pompey's. Like Pompey in the East, he was able to operate with extraordinary freedom in this command, but his status remained that of a proconsul commanding the Roman people's legions, while his successes were acclaimed at Rome, being accorded three sets of thanksgivings (*supplicationes*), each of unprecedented duration. There is thus no ground for regarding Caesar as a warlord during his time in Gaul.

Meeting at Luca in April 56, Caesar, Pompey and Crassus decided, in response to turbulence at Rome, to resume the collaboration which they had

44 On Pompey's early career see now Vervaeke 2009.

45 *Contra* Flower 2010: 143 ('Pompey played the role of a warlord in the East, but one much more successful than Sulla had been'). Earlier, she denies that Sulla was a warlord in the East (Flower 2010: 93).

begun in 59. In accordance with this agreement, Pompey and Crassus took the consulship for 55, and then had laws passed extending Caesar's command in Gaul for a further five years and conferring on Pompey and Crassus the command of respectively Spain and Syria for the same period. This naked demonstration of their power vividly illustrated how greatly the Republic had already been destabilized.⁴⁶ It also posed the risk of a collapse into warlordism, if the three were to quarrel and to use their armies against each other. However, events took a different course. Crassus, who had accepted Syria in the hope of conquering Parthia and so making himself the equal of Pompey and Caesar, was defeated and lost his life at the Parthians' hands. Pompey, content to govern Spain through his legates, remained at Rome where he was called on in 52 to resolve the crisis arising from Clodius' death. This led to a rapprochement between Pompey and the senatorial conservatives and, as the expiry of Caesar's command approached, an impasse between them and Caesar of which the outcome was civil war. Rather than being a warlord seeking to retain his Gallic fiefdom, Caesar was now eager—as proconsuls had always been—to return to Rome to enjoy the fruits of his success. However, agreement was required between Caesar, Pompey and the senate on the terms of his return, and this could not be reached. Caesar accordingly entered Italy in arms. In his opponents' view, he was marching against the Republic, but he himself claimed, much as Sulla had done, to be protecting the liberty of the Roman people against its oppressors (Caesar *Bellum Civile* 1.22.5).

Following Caesar's assassination in 44, Antony initially enjoyed legitimate authority as the surviving consul. The young Octavian (and future Augustus) rose against him late in the year by raising a private army from Caesar's veterans, and so effectively as a warlord, or, to use the term which Syme frequently applies to him in this phase of his career, adventurer.⁴⁷ However, Cicero soon got Octavian's action legitimized by a senatorial grant of *propraetorian imperium* and other honours, bolstered with the now traditional justification (later repeated by Augustus himself in his *Res Gestae*) that he had raised his army to defend the liberty of the republic.⁴⁸ The ensuing war at Mutina

46 On the extent to which the Republic had been undermined by the mid-50s see the remarks of Crawford 2008.

47 Syme 1939: 4, 113, 134, 137, 141, 143, 160, 168, 170, 177, 182, 186, 216, 222, 277, 317, 379, 407. On Syme's fondness for the term 'adventurer' see Welch 2012: 3. The word is used here in the sense defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* (s.v. 3b) as 'a person who engages in war-like adventures, esp. for financial gain, without any attachment to a particular party; a soldier of fortune, a mercenary soldier'.

48 Cic. *Philippicae* 3.5, 4.2, 5.45–8; *RGDA* 1.1–2.

was prompted by Antony's attempt to take over the command of Cisalpine Gaul. However, the sequel saw a realignment in which Antony, Octavian and Lepidus allied to seize control at Rome. In November 43, they got formal constitutional expression for their power by taking office, by the tribunician Lex Titia, as *IIIviri rei publicae constituendae*, a three-man board 'to set the republic to rights', with vast powers including a share-out of the provinces.

This office, taken initially for five years but then extended for a further five, was represented as needed to put an end to the civil wars, a goal duly achieved by the defeats of Brutus and Cassius in 42 and Sextus Pompeius in 36. If the triumvirs had remained friends, a further configuration of power would have been needed, but in the event Lepidus was ousted in 36 and by 32 Antony and Octavian had quarrelled irretrievably. Each went to war then promising to restore power to the senate and people after their victory. The fact that Antony was accompanied by Cleopatra enabled Octavian to represent him as treasonably abetting a foreign queen in an assault on the fatherland.⁴⁹ By 30 BC, his victories at Actium and Alexandria left him in undisputed control of the Roman world.

Thus each of the civil wars was fought to secure control of the government of the Roman Republic and its empire, and each ended quite quickly in a decisive victory. An alternative outcome would have been a stalemate in which no one side secured control at Rome and across the empire, resulting in a situation comparable to that in post-imperial China, in which for an extended period regional army commanders were effectively autonomous and the central government had little power. The commanders would then indeed have been warlords. However, such a descent into warlordism was averted by the rapid victories in their civil wars achieved by successively Sulla, Caesar, the triumvirs and Octavian.⁵⁰

However, although the Republic during its civil wars escaped a general collapse into warlordism, the phenomenon was not wholly absent. Several individuals who did not contest the central government nonetheless managed to establish and sometimes to retain for extended periods regional commands which were out of its control. Their position was accordingly closely comparable to that of the warlords of post-imperial China and their recent successors, and it is therefore these commanders, rather than the civil war leaders, who should be regarded as the true warlords of the late Roman Republic. The first such commander, and arguably the most successful, was Sertorius.

49 On the triumvirs' justifications and promises see Lange 2009: 18–93; Rich 2012: 43–8.

50 See also Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein 2006: 635, for warlordism as an averted alternative.

Sertorius went to Spain in 83/2 as proconsul appointed by the Marian government. In 81 Sulla's appointee C. Annius obliged Sertorius to flee Spain, but, after a stay in Mauretania, he returned in 80 at the invitation of the Lusitani. Thereafter Sertorius gradually secured control of most of Spain with an army largely supplied by the Iberian communities, inflicting numerous defeats on Roman commanders, and continued to hold Pompey and Metellus Pius at bay until his assassination in 73. His leadership style in some ways recalls that of Viriathus. Its charismatic quality is reflected above all in the use of his white doe as a means of winning loyalty, and, as with Viriathus, Sertorius' success in guerrilla tactics may be partly due to local fighting traditions.⁵¹

Berve, reacting against earlier idealization of Sertorius, claimed that he was just 'a brilliant *condottiere*' ('ein glänzender Condottiere'), without loyalty to Rome.⁵² This is mistaken: Sertorius surely regarded himself as the champion of Republican legitimacy against a faction which had seized power at Rome. A fragment of Livy (frg. 22.15–46 W-M) shows him comporting himself as proconsul in his dealings with provincial communities, and he set up his own senate. Slingshot pellets have been discovered on which Sertorius is styled as proconsul, and two also include the word *pietas*, evidently conveying a civic message, of Sertorius' loyalty to the fatherland.⁵³ Sertorius did not cede the province of Asia in his treaty with Mithridates, and in sending M. Marius to Mithridates may have envisaged him as governor for the province.⁵⁴

Nonetheless, although there are said to have been fears that Sertorius might cross into Italy, there was never any serious prospect of his doing so.⁵⁵ In reality all that he achieved was to maintain control of a region through the forces he had amassed and in defiance of the central government at Rome. Thus Sertorius' position was similar to that of the modern-day warlords, and it is therefore appropriate to speak of him as a warlord.

51 On Sertorius see especially Spann 1987; Konrad 1994; Naco del Hoyo and Principal, this volume. Sertorius' Iberian troops are associated with guerrilla fighting by Plut. *Sertorius* 12.6–7, 14.1, 18.1, but see *contra* Cadiou 2004; 2008: 219–27.

52 Berve 1929: 227 (see also recently König 2000). *Contra*, Mommsen 1857: 19 ('mit dem sichersten politischen und patriotischen Takt trat Sertorius, sowie er irgend es vermochte, statt als Condottier der gegen Rom empörten Lusitaner auf als römischer Feldherr und Statthalter von Spanien'); Spann 1987: 61, 147 ('nor was he an adventurer, a *condottiere*, or a soldier of fortune').

53 Beltrán Lloris 1990; Lowe 2002: 78; Welch 2012: 29.

54 Sertorius as legitimist: Spann 1987: 59–62, 86–9, 147–50; Konrad 1994: 116, 184–9. On the terms of the treaty with Mithridates, Plut. *Sert.* 23.6 is preferable to App. *Mithr.* 68, which reports Asia as ceded: Gelzer 1932; Konrad 1994: 194–5. M. Marius: Konrad 1994: 198–202.

55 Fears of Sertorius crossing to Italy: Sall. *Hist.* 2.98.10; Plut. *Sert.* 21.9; App. *BC* 1.108.

The empire-wide chaos produced by the civil war between Caesar and the Pompeians facilitated the emergence of several minor warlords or (to use the term of which Syme was so fond) adventurers. Thus the Pompeians P. Attius Varus and Q. Caecilius Bassus both contrived to get unauthorized control of a province. When war broke out in 49, Varus was sent by Pompey to defend Picenum, but, as Caesar advanced, he fled to the province of Africa, of which he was a former governor, and took over its command, refusing admission to the appointed governor L. Aelius Tubero. He then held the province in the Pompeian interest against Caesar's commander Curio until the arrival of the main Pompeian forces in the province after their defeat at Pharsalus, and then continued to fight for the Pompeian cause in subordinate roles until his death at Munda.⁵⁶ The *eques* Bassus took control of the army of Sex. Iulius Caesar, the dictator's relative and governor of Syria, following his murder in 46, made Apamea his stronghold, and held out against the commanders sent against him until obliged to cede his force to Cassius in spring 43.⁵⁷

The most colourful of these lesser warlords was Cicero's friend P. Sittius, from Nuceria. At the time of Catiline's conspiracy, Sittius had been in Further Spain, attending to his business interests there and with the king of Mauretania, and had been suspected of involvement in the conspiracy, an allegation hotly denied by Cicero. By 56 he was in exile, and at some point he raised a private army in Africa, with which he assisted Bocchus, king of Mauretania. In 46, when the civil war moved to Africa, Sittius gave valuable assistance to Caesar. For this he was rewarded with land in the new province of Africa Nova (the former kingdom of Numidia), on which he settled his soldiers, but he himself was killed by a Numidian princeling.⁵⁸

56 Varus in Picenum and his seizure of Africa: Caes. *BC* 1.12–13, 31; Cic. *Pro Ligario* 2–3, 22–27. For the rest of his career see Klebs 1896.

57 Variant accounts of Bassus' activities are given by App. *BC* 3.77–8, 4.58–9 and Dio 47.27–8. Other sources: Cic. *ad Atticum* 14.9.3, 15.13.4, *ad Familiares* 12.11.1, 12.3, 18.1; Livy *Periochae* 114; Strabo 16.2.10; Josephus *Antiquitates Judaicae* 14.268, 272, *Bellum Judaicum* 1.216, 219. Addressing Caesar in 45, Cicero described Bassus as *furiosus* (*Pro Deiotaro* 25), but in February 43 he spoke warmly in the senate of him and his army (*Phil.* 11.32: *Q. Caecili Bassi, privati illius quidem, sed fortis et praeclari viri, robustus et victor exercitus*). 'Adventurer': Syme 1939: 103.

58 On Sittius' career see Münzer 1927; Heurgon 1950; Berry 1996: 246–7. His activities in 64–56: Sall. *Catilina* 21.3, anachronistically claiming that he had already raised an army in Mauretania by 64 (Syme 1964: 101); Cic. *Pro Sulla* 56–9, *Fam.* 5.17. His private army and involvement in the civil war in 46: *Bellum Africum* 25.2–3, 36.4, 48.1, 93–6; App. *BC* 4.54; Dio 43.3.1–4, 4.6, 8.4, 9.5, 12.2. 'Adventurer': Syme 1939: 75.

The most important warlord in the later phase of the civil wars which brought down the Republic was Sextus Pompeius.⁵⁹ In 45 Sextus had held Corduba for his brother Gnaeus against Caesar; after Gnaeus' defeat at Munda and subsequent death, he escaped to eastern Spain. There, like Sertorius and like his brother Gnaeus in 46–45, Sextus was able to regroup and build up a substantial army, recruiting partly from survivors of the Pompeian forces but mainly from the local communities, and exploiting guerrilla tactics. By 44, he had inflicted several defeats on Caesarian commanders and established control over much of Spain.⁶⁰ Following Caesar's death, Lepidus, the appointed governor of Narbonese Gaul and Nearer Spain, opened negotiations with Sextus, and by November he agreed to withdraw from Spain, having been promised return to Rome and the opportunity to buy back the family property there. However, in the event Sextus based himself at Massilia, retaining some of his forces. In April 43, after the Mutina war, the senate appointed him to a Mediterranean-wide command over 'the fleet and the coast', reminiscent of the appointment which his father had held against the pirates, with the novel title *praefectus classis et orae maritimae*. However, when Octavian seized the consulship in August 43, he had Sextus outlawed under the Lex Pedia for alleged complicity in Caesar's murder, and, in November, following the formation of the triumvirate, Sextus was included on the list of the proscribed. Sextus responded by using his fleet to rescue fugitives from the proscriptions and to take over Sicily, obliging the governor Pompeius Bithynicus to share authority with him and later having him executed.⁶¹ With Sicily (and for a time also Sardinia) as his base, Sextus was able to build up a substantial fleet and use it to raid shipping and the Italian coast to such effect that in 39 Antony and Octavian were constrained to come to terms with him at Misenum. However, this settlement soon broke down, and the ensuing war ended in 36 with decisive victory for Octavian, followed by Sextus' flight to Asia and death.

Sextus has generally had a bad press. Ancient writers generally portray his forces as pirates and slaves, while modern judgements have commonly been unfavourable: Syme, for example, dismissed him as an 'adventurer'.⁶² Recently,

59 On all aspects of Sex. Pompeius' career see now Powell and Welch ed. 2002; Welch 2012.

60 On Sextus' activity in Spain see especially Lowe 2002.

61 Sextus' occupation of Sicily: App. *BC* 4.84, 5.70; Dio 48.17, 19.1; Liv. *Per.* 123. Welch 2012: 167–9 argues that Sextus took over the island earlier in the year, while his naval command was 'still universally recognized'.

62 Syme 1939: 103, 166, 189, 228.

K. Welch and her collaborators have mounted a powerful defence.⁶³ Naval raiding was a well-established war tactic, and whether Sextus collaborated with pirates is not proven. He did accept fugitive slaves, but Octavian had obliged owners to provide slave rowers for his fleets. Sextus insisted on the legitimacy given to his command by the grant of the naval prefecture, giving the title and its senatorial conferment (*ex senatus consulto*) prominence on his coinage. He did the Republican cause a great service by providing a haven for the proscribed, and some of those he rescued remained with him even on his flight into Asia. He probably conceived of himself as fighting throughout for the Republic, although in his propaganda his stress was rather on familial loyalty and his own achievements: his coinage featured his father and brother and Neptune, and, while he celebrated his *pietas* both on his coinage and by adopting the *cognomen* Pius, the *pietas* commemorated was to his father rather than the fatherland.⁶⁴

For all his claims and aspirations, Sextus never achieved more than dominance in the region under his control (first in Spain and later the islands) and disruptive raiding. This may well have been the most that was feasible: Appian's criticisms of his failure to go on the offensive may be misplaced.⁶⁵ Sextus was never able to challenge for the control of the central government, and from the perspective of those holding that government he was in rebellion except for brief periods in 44–43 and 39–38. Even the short-lived Misenum agreement, although it granted him legitimacy with a five-year command, an augurate and designation to the consulship, prescribed that, rather than returning to Rome, he should remain in his provincial stronghold: the consulship was to be held in absence.⁶⁶ Thus, like Sertorius and like the modern-day warlords, Sextus' position was that of a commander maintaining regional control independently

63 Powell and Welch ed. 2002 (especially the contributions by Powell, Welch and Watson); Welch 2012.

64 For Sextus' coinage see Crawford 1974: nos. 477–9, 483, 511; Welch 2012: 107–10, 185–90. The only Republican motif on the coinage is the *corona ciuica* (oak wreath) surrounding Sextus' head on the aureus (Crawford 1974: no. 511/1), perhaps alluding to his rescue of the proscribed.

65 App. *BC* 5.25–6, 91, 100, 110, 140, 143. Sextus is defended against such charges by Powell, in Powell and Welch ed. 2002: 104–5, 113–8, and Welch 2012: 226–7.

66 The terms of the Misenum treaty are reported at App. *BC* 5.72–3; Dio 48.35–6. Consulship in absence: App. *BC* 5.72.305. Sextus' use of his titles of augur and consul designate is attested by *ILLRP* 426, but they were cancelled by Octavian and Antony in their Tarentum agreement in 37 (Dio 48.54.6).

and in defiance of central government, and thus he too can appropriately be designated a warlord.

Octavian's expulsion of Sextus from Sicily led directly to his ousting of Lepidus from the triumvirate, followed only a few years later by his final victory over Antony. He was then obliged to make good on his promise to restore power to the senate and people, while ensuring that he retained the reality of power for which he had fought so hard, a compromise made all the more necessary since Caesar's fate had shown the peril of overt autocracy. His solution was a masterpiece of statecraft, for which he was rewarded with honours including the name Augustus: over the years 28–27 he transferred enough of their traditional powers to the magistrates, senate and people to enable him to claim that the promised restoration had taken place, but retained a large share of the provinces and with them the majority of the legions, insisting that he had done so as a temporary measure, for just ten years, to enable him to follow up his suppression of the civil wars by establishing peace against the empire's remaining foes, both within and beyond its frontiers. At the time Augustus may not have envisaged this arrangement as permanent, but so in the event it became, with the division of the provinces being renewed at intervals throughout his long reign and becoming explicitly permanent under his successors.⁶⁷ Thus the sharing-out of the provinces, which had been pioneered by Caesar, Pompey and Crassus in 55 and taken further with the establishment of the triumvirate in 43, did not—as it might have done—result in the empire's collapse into warlordism, but instead became a permanent part of the architecture of the new monarchy.

5 Conclusion

Its commonly pejorative overtones and fluid usage might well suggest that the word warlord would be best avoided in serious historical analysis. Nonetheless, it can be of value if deployed with care on the lines worked out in the recent political science debate, namely as a generic term for an individual non-state agent with military force under his command enjoying effective autonomy from central state control. In the modern world such individuals are found in states where central government control has weakened or collapsed, as in post-imperial China or in today's failed or failing states, and comparable situations have occurred in earlier historical periods. Warlords may also occur in societies where central state authority has not yet

67 For the significance in Augustus' evolving political settlement of the division of the provinces and its claimed justification in pacification see further Rich 2012.

fully developed or where it suits state authorities to co-operate with independent force providers like mercenary captains. Many warlords are indifferent to ideology, but some make claims to ideology and/or legitimacy, sometimes sincerely held. However, warlords should not be elided with civil war leaders: warlords operate independently of state governments rather than contesting for their control.

An attractive hypothesis, recently developed and now widely held, has identified aristocratic warlords, heading warrior bands and roving with some freedom between communities, as a characteristic feature of the society of Rome and its neighbours in western central Italy at the time of the Roman kings and the early Republic. However, for all its attraction, this theory remains a speculative treatment of the inevitably tenuous evidence, and so should not be taken as established beyond question.

In the developed Roman Republic, central state institutions were strong and there was accordingly no place for warlords. Provincial commanders enjoyed largely unfettered autonomy in the field, but there was no danger of this leading to warlordism, since their ambitions were always centred on returning to Rome and resuming their life there.

In the first century BC, a series of civil wars led to the collapse of the Roman Republic. These wars arose in large part from the excessive power accumulated by the civil war leaders. However, except for the earliest phase of Pompey's and Octavian's careers, when they raised private armies, the term warlord is a misnomer for the principal civil war leaders, who were not independent of the central government but struggling for its control. One possible outcome of these conflicts would have been a warlordist stalemate, with rival commanders controlling regional fiefdoms and a weakened central government, but this risk was averted by the rapid victories won in each of the civil wars, with one side each time securing empire-wide control. However, for a time lesser commanders did secure independent control in particular regions, and two of these, Sertorius and Sextus Pompeius, were able to hold on for considerable periods, resisting attempts to re-establish central government authority over their fiefdoms. It is these men, not the chief civil war leaders from Sulla to Octavian, who were the true warlords of the late Roman Republic.

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Why No Warlords in Republican Rome?

Nathan Rosenstein

As John Rich cogently argues in his chapter in this volume, warlordism does not furnish a useful category of analysis for republican Rome. Much of course depends on what exactly we take a warlord to be, and unfortunately little agreement exists about precisely how to define the term. Political scientists and students of international relations, who tend to be quite exacting in their demands for definitional precision, have offered a variety of descriptions of just what constitutes a warlord, but definitions based on the experience of modern nation-states or even failed states do not map well onto those of Italy in the fourth through the first centuries BC. Instead, in this period we might imagine that a warlord would be someone who controls a region small or large primarily by virtue of his control over an armed force rather than because he is an agent of the state, state authority within the region being either weak or non-existent. His control of his army in turn would derive not from any magistracy or other state-sanctioned position but principally from the personal loyalty of his soldiers. Further, the warlord's goals would in the main be non-ideological but rather personal profit either in the form of wealth or power or both.

Defined in this way, warlord-like figures quite possibly were a feature of sixth and fifth century Italy.¹ At a time when state structures were rudimentary and weak—if they existed at all—the Vibenna brothers or Poplios Valesios appear to have been charismatic leaders of military forces. Their goals however remain unknown, and the bands they led seem not to have controlled any particular area of Italy but roamed from one place to another. The leaders of clan-based war-bands like the Fabii, who undertook something like a private war against Veii, and perhaps Attus Clausus with his kinsmen and clients may also fit our definition of warlords to some extent, particularly insofar as they were associated with particular parts of Roman territory.² However the evidence is much too fragmentary and unreliable to reach definitive conclusions.³

Beginning in the later second century, aristocratic cohesion began to break down and competition among aristocrats to serve the *res publica* started to entail challenging the senate's control of it. By the early first century political

1 On warlords in early Rome see now Armstrong 2016.

2 Note that each *gens* is associated with a specific tribal region: Taylor 1960: 40–1, 35–6 on their locations.

3 Rawlings 1999; Armstrong 2013.

rivalry had on occasion spilled out of the forum and *comitia* and onto the battlefield. At this point we start to encounter figures whom we might term warlords. However, for one reason or another it is difficult to fit them into the definition sketched above. So despite the fact that during his eight years in Gaul Julius Caesar acted with nearly complete independence and was effectively beyond the senate's control, he considered himself and was considered by the senate a promagistrate acting on behalf of the Republic. Caesar unquestionably focused much of his attention on accumulating wealth during his time there, but this hardly set him apart from any other Republican general. His goals were primarily political, and the wealth he accumulated in Gaul he directed towards building up his political position in Rome.

Even after the outbreak of civil war in 49, when the institutions of Republican governance collapsed, Caesar persisted in identifying himself as a magistrate, securing election as consul for 48 and then appointment as dictator every year thereafter. Still, his position did not depend on those offices but the support of his army, so in that sense he meets our definition of a warlord. However, his ambitions were hardly limited to securing his control over some part of Italy or Rome's empire; he wanted the whole thing. Caesar's goals at this stage thus became even more political and focused—if not initially on changing the nature of the government at least gaining control of it. And once he had done so by defeating his enemies at Pharsalus, he effectively became the state, which he then defended against those remaining opponents who sought to overthrow him.

The latter, too, in some ways fit our definition of warlords in that the rump of Pompey's allies in Africa and his sons and their supporters in Spain depended on the loyalty of their soldiers to sustain their positions. On the other hand, Caesar's opponents in Africa were not seeking to carve off an autonomous power base from Rome's empire but to use this as a position from which to regain control of it. The goals of Pompey's sons in Spain are more difficult to fathom, but they are likely to have been the same. And while all of these figures sought to raise money, they employed it in the service of overtly political goals and often with an expressed ideological agenda involving restoration of the legitimate form and operation of the Republican government. They did not intend their positions to be permanent but transitory, simply a means to an end. Sulla, too, throughout his time in Greece and during his campaign in Italy considered himself the Republic's duly appointed proconsul.⁴ Despite his designation as a *hostis* by the government in Rome, his position was that that government was illegitimate, having come into power by force after 87. His goal was to free the Republic from the tyranny of those who had seized control

4 Keaveney 2005.

of it. His extraordinary efforts to secure wealth during his time in the East were aimed at maintaining the support of the army that would be the instrument with which he would return the Republic to its proper state (as well as punish his enemies). Much the same could be said of Sertorius in Spain, who led a government in exile for a decade following Sulla's seizure of power at Rome with its own senate and army modeled on those of the Republic, or Sex. Pompeius, who upheld the republican cause after Philippi.⁵

The striking feature common to every candidate for designation as a warlord is the brevity of his time in that status. To the extent that warlordism was a feature of the late Republican civil wars, the phenomenon was a temporary aberration, a feature of periods when the legitimacy of the government in Rome was open to challenge. Some of these figures, like Sertorius or Sex. Pompeius, were able to hold out for at most a few years before their enemies crushed them; the victories of others, like Sulla or Octavian, enabled them to become the government in short order.

What demands emphasis here is the long period between the age of the Vibennas or Poplios Valesios and the late Republic during which warlordism was entirely absent. Certainly from the conclusion of the Conflict of the Orders in the later fourth and early third centuries down to the early first century increasingly strong state institutions characterized the Republic. The same period also witnessed the rise and dominance of the *nobilitas*, a development that brought tremendous political and ideological cohesion to the Republic's ruling class that formed the basis for its system of values.⁶ Both trends worked against any tendency towards warlordism at Rome. The growing power of the senate following passage of the *lex Ovinia* c. 315, through which Rome's leading families exerted collective control over the *res publica*, together with the gerrymandering of the popular assemblies and their lack of any ability to act independently of aristocratic control worked against the ability of individuals to create a permanent independent base of power.⁷ At the same time, aristocratic ideology held up honor as the chief goal of every *nobilis*, but this could only be earned through service to the Republic and its citizens.⁸ However, the principal means to do so lay through election to high public office—particularly the consulship, which brought command of the Republic's armies. Since the number of offices was limited but aspirants many, political competition to win them constituted a strong centripetal force countering any

5 On Sertorius: Spann 1987; on Sex. Pompeius: Welch 2012.

6 Hölkeskamp 1987.

7 Cornell 2000.

8 Rosenstein 2006.

tendency for aristocrats to go their separate ways and seek autonomous positions of power in the countryside.

Several additional measures kept individual generals on a tight senatorial leash and prevented them from using their armies to take control of various slices of Italy. Foremost among these was the practice of frequent rotation of command within the aristocratic class.⁹ Because individual aristocrats competed vigorously among themselves for public office and the honor it bestowed, aristocratic solidarity required that they make opportunities to gain those offices widely available among themselves (for the alternative was jealousy, fragmentation, and civil strife). Long tenures in command therefore were unusual. T. Quinctius Flamininus, whose consulate and subsequent proconsulship in Greece lasted five years, was quite exceptional as were Scipio Africanus' lengthy tenures in Spain and North Africa during the war with Hannibal. Likewise, frequent reelection to the consulship was limited save in extraordinary circumstances—once again the Second Punic War forms the main exception.

On an even more basic level, while aristocrats were certainly not indifferent to money or unwilling to gain wealth—becoming rich was one of the 'ten greatest goods' that Q. Caecilius Metellus in a speech over his deceased father Lucius praised him for having obtained (*ORF*⁴ 6.2 = Pliny *Naturalis Historia* 7.139)—honor was paramount in their system of values. Hence financial greed did not impel individual aristocrats to seek to establish control of localities in order to milk them for cash, as was the case in republican China. Instead competition for office encouraged the exchange of favors, coalition building within the ranks of the aristocracy and seeking public favor as a means for individuals to lay the groundwork for support for election to public office. As Polybius observed during his time in Rome, young aristocrats devoted themselves to 'law courts and formal visits, haunting the Forum and endeavoring thereby to ingratiate themselves with the people ...' (31.29.8, trans. Shuckburgh). These activities as well as other sorts of politicking put a premium on aristocrats' access to one another. For this reason as well as others they all maintained residences in Rome and spent much of their time in the city. That tended to work against tendencies towards the localism that could give rise to warlords. And on a very practical level, the ability of a general to maintain an army from local resources and without the support of the senate was very limited. Most wars did not pay for themselves, so that—as Polybius saw (6.15.4)—the senate's control over pay and supplies for the troops gave the *patres* a powerful means of reining in independently minded commanders.¹⁰

9 Rosenstein 1990: 166–71.

10 Rosenstein 2016.

Crucial, too, was the development over the course of the third and second centuries of practices that worked to distribute the consulate and military leadership among an increasingly wide circle of aristocrats. Between 366 and 291, about 40 percent of all consulships were filled by men repeating their tenure of that office. In several cases, those elected were holding the consulship for more than the second time, which resulted in iterators holding between 60 and 65 percent of all consulates in these years. A change occurred around 290. From that date down to 217 the frequency of repeated consulships drops significantly; only around 22 or 23 percent were held by men holding that office for a second or third time. Frequent iteration reappeared during the emergency years of the Second Punic War, but thereafter its occurrence became even more rare. After 200, repetition of the consulate is almost completely absent, occurring in only about 5 percent of all consulates, with the same proportion of consuls holding that office for a second time. And after 80, only Pompey and Crassus in 55 and Pompey again in 52 held the consulate more than once before the outbreak of civil war in 49. This practice contributed substantially to oligarchic solidarity and prevented one or a few charismatic and talented leaders from laying claim repeated to command of Rome's army on the basis of unique aptitude for war and victory.

The *lex Genucia* of c. 342, is thought by some scholars to have established the rule that a ten year interval had to elapse before anyone could be elected consul for the second time—although plenty of exceptions occurred in the years that followed.¹¹ The ten year rule was however definitely in force after 200 down to c. 152, when legislation forbade reelection to the consulate altogether. Equally striking however are the frequent exceptions to these rules. During the second and third Samnite wars a handful of eminent senators held the consulate repeatedly between 321 and 290. Iteration was likewise common during the conflict with Pyrrhus and in the first and second Punic wars. The rapid reelection of M. Claudius Marcellus in 152, three years after his second consulate in 155 (a decade after he had stepped down from his first at the close of 166), almost certainly provoked passage of the law prohibiting reelection to the consulship altogether. Yet in 132 Scipio Aemilianus won a second consulate in contravention of that law, having gained his first in 146 despite the fact that he at the time was below the minimum age and had held none of the preliminary offices. And of course Marius' six consulships between 107 and 100 made a mockery of this legislation.

Not surprisingly all of these cases occurred at times of military emergency, when the need for capable leadership to take charge of operations appeared

11 Livy 7.42.2; recent discussion in Oakley 1998: 23–25; and Forsythe 2004: 272–74.

urgent. At such moments, the imperatives of war could easily justify setting aside the rules that sustained political harmony among the ruling class in the interest of the war's successful prosecution. Yet the ways in which these iterations had come about raise an important question regarding how limits on repetition of the consulship could be reestablished and enforced once the crisis had passed. It is sometimes supposed that the elevation of a senator of consular rank who had enjoyed earlier military success to deal with a crisis occurred as a consequence of senatorial initiative.¹² The *patres*, understanding that military necessity and the welfare of the *res publica* trumped their collective self-interest in preventing the accumulation of an excess of military glory and the political clout it bestowed on any one of their members, acted to put command of the war in competent hands. However, a moment's reflection is enough to call such a reconstruction into question. Marius obviously held his successive consulates during the conflict with the Cimbri and Teutones without the senate's express blessing. Popular enthusiasm repeatedly extended his tenure in Gaul to meet the crisis, and all the senators could do was acquiesce and accept the will of the voters. Likewise, Scipio Aemilianus owed his second consulate in 134 not to the acknowledgement of his peers in the curia that he was the right man to meet the challenge of winning the war against Numantia, as Scipio's stealth candidacy and the *patres* subsequent refusal to provide him with additional troops after his election demonstrate. Nor were the fathers any more enthusiastic about his first consulate. We know little about the circumstances under which Marcellus won his perfectly proper second consulate in 155 a decade after his first, but clearly his third in 153 provoked considerable displeasure in the *curia* in view of the legislation that followed.

In view of these cases, there are no grounds to assume that the senators regularly managed the voting at consular and praetorian *comitia* during the Second Punic War to ensure that the right men commanded the Republic's armies. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates clearly that the fix was by no means in when Fabius Maximus, Claudius Marcellus, Fulvius Flaccus and others won repeated consulates and praetorships during the war's early and middle years. They owed their political success not to a senatorial consensus that they were the best men for the job but to direct appeals to the voters to place conduct of the war in their hands. In view of these cases, little reason exists to assume that things were any different in earlier elections during the First Punic War or the conflicts with Pyrrhus or the Samnites, that a senatorial consensus decided which former consuls would be elevated to lead the Roman war efforts. It is far more plausible to believe that when a particular consular won reelection to

12 On what follows, see Rosenstein 1993.

that office, his iteration came about because he had persuaded the voters, not his peers, to reelect him. The *patres* stood aside in such cases and acquiesced to the will of the *populus*. As Livy reports in a somewhat different context, in 198, tribunes of the plebs blocked Flaminius' candidacy for the consulate because he had held only the quaestorship. When the matter was referred to the senate, the *patres* opined that 'the people have the power to elect whomever it wishes to whatever office it is lawful for him to hold,' (Liv. 32.7.11).

The only evidence for senatorial intervention in political competition during the Hannibalic War was a decree permitting the people to reelect whomever it wished during the war (Liv. 27.6.7). Yet even this pronouncement did not signal the limit of the senate's readiness to bow to the will of the people. The election of Marcellus to the consulate of 153, Scipio Aemilianus to those of 134 and 146, and Marius' five from 104 through 100 were all patently in violation of one or another law, and yet the senate did nothing to prevent them.

This conclusion in turn raises a serious problem for our understanding of how the aristocracy managed to prevent the rise of one or a few members whose overwhelming military accomplishments would cast those of the others into the shade. The accumulation of military glory could form the basis for a personal ascendancy that would threaten the rough equality essential to elite cohesion. If as long believed episodes of iteration at times of military emergency came about because the *patres* chose to place command in the hands of a particularly competent general as a temporary expedient, it is obvious that they could act subsequently, when the crisis had passed, to re-impose the limits governing repetition of the consulate and in so doing protect equality and cohesion within the upper reaches of their ranks. But if the iterations described above arose from popular initiative and the senate either chose or was compelled to accede to the will of the voters, why was iteration not far more frequent? What interest did the *populus* have in a practice that buttressed aristocratic cohesion? Yet as noted above, the trend was for iteration to become increasingly unusual between the late fourth and the first centuries.

Moreover, war is at all times a dangerous and uncertain enterprise. If voters thought a consular candidate's prior experience in command and a record of earlier victories were likely to make a critical contribution to success in meeting a military crisis, why did they not think so at other times? They were after all selecting men to lead the Republic's armies to war, armies that might well include many of the voters themselves. Why, in other words, in a polity so often at war did the voters not concentrate military leadership in the hands of one or a few highly talented generals, thereby creating—if not warlords—at least war leaders whose continuous success would have enabled them to dominate the political life of the Republic?

In an earlier work I argued that one part of the solution was a general belief at Rome that the favor of the gods and the efforts of the soldiers were the critical factors in the outcomes of battles.¹³ A lack of the former—the breakdown of the *pax deorum* owing to either unintentional or deliberate ritual errors or a failure to heed the *auspices*—and/or the lack of training or determination among the latter caused defeats while the primary contribution of a commander was to serve as an exemplar of courage and tenacity for his men. The argument I presented did not imply that generals bore no responsibility for the defeats their armies suffered. The point rather was that the Romans judged *imperatores victi* by a moral rather than a technical standard. A general's character was what the Romans focused on in evaluating his contribution to a defeat. Rashness, cowardice, a lack of self-control that infected his men, or a lack of strictness that rendered them undisciplined: these were the traits that brought punishment. Generals were blamed for failure to demonstrate the requisite *virtus* in defeat or disregard of the *auspices* or other religious requirements prior to battle rather than for their deficiencies in their mastery of the set of technical skills that composed an ancient commander's toolkit—command and control of their men or improperly deploying them for a battle for example or mistakes in maneuvering them during combat or some failure to adopt the correct solution to a tactical problem.

This focus on a general's character in assigning blame for a defeat was an essential element in the system that allowed military command to be rotated among a variety of aristocrats, for any aristocrat could lay claim to the requisite personal qualities that fit him for command of an army, whether or not he had previously demonstrated the mastery of the techniques of military command or had experience as a general or even presided over a Roman defeat. However, the readiness of voters to turn to experienced generals with records of victories at times of crisis would seem to belie this interpretation. It suggests that the Romans recognized that some aristocrats were more skilled at leading armies and more talented at fighting battles than others and that those skills would make a critical contribution to the successful outcome of wars. And so if the voters were prepared to act in accordance with this perception at times when the military situation was critical, why did they not do so at others?

This seeming contradiction however can be resolved by understanding that consular elections, like all elections at Rome, were less about selecting military leaders or administrators on the basis of technical competence than about bestowing honor. Obtaining honor from one's fellow citizens brought *fama* and that in turn was a source of *gloria*. Public office was quite literally an *honor* for

13 Rosenstein 1990.

any Roman, and honor and *honores* were what every aristocrat strove to win. Election to a magistracy, particularly the consulate, represented an expression of the *populus'* *gratia* for an aristocrat's services to it and the *res publica*. These services could be outstanding courage in war and valiant deeds in battle, but the range of acts that served the public embraced far more than simply martial *virtus*. Aristocrats regularly provided advice on religious, legal, financial, and even family matters to ordinary citizens who consulted them. In his dialogue, *On the Orator*, set in 91 BC, Cicero has one of the speakers point out that leading men:

... used to make their counsel available to all citizens. In the old days, someone would approach them as they were walking in the forum or at their homes seated on their magisterial chairs not only with questions about the law but even about the marriage of a daughter, about buying a farm, about cultivating a field, in a word about every kind of obligation or business affair ... about all sorts of religious and human matters.

DE OR. 3.133–4

They advanced the interests of those who sought their protection and assistance, especially by acting as their advocates in the law courts and by working on their behalf in whatever ways they could.¹⁴

Personal services like these as well as services to the whole community whether in war or in the conduct of any public business (*beneficia*) produced gratitude (*gratia*) in their beneficiaries and imposed an obligation (*officium*) on them to repay. Paramount among the means by which the public could do so was to honor an aristocratic benefactor by electing him to public office (*honor*). But the honor they bestowed in turn imposed upon him a similar *officium* to repay the debt he owed the *populus* for it, which he could do by providing further outstanding service to the Republic and its citizens as a magistrate. And if that magistracy was the consulate, it entailed leading Rome's armies to victory. That service and the benefit to Rome that military success brought in turn evoked *gratia* and *officium* in the *populus*, leading to *honor* for the benefactor, and the reprise of the whole cycle.

What complicated this simple cycle of *beneficia*—*gratia*—*honor*—*gratia*—*beneficia* and supplied much of its political dynamic to Republican aristocratic rivalry was the complexity of moral calculus involved in distinguishing among and weighing up the services of several aristocrats competing for public office. *Beneficia* could take a variety of forms and assessing their individual merits

14 Rosenstein 2012: 16–17.

was never straightforward, particularly when ancestral *beneficia* or those of relatives were added to the mix. Further complicating the equation was the issue of character, since what signaled to the public that an aristocrat was someone who would strive to serve them often and well were the intangibles of character, as revealed in his personal deportment—the *gravitas* with which he spoke, his measured gait when he walked, the dignified expression of his face and his controlled gestures, the restrained ‘joviality’ with which he interacted with his fellow citizens. The fact that all the various services and markers of character of the several candidates (along with those of their ancestors and relatives) competing for election to public office had to be weighed and evaluated against one another gave the voters enormous power over their ‘betters’. Polybius saw this clearly:

After this one would naturally be inclined to ask what part is left for the people in the constitution, when the Senate has these various functions, especially the control of the receipts and expenditure of the exchequer; and when the Consuls, again, have absolute power over the details of military preparation, and an absolute authority in the field? There is, however, a part left the people, and it is a most important one. For the people is the sole fountain of honour and of punishment ... it is the people who bestow offices on the deserving, which are the most honourable rewards of virtue.

6.14.1–2, 9 TRANS. SHUCKBURGH

Viewed from the perspective of the sovereign power of the *populus* to bestow honor, a law that established a ten-year rule before reelection to the consulate or the one passed c. 152 that forbade iteration altogether demands an explanation. For on their face, they limit the power of the voters to select among aristocrats vying for *honores*. Why should ordinary Romans vote to pass them? What justification could proponents advance that would be in keeping with the people’s freedom to bestow honor on whomever it wished, whose services to itself the *populus* deemed most deserving of reward?

The only possible answer is that such measures would actually enhance the power of the *populus*. Were ex-consuls who had served the Republic well by winning victories in their consulates to present themselves too often to the voters for recompense in the form of *honores*, this would deny the people the opportunity to bestow those *honores* on others whose services also made a claim on the public’s *gratia*. And if no rewards for their services were forthcoming, fewer and fewer of the elite would seek to serve the people in order to gain honor. By limiting the votes’ ability to reward repeatedly those aristocrats

who had previously bestowed the greatest services upon Rome, these laws actually enlarged the range of choices open to the public in elections and so enhanced their voters' power to choose.

However major wars, particularly in times of military crisis, offered the chance to perform extraordinary service to the *res publica*, and the bestowal of leadership in such circumstances represented an extraordinary honor, to which those who had already performed great services to Rome could well feel they had the strongest claim. Hence their eagerness to come forward at such times, and the willingness of the voters to express their gratitude for their earlier achievements by reelecting them to the consulate, notwithstanding the fact that they were acting contrary to the interests of their own power within the Republic.

This system began to change, particularly after Sulla, for several reasons. In the first place, the consulate began less and less frequently to entail the conduct of major wars. Most consuls instead governed relatively peaceful provinces where opportunities for distinguishing themselves were rare. Also, the careers of young Roman aristocrats no longer included long periods of military service, particularly once citizens ceased to serve as cavalrymen. The relative rarity of extensive military experience is what enabled Cicero to make such a point of Pompey's extraordinary amount of it in his advocacy of the *lex Manilia*. This same development is likewise what gives point to the contrast in the speech that Sallust writes for Marius where Marius stresses his own first-hand experience in war while consuls chosen from the *nobilitas* only begin to learn of it from books upon their election to that office (Sallust, *Iugurtha* 85.5–12). Two related developments are also important here. The first is the process of structural differentiation, which was well under way by the late Republic and led aristocrats increasingly to specialize in one or another aspect of service (although the ideal of a generalized aristocratic competence never disappeared). One result was the emergence of the *virī militares*, aristocrats acknowledged to be particularly expert in warfare.¹⁵ At the same time, familiarity with the genre of Hellenistic technical treatises became more common among the elite, among which naturally were the military handbooks like the one that Polybius wrote and those that Marius disparaged. Both developments combined to foster a sense that generalship entailed a mastery of specialized knowledge and a specific set of technical skills. Accusations of corruption and immorality that aristocrats raised against one another in their rivalries also began to undermine the aristocracy's claims to beneficent service to the *res publica*. These eroded the public's confidence that an aristocrat's character was

15 Hopkins 1978: 74–96.

what it appeared to be and so could be trusted to fit him to lead armies into battle and to place the Republic's welfare ahead of his own.

All of this helped lead to the unprecedented separation of military command from public office exemplified by the career of Pompey. None of his commands, beginning with the private army he raised in 83 and led in the civil war between Sulla and his enemies through his extraordinary commands against Lepidus, Sertorius, the pirates, Mithradates, and even his leadership of the senatorial forces against Caesar in 49 were the result of election to a consulship. Only after 55, when he held the consulate with Crassus, did Pompey obtain command of an army as a consequence of an election to that office, and this command entailed no war. It is here, in Pompey's career, that the defenses against warlordism are first tentatively breached and the system that prevented the massive accumulation of honor on the basis of military achievement begin to break down.

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Italy and Sicily in the Second Punic War: Multipolarity, Minor Powers, and Local Military Entrepreneurialism

Michael P. Fronda and François Gauthier

Interpreting the *Imperium Romanum* in the Third Century BC

How should we understand the relationship between Rome and the various polities in Italy and Sicily on the verge of the Second Punic War? To be sure, Rome was a superpower, dwarfing all other polities in population and military might. The Italian allies (*socii*) and the kingdom of Syracuse were bound to Rome by certain military obligations and were no doubt subordinate to Rome in matters of foreign policy. Yet these allies theoretically remained independent and self-governing; they did not possess Roman citizenship and were thus technically neither Roman nor subject to Rome.¹

Scholars of an earlier generation, while mindful of the often-brutal manner in which Rome asserted domination over Italy and Sicily in the fourth and third centuries, tended to highlight the general benignity of Roman hegemony and to see in the patchwork of alliances, various legal statuses, and diverse exchanges between Rome and its dependents a coming-together: the formation of a Roman-Italian commonwealth that anticipated further integration and the formation of a unitary Italian state.² The notion goes back at least to Th. Mommsen, who argued that the creation of an Italian state under Roman direction was an inevitable process, the result of ‘the necessary laws of progress’ (*die wendigen Gesetze der Entwicklung*).³ Mommsen’s view, heavily influenced by the political context of German states in the nineteenth century, has cast a long shadow. More recent scholarship, however, has increasingly stressed the asymmetry of power, Roman abusiveness, the disinterest on the part of the *socii* to integrate with Rome, and even the resistance of the subordinate allies to encroaching Roman domination. In this view, the relationship between Rome and the allies is not one of partnership, but rather of imperial

1 See Beloch 1880; Galsterer 1976; Humbert 1978; Hantos 1983; Rich 2008; Fronda 2010.

2 For example: Toynbee 1965, referring to the ‘Roman Commonwealth’; see also Staveley 1990: 420–430; Cornell 1995: 364–368; David 1994: 35–53; Keaveney 2005.

3 Mommsen 1854–5, vol. 1: 418.

master and subject.⁴ Indeed, one prominent scholar has referred to Italy during the Middle Republic as ‘Rome’s Italian Empire.’⁵

This paper argues against this terminology. We contend that ‘hegemony’ or ‘sphere of influence’ is a more accurate characterization of the distinct asymmetry of power enjoyed by Rome, or—to employ Realist terminology in keeping with the themes of this volume—we may see the communities of peninsular Italy and the surrounding islands comprising a unipolar international system dominated by the Roman superpower. This is not just a matter of semantics or lingo-ism: rather, a more careful interpretation of the nature of Roman power sheds light on state behavior in the turbulent years of the Second Punic War. Hannibal’s victories shook up the power hierarchy in Italy, rapidly turning a unipolar system into a volatile multipolar system of independent polities pursuing their own foreign policies. Left more or less to themselves, several of Rome’s former allies resorted to very bellicose policies against neighboring communities, as they craved to recover a position of local hegemony lost because of Rome’s preeminence. This highly militarized interstate environment also created openings for individual sub-state actors to promote their own personal-political agendas through military adventures. These actors, whom we might call ‘military entrepreneurs’, were sometimes official agents of the state, though there are also examples of private individuals. Thus, the unstable and shifting conditions opened the door to a kind of regional warlordism.

What’s an Empire?

What is an empire? The word is used frequently, yet its meaning is often disputed.⁶ In his important study on empires, M. Doyle proposes the following definition: ‘Empire, then, is a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social, or cultural dependence.’⁷ According to this definition, two factors stand out. The first is foreignness: empire necessarily implies that the ruler and ruled do not share a common culture, ethnicity, identity or fundamental values, and the subject polities are not significantly integrated and thus do not perceive that they are partners in a common system. If the perception of foreignness is lacking, then

4 Articulated most forcefully by Mouritsen 1998; see also Pobjoy 2000; Fronda 2010: 21–28.

5 Rosenstein 2012: 144.

6 Doyle 1986: 30–47.

7 Doyle 1986: 45.

political relationship is closer to that of a unitary state rather than an empire. The second factor is the weight and scope of political control. According to Doyle, an empire exists only where the dominant state exercises effective control, either through formal or informal means, over the lesser state's *foreign and domestic* policy. Other asymmetrical power relationships can exist, but these are not empires. For example, if the dominant state constrains and unequally influences but does not control the weaker state's foreign and domestic policies, Doyle terms this relationship 'dependence'. Control of foreign policy but not of domestic policy is 'hegemony', while influence (but not control) over foreign policy is 'sphere of influence'. Doyle's scheme is reproduced in simplified form in the table below:

Weight of power	Scope of power	
	<i>Foreign and Domestic Policy</i>	<i>Foreign Policy only</i>
<i>Control</i>	Empire	Hegemony
<i>Constraint and unequal influence</i>	Dependence	Sphere of Influence
<i>Equal influence</i>	Interdependence	Independence, diplomacy

The Nature of Roman Rule before the Second Punic War

Where does Rome's power vis-à-vis its various dependents and allies in Italy and Sicily fit within this framework? In terms of foreignness, despite later Roman claims of cultural fraternity between the Romans and other peoples in Italy in the third century, Rome was doubtlessly viewed as a foreign state by the majority of those polities under its sway. Indeed Gauls, Etruscans, Samnites, Bruttians, Messapians and Greeks were not only culturally and linguistically distinct from the Romans, but also they had little in common with each other apart from their attachment to and dependence on Rome.⁸ Furthermore, the peoples within Rome's geo-political influence presented a great variety in terms of legal rights and status. Some communities, especially in the central Italian peninsula, were incorporated into the Roman citizen body and enjoyed full citizenship (*civitas optimo iure*), while a handful of cities received a secondary citizen status, the citizenship without the vote (*civitas sine suffragio*).

8 Lomas 2011: 340–3; Fronda 2010: 21–28; Mouritsen 1998: 8; Mouritsen 2008; Terrenato 1998.

Presumably most of the inhabitants in communities possessing Roman citizenship came to perceive of themselves as Roman, but legal status by itself did not guarantee feelings of common identity. In particular, cities that had the citizenship without the vote, such as Capua, probably perceived Rome as a foreign state, despite whatever personal bonds connected individuals from these communities. Other polities in Italy had the status of Latins or were allies (*socii*). Both were considered technically free and independent. The Latins shared some legal privileges with Roman citizens; the *socii* were tied to Rome by individual treaties whose terms differed from city to city. Lastly, the ways the various Italian communities had been incorporated into the Roman system of alliances were also different: some had been defeated in battle while others had willingly made an offer of friendship.⁹ The situation in Sicily was further complicated: the kingdom of Syracuse had been an ally of Rome since 263, when the Romans defeated king Hieron II, who sued for peace and was granted a treaty. Communities in the northern part of the island were also technically free, yet since 227 fell under the authority of a Roman praetor. There is little doubt that the inhabitants of Sicily recognized Rome as a foreign power, and likewise the Romans themselves saw the Sicilians as distinct from Italians.¹⁰

The only common obligation for the different categories of Italian allies was to provide troops for the Roman army.¹¹ However military service alongside Roman citizens did not seem to have promoted integration or homogeneity to the peoples of Italy, as levies were conducted on a regional basis to ensure that members of the same unit would be able to understand each other, and soldiers were not intermingled in multilingual units.¹² Indeed, in a great extent of Rome's domain the inhabitants did not use the Latin language, whose spread, as attested by inscriptions, was very slow, while local languages continued to be used at least until the first century BC.¹³

Yet what about the weight and scope of Roman power? Here we argue that the asymmetrical relationship between Rome and its dependents fails to conform to the definition of empire. There is little doubt that Rome greatly constrained the foreign policies of its dependent allies. With respect to the allies' domestic policies, however, the Romans were remarkably hands off.

9 Conquest of Italy: Afzelius 1942; Harris 1990; Timpe 1990; Hölkeskamp 1993; Fronda 2010: 23–27.

10 *CIL* 1² 638, mentions the *Italici* as a distinct category.

11 Military involvement of the Italians: Afzelius 1944; Brunt 1971; Ilari 1974; Gabba 1976; Lo Cascio 1991; Rosenstein 2006; Erdkamp 2007; Lomas 2011: 348–8.

12 Pfeilschifter 2007: 31; Jehne 2006: 243–267.

13 Bradley 2000: 155–245; Pfeilschifter 2006: 29.

Thus Rome rarely garrisoned allied cities at least before the Second Punic War,¹⁴ and it did not impose its coinage or weight standards on its allies.¹⁵ Rome did not appoint regular officials to supervise dependent states, with the exception of the province of Sicily (administered by an annually appointed praetor),¹⁶ and possibly the communities with *civitas sine suffragio*, which may have received a Roman prefect—though the evidence for annual *praefecti* prior to the second century is ambiguous, and in any case their interference in local affairs appears to have been greatly limited.¹⁷ Likewise Rome did not expect annual tribute from its Italian allies, while the kingdom of Syracuse occasionally provided resources that the Romans lacked;¹⁸ only the communities in provincial Sicily paid regular tribute.¹⁹ Rome did not impose a particular type of constitution or form of government on its allies nor did it force them to adopt specific laws. The Romans intervened directly in the allies' affairs only infrequently, though they probably supported local aristocrats whose collaboration helped secure Roman hegemony.²⁰ In short, the Romans employed few of the tools of control and supervision typically associated with an empire; Rome seemed to have cared little about the local management of its allies, as long as they fulfilled their basic obligation to provide troops.²¹ Lastly, the polities of Italy did not perceive that they were part of an empire or consigned to satellite status. Rather they saw themselves as independent and autonomous, and capable of acting in their own political interests.²²

Rome's relationship with these allies was one-sided, but it certainly did not constitute an empire; indeed, only the control and administration of the northern and western portions of the island of Sicily—the praetorian province of Sicily—could be properly termed empire.²³ Rome's position in Italy

14 Staveley 1990: 426; Fronda 2010: 29–30, 209; Roselaar 2009.

15 Perhaps because Rome's allies did not pay tribute but instead provided and paid for their own troops, there was less need to impose a unified system of coinage; see Nicolet 1976; *ibid.* 1978.

16 The *praetor inter peregrinos* was most likely created to be sent to Sicily: Brennan 2000: 85–89.

17 The Romans sent prefects to Capua in the fourth century and again in 211 (Livy 9.20.5, 26.16.7–10). It is not known if this was a regular practice, and their precise function is unclear; see Sherwin-White 1973: 43–45; Frederiksen 1984: 241; Fronda 2007: 94.

18 Liv. 21.49–51; 22.37; 23.21; Polyb. 1.18; Zonaras 8.10; 8.14; 8.26.

19 Serrati 2000: 115–133; Naco del Hoyo 2011: 381–385; Frank 1933: 68–9.

20 Patterson 2006; Fronda 2010: 30–32.

21 Pfeilschifter 2006: 137.

22 Fronda 2010: 25–28.

23 Rome's empire also included Sardinia and probably Corsica, which were also administered by a praetor since 227 (Liv. *Per.* 20; Solinus 5.1).

and its relationship to the kingdom of Sicily are best characterized according to Doyle's criteria as something between 'hegemony' and 'sphere of influence'.²⁴

From Unipolarity to Multipolarity

To put it another way, when discussing Italy and Sicily in the third century, we are not talking about a single empire, but rather an *international system* with a highly asymmetrical power hierarchy dominated by one great power with no competitors but nevertheless comprising many sovereign states. In international relations terms, this describes the condition of 'unipolarity'. Indeed, A.M. Eckstein, who has been on the forefront of applying modern political science theory to ancient interstate relations, has observed the overlap between Doyle's 'sphere of influence' and what political scientists label 'unipolarity'. Eckstein also stresses that 'sphere of influence' or 'unipolarity' is not a permanent condition. New competitors may emerge, or the dominant state may lose its advantages, perhaps even leading to a 'power-transition crisis' that results in a radical redistribution of power.²⁵ Such changes in the balance of power can unfold rapidly, and even a seemingly stable unipolarity can quickly revert to multipolarity—the 'normal asymmetry' of power between states²⁶—where multiple power-centers compete for their own interests.

This is precisely what happened early in the Second Punic War. When Hannibal invaded Italy and smashed the Romans in a series of battles, many of the communities of Italy and Sicily found themselves largely free of Rome's influence. Various smaller states—several *socii* and even some communities possessing *civitas sine suffragio* in southern Italy, as well as the Kingdom of Syracuse in Sicily—now free from constraint, began to pursue their own independent foreign policies. They were not unified under the Carthaginian banner, nor did they form an anti-Roman coalition. Instead, they operated individually, each in pursuit of its own advantage. In other words, Hannibal succeeded in re-introducing highly competitive multipolarity in Italy and Sicily, where Rome had only recently enjoyed the uncontested dominant position. A number of more robust communities—'second-tier' or 'middle' or 'minor' powers such as Capua or Tarentum or Syracuse—adopted aggressive foreign policies, competing not with Rome so much as with neighboring communities for territory and resources, to advance their own hegemonic aspirations.

24 Definitions of empire and the nature of Roman rule in the republic: Eckstein 2009; Morstein-Marx 1995: 12–42.

25 Eckstein 2009: 20–37.

26 *Ibid.* 22.

Indeed, the prospect of territorial or hegemonic expansion was probably critical in convincing them to break from Rome.²⁷

Three Case Studies: Capua, the Bruttians, and Syracuse

A few case studies will serve to illustrate the dynamic discussed in the previous section. The most revealing—as well as the most widely discussed²⁸—example is Capua, the largest state in Campania and perhaps the second largest city in third-century Italy, after Rome.²⁹ According to Livy (22.13.1–5), the people of Capua entertained the idea of going over to Hannibal's side as early as 217 BC, though this may be Livian foreshadowing. In any case, the secession movement gained momentum after the Roman defeat at Cannae in 216, when Capuans decided to send envoys to the Carthaginian commander to discuss an alliance. We are told that one of the chief motivations on the part of the Capuans was the prospect of restoring Capuan hegemony. After protracted negotiations the Capuan ruling class agreed to defect from Rome, and they made a treaty with Hannibal.³⁰ There was a great deal of resistance among some quarters of the Capuan aristocracy to siding with Hannibal, and several arguments against defection were raised, but Hannibal finally clinched the deal by coming to Capua in person and promising that Capua would become the master of Italy should the Capuans side with him (Liv. 23.7.4–9; 23.10.1–2).

Almost immediately after striking their deal with Hannibal, the Capuans embarked on an aggressive, hegemonic policy targeting some of the neighboring polities in Campania. In the early spring of 215 the Capuans decided on their own to subjugate the nearby city of Cumae. They first tried to convince the Cumaeans to revolt from Rome, and when this attempt failed, they tried to ambush the Cumaeans at a nearby religious festival. The plan backfired when the Capuans were themselves ambushed by a Roman army and suffered heavy losses (Liv. 23.35.1–19). Still later the Capuans convinced Hannibal himself to attack Cumae (Liv. 23.36.1–8, 23.37.1–10). Throughout the entire episode the Capuans, not Hannibal, were behind the effort (Liv. 23.35.2, 23.36.6–7). In fact, Hannibal appeared annoyed by the campaign, since it forced him to come out

27 Fronda 2007; Fronda 2010: 76–85, 119–126, 167–171, 192–200, 280–281.

28 E.g., Ungern-Sternberg 1975: 24–62; Frederiksen 1984: 238–242; Fronda 2007; and Fronda 2010: 103–126, with further bibliography.

29 Liv. 7.31.1, 23.11.11; Zonar. 8.25; Florus 1.11.6; Pausanias 5.12.3; Strabo 5.4.10; Frederiksen 1984: 36–4; Fronda 2007: 98–99.

30 Liv. 23.6.1–5, 23–7.1; see also Zonar. 9.2; Diodorus Siculus 26.12.1.

of winter quarters and divert resources. The evidence suggests that Capua did not simply see in Hannibal a chance to be free from Rome, but rather it saw in the volatile interstate environment after 216 an opportunity to subjugate a neighboring community and reclaim its hegemonic position in Campania.³¹ Nor was Cumae the only potential target of Capuan aggression. Livy (23.19.4) reports that the people of Acerrae and Nola requested that the Romans maintain garrisons in their cities because they were afraid not of Hannibal but rather they feared the Capuans.

We see a very similar dynamic in Hannibal's dealings with the peoples in the far 'toe' of Italy, where in 215 Hannibal left part of his army under the command of Hanno. Livy (24.1.1) states that Hanno was assisted by the Bruttians, the blanket term for Oscan speaking 'native' groups who lived in the interior of his region.³² The Carthaginians and the Bruttians coordinated attacks on several Greek cities along the coast of southern Italy, including Rhegium, Locri and lastly Croton. The operation against Rhegium utterly failed, but the Locrians, faced with intense military pressure, decided to seek a negotiated peace with the Carthaginians.³³ According to Livy (24.2.1–2), the negotiations and subsequent Locrian-Carthaginian treaty upset the Bruttians because they had hoped to plunder the city. In turn, they initiated operations against Croton, but not before seeking explicit guarantees first from Hanno and then from Hannibal that Croton would be handed over to them once the city fell (Liv. 24.2.5). This shows how the Bruttians saw their cooperation with the Carthaginians as a means to territorial and material gain. Neither Carthaginian commander agreed to the request, but the Bruttians nevertheless invested Croton. The operation proved difficult because of the significant defensive works protecting the city, which prevented the Bruttians from storming it. Yet after a long siege, the people of Croton finally surrendered. Most of the population was transplanted to Locri and the city was abandoned, presumably left for the Bruttians to control (Liv. 24.2.6–11, 24.3.9–15). Note that Croton's surrender followed quadruple negotiations between the Carthaginians, the Bruttians, the people of Croton, and envoys from Locri, which itself appears to have intervened independently, probably hoping to advance Locrian interests.³⁴ This second case study underscores the multipolarity of post-Cannae Italy, as several parties brought to

31 Possible longstanding rivalry between Capua and Cumae: Fronda 2010: 141–143.

32 Activities of Hannibal's lieutenants in Bruttium: Liv. 23.11.7, 23.43.6, 23.46.8, 24.1.1, 23.30.1; Appian, *Hannibal* 29.

33 Rhegium: Liv. 23.51.10–12, 24.1.2, 24.1.9–13, 24.2.1; Locri: Liv. 24.1.13–24.2.1.

34 Episode discussed in Fronda 2010: 171–178, esp. 171 and 173 (for Locrian motives).

bear both military and diplomatic means to secure or advance their positions within the regional power hierarchy.

Our third case study comes from outside of peninsular Italy. Hieron II, the long-reigning king of Syracuse, steadfastly adhered to his alliance with Rome even after the Roman disaster at Cannae. He had been a faithful ally of the Romans for more than forty-five years, during which time he exploited Rome's protection to secure his own holdings. When he finally died in 215, he was in his 90s and his son Gelon had already predeceased him. Thus Hieron's grandson Hieronymus—only fifteen years old and under the tutelage of several regents and advisors—ascended the throne, and the political situation changed dramatically. Not surprisingly, the advisors were split as to the best course of action to follow now that Hannibal appeared on the rise: some cautioned that Hieronymus should stay loyal to Rome, while another group pushed for him to break with Rome.³⁵ The more hawkish advisors urged that this precise moment, when Rome was weak, was a chance for Hieronymus to expand Syracuse's dominion in Sicily (Liv. 24.6.8; Polyb. 7.4.4–6). According to Polybius (7.4.1–8), he at first agreed to an alliance with Carthage on the condition that he obtain all of the lands east of the Himera River. He then demanded dominion over the entire island, a condition the Carthaginians agreed to in order to gain Hieronymus' support against Rome. The ink was barely dry on the agreement when Hieronymus acted on his hegemonic designs. He sent two smaller armies of 2,000 men each to attack cities under Roman control, while he himself led the remainder of the Syracusan army, comprising 15,000 men to Leontini, near the border between his kingdom and the Roman province, clearly in preparation for a larger campaign of conquest (Liv. 24.7.1–2). Once again we see a minor power exploiting the shifting power balance to pursue its own aggressive, expansionist policy.

Minor Powers and Local Military Entrepreneurialism

The previous discussion highlighted how smaller states, especially 'minor' powers reacted to the transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, as those polities contended with each other and neighboring weak states. So too this highly competitive interstate environment presented ample opportunities for sub-state players (political factions and individual actors) to participate in military activity and, since martial and political success were intrinsically linked, to translate battlefield exploits into political capital. There are two obvious

35 Defection of Syracuse: Liv. 24.4–6; Polyb. 7.2–5; Edwell 2011: 327–328.

reasons for the increased chances for local aristocrats to take part in military activity. First, there was a major war being fought on Italian soil, which meant fighting not only between the principal combatants and their allies, but also (as we have discussed) between and among various neighboring polities—that is, a return of sub-regional warfare and the flaring up of local hostilities and interstate rivalry that had been suppressed under Roman domination. Second, no longer strongly constrained by Rome in matters of foreign policy, the ruling classes in polities throughout Italy and Sicily were now free to initiate warfare.

The political elite of those minor powers with hegemonic aspirations had additional motivation to engage in military activity. In the wake of Cannae, local ruling classes were confronted with a very blunt decision, to remain loyal to Rome or to side with Hannibal. In every case where we have evidence the decision was hotly debated and contested, and often split the local ruling class into rival factions, even in those states that had the most to gain by defecting. It was incumbent on those local aristocrats who pushed for breaking with Rome—for overturning the status quo—to convince their fellow townsmen that theirs was the correct choice. This was especially true for those elites who argued that freedom from Rome would bring about territorial or hegemonic gains for their community: if this promise rang hollow, their party risked losing credibility and political standing. Thus, it is not surprising to see the prime movers behind a city's defection later personally leading military campaign.

Three Case Studies: Capua, Syracuse, Tarentum

Marius Alfius was the *medix tuticus* of Capua in 215, when the Capuans launched their campaign against Cumae. He was probably elected soon after Capua's defection, and was therefore surely among those aristocrats who pushed hardest for siding with Hannibal—the faction that had argued that breaking with Rome would pave the way for Capuan hegemony (Liv. 23.6.2). According to Livy (23.35.13–14), Marius Alfius personally commanded the Capuan field army, a large force of 14,000 troops, and oversaw the preparations for the planned ambush of the Cumaeans. Moreover Alfius was among those killed when a Roman army launched a surprise attack on the Capuan camp (23.35.19). That Capua's chief magistrate commanded the Capuan army may not seem remarkable, and presumably this was a chief competency of the *medix tuticus* in the period before the Roman conquest.³⁶ Yet of the seven Capuan *medices* between 217 and 211 (five known by name) only Alfius is reported personally

36 Salmon 1967: 84–101; Weinstock 1932.

leading troops. The others appear to have fulfilled their office within the city walls while appointing commanders for the Capuan army.³⁷ Alfius' command makes sense in the immediate political context: a successful campaign against Cumae would have put proof to the promise of Capua's regional ascendancy, while at the same time Alfius could hope to gain personally from a successful military enterprise.

Hieronymus of Syracuse also tried to capitalize on military success. When he came to power in 215 Hieronymus' situation was tenuous. He was only a teenager at the time of succession, and he was under the regency of fifteen guardians. The regents were soon dismissed, but Hieronymus was still strongly influenced by an inner circle of advisors that included relatives by marriage (and therefore potential dynastic rivals). Questions about his legitimacy and fitness for rule, palace intrigues, and even plots against him emerged from the very start of his reign. That he was assassinated only a year later—an event that led to subsequent intrigues and political wrangling—underscores the insecurity of his position. Moreover, the decision to break from Rome was controversial: the debate divided his inner court and further roiled an already fractious political scene.

As soon as the agreement with Carthage was made Hieronymus sent two commanders, the brothers Hippocrates and Epicydes, each with a small force of 2,000 soldiers, against towns garrisoned by the Romans. Hieronymus himself took to the field and marched toward Leontini (Liv. 24.7.1–2). Undoubtedly Hieronymus was aiming at enlarging his kingdom, but also by personally commanding the army to win glory and earn popularity and thus further legitimate his title through military success.

Livy states that Hieronymus' public manner sharply contrasted that of his father Gelon, and grandfather Hieron, even implying that Hieronymus was trying to distance his own image from Hieron's (Liv. 24.5.1–5). Livy's characterization follows a long tradition criticizing Hieronymus as degenerate, prone to vice and cruelty, and an unworthy successor of his wise and just grandfather (Polyb. 7.4.6, 7.7.1–8). In fact, Hieronymus was more likely trying to emulate his grandfather, who was extremely popular with his subjects (Polyb. 7.8.1–8; Liv. 24.5.1). For as a young man Hieron also personally commanded armies and won glory on the battlefield, he established himself as a military monarch in Syracuse and then received legitimation through election as *strategos*, and he

37 217: Pacuvius Calavius (Liv. 23.2); 216: Marius Blossius (Liv. 23.7); 215: Marius Alfius (Liv. 23.35); 214: Cn. Magius Atellanus (Liv. 24.19); 213: name not recorded; 212: name not recorded; 211: Seppius Loesius (Liv. 26.6). Note especially Cn. Magius Atellanus, who appointed command of the Capuan army to Statius Mettius (Liv. 24.19.1).

later assumed the title of *basileus* after defeating the Mamertines at the Battle of the Longanus River. Hieron continued to lead armies personally at least until 263, when he was compelled to come to terms with the Romans. Thus, when Hieronymus took the field in 215, he was harkening back to the glory days of Hieron's reign, when the monarch was a warrior king.

This is not the only image that Hieronymus tried to invoke. Livy (24.5.3) states that Hieronymus appeared in public not dressed in typical aristocratic attire, as had become the custom of Hieron and Gelon, but instead wearing a purple garment and a diadem. He went around surrounded by an armed escort, and he sometimes proceeded from the palace in a chariot drawn by four white horses, all 'in the manner of the tyrant Dionysius' (*more Dionysi tyranni*). The combination of martial, monarchical and even divine imagery is unmistakable. If Livy's description is accurate, Hieronymus modelled himself on Dionysius son of Hermocrates, perhaps the greatest of the *condottieri* in Syracusan and southern Italian history. Hieronymus thus took advantage of the sudden multipolar environment not only to try to expand his kingdom, but also to secure his tenuous political position, and, by promoting himself as a charismatic military leader, to place himself alongside the great figures in Sicilian history.

Hieronymus was assassinated in Leontini in 214, a little more than a year into his reign. His two appointed commanders, Hippocrates and Epicydes returned to Syracuse. The two were actually Carthaginians by birth, but their grandfather was a Syracusan who had been exiled under Agathocles. The brothers had been sent to Syracuse to negotiate on behalf of Hannibal and remained there in Hieronymus' confidence. Syracuse was beset by political turmoil following Hieronymus' assassination. The brothers helped forestall pro-Roman revolution, and then got themselves elected *stratego*i. Epicydes and Hippocrates next occupied Leontini, declared the city independent from Syracuse, and began to attack farms and towns in the Roman province. When the Romans captured Leontini in 214, the brothers escaped, took command of a Syracusan relief army on its way to Leontini, and used it to seize control of Syracuse.³⁸ This rather spectacular coda to the brief career of Hieronymus itself serves as a spin-off case study in military entrepreneurialism, as these two outsiders achieved a high level of political authority based almost entirely on a string of military commands (both official and self-appointed) and, through their charismatic leadership, the support and loyalty of soldiers.

38 See Liv. 24.6.1–4; 24.29.1–12; 24.30.1–3; Polyb. 8.3.1; Edwell 2011: 327–330 for references and chronology.

Our last example in this section comes from Tarentum, the most powerful of the Greek cities of Magna Graecia, which defected in 213.³⁹ Although Tarentum did not defect immediately after Cannae, the city's loyalty was tenuous, and by as early as 214 an anti-Roman movement began to coalesce. Late in that year Hannibal moved his army to the vicinity of Tarentum, perhaps at the urging of Tarentine envoys (Liv. 24.13.1–6), and in 213 he campaigned in the nearby Sallentine peninsula and won over a number of communities there, possibly hoping a show of strength would convince the Tarentines to switch sides.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, abusive Roman behavior caused further Tarentine disaffection.⁴¹ This set the stage for two of the leaders of the anti-Roman party, Nicos and Philomenos, to approach Hannibal with an offer to betray the city.

According to Polybius (8.24.4), the two men waited until an opportune time, then proceeded out of the city 'as if on an expedition' (ὡς ἐπ' ἐξοδείαν), to camouflage that they were really heading to Hannibal's camp, a few days march from Tarentum. Initial plans were drawn up, and it was agreed the parties would meet again. In the meanwhile Hannibal instructed Nicos and Philomenos to capture the nearest cattle and herdsmen and drive them back to Tarentum, to convince their fellow townsmen that they really had gone on an expedition (Polyb. 8.24.4–11; Liv. 25.8.3–7). Nicos and Philomenos made a second expedition to Hannibal to finalize plans and to hammer out the details of a treaty, and they then made numerous additional trips in and out of the city, sometimes hunting trips, sometimes expeditions.⁴² They did this so that the city guards would become accustomed to their coming and going, which would aid in arranging Hannibal's entry. Polybius (8.24.13) also states that Nico and Philomenos sold some of the 'plunder' (λεία) they obtained on their forays and held public feasts, which augmented their reputation among their townsmen and built political capital. Throughout his narrative, Polybius repeatedly uses martial terminology—especially ἐξοδος and λεία—to describe Philomenos and Nicos' activities. The implication is clear: the conspirators were conducting private military ventures to obtain glory and enhance their political credibility, and to provide them with the wherewithal to further win over the townsfolk.

One may reasonably guess that they made their expeditions into the Sallentine peninsula and raided communities that were traditionally the object of Tarentine expansionism. If so, this nicely exemplifies two themes of this

39 Tarentum as large, hegemonic state: Fronda 2010: 192–200.

40 Liv. 24.17.8, 24.20.9–10, 24.20.13–16, 25.1.1; Fronda 2010: 212–213.

41 Liv. 25.7.10–13; Fronda 2010: 214–216.

42 Additional expeditions: Polyb. 8.25.1–9; Liv. 25.8.8–10.

chapter: first, that regional hegemonic states were attracted to Hannibal's enticements to defect because they saw the opportunity to expand their power within a multipolar environment, and second, that individual actors sought to exploit militarized multipolarity for their own political ends. In this case, Philomenos and Nicos successfully maneuvered such that when Hannibal's troops entered Tarentum, the ringleaders possessed enough credibility to convince reticent townsmen to go along with their plans to defect from Rome (Polyb. 8.31.2). They subsequently played an active role in Tarentine military affairs: in 210 Nicos personally commanded one of the ships in a Tarentine fleet that badly mauled a Roman fleet, and his ship rammed the Roman flagship while Nico himself slew the Roman naval commander (Liv. 26.39.15–16). Nicos and Philomenos and their allies were still in power when Tarentum fell to Rome in 209, suggesting that they established themselves as a new ruling regime (Liv. 27.16).

Once again, the leaders of the anti-Roman party at Tarentum portrayed themselves as charismatic military adventurers to promote their own political agenda and ultimately achieve political primacy. They continued to participate in and lead military activities, presumably to reinforce and further legitimize their own position and policies, similar to the examples of Marius Alfius of Capua and Hieronymus of Syracuse. Perhaps more intriguing is that Nicos and Philomenos do not appear to have been magistrates when they conducted the raids that contributed to their later political leadership: rather, they were private individuals conducting private war. Their eventual control of the state was built primarily on their martial exploits, much like Hippocrates and Epicyles of Syracuse, though the latter were appointed military commanders by Hieronymus before they later seized control of the state. Thus, Nicos and Philomenus stand out as the most extreme of the examples of local military entrepreneurialism discussed in this section. It might be argued that such strongmen, whose local preeminence was constructed almost entirely on their martial exploits—sometimes operating independent of their polity—were warlords.⁴³

Conclusion

Rome's *imperium* at the outbreak of the Second Punic War was not an empire. Instead, the highly asymmetrical power relationship between Rome and

43 On warlords in antiquity: Zimmermann 2010; on private Roman military expeditions during the First Punic War: Bleckmann 2002. Timpe 1990: 368–387.

the polities of Italy and Sicily is better described as unipolarity. Thus, when Hannibal invaded Italy and won a string of victories between 218 and 216, he did not shatter an empire, but instead dramatically realigned the balance of power between sovereign and self-governing polities, each with a strong sense of independence and autonomy. What emerged was a charged and volatile multipolar interstate anarchy in which—for a brief window of only a few years—the independent polities in Italy and Sicily were free to pursue their own foreign policies and compete with each other. Hannibal's new allies were not unified with or under Hannibal. Instead, they acted out of their own interest, which Hannibal sometimes promised to advance in return for their assistance. Yet the interests of his allies were often at cross-purposes. Indeed, as demonstrated elsewhere, when certain regionally powerful states (minor powers) defected to Hannibal, it probably convinced neighboring communities to remain loyal to Rome, not out of love for the Romans but because of fear of the local hegemonic power, especially if those states had a longstanding grudge or mutual rivalry.⁴⁴ This very same multipolarity that hamstrung Hannibal's efforts offered opportunities for some states, especially those with regional hegemonic ambitions. The brief multipolar moment also presented favorable circumstances for 'military entrepreneurs'—individuals, whether representatives of states, such as Marius Alfius of Capua, or private military entrepreneurs like Nicos and Philomenos of Tarentum, who promoted their personal political agendas through personal martial success. Hannibal's failure to overcome the centrifugal tendencies of the polities of Italy and Sicily guaranteed that this multipolar moment would be a short one. Rome's reconquest of the peninsula and the post-war settlement put an end to any dreams that Italy would remain a multipolar environment.

Rome's position after the war was even more unassailable than it was before the war: the Romans confiscated more territory and founded several new colonies, ruling classes in rebellious cities were punished severely, Roman magistrates periodically policed the peninsula, Roman interference in local affairs may have gradually increased in frequency, and Roman claims that Italy was their exclusive domain became more strident than before.⁴⁵ At this point we can more legitimately talk about the Roman hegemony or even empire in Italy. One might argue that the situation after 200 BC was an early stage of state formation—the first steps in the creation of a unitary Roman-Italian state—but that is a topic for another study.

44 Fronda 2010: 280–287.

45 *Ibid.* 307–329.

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Imperialism and Multipolarity in the Far West: Beyond the Lusitanians (237–146 BC)

*Eduardo Sánchez Moreno**

Board Game: Towards a Theoretical Framework

The Mediterranean expansion of the Roman Republic conformed to a multipolar scenario and a complex interaction displayed within it. In the case of its projection in the Iberian Peninsula, the prevailing view of an unidirectional and organic Roman imperialism against a substantially receiver ‘indigenous world’ is reconsidered in favour of a process defined ultimately by the multilineality and multivocality of actors and agendas, as the progress of the investigation infers.¹

In a horizon like the present one, in which hegemonic powers, city-states, peoples and confederations of varied substrate and different articulation compete, an approach that takes into account the perspective of International Relations (IR) seems to fit, since it is a discipline whose theory is stimulating the analysis of the Hellenistic-Roman expansionism.² The adaptation of the so-called ‘realist theory’ to the ancient Mediterranean, under the premise of a framework of relationships defined by militarism, anarchy and interstate rivalry, owes much to A.M. Eckstein.³ In short, the exegesis is that ‘Rome was responding, as any state does, to the harshly undisciplined nature (i.e. anarchy in its literal sense) of interstate relations, in which a state has to fight to maintain its security against rivals or else cave in to the dominance of a

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1 Renewed readings of the Roman expansion from the paradigm of interaction in García Ríaza 2011. About the Roman military offensive in the Iberian Peninsula: Richardson 1986; 2011: 468–478; Roldán and Wulff 2001; Naco 2006; Pina 2006; Cadiou 2008; López Castro 2013; Cadiou & Navarro 2014. General perspectives on Roman imperialism during Middle-Late Republic: Gargola 2006; Richardson 2008: 10–62; Erskine 2010; Morley 2010; Rosenstein 2012; Hoyos 2013a; Clark 2014.

2 Schieder and Spindler 2014.

3 Eckstein 2006a.

stronger one'.⁴ A particular variation of the 'realist theory' is constructivism, which relates to T. Mommsen's defensive imperialism and has in P.J. Burton its principal representative.⁵ From this approach, diplomacy through the particular handling of *amicitia* and not solely military conquest, would be the core mechanism in the Roman interaction with other states.⁶

From these debates, the impact of Carthaginian and Roman imperialism on the westernmost areas of the Roman Republic domain, that is, Hispania Ulterior, will be discussed on the following pages. This analysis will be focused on the inhabitants of the hinterlands of the southwest of the Iberian Peninsula, the Lusitanians, and their depiction of political relations and hostilities against the Carthaginians and Romans and their respective allies and neighbours. The time frame of this study moves between the creation of the Carthaginian domination of the Barcids in Iberia (237 BC) and the final defeat of Carthage in the Third Punic War (146 BC): a scenario for competence and succession of hegemonies defined by military interventionism, instability and alignments of varied order. In this scenario and period, the Lusitanians played an important role in geostrategic, political and military terms. Nevertheless, their profile at the crossroads of two imperialisms has been underserved or evaluated marginally in research.

Infra Tagum

The ethnohistorical and spatial characterization of the Lusitanians, before the creation of the province of Hispania Ulterior Lusitania by Augustus, is still a pending issue. The deficiencies and biases in literary sources, recurring in the projection of the Lusitanians under the cliché of barbaric raiders of the borders, the endemic *latrocinium*, are responsible for this.⁷ However, the lacking knowledge of the Lusitanians is also a result of intermittent archaeological research, with very scattered results.

According to the available information, we can relate the Lusitanians of the third and second centuries BC with a predominantly southern geographical

4 Hoyos 2013b: 6. Similarly, Fronda 2010: esp. 280–287 has set out a multipolar analysis of the Hannibalic War in the south of Italy. Discussions about Mediterranean imperialism from a systematic or international point of view: Doyle 1986: 83–91; Eckstein 2006b; Hoyos 2013a: 6–10; Edwell 2013.

5 Burton 2003; 2010; 2011.

6 Emphasizing diplomatic potentiality, see Coşkun 2005; 2008; Torregaray and Santos 2005; Eilers 2009; Auliard 2009; Torregaray 2011; Sanz 2013.

7 This is an ethnographic category emanated from the Greco-Roman narrative, uncritically fossilised in modern historiography. See below n. 29.

space, which was disposed around the lower course of the Guadiana river, the western sector of Sierra Morena, the Alentejo and low Extremadura, without exceeding the line of the Tagus river northward.⁸ This was a culturally and linguistically diverse space, affected by the Atlantic, Indo-European, Phoenician-Punic and Tartessian substrates, and where, during the late Iron Age, a regionalised settlement of incipient urban sprawl emerged. As indicated above, that of Lusitanians is a supra-ethnic category handled by the Greco-Roman narrative from the position of cultural antagonism and military conflict.⁹ Such a generic ethnonym masks a conglomerate of peoples and political communities resulting from a complex process of ethnogenesis that was boosted with the arrival on the scene of the Carthaginians and Romans.¹⁰

These Lusitanians formed agro-based societies governed by urban aristocracies, which strengthened their power over interregional client networks. Like their neighbours (that is, the Celtici—with which they are usually confused with—, Conii, Turduli and Turdetani in the south and east, and Vettones in the north), the Lusitanian peoples were organised around *oppida* that acted as territorial and political centers, which bound a dispersed rural habitat. It was precisely the male population—of an age to carry arms—from the nearby villages to urban centers that nourished the recruitment of civic armies that characterised the Lusitanians from the late third century BC.

A contrasted analysis of the written sources reveals the scale and manoeuvrability of troops mobilised by the Lusitanians at the time of the intervention of Carthaginians and Romans in the mainland southwest.¹¹ The *auctoritas* of the commanders in the government of armies, made up of units of light infantry and cavalry is also remarkable, the latter certainly being representative of the Lusitanians. Recruited by villages, towns and *oppida*, such armies

8 Subsequently, Lusitania spreads as an area of Roman expansion to the Tagus-Duero interfluvium: Pérez Vilatela 1990; 2000a: 100–105, 249–255; 2000b; Guerra 2010: 87–92. On the integration of the Lusitanian region into the Hispania Ulterior province: de Francisco 1989: 57–96; Edmondson 1994; Richardson 1996; Gorges and Nogales 2010; Salinas 2012a.

9 In this regard, Plácido 2004; 2009. Also, the Celtiberians are ethnographically apprehended as a hostile group to Roman expansion: Ciprés 2012.

10 Concerning the ethnic configuration of the peninsular southwest and the fragmentation of the settlement between the Guadalquivir and the Tagus rivers in the Iron Age: Alarcão 1992; 2001; Rodríguez Díaz 1995; 2001; García Fernández 2007; 2012; Almagro Gorbea 2009; 2011; Correia Santos 2009; Salinas 2011: 144–149; 2012b.

11 With a renewed vision: Cadiou 2008: 173–177, 193–199, 216–219; see also Quesada 2003; 2006a; 2006b; 2009a: 122–129; Gracia 2003: 201–282; Cadiou 2008: 204–215 to contextualise the Iberian and Celtiberian armies.

were able to besiege cities, establish and capture camps, and create front-line combat formations, which were strategies that were combined with the frequent use of ambushes and looting. Conceivably, the Lusitanian contingents from the third and second centuries BC would combine units formed by civilians with militia groups, provided by mercenary chiefs or 'warlords'. Possessing good political shrewdness, these *hegemones* found a revulsive to their power and prestige in Mediterranean imperialism. In summary, the military characterisation of the Lusitanians has little in common with the image of guerrilla bands consecrated by the positivist and romantic historiography.¹²

These communities maintained political and economic ties between them and neighbouring peoples such as the Vettones, Turduli or Turdetani, and with the Punic cities in the Guadalquivir valley and the Atlantic coast. Thus, there were frequent supra-community actions in the form of *symmachíai*, which acquired a multiethnic character against the Punic and Roman expansionism.¹³ Such intercommunity linkages, with antecedents in secular relations of trading exchange, were legitimated through a 'kinship diplomacy' that was a typically Hellenistic discourse of power, also manoeuvred by the Lusitanian elites in response to cultural convergence.¹⁴ These associations were often military in nature, and involved a logistical assistance or collaboration with troops for defense—or expansion—demanded by allied states and hegemonic powers.

Carthaginians and Lusitanians

Presumably, the participation of Lusitanian groups as allies or mercenaries of Carthage, preceded the outbreak of the Second Punic War. Not surprisingly,

12 Concerning the Lusitanian and Celtici warfare and military organisation, lacking an integral systematisation: Ciprés 1993: 135–136, 147–156, 159–162; Berrocal 1997; Paniego 2013: 23–28.

13 Pérez Rubio et al. 2013; García Riaza 2013.

14 Viriathus, *hegemon* of the Lusitanians between 147 and 139 BC, represents the paradigm. If in the analysis of his figure the rhetoric-moralistic and the heroic-romantic connotations, historiographically concocted, are neutralised (Lens 1986; García Moreno 1988a; Guerra and Fabião 1992; Pereira 2009; Iglesias 2010; Aguilera 2015), the result is an acceptable political-military career as a Western model of late-Hellenistic prince. On Viriathus' rank, power and ideological slant, see: López Melero 1988; Pérez Vilatela 1989a; 2000a: 268–275; Sánchez Moreno 2006; 2010; Salinas 2008; Sánchez Moreno and García Riaza 2012: 1256–1257.

the Punic interest in the southwest of the Peninsula is evident from the beginning of Barca's eparchy in Iberia (237–206 BC).¹⁵

After landing at Gades, Hamilcar Barca faced the coalition forces of Tartessians and Celts (Celtic or Lusitanian, most probably) in the area of the lower Guadalquivir, led by the kinglets Istolacius and Indortes.¹⁶ Under the commands of Hasdrubal (228–221 BC) and Hannibal in Iberia (221–218 BC), the ongoing control of the Guadalquivir-Guadiana-Tagus interfluves, used as a strategic rearguard to supply resources to the Carthaginians, took hold, and this was only possible through the joining of numerous local powers.¹⁷ These assistance networks transformed Lusitania, during the war with Rome, into a place of shelter and provision for the Punics,¹⁸ and a key region for the supply of mercenaries and allied troops.¹⁹ The provision of the latter concerned those communities that, located within the orbit of Carthage, were urged to cooperate militarily, either under threat, or because of the interests of their own ruling elites who were, to greater or lesser extent, influenced by the

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- 15 On the Carthaginian presence in Hispania: Chic 1978; López Castro 1995: 73–97; González Wagner 1999; Domínguez Monedero 2007; Hoyos 2011; García Fernández 2012; Bendala 2013; 2015.
 - 16 Diodorus 25.10. After the battle 3,000 Hispanics were integrated into the Carthaginian army—this is the first peninsular military contribution to the Barcid army attested in our sources—and another 10,000 ended up being released by Hamilcar.
 - 17 From this projection of economic and military interests it must be understood (without rejecting other explanatory motives) the campaign that leads Hannibal towards the Duero in 220 BC, and its effect on the Carpetanian, Vettonian (in the Lusitanian outskirts) and Vaccean communities affected by his incursion. See recently on this campaign: Sánchez Moreno 2008; Remedios 2012; Domínguez Monedero 2013; Ruiz Zapatero and Álvarez Sanchís 2013.
 - 18 In *Lusitania ac propius Oceanum* is where Hasdrubal, Hannibal's brother, protects himself against the progress of the Scipiones after the defeat at Ebro's mouth battle in 217 BC, (Livy 22.20.12). At the time of the Roman capture of New Carthage (209 BC) general Mago Barca and general Hasdrubal Gisco are respectively cantoned in the country of the Conii and the estuary of river Tagus (Polybius 10.7.5; Liv. 26.20.6). And after the Battle of Baecula, is in inner Lusitania where Hasdrubal Gisco tries to reorganise and protect himself in 208 BC (Liv. 27.20.8; 28.1.2) and gets reinforcements a year later (Liv. 28.2.15; 28.16.3).
 - 19 The Lusitanians were present in the army that accompanies Hannibal to Italy if we are to believe Livy (21.48.8; 21.57.5). In the Ulterior—beyond the hinterland of Gades—the Carthaginians recruited large troops in the final phase of the war in Iberia, between 208–206 BC (Liv. 28.12.14; 28.23.7). On the Iberian mercenaries in Hannibal's army, see: Quesada 2005; 2009a; 2013; Jiménez 2012.

tradition of contacts with the Phoenician-Punic centres of the Atlantic and Mediterranean shores.²⁰ Indeed, the impact of the pre-Barcid Punic presence in the peninsular inland is being valued by research as the first episode of a process of 'Western Hellenization'—crowned afterwards by Carthaginian and Roman imperialisms—which has its outcome in the ideological and material dynamization of the local political structures.²¹

The interconnection with cities and *reguli* of the southwest mainland was maintained during the period of anarchy that followed the defeat of the Carthaginians in Iberia. The surrender of Gades to Scipio Africanus in 206 BC²² symbolised the transition of Mediterranean hegemonies and thus the activation of resistance fronts to the new dominant power. Therefore, in the uprising of 197–195 BC led by the local *reguli* Culchas—former ally of Scipio—and Luxinius against Roman power, it is feasible to recognise the participation of Lusitanian and Celtici peoples. In fact, apart from the seventeen strongholds controlled by Culchas and the cities of Carmo, Malaca, Sexi and Bardo, the whole of Baeturia and other unidentified communities that had delayed their decision, joined the revolt.²³ Encouraged by the participation of 10,000 mercenaries at the service of the Turduli, the rebellion continued until 195 BC when the consul M. Porcius Cato was sent to Hispania with the mission of suppressing the upheaval, revived in the province of Citerior.²⁴

In Hispania Ulterior, instability was latent in the following years, since in 194 BC, P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica confronted a powerful army of Lusitanians in the vicinity of Ilipa (Alcalá del Río, Seville), *pervastata Ulteriore provincia*

20 As seen in the case of the southern Lusitanian aristocracies. In this regard: García Moreno 1992: 125–127; Sánchez Moreno and García Riaza 2012: 1251–1254.

21 Domínguez Monedero 2005–2006; 2007; Bendala 2006; 2010; 2013; 2015: 80–140; Barceló 2006; 2012; Ferrer 2011; 2012; Ferrer and Pliego 2010; 2013; Mora and Cruz 2012. For a Mediterranean contextualisation of the 'Hellenistic West': Prag & Quinn 2013.

22 Just before Gades' *deditio*, Scipio authorised to his newly won ally the Prince Numidian Masinissa, up to that point a Carthaginian ally (Liv. 27.5.11–14), to devastate 'the neighbouring lands' (Liv. 28.35.13). These areas would correspond to the territories of the last nuclei reluctant to Rome, located in the west of Gades and among those there would be Lusitanian support to the Carthaginian cause (Sánchez Moreno and García Riaza 2012: 1252). On Gades' surrender and its legal regulation, see: López Castro 1991; 1995: 100–106; Millán 1998: 181–185; Naco 2006: 86–87.

23 Liv. 33.21.6–9; see also Appian *Hispanica* 39.

24 Liv. 33.43.1–3; 33.44.4–5; 34.8–12; 34.17–19. Regarding Cato campaigns in Turdetania: Chic 1987.

cum ingenti praeda domum redeuntis.²⁵ Far from calming down, the hostilities persisted, and therefore around 191–189 BC, L. Aemilius Paullus and P. Junius Brutus opposed the acting Lusitanian groups in Bastetania and the region of Gades, with different outcomes.²⁶ The atmosphere of these riots in which, with greater or lesser involvement, the Lusitanians participated was, in short, a generalised uprising of anti-Roman outbreaks: focal points which in some cases—Bastetania, Turdetania—had formed a nuclear part of the Barcid eparchy and in others—Turduli and Lusitanian-Celtici areas—formed a certain Punic periphery. In addition, it does not seem coincidental that this is the same spatial correlation in which fifty years later, Viriathus would conduct the war against Rome: the Andalusian coast and especially the Guadalquivir valley and hinterland beyond Sierra Morena and the Guadiana, in other words *infra Tagum*.²⁷

Crossing the Straits

Written sources provide loquacious references of the Lusitanian armed incursions in the Guadalquivir valley, the southern Atlantic coast and North Africa during the second century BC.²⁸ Such mobility is recorded in the Greco-Roman narrative under the *topos* of bandit raids, ravaging the fertile territory of recent subjects of the Roman Republic. However, this long-haul cultural simplification in the historiographical (sub)-valuation of the Lusitanians²⁹ masks, in

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- 25 Liv. 35.1.5. On the magnitude of the Lusitanian forces the figures provided by Livy are quite telling: 12,000 dead, 540 prisoners, mostly horsemen and 134 military standards captured by the enemy, Liv. 35.1.9–10.
 - 26 Liv. 37.46.7–8; 37.57.5–6. Episodes that, as García Moreno (1986) argues, would relate to the legal and territorial reorganisation imposed by Lucius Aemilius Paullus to the Punic-Turdetanian city of Hasta (Mesas de Asta in Jerez de la Frontera, Cádiz) and its subsidiary *Turris Lascutana*, whose inhabitants were released from a certain kind of community servitude by the praetor. On the decree reflected in Lascuta's notorious bronze (*CIL* II 5041), dated precisely 189 BC, see with previous bibliography: Díaz Ariño 2008: 191–194.
 - 27 On the scenario and the dimension of Viriathus' wars: Gundel 1968; García Moreno 1988a; Pérez Vilatela 1989a; 1989b; Pastor 2004: 153–181; 2011; 2014; Rodríguez Martín 2009; Gorges and Rodríguez Martín 2009; Silva 2013: 137–178.
 - 28 On the movements of the Lusitanians towards the southern areas of Iberia, traditionally interpreted as bellicose and destabilizing: Chic 1980; Santos 1981; González Román 1981: 37–40; García Moreno 1988b: 91–97; Sayas 1988; Ciprés 1993: 76, 138, 153–155; Salinas 1993: 22–29; López Castro 1995: 153–155; Gozalbes 2005: 153–166; with alternative approaches: Sánchez-Corriendi 1997; Sánchez Moreno 2006; forthcoming; Baray 2015.
 - 29 Starting with the classic codification of the Lusitanians as *latrones*/Λησται (Ciprés 1993: 60–79, 136–141) and the banditry as a way of marginal and unlawful hostility,

reality, an experienced political and military collaborative strategy: the connectivity of the Lusitanians and some of their inland allies with the Turdetani and North African cities located in the orbit of Carthage.³⁰ Therefore, this is how the movements of citizen troops—and not herd-robbers gangs—under the command of prominent Lusitanian leaders should be understood, in the account of the wars of Rome in Iberia by Appian of Alexandria.³¹ A review of this record would be of interest.

Between 155–154 BC, a Lusitanian *hegemon* under the expressive name of Punicus,³² forced the praetors M. Manlius and L. Calpurnius Piso to flee, after attacking the territory of communities subjected to Rome, and killing six thousand men. Therefore, ‘excited by this, overran the territory as far as the Ocean and, after adding the Vettones to his army, besieged some subjects of the Romans called the Blastophoenicians’.³³ Punicus—who was struck on the

inherent of populations subversive to the imperialism of Rome (Shaw 1984; Vallejo 1984; Grünewald 2004; Gozalbes 2006; 2007; Cadiou 2008: 180–185; Riess 2011). The topic of the banditry together with the one of the guerrilla struggle as a warlike idiosyncrasy of *homo hispanicus* (Cadiou 2008: 173–203; Quesada 2011) has highly conditioned the historiographical projection of the Lusitanians. See in this sense the insightful analysis by Aguilera 2015. For its part, from a socioeconomic perspective the primitivist and tribal characterisation of the Lusitanians is based on the myth of poverty and landlessness: Caro Baroja 1943: 145–153; García y Bellido 1945: 554–560; Sayas 1988; Salinas 1993: 22–29. And yet, it is none but the ideology built by Hellenistic historiography to legitimise the ‘Lusitanian banditry’ and justify the benefactor interventionism of Rome in frontier societies. This is a deeply-rooted reading in modern research, subject of critical review only recently: Sánchez Moreno forthcoming; Baray 2015.

- 30 Chic 1980: 20–21 understands these connections as Lusitanian mercenary services in Andalusian philo-Punic settlements, rectifying in favour of their role as allies—instead of mercenaries—of the Turdetani: Chic 1987: 24 n. 11. Similarly, Ciprés 1993: 153–154 and García Moreno 1992: 125–127, who defends a ‘punización de los grupos lusitanos sudtajanos’ settled in the (pro-Carthaginian) mercenary inheritance of their military elites.
- 31 App. *Hisp.* 56–75 for the Hispania Ulterior conflicts between 156–139 BC. On Appian’s work regarding Iberia see Sancho 1983; Gómez Espelosín 1993a; 1993b; Richardson 2000.
- 32 Plausibly, an epithet concerning the origin or the political affinity of the character, not a *stricto sensu* anthroponym. On his onomastic affiliation: Solá 1967: 310–311; García Moreno 1986: 205–207; see López Castro and Belmonte 2012 for the survival of the Phoenician-Punic onomastics in Roman times.
- 33 App. *Hisp.* 56. Appian says about the Blastophoenicians: ‘Hannibal the Carthaginian is said to have settled some people from Lybia among them, and consequently they are called Blastophoenicians’. On the identity of these North African peoples (also recognisable under the term Libyan-Phoenician), the debate on the location and nature of their settlements and personality of their coinage (*Asido*, *Bailo*, *Oba*, *Lascuta*, *Iptuci*, *Vesci* in Gades’ backshore, *Arsa*, *Turrirecina*, *Balleia* in the Turduli Baeturia; with inscriptions in

head and died—was succeeded by Caesarus, who faced the new praetor of Hispania Ulterior with varying success: although defeated in the first instance, he managed to react by retreating, killing 9000 men, as well as recovering the loot and camp taken by L. Mummius, conquering the Roman camp itself and capturing numerous enemy weapons and banners that ‘the barbarians carried throughout Celtiberia in mockery of the Romans’ (App. *Hisp.* 56). At that time, another Lusitanian *hegemon* named Caucenus, from the north bank of the Tagus, confronted the Roman power with his troops, destroying the territory of the Conii under Roman rule, and took over their capital Conistorgis.³⁴ Subsequently, and this is a revealing fact, he proceeded to the coast with a large army, crossed over the straits near the Pillars of Hercules—predictably close to Gades—and once on African soil, sent part of his forces ‘to submit to plunder the rest of Libya’, and the other to put under siege Ocile (probably Zilis/Asilah at the south of Tangier) in the Mauri territory. The praetor Mummius, for his part, followed Caucenus with 9,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, killing up to 15,000 Lusitanians who were looting in Libya, and an unknown number of those besieging Ocile, before ending the siege and obtaining a large booty, which made him earn a triumph when he returned to Rome (App. *Hisp.* 57).

Mummius's successor in Hispania Ulterior, Gaius Atilius Serranus, increased the pressure on the Lusitanians in 152 BC by attacking the city of Ostraca, of unknown location. Meanwhile, he threatened the allied neighbouring communities of the Lusitanians, among them some of Vettonian affiliation, demanding the establishment of friendship treaties that would include territorial compensations.³⁵ Taking advantage of the winter withdrawal of the praetor, the Lusitanians rebelled and acted against certain nuclei allies of Rome, causing a harsh retaliation by the new *imperator* in Hispania Ulterior, Servius

an ‘aberrant’ Neo-Punic variety of writing), see: García Moreno 1992; Chaves 1990; López Castro 1992; García-Bellido 1993; 1995; 2013; Domínguez Monedero 1995a; 1995b; 2000; Alfaro 1998: 105–115; Ferrer 2000; 2004; Ferrer and Álvarez 2009; Mora Serrano 2011; Mora Serrano and Cruz Andreotti 2012.

34 App. *Hisp.* 57. The usual reduction of the Conii's country in the Portuguese region of Algarve has been challenged in favour of the Guadiana's River medium valley (Alarcão 2001: 335–338; Almagro Gorbea 2008), proposing the identification of Conistorgis with the Castle hill of Medellín (Badajoz), a settlement originated in a Tartessian colonisation from the 7th century BC (Almagro Gorbea 2008; 2011).

35 App. *Hisp.* 58. Military-legal relations between Romans and Lusitanians have been studied extensively by García Riaza 2002: 99–121, 124–128, 149–159; 2012a; 2012b. More specifically, on the redistribution of land to the Lusitanians both as a diplomatic motivation and as propagandistic rhetoric: Sánchez Moreno forthcoming.

Sulpicius Galba (App. *Hisp.* 58). It is certainly a significant fact that in the winter of 151 BC, the governor of Hispania Citerior, the consul Lucius Licinius Lucullus, was in Turdetania. The consul, aware of the fact that the Lusitanians were raiding nearby, acted against them, annihilating, firstly, 4,000 men and secondly, 1,500 more casualties. To these numbers, a third group, besieged on a hill, would be added. In the meantime, as had happened two years before with Caucenus, new Lusitanian troops crossed the Strait surrounding Gades and headed to Africa.³⁶

From what ports were the Lusitanian contingents shipped? What state provided the fleet that moved them to African soil? Under what circumstances and on what basis of relationships was it carried out? The answers seem rather difficult ... From Appian's account—unspoken regarding naval logistics—we can infer a circulation on the Atlantic side of the straits, with Gades as a free port on their journey. It may also be stated that other coastal Punic or Turdetanian cities could charter vessels, supplementing the port of Gades. In any case, behind these actions, we may suspect alliance networks that link the Lusitanians with certain communities of the southern mainland³⁷ and the North African Carthaginian area.

Allies *versus* Allies

From the review of the previous set of information, two conclusions can be established, already outlined above. The former is the potentiality of the armies mobilised by the Lusitanians and their allies from the final stages of the Second Punic War onwards. The latter is the aggressive attitude of the Lusitanians towards the legions of praetors and consuls, to the allied centres or to those subjected to Rome in the Punic-Turdetanian and North African areas. Investigating this issue, there is a decisive fact: the movement to Africa by the Lusitanians observed in Appian's account coincide with the years immediately

36 App. *Hisp.* 59. The coordinated and complementary attack of the two Hispanic governors in 151–150 BC, Galba and Lucullus, 'devastating the Lusitania on both sides', enlightens the magnitude of the Lusitanian threat and the fear of its extension towards North Africa.

37 Was Gades among them, despite the *foedus* that bounded it to Rome at that time? On the political autonomy of Gades in the context of second century BC Roman imperialism: López Castro 1995: 144–159; 2007; Millán 1998: 179–185.

prior to the last war between Rome and Carthage,³⁸ which will definitely terminate the autonomy of the African metropolis in 146 BC.³⁹

Going further, the scenario that coincides in time and appears to be behind the Lusitanian significant military presence in Africa (with *floruit* between 153–150 BC), is the conflict between Carthage and the elderly king of Numidia, Masinissa.⁴⁰ It must be remembered that Masinissa had been an ally of Rome for fifty-five years, when, as a young prince, he negotiated his accession to Scipio Africanus in Iberia at the daybreak of the surrender of Gades.⁴¹ Decades later, the conflict between Masinissa and Carthage was a military-diplomatic crisis prompted by the expansionism of the Numidian king at the expense of Carthage which, although being silenced internationally after its defeat in the Hannibalic War, was experiencing a strong recovery process. Therefore, the hypothesis is that the Lusitanians would have irrupted into the scenario as auxiliary forces of the Carthaginians, probably together with other pro-Punic peninsular contingents. This would have been carried out through an interconnected and simultaneous confrontation in southern Iberia and North Africa, against the antagonistic front represented by Roman imperialism and, in turn, in Libya, Rome's hegemonic ally Masinissa in those decades.⁴²

The escalation of tension existing in North Africa during the first half of the second century BC reached a dead end in 151 BC when Masinissa's forces attacked the city of Oroscopta.⁴³ Despite being a settlement under the jurisdiction of Carthage, or precisely because of this, the Carthaginian military response

38 Chic 1980: 21 refers to a 'Lusitanian seafaring tradition' in the 155–147 BC period, which he suspects to be related to the events experienced by Carthage. On the contacts between Hispania and North Africa at this time: Blázquez 1961, see: 37–40; Millán 1998: 179–202; Callegarin 2008.

39 On the so-called Third Punic War, see most recently: Hoyos 2010: 214–219; Le Bohec 2011; Rosenstein 2012: 233–239.

40 The preserved narrative is due to Appian (*Libyca* 67–74), inspired on Polybius. On the relationships between Carthage and Numidia in the period 201–149 BC: Hoyos 2010: 211–216; Kunze 2011; Gozalbes 2014: 275–285; see also Amara 2013.

41 Liv. 28.16.11–12; 28.35.1–13; 29.29.5; App. *Hisp.* 37; *Lib.* 10; Silius Italicus *Punica* 16.136. Livy has left an accurate biographical excursus on Masinissa and his struggle to become king of the Numidians using his friendship with Rome: Liv. 29.29.5–33.10; 29.12.5–15.14; see Masinissa's praise in Polyb. 36.16.1–10. An assessment of the Numidian king as *exemplum* of *amicitia* in Livy's rhetoric: Levene 2010: 247–260.

42 It is remarkable the account of Iberian forces—feasibly Lusitanians under Caucenus' command?—assailing Numidian troops in Libya by 153 BC (App. *Lib.* 68).

43 App. *Lib.* 70. Would it be any link between the events in Oroscopta and those at the North-African Ocile, which was besieged a year earlier by Caucenus' Lusitanians and liberated by Mummius (App. *Hisp.* 57)?

to Masinissa's umpteenth provocation broke the peace terms established by Scipio Africanus in 202 BC, and officially made a *casus belli* to the *nobilitas* in favour of ending with Carthage once and for all.⁴⁴ That the Punic metropolis was in those moments—after a remarkable economic restructuring—a rising state is evidenced by the army gathered against Masinissa in 151 BC. 25,000 infantry soldiers and 400 horsemen formed this army, joined by 6,000 Numidian deserters and other reinforcements from the country (App. *Lib.* 70–71).⁴⁵ It is true that the participation of Iberian communities in support of Carthage is not explicitly stated, but it is revealing that, coinciding with the time of highest tension between Numidians and Carthaginians, the consul Lucullus, who was exerting *imperium* in Hispania Citerior—was trying unsuccessfully to block the passage to Africa of Lusitanian troops that were embarking from the Turdetanian coasts. This was a preventive action—of retention and punishment—which Lucullus exercised in coordination with his counterpart in Hispania Ulterior, Galba, whose policy of extermination of Lusitanians reached dramatic heights (App. *Hisp.* 59–60). The motive of the Lusitanian naval traffic seems obvious: the aid to Carthage.

There is another detail to consider regarding the North African board-game in 151–150 BC, connected to Hispania. This is the presence in Masinissa's camp of a young Scipio Aemilianus (at that time Lucullus' military tribune in Hispania Citerior) with the mission to request of Rome's old ally, a reinforcement of elephants for the war against the Celtiberians.⁴⁶ In fact, the young

44 App. *Lib.* 69; 79. The surrendering terms imposed after Hannibal's defeat at Zama established that, with regard to foreign policy, 'the Carthaginians would not make wars neither in Africa nor outside Africa without the mandate of Roman people, (that) they would return their goods to Masinissa, and (that) they would pact an alliance with him' (Liv. 30.37.4; see Polyb. 15.18.4–5; App. *Lib.* 54; Cassius Dio, *Fragment* 57.82).

45 Another passage (App. *Lib.* 73) notes that the Carthaginians ended up with 58,000 fighters. In the negotiation preceding Rome's declaration of war against Carthage (149 BC), Hasdrubal the Boetharch, commander of the Carthaginians, warns Gulusa, one of the sons of Masinissa, that 'with regard to [Carthage's] foreign allies, expectations are excellent' (Polyb. 38.7.8–9). Note the cocky appearance with which Polybius describes the Carthaginian general (Polyb. 38.7–8).

46 Two years earlier, in 153 BC, Masinissa had provided M. Fulvius Nobilior with 300 horsemen and 10 elephants in his campaign against Numantia (App. *Hisp.* 46). The presence of Scipio Aemilianus in Numidia coincides with the arrival of Caucenus' Lusitanians at the African coast (App. *Hisp.* 46) and the troubles that one of Masinissa's sons had when being surrounded by Iberian forces (presumably Lusitanians) (App. *Lib.* 68). In the years to come, in their operations in Celtiberia Q. Caecilius Metellus in 143–142 BC (Valerius Maximus 9.3.7) and Scipio Aemilianus in 134–133 BC received Numidian elephants too, with a body of slingers and archers commanded by prince Jugurtha, the grandson

tribune was entrusted with the arbitrage in the dispute between Masinissa and Carthage (App. *Lib.* 71–72). Nonetheless, the clash was inevitable and the ‘war of Masinissa’ ended with the defeat of the Carthaginians in Oroscopa, after suffering a painful siege and the loss of almost all their forces (App. *Lib.* 72–73). Somewhat earlier, during the battle in open field that Scipio witnessed from a hill, he had admired these armies, made up of Numidian and Carthaginian troops and their respective allies, which reached the figure of 110,000 fighters.⁴⁷

Returning to Hispania Ulterior, without abandoning the perspective of certainly meaningful international relations,⁴⁸ and referring to the already suggested boardgame, the punishment campaigns that the Lusitanian *hegemones*—Punicus in 155 BC, Caesarus in 154 BC, and Caucenus in 153 BC—ran over the territories of southern communities, subjected to Rome *maiestas*, acquire full sense at this point. Among these, the Libyan-Phoenician cities of the Cádiz region—as well as those of the Turduli Baeturia?—seemed to align, i.e. if we accept that their original military populations, albeit strongly Punized, would be less of Carthaginian extraction but rather more Libyan-Mauritanian or essentially Numidian.⁴⁹ Therefore, calibrating in the balance of political interests the convenience of loyalty to the Numidian kingdom, the circumstantial proximity of some Libyan-Phoenician enclaves to Rome can be inferred. Consequently, it is also understandable, in reverse, the punitive action carried out against certain Libyan-Phoenician centres by the pro-Carthaginian (or rather, anti-Roman) Lusitanian armies (App. *Hisp.* 56). It should be considered that behaviours are not, as a general rule, unanimous

of Masinissa (App. *Hisp.* 89). In Hispania Ulterior the Numidian support to Rome was maintained in the crucial phase of Viriathus’ war in 141 BC. Servilianus had requested and obtained from Micipsa, son and successor of Masinissa, the amount of 300 riders and 10 elephants used unsuccessfully against Viriathus in his operations in the Turduli Baeturia (App. *Hisp.* 67).

- 47 ‘He [Scipio Aemilianus] often said afterwards that he had been present at many contests, but never enjoyed any other so much, for here only had he seen at his ease 110,000 men join battle. He added with an air of solemnity that only two before him had seen such a spectacle: Jupiter from Mount Ida, and Neptune from Samothrace, in the Trojan war’ (App. *Lib.* 71). On the battle of Oroscopa see Amara 2013: 160–161.
- 48 But not much estimated by research usually devoted to the paradigms of ‘primitive belligerence’ and ‘barbarian geography’ for Lusitanians (see above, n. 29). An exception is represented by the, in many respects, sharp works by García Moreno (1988a; 1989) and Pérez Vilatela (1989a; 1989b).
- 49 As suggested by Domínguez Monedero (1995a: 236) throughout the evaluation of Libyan-Phoenician mints. See above n. 33.

or respond to an ethnic unit action, which is essentially a historiographical simplification:⁵⁰ neither all the Libyan-Phoenician communities would be necessarily committed to the same extent to the Roman-Numidian alliance, nor all the Punic cities of Iberia would take part in favour of Carthage. Precisely, the existence of fluctuations and conjunctions confers to the Lusitanian operations a selective nature.

In conclusion, there is sufficient evidence in our sources to suspect, if not to assume, a double alignment in the multipolar scenario represented by the Circle of the Strait in the mid-second century BC in its double extension, Iberian and African. On the one hand, a Carthaginian state is found under reconstruction, and in its wake, exceeding its territory and immediate hinterland, some of its old mainland allies with whom networks of solidarity and assistance are maintained: from federal centres of Carthaginian affiliation to small subsidiary war powers. Presumably, military contributions could concur between those minor Carthaginian allies, such as groups of Lusitanians and perhaps Turduli, Vettones and Oretani. They would have their own agendas and traditions, holding an active worldview of the scenario in which they were integrated. In fact, their military categorisation certainly surpasses that of mercenary groups without a political roadmap. To sum up, the proposal assumed here is to understand the inner southwestern Iberian communities, and in particular, the Lusitanians, as actors in the interstate theatre of western Mediterranean imperialism.

On the other hand, the dominion that Rome had established in Hispanic demarcations since the defeat of the Punic in Iberia was located opposite to Carthage. This was an *imperium* that became stronger on a growing (though discontinuous) alignment of subjected states and allied populations, which were remarkable in the Guadalquivir valley and the Baetica coast. This Roman rule was also protected strategically in North Africa by an instrumental ally, the Numidian kingdom of Masinissa, and under his tutelage, a constellation of principalities and vassal tribes that reached the Sahara sands.

And yet, a swan song would eventually become the assistance axis articulated around the Carthaginian metropolis. Since the defeat of Carthage in 146 BC and the consolidation of the Roman domain in Hispania Ulterior after the *bellum Viriathicum* (147–139 BC) would foster the dissolution of a Lusitanian-Carthaginian entente, which began its days *of wine and roses* with Hamilcar Barca's landing at Gades.

50 On this topic: see Sánchez Moreno 2011.

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Sulla, the Army, the Officers and the *poleis* of Greece: A Reassessment of Warlordism in the First Phase of the Mithridatic Wars

Sophia Zoumbaki

In 87 BC, Sulla crossed the Adriatic in the capacity of proconsul, entrusted with the task of vanquishing the King of Pontus, Mithridates VI Eupator. Five legions, a few cohorts and the cavalry accompanied him.¹ In order to secure supplies of cash, the senators resorted to a desperate solution. They voted to seize and sell the sacred treasure supposedly donated by the legendary King Numa, in order to finance sacrifices to the gods. The sale of this precious ancient treasure, however, yielded only nine thousand pounds of gold. But, τὸς ἦν τότε πάντων ἀπορία καὶ ἐς πάντα φιλοτιμία, ‘so limited were their means at the time, and so unlimited their ambition’.²

Shortly afterwards, in 86 BC, when the balance of power in Rome enabled L. Cornelius Cinna to gain control, supplies for Sulla’s army were cut off, Sulla was declared a public enemy (*hostis*), and command was transferred to the consul Marius.³ After Marius’s unexpected death, the *consul suffectus* L. Valerius Flaccus replaced him, took over the governorship of Asia and was sent out to the East. Although Memnon mentions that Flaccus was ordered to cooperate with Sulla, this seems difficult given that Sulla was a *hostis* and he would not readily compromise and consent to being replaced by Flaccus or allow him to win the glory of the victor over Mithridates.⁴ Moreover, Sulla felt that this army was not in fact directed against Rome’s chief enemy but against him personally, λόγῳ μὲν ἐπὶ Μιθριδάτην, ἔργῳ δὲ ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνον αὐτὸν (Plut. *Sull.* 20.1). Flaccus was later executed by his quaestor, C. Flavius Fimbria, who took command of the force, and later was granted confirmation from Rome. Sulla was, on the

1 Appian, *Mithridatika* 30. On Sulla’s appointment as commander of the war against Mithridates and for the subsequent political events, see de Blois 2007, 169–172 and also for the composition of his army see Cagniat 2007: 82 and 83.

2 Appian, *Mithr.* 22 (translation by H. White, Loeb, 1962: 277). See Harl 1996: 50.

3 App. *Bellum Civile* 1.73; 77; 81; *Mithr.* 51; Lovano 2002: 97.

4 Badian 1962, 56–57 on the Concordia that was formally maintained. Lovano 2002: 98–99 (with bibliography) argues that Flaccus intended to anticipate Sulla and steal the glory of the victory ‘before Sulla could free his hands of affairs in Greece’. Seager 2008: 181 accepts that Memnon’s mention (*FrGrH* 24.1) may however reflect the Roman attempts to reach reconciliation with Sulla.

contrary, still a *hostis* and was thus treated as 'no more than a warlord in charge of his own personal client army', as H. Flower has stated.⁵

The label of 'warlord' has been applied to Sulla and other commanders in historical studies concerning the Republican period in a rather rhetoric use,⁶ transferring a term, which is a modern coinage used by social sciences (always with negative connotations) for modern military rulers.⁷ 'Warlord' became popular among medieval and ancient historians in the 1980s and 1990s respectively;⁸ however, its anachronistic use for antiquity should take into account ancient criteria. Moreover, if an equivalent phenomenon is to be traced in antiquity, the features of an ancient 'warlord' should be determined. Recent studies have pointed out the need for a definition of some key points of agreement on the nature of a 'warlord', even in regard to modern 'warlords'. Some attempts to formulate these key points have been undertaken,⁹ beyond the general emphasis on the dominance of a leader on the basis of military strength, since various studies focus on different aspects of the phenomenon.

Some of the key points in the definition of a 'warlord', formulated for modern 'warlords' by A. Giustozzi and by John MacKinlay, seem to be applicable to Sulla: Sulla 'had full and autonomous control over a military force, which he could use at will, and was able to 'provide important services to subordinate commanders, such as leadership, coordination, logistics ...'. Also, 'he exercised political power over part of the territory of a state, where central authority had weakened'. As more *poleis* sided with Mithridates, 'he used violence to

5 Flower 2010: 93.

6 See Fields 2008: 101; Keaveney 2007: 41; Flower 2010: 14, 32, 54, 93, 136, 143, 147, 155; Mayor 2010: 202, to cite some characteristic examples.

7 See e.g. MacKinlay 2000: 48–62; Giustozzi 2005: 1–25; Marten 2006/07: 41–73; Marten 2012: esp. 3–7 on the definition of the term.

8 For an overview of the use of the term 'warlord', see Giustozzi 2005: 2–3. As to approaches to 'warlordism' in the past, see McGeorge 2002: 2 who notes that 'the basis of their political power was military power' without any further attempt to define the term more closely. Whittaker 2002: 277–302 emphasizes the emergence of soldiers-landlords and their semi-private armies in the Later Roman period. On this period see also Liebeschuetz 2007: 479–494. For further attempts to define the term see Giustozzi 2005: 5 and 14; MacKinlay 2000; Marten 2012: 3–7.

9 See an approach to modern 'warlordism' in Marten's 2012 definition (where earlier bibliography is to be found): 'Warlords are individuals who control small pieces of territory using a combination of force and patronage' (p. 3); 'The word 'force' in my definition denotes the fact that warlords command loyal militias that are not under state control.... 'Patronage' is the ability to distribute resources to supporters based on informal ties and personal preferences, without being subject to laws or other abstract social rules', (p. 6).

maintain his power'.¹⁰ He acted financially and politically 'without interference from the state in which he was based', plundering the resources of territories under his command, making the civil communities suffer, and he 'exterminated uncooperative populations'.¹¹

Nevertheless, an observation of stray 'warlordish' traits in the behavior of an ancient general is clearly a superficial and simplistic method. Moreover, as studies on warlordism (whether in regard to modern periods or to the past) usually focus on different aspects and features of the phenomenon, it is necessary to distinguish the main factors that underlie the analysis of such studies. That is to say, the need arises to go beyond particular individual characteristics of each specific case and period, beyond subjective views of individual researchers and to ask, whether certain basic decisive factors for the definition of a leader as a 'warlord' can be recognized. In the attempt to deconstruct studies on modern warlordism in order to reveal individual characteristics and subjective views, we suggest that every analysis should take into consideration aspects of the behavior of a 'warlord' that fall into three basic categories: (1) his relationship with his army, (2) his relationship to the central power of his state of origin and (3) his treatment of the territories and populations under his control. In any case, application of the term to personalities of the past would be expected to take into account the standards and values of the period in question.

In this paper, Sulla, who was undoubtedly a charismatic military leader,¹² will be examined in this light, namely on the basis of three levels of his relationships, i.e. to his army, to Rome's central authority and to the populations under his control. It seems plausible that the question of 'warlordism' cannot be answered by a facile generalization relating to the full span of Sulla's career, but in a given period, since fluctuations in his relationships followed the shift in the correlation of power and interests at different periods of his life. This study will concentrate on the period of the first phase of the Mithridatic War and on *poleis* of mainland Greece, where some of these military operations took place, and beyond the large cities of Asia Minor and the Aegean, where the material has already been studied more systematically. Literary, epigraphic and numismatic sources will be taken into account in order to trace Sulla's activity in the early stage of the Mithridatic War.

10 Giustozzi 2005: 5, 14, 15.

11 MacKinlay 2000: 48–49.

12 Hatscher 2000: 117–161.

Sulla between State Legitimacy and Support from the Army

Sulla's link with his army that was sent out to the East by Rome is an issue that needs to be examined in parallel with his relationship with the central authority in Rome. Obviously, his relationship with Rome's central authority at different periods of his life had an impact on his soldiers, as his close connection to them appears to be correspondingly stronger during periods of bad relations with central authority. In the period under examination, certain contradictory facts can be observed. Once Sulla was declared *hostis*, he officially no longer had political legitimacy to act as a representative of the Roman state and as a commander of a Roman military force. Nevertheless, the decisions to outlaw him and cut off funds for his military operations were not lawfully and objectively taken, since he had been legally appointed as a proconsul to fight against Mithridates. Thus, on the one hand, Sulla acted during this period as an independent military leader who placed his personal dignity and interests above those of Rome, while on the other hand he was pushed to act in this way. Furthermore, after the treaty of Dardanus¹³ he accepted the mutineers against Fimbria in his camp (Plut. *Sull.* 25)—in other words the army sent by Rome against Sulla—and at this time exactly, he wrote a letter to the Senate reporting about Eastern affairs, thus presenting himself as a legitimate proconsul who recognizes and addresses the authority of the Senate.¹⁴ Remarkably, Sulla was powerful at that moment, since he received ships, infantry, cavalry and chariots from Mithridates, and he had at his disposal the revenues of Greece and Asia. Despite the response of the Senate, he was at the same time preparing his second march against Rome. He knew that he was only able to rely on the wealth of the East and on his army's loyalty. It is a puzzling period, during which Sulla swung between being a legitimate representative of Rome, who recognized central authority, and an independent leader who acted for his own benefit.

Thorough studies on Sulla's relationship with his army as well as on the evolution of a 'revolutionary' army in Rome have been undertaken by

13 On the terms of peace, which were not published (App. *Mithr.* 64), and the army's indignation see Morstein-Marx 1995: 261–264.

14 App. *BC* 1.77. The original content of the letter is unknown to us—Appian's source was apparently Sulla's memoirs—and it contains several anachronistic details. See Badian's comments and his remarks on the similarities of this text with Plut. *Sull.* 22.1 on Metella's escape, Badian 1962: 57. On the specimen of memoirs the period in question see Tatum 2011: 161–188, esp. on Sulla 163–174.

A. Keaveney.¹⁵ In 2005, he argued against an oversimplified view of Sulla as a warlord, a view that could be based on the twelfth chapter of Plutarch's biography of Sulla. Keaveney suggests that this text derives from Appian's account of the Triumvirs and projects onto Sulla the Triumvirs' relationship with their soldiers. Sulla's care for providing his soldiers with land and booty are not interpreted by Keaveney as acts to buy their loyalty, but as the commander's wish to fulfill regular expectations of the armies. It is, after all, indisputable that every military man depends on his army's loyalty.

Keaveney is apparently right to argue that Plutarch's hostility to Sulla is evident in the negative portrayal sketched in the twelfth chapter of his biography. Moreover, he observes that Plutarch's description in the aforementioned chapter displays some similarities with Appian's passage 5.2.17 (not 5.27, as cited by Keaveney), which refers to the period of the Triumvirs.¹⁶ Hence, Keaveney suggests that Plutarch derives from Appian and 'has unjustly described Sulla as a Triumvir or something close to it'.¹⁷ However, several subtleties must be taken into consideration. Firstly, in this passage Plutarch not only criticizes Sulla, but also Marius, Cinna and Fimbria. Besides, a thorough *Quellenforschung* undertaken by Claudia Ruggeri¹⁸ on the sources from which Plutarch derives the material for his twelfth chapter of Sulla's Life, demonstrates that Plutarch's and Appian's narratives of these events differ drastically. Likewise, the contrast in the general spirit of their works is equally marked: Appian's text is rather pro-Sullan, while Plutarch's account is anti-Sullan. Moreover, Ruggeri argues that Plutarch's passage is very similar to Diodorus's text (38.7) on the siege of Athens and suggests that their sources were probably two authors who were contemporary to the events, Posidonius of Apamea and Rutilius Rufus. Thus, it is apparently the latter's anti-Marian works that form the basis of Plutarch's passage 12.5–9 and not Appian's references to the Triumvirs.

In 2007, Keaveney revisits the question of Sulla's link with his soldiers and the accusation of his corruption of the army, as it is presented in Sallust (Sulla's contemporary), who, in his account of Catiline's conspiracy, states that Sulla

15 Keaveney 2005: 297–302; Keaveney 2007.

16 Plut. *Sulla* 8–9: οἱ δὲ τότε στρατηγοὶ βία τὸ πρωτεῖον, οὐκ ἀρετῇ, κτῶμενοι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἀλλήλους δεόμενοι τῶν ὅπλων ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἡναγκάζοντο δημαγωγεῖν ἐν τῷ στρατηγεῖν, εἴθ' ὧν εἰ τὰς ἡδυπαθείας τοῖς στρατευομένοις ἀνήλiskon ὠνούμενοι τοὺς πόρους αὐτῶν,.... ταῦτα ἐξήλαυνε, Μάριον εἴτ' αὖθις ἐπὶ Σύλλαν κατήγε, ταῦτα Ὀκταουῖου τοὺς περὶ Κίνναν, ταῦτα Φλάκκου τοὺς περὶ Φιμβρίαν αὐτόχειρας ἐποίησεν. Οὐχ ἥμισυ Σύλλας ἐνέδωκεν, ἀρχάς, ἐπὶ τῷ διαφθεῖρειν καὶ μετακαλεῖν τοὺς ὑπ' ἄλλοις ταττομένους καταχορηγῶν εἰς τοὺς ὕφ' αὐτῷ καὶ δαπανώμενος ... See Keaveney 2005: esp. 299.

17 Keaveney 2005: 300.

18 Ruggeri 2006: 315–324.

allowed too much freedom and luxury to the soldiers he led to Asia in order to cultivate their loyalty.¹⁹ Keaveney argues convincingly that Sulla's characterization as a 'corrupter' of the army is somewhat of an exaggeration. However, his sharp criticism of Sallust's words as 'arrant nonsense'²⁰ disregards the fact that this text focuses on plundering of art treasures from the East, and it was exactly through this plundering that Sulla's soldiers became acquainted with wealth and luxury, as further sources attest. This is clearly shown by the fact that Sulla had to apologize to them after the Peace of Dardanus, as their hopes of plundering were not fulfilled (Plut. *Sull.* 24.4). Appian notes that Sulla's soldiers were eager to fight against Mithridates, because this war promised much plunder (*BC* 1.7.57: ...καὶ τόνδε [i.e. τὸν στρατὸν] τῆς ἐπὶ τὸν Μιθριδάτην στρατείας ὀρεγόμενόν τε ὡς ἐπικερδοῦς...); indeed they feared that, if the command was ascribed to Marius, he would enlist other soldiers, so that they would miss the opportunity for benefit. Looting the riches of the East was a desire of the soldiers throughout the campaign, which is clear from several references in the literary sources.²¹ Sulla would not disappoint his army.

It is remarkable that Sulla's soldiers were strongly bound to their commander, not as a 'semi-private' army, a phenomenon that becomes more intense in the time of the Triumvirs, but as an army that had associated its fortunes with him. Thus, their commander's honor was a highly esteemed value, even placed above Rome's benefit. When Sulla spoke to his soldiers about a personal offence, an outrage committed against him by Sulpicius and Marius in regard to the command of the Mithridatic War in 88 BC (App. *BC* 1.7.57: ... τὴν δ' ὕβριν ὁ Σύλλας τὴν ἐς αὐτὸν εἰπὼν Σουλπικίου τε καὶ Μαρίου ...), the soldiers encouraged him, θαρροῦντα ἐκέλευσεν, and they remained loyal to him. On the contrary, all officers with the exception of one *quaestor*, apparently Lucullus, deserted Sulla.²² It is characteristic that Lucullus, Sulla's closest associate, later refused

19 Sallust, *Catilina* 11.5–6: *Huc accedebat quod L. Sulla exercitum quem in Asia ductaverat, quo sibi fidum faceret, contra morem maiorum luxuriose nimisque liberaliter habuerat. Loca amoena, voluptaria facile in otio ferocis militum animos molliwerant.*

20 Keaveney 2007: 26.

21 See for example Plut. *Sull.* 14.4–10 on plundering of Athens, App. *Mithr.* 8.51 (... καὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν συνεχῶς μετατιθεμένην διήρπαξε ...) on the sack of Boeotia; see Cagniart 2007: 83 for Asia.

22 App. *BC* 1.57. See de Blois 2007: 171–172; Morstein-Marx 2011: 259–278, esp. 264, 271–272 and 273–274 on the soldiers' actions against the tribunes who came to take the army away from Sulla (Plut. *Sull.* 8.9.1) and on Appian's apparent exaggeration about the officers who deserted Sulla. Even if Appian's account is an exaggeration, it is clear that Sulla had to appoint a new staff of officers for his campaign against Mithridates. The officers appointed by him do not seem to have been of very prominent origin and very few occupied

to co-operate with Fimbria in order to capture Mithridates at Pitane (Plut. *Luc.* 3.4–8). A ‘partisan nature’²³ is obvious in Lucullus’s refusal, since he ignored the overriding Roman interest and ranked Sulla’s vindication above public advantage (*Luc.* 3.7: ἀλλ’εἵτε τὰ πρὸς Σύλλαν δίκαια πρεσβεύων πρὸ παντός ἰδίου τε καὶ κοινοῦ συμφέροντος ...). During the campaign against Mithridates, the commander’s honour thus remains of great importance for the army. Although formally Sulla was no longer a legitimate representative of Rome, the officers who were subordinated to him recognized in him a different type of moral legitimacy, τὰ πρὸς Σύλλαν δίκαια.

It was this military support that enabled Sulla to act independently from the state, during the period he was declared a *hostis*. An army so strongly bound to its commander, as though it was his personal army, was a new phenomenon. Certainly it had its roots in Marian reforms known as *capite censi*,²⁴ but now it became entirely clear that an army could be converted into a useful instrument in a charismatic leader’s hands. However, a one-sided focus on the relationship of a military man with the army under his command is not sufficient for the definition of a ‘warlord’. An analysis of the whole pattern of his behavior and strategies is required. In this volume, A. Coşkun argues that there is no ‘uncontestable dividing line between a legitimate and an illegitimate ruler.... Their classification thus mainly depends on the perspective and on one’s own involvement or interests in an area or conflict’.²⁵ Therefore, it remains to examine Sulla’s activity in mainland Greece during the period when the region was under his direct control.

Sulla and Greek *poleis* and Sanctuaries

Forcible Recruitment

Sulla arrived in Greece with limited military force and limited money to spend on such a large war. Therefore, there was no other choice but to collect human and material resources from the East. He urgently and forcibly gathered troops and provisions from Rome’s allies in Thessaly and Aitolia, as Appian recounts (*Mithr.* 30: ... χρήματα μὲν αὐτίκα καὶ συμμαχούς καὶ ἀγορὰν ἔκ τε Αἰτωλίας καὶ

important posts later. Several individuals can be identified with homonyms known from inscriptions or coin legends, while others are known merely through brief references in literary sources, see Badian 1962: 54–55.

23 Tröster 2008: 80.

24 De Ligt 2007, especially 125–127.

25 See A. Coşkun’s chapter.

Θεσσαλίας συνέλεγεν). The task of recruitment from allies was perhaps assigned to Hortensius, στρατηγικὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ φιλόνηκος, 'a bold and capable general', who led a force from Thessaly to Chaeronea.²⁶ That the allies recruited forces for Sulla, is also shown by a fragmentary inscription of the Aitolian Koinon, in honour of Ladas or Ladames who served in the Roman army.²⁷ The individual in question seems to have been a member of a family, which was involved in the administration of the Aitolian league.²⁸ He was granted honours by Sulla, possibly *dona militaria*.²⁹ Local levying of troops as well as reward for their contribution to victory was an established practice for the Roman Republic, and Sulla certainly perceived subjugation and reward as a way to maintain his power.³⁰ Similarly, Anaxidamos and Homoloichos, two Chaeroneans who played an important role in the outcome of the battle of Chaeronea, were honoured by him with *aristeia*, the recognition for gallantry, together with an officer, Basillus, the military tribune (ὁ τοῦ τέλους ταξίαρχος).³¹ A base found on a hill near Chaeronea bearing the names of the two Chaeroneans probably belongs to a monument commemorating their excellence.³²

Sulla, however, forcibly expanded the recruitment of the Greek population beyond Rome's allies, since Appian speaks of military forces from the Peloponnese and Macedonia that Sulla took with him on his way back to

26 Plut. *Sull.* 15.3–4: ... ἐκ Θεσσαλίας ἄγοντα τῷ Σύλλαι δύνανται. He is further mentioned (Plut. *Sull.* 17. 7) as a *presbeutes* along with a certain Galba (perhaps Ser. Sulpicius Galba) as σπείρας ἐπιτάκτους ἔχοντες (leaders of cohorts of reserves) in the battle of Chaeronea; see also App. *Mithr.* 43: μάλιστα δ' ἐπὶ οὖν οἱ περὶ Γάλβαν τε καὶ Ὀρτήσιον; Memnon from Herakleia, *FrGrH* 434, 22.

27 *IG* IX 1² 1, 139.

28 Grainger 2000: 15, 205 (Ladames no. 5).

29 *Dona militaria* were awarded to the allies during the Republican period, see Maxfield 1981: 121.

30 See Prag 2011: 15–28, esp. on rewards 25–26.

31 On Anaxidamos and Homoloichos see Plut. *Sull.* 17.5–7. On (L. Minucius) Basilus see App. *Mithr.* 50–51: οὐδέ τις ἐτόλμα, μέχρι Βασίλλος ὁ τοῦ τέλους ταξίαρχος πρῶτος καὶ τὸν ὑπαντήσαντα ἔκτεινεν. Τότε δ' αὐτῷ συνεσέπιπτεν ὁ στρατὸς ἅπας ... ὁ δὲ Σύλλας τῆς ἐπιούσης τὸν τε ταξίαρχον ἐστεφάνου καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀριστεία ἐδίδου. For an interpretation of *aristeia* in Plutarch's text see Mackay 2000: 170.

32 A base found on the hill Isoma (Camp et al. 1992: 443–455) and bearing the names of the two Chaeroneans has been regarded as Sulla's trophy mentioned by Plutarch. However, this base has certainly nothing to do with the Sullan monument. Sulla's trophy could not have mentioned the two Greeks despite their gallantry, as Mackay 2000: 168–177 already suggested. We are probably dealing with an honorific monument for the two Chaeroneans. For a new view on the inscription see Kalliontzis 2014: 349–359.

Rome: On his return to Italy in the spring of 83 BC, Sulla sailed to Brundisium on 1600 ships and took with him five legions of Italian troops and 6000 horses, to which he added more forces from the Peloponnese and Macedonia, in total about 40,000 men.³³ A decree of Chaeronea (found in Delphi) in honour of the Thracian Amatokos, son of Teres, records that his contingent, perhaps cavalry and infantry (see ll. 4–5), was left there by Sulla probably in the winter of 87 BC, while he was besieging Athens, and shows that Sulla used allies from the Thracian kingdom of the Odryssae.³⁴ The wording of the decree from Chaeronea (e.g. ll.5–6: ἀναστροφὴν ἐποιήσατο εὐσχήμονα], ll.10–11: μὴθὲν ἀδίκημα μῆτε κατὰ τὴν π[όλιν μῆτε] κατὰ τὴν χώραν) shows indirectly that billeting of troops was an additional burden for the towns, not only because it meant economic bleeding, but also because of the frequent improper behavior of the soldiers towards the inhabitants and the territories of the *poleis*.³⁵

Terror and the Manifestation of Dominance

Athens, as Mithridates's bulwark in Greece, experienced both plunder and bloodbaths. Sulla's mercy was shown only after the intervention of pro-Roman Athenian exiles, Medeios and Kalliphon (Plut. *Sull.* 14.5). In any case, the slaves were sold and the citizens were left free but without the political rights, which were to be reinstated only for their children (App. *Mithr.* 6.38–39). Sulla's siege and plundering of Piraeus and Athens, where the 'destruction debris', a layer of ash and architectural ruins, has come to light at several spots in the Agora

33 App. *BC* 1.11.79: καὶ ὁ Σύλλας πέντε Ἰταλοῦ στρατοῦ τέλη καὶ ἰππέας ἑξακισχιλίου ἄλλους τέ τινας ἐκ Πελοποννήσου καὶ Μακεδονίας προσλαβὼν, ἅπαντας ἄγων ἐς μυριάδας ἀνδρῶν τέσσαρας ἐπὶ τε Πάτρας ἀπὸ τοῦ Πειραιῶς καὶ ἐκ Πατρῶν ἐς Βρεντέσιον χιλίαις καὶ ἑξακοσίαις ναυσὶ διέπλει. On Sulla's route from Patras or Dyrrhachion to Brundisium see Dohnicht and Heil 2004: 241–242 and n. 65.

34 Holleaux 1919: 320–337. It is possible that the force commanded by Amatokos was part of Q. Bruttius Sura's troops, who was sent by the governor of Macedonia, C. Sentius, before Sulla's arrival, and defeated Archelaos at Chaeronea (App. *Mithr.* 29; Plut. *Sull.* 11.4–5). His victory was not decisive and he consequently left a Roman garrison in the town, when he received Lucullus's order to return to Macedonia. Either Amatokos's force was the garrison left by Sura or a Thracian contingent on its way back to Macedonia with Sura, which was brought to Boeotia together with other troops gathered in Thessaly by Hortensius (Plut. *Sull.* 15.3–4).

35 See Plut. *Luc.* 4.1; 33.4; *Sull.* 25.2; App. *Mithr.* 61; 63. Ñaco del Hoyo *et al.* 2009: 34–39 on the garrisoning and billeting of troops.

and Kerameikos,³⁶ his hostile treatment of Thebes for treachery,³⁷ the destruction of Eretria³⁸ and the rampage of Anthedon, Larymna and Halae, which were used as bases by the forces of Mithridates (Plut. *Sull.* 26.4),³⁹ all show that the application of force and terror as instruments of political compulsion were used by Sulla to demonstrate and maintain his power over Greek *poleis*.⁴⁰ Plutarch's mention of τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ δέους ἀφώνων γενομένων (*Sull.* 26.4) is a vivid description of the awe and panic of the population of the aforementioned towns. Shortly afterwards, the inhabitants of Halae returned to their home-town, but Sulla was surprised when informed of this, as shown by the following anecdote: fishermen offered him some fine fish from Halae during his stay at Aedipsus, but on hearing where the fish came from, he asked 'Is any man of Halae still alive?' (Plut. *Sull.* 26.3). The same situation is described in an honorific decree of Daulis (Phokis)⁴¹ for Hermias from Stratonicea, who exercised his influence ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγχιμένων in favour of the small town, which certainly suffered as a result of the hostilities in the region, περιστ[άντων] ἀν

36 On the blockade of supplies and famine see Plut. *Sull.* 12.2; App. *Mithr.* 5.34–35 where we also find references to pro-Romans who shot lead balls with messages to Sulla about the arrival of supplies; see Roth 1999: 324. On destructions see Plut. *Sull.* 12; 14.4–10 on plundering; App. *Mithr.* 30–39; 38 refers to Sulla's order to his soldiers not to plunder Athens; Strabo 9. C 395–396; Paus. 1.20.7; Cagniat 2007: 83. See also the irony of Sulla's statement cited in Plut. *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* 202 ff. that the fact that he saved Athens from destruction was one of the greatest events of his life. For archaeological traces and literary sources see Geagan 1979: 371–437; Hoff 1997: 33–51. The Agora excavations have revealed damage which is linked to Sulla's plundering, Camp 1986: 181. Destructions in Piraeus were apparently even harsher, see Grigoropoulos 2005: esp. 15–30. The military and symbolic value of gaining control over Athens, where Archelaos had withdrawn to wait for reinforcements from Asia, is self-evident and has been stressed by several scholars, see for example Keaveney 1982: 68–77 (74–75 for a totally unnecessary apologist defense of these events); Naco del Hoyo et al. 2009: 44–45 with bibliography. Morstein-Marx 1995: 212–220 on treatment of Athens after its fall.

37 App. *Mithr.* 54; Plut. *Sull.* 19.6; Paus. 9.7.4–6; 33.6.

38 This is testified by the debris as well as the coin hoards which are buried during these events, see Schmidt 2000: 169–180; Kaltsas et al. 2010: 85–86.

39 On the destruction of Anthedon, Larymna and Halae see Plut. *Sull.* 26.7. The destruction of the three towns is to be interpreted either as revenge for the population's Pro-Mithridatic stance or as an action to prevent Archelaos from using their harbours (Santangelo 2007: 48 n. 66), or both.

40 Naco del Hoyo et al. 2009: 44 n. 79.

41 Pomptow 1921: 181–182, no. 168 (*SEG* 1, 175); *FD* III 4 : 69. The inscription is written on the monument of Aemilius Paulus in Delphi.

[χώραν (or πόλιν) ἀμῶν φόβ]ων κα<ι> κινδύνων μεγάλων (ll. 1–2).⁴² It is possible that the Stratonicean Hermias intervened to Sulla on behalf of Daulis, given the faithful relationship of the Stratoniceans to Sulla, since they gave him soldiers, grain and great expenditures, as indicated by a *senatus consultum*.⁴³

Sulla's complete domination over both Mithridates and Greek *poleis* was certainly manifested through the trophies he erected in commemoration of his victorious confrontation with the Pontic forces in Chaeronea and Orchomenos. Although they do not celebrate Roman victories over Greeks, Sulla's trophies do constitute indisputable proof of Roman dominance over Greece and send a message of Sulla's power to both Greeks and Rome. The Chaeronean trophy, which bore a Greek inscription mentioned by Plutarch, has not been found.⁴⁴ The recently discovered Sullan trophy at Orchomenos⁴⁵ is a prominent monument also bearing a Greek inscription, which was obviously his deliberate choice.⁴⁶ It is especially noteworthy that Sulla's trophies are the first permanent monumental triumphal structures erected by Romans on Greek soil, as recorded by both written and archaeological sources.

Sulla's titles⁴⁷ in monuments erected on the Greek mainland, both by him and by Greek *poleis*, are of interest. Only the Latin inscriptions of monuments erected for him on Delos⁴⁸ include his title of proconsul. From the remaining inscriptions on monuments erected by *poleis* of mainland Greece, he is mentioned as ἱμπεράτορα/αὐτοκράτορα; the honorary inscriptions from Oropos include only the epithet Ἐπαφροδίτος, while further inscriptions include no title, but merely his name.⁴⁹ As for the monuments erected by Sulla himself, the Latin inscription of his dedication to Mars in Sicyon mentions him as

42 See Vatin 1970: 677–680 for foreigners in the region during the First Mithridatic War.

43 Sherk 1969: 18; see Rostovtzeff 1998: 941.

44 See ns. 31 and 32 above.

45 Kountouri 2001–2004: 193–194. The publication of the monument is under preparation by E. Kountouri, N. Petrochilos and S. Zoumbaki.

46 Plut. *Sull.* 19. 5: διὸ καὶ τοῖς τροπαίοις ἐπέγραψεν Ἄρη καὶ Νίκη καὶ Ἀφροδίτην ... οὕτως ἀναγέγραπται; 34.2: παρ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς τροπαίοις « Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Σύλλας Ἐπαφροδίτος ». See Fioravanti 2012: 147–160.

47 Mayer 2008: 121–135.

48 *I.Délos* 1850–1852.

49 Athens: *IG* II² 4103 (*SEG* 24, 214): [Λεύκιον] Κορνήλιον [Λευκί]ου υἱὸν Σύλλαν. Oropos: *IG* VII 264; Petrakos 1997: no. 442: Λεύκιον Κορνήλιον, Λευκίου υἱὸν Σύλλαν Ἐπαφροδίτου and *IG* VII 371; Petrakos 1997: no. 443: Μετέλλαν Καικελίαν, Λευκίου Σύλλα Ἐπαφροδίτου γυναῖκα. Thespiai: *IThesp.* 397: Λεύκι[ον] Κορνήλιον Λευκίου υἱ[ὸν] Σύλλαν αὐτοκράτορα; 398: Σύλλ[α - - -]. Akraiphia: *ADelt* 293–294: Λεύκιον Κορνήλιον Λευκίου υἱὸν Σύλλαν ἱμπεράτορα. Messene: *SEG* 48, 496: [Λεύκιον Κ]ορνήλιον [Λευκί]ου υἱὸν Σύλλαν ἱμπεράτορα.

imperator, *L. Cornelius L. f. Sulla imper(ator) Martei*,⁵⁰ and the inscription on the trophy in Orchomenos bears the Greek equivalent αὐτοκράτωρ. It is remarkable that he prefers to use the title *imperator*, commander *cum imperio*, a title also given by acclamation of the troops after important victories, and not the official title of *proconsul* assigned to him by his state, which had meanwhile declared him an enemy. Moreover, it is remarkable that the same title is used on coins minted by him in two phases, one bearing the title *Imperator* and the other *Imperator iterum*.⁵¹ It is the first time that Roman coin issues bear the name of a magistrate defined as *imperator*. It is further characteristic that the two trophies, which are depicted on the reverse of the golden coins bearing the legend *Imper(ator) Iterum*, are also depicted on a series of coins minted by Sulla in the type of the Athenian New Style tetradrachms. His military success brought him glory and wealth, bound his troops together and provided the means to maintain his power. It was to be expected, therefore, that he would adopt this iconography on his coins and the title of *imperator* in his self-presentation.⁵²

Financial Drain, Metal for the 'Lucullan Coins' and the Role of the koina

Since Sulla's power was based on the support of his military officers and soldiers, resources for his economic survival and the financing of his army were of vital importance, and he demanded them from the *poleis* of Greece. 'Food for the soldiers, fodder for the horses, means of transportation, quarters for the army, material and labour for the construction of military engines, supplies of clothes, shoes, armour, and weapons for the re-equipment of the soldiers, had all to be furnished by the people of Greece', as described by M. Rostovtzeff.⁵³ Sulla's first contact with Greece thus concentrated on demand for recruits and provisions of various types, from mules and wood—needed, for example,

50 Orlandos, *PAAH* 1938: 121–122, fig. 2; *CIL* 1² 2828; *ILLRP* 224.

51 L. SVL(L)A IMP(E) (*RRC* 367–368) and L. SVLLA IMPER ITERVM (*RRC* 359), both series including *denarii* and *aurei*. See Santangelo 2007: 204–207; Assenmaker 2013: 248–277 with earlier bibliography on the chronology of the coin issues (he suggests dating the former to c. 90–89 BC and the latter to the end of 84 BC) and the use of titles in Sulla's self-presentation. Generally on the use of titles by Sulla see Assenmaker 2014: 159–163; 193–213.

52 On Sulla's self-presentation see Gisborne 2005: 105–123, esp. 112–116 on the title of *imperator*.

53 Rostovtzeff 1998: 939–940. There is limited evidence for Roman garrisoning in towns during the Mithridatic Wars, see Naco del Hoyo et al. 2009: 35–38.

during the siege of Athens⁵⁴—to precious metal, which was necessary in order to mint currency for the payment of his troops.

The operation of collecting the precious metal for the issue of coins would have been coordinated by Lucullus. This ‘business of highest importance’, namely the minting of currency, was entrusted to him by Sulla because of his constancy and mildness (Plut. *Luc.* 2. 1: δι’ εὐστάθειαν καὶ πραότητα).⁵⁵ The origin of the precious metal for this coinage is not mentioned by Plutarch in his life of Lucullus, but it can be guessed from his reference in *Sull.* 12. 3–4; 19, and from related mentions in Appian and Pausanias: the metal was apparently mainly derived from precious votive offerings that Sulla removed from panhellenic sanctuaries: Olympia, Epidauros and Delphi.⁵⁶ The so-called ‘Lucullean’ coins, the majority of which were minted in the Peloponnese during the Mithridatic War, remained in use for an extended period of time, as is clear both from Plutarch⁵⁷ and a late first century BC inscription from Delphi, where the cost of freeing three slaves is assessed in 105 πλάτη Λευκόλλεια.⁵⁸

There has been a lengthy debate among numismatists in an attempt to identify the Lucullean coins. Most of them identify the ‘spread-flan coins’ (πλάτη Λευκόλλεια) with three series of the Athenian New Style tetradrachms, which M. Thompson⁵⁹ distinguishes from the other New Style series and dates them to Sulla’s era. Thompson accepted that the monograms of two of these

54 Plut. *Sull.* 12.2; see Roth 1999: 144.

55 Plutarch notes that it was a παραμύθιον, a consolation, that it was Lucullus again who performed the oppressive duty of collecting a contribution of twenty thousand talents from Asia and re-coin this amount, staying mild, honest and just (Plut. *Lucullus* 4. 1).

56 Plut. *Sull.* 12. 3–4: ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ χρημάτων ἔδει πολλῶν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, ἐκίνει τὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἄσυλα, τοῦτο μὲν ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρου, τοῦτο δὲ ἐξ Ὀλυμπίας, τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ πολυτελέστατα τῶν ἀναθημάτων μεταπεμπόμενος. ἔγραψε δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀμφικτύοσιν εἰς Δελφοῦς ὅτι τὰ χρήματα τοῦ θεοῦ βέλτιον εἴη κομισθῆναι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἢ γὰρ φυλάξῃν ἀσφαλέστερον ἢ καὶ ἀποχρησάμενος ἀποδώσειν οὐκ ἐλάττω. App. *Mithr.* 8. 54: ... καὶ χρήματα οὐκ ἐπιπεμπόντων οὐδ’ ἄλλο οἴκοθεν αὐτῷ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ὡς πολεμῶ, ἀψάμενος ἤδη ἐν Πυθοὶ καὶ Ὀλυμπίᾳ καὶ Ἐπιδαύρῳ χρημάτων, καὶ ἀντιδούς πρὸς λόγον τοῖς ἱεροῖς τὸ ἥμισυ τῆς Θηβαίων γῆς πολλάκις ἀποστάντων ... Paus. 9. 7. 5–6: συνέλεξεν οὖν ἔκ τε Ὀλυμπίας ἀναθήματα καὶ τὰ ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρου καὶ τὰ ἐκ Δελφῶν, ὅποσα ὑπελίποντο οἱ Φωκεῖς· ταῦτα μὲν δὴ διένειμε τῇ στρατιᾷ, ... On Sulla’s appropriation of sacred treasures see Köster 2010, who suggests that this was a regular practice rather than an unprecedented and unusual act.

57 Plut. *Luc.* 2. 2: δι’ ἐκείνου γὰρ ἐκόπη τὸ πλεῖστον ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ περὶ τὸν Μιθριδατικὸν πόλεμον, καὶ Λουκούλλειον ἀπ’ ἐκείνου προσηγορεύθη καὶ διετέλεσεν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον, ὑπὸ τῶν στρατιωτικῶν χρειῶν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ λαμβάνον ἀμοιβὴν ταχείαν.

58 *FD* III 3, 282 (Il. 5–6: ... ταῦτα ἐν ἐνὶ ἀπ[έδοντ]ο πλάτεων Λευκολλίω[ν] ἔκατον καὶ π[έντε] ...); on the identification of πλάτη Λευκόλλεια with Lucullan coins see Daux 1935: 1–9.

59 Thompson 1961: 425–439.

series were to be expanded as TAM(ίου) and MAP(χου), which means that they were struck under the supervision of a treasurer of Sulla's staff, whose name was Marcus. As Sulla's treasurer was Lucius Licinius Lucullus, Marcus has been identified as Lucullus's brother. Plutarch mentions that he served as *quaestor* under Sulla, but the date or other details connected with this office remain unknown.⁶⁰ A further series of these coins bears two trophies on the reverse, which has been interpreted as a representation of Sulla's two victories at Chaeronea and Orchomenos. The striking stylistic difference between these series and the standard New Style emissions poses the question of the mint and the engravers who undertook the die-cutting, given Plutarch's mention that the greatest portion of these coins were struck in the Peloponnese: ἐκόπη τὸ πλεῖστον ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ. Thompson inclines to the view that these series were struck in the Athenian mint, like all others, but they are dated to after Sulla's capture of Athens, 87/86 BC. Chr. Boehringer suggested that these imitations of the Athenian tetradrachms were minted somewhere in the Peloponnese and he proposed Akrokorinth, but J. Warren is inclined towards Sikyon. M.H. Crawford argues that some of the Lucullean coins were struck in the Peloponnese before the capture of Athens by Sulla and some in Athens after its capture.⁶¹ Moreover, J. Warren has argued that a further part of the so-called Lucullean coins can be recognized in a group of silver triobols struck in the Peloponnese in the format of the coinage of the Achaian League. The date of these Achaian coins has caused further debate among numismatists,⁶² but this controversy cannot be resolved in the context of this study.

Plutarch's ἐκόπη τὸ πλεῖστον ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ possibly implies that coins were also minted at other places for the same purpose, namely in order to finance the war. Numismatic research⁶³ on didrachms of the Koinon of the Aeginetans, which display close similarities with the Athenian tetradrachms, indeed connects this coinage of the Koinon with Lucullus's presence in the region, where he is honoured as *tamias*.⁶⁴ Similarities between the didrachms

60 Plut. *Luc.* 37.1: ὁ δὲ Λούκουλλος ἀναβάς εἰς Ῥώμην πρῶτον μὲν κατέλαβε τὸν ἀδελφὸν Μάρκον ὑπὸ Γαίου Μεμμίου κατηγορούμενον ἐφ' οἷς ἔπραξε ταμιεύων Σύλλα.

61 Boehringer 1972: 30; Warren 1996: 302; Crawford 1974: 80 n. 1.

62 Their traditional date is the period before the Achaian War and the dissolution of the Achaian League in 146 BC. Boehringer 1991: 163–70 suggested that these coins were minted around the end of the second or even the beginning of the first century BC by the Achaian league which was reinstated shortly after its dissolution, as Pausanias (7. 16, 10) mentions. For a summary of this controversy see Zoumbaki 2010: 116 and ns. 37 and 38.

63 de Callatay 2004: 125–156.

64 IG IX 2, 39, dated to 88/87 BC, when Lucullus undertook the office of *quaestor*.

of the Koinon of the Aeginetians and Cretan emissions under Lucullus,⁶⁵ which also display obvious similarities with the Athenian tetradrachms, seem to support the view that the coins of the Koinon of the Aeginetians were minted under Lucullus's order. It has to be stressed that coins which were minted in Greece at the command of Roman magistrates for military purposes for the payment of their troops, or even bearing the name of a Roman magistrate, were, as a rule, still of Greek types in this period. The coin types selected by the Romans should have been in any case recognizable and acceptable by the soldiers, as were the Athenian New style and the Macedonian tetradrachms.⁶⁶ A group of Late Hellenistic didrachms, struck in the name of the people of Leukas and depicting Aphrodite Aeginetia on the obverse and a prow of a galley on the reverse, display strong Roman features according to Fr. de Callatay, who assigned them—with some caution—to Sulla and his minting of currency, in order to pay his troops during the first Mithridatic war; he goes further by associating Sulla with a small group of didrachms in the name of the Akarnanian polis Thyreion and also with the period of the Mithridatic wars.⁶⁷

Lucullus therefore undertook the general coordination of the gathering of precious metal and organizing the mint, but this work was not necessarily carried out at once or in a single place. It could have been conducted on a regional level: in Athens perhaps under the supervision of his brother Marcus, on Crete, in the area of jurisdiction of the Koinon of the Aeginetians, and in the Peloponnese, as Plutarch informs us ἐκόπη τὸ πλεῖστον ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, where perhaps the Achaian Koinon could have supervised this work, irrespective of the types used, namely those of the Achaian League or of the Athenian New Style. If this is correct, it is possible that different coin-types could have been adopted in each case and it is thus useless to attempt to identify 'Lucullean' coins with a one and only type, as perhaps the term 'Lucullean' covered coinage struck for the same purpose by several mints.⁶⁸

To date, there is no general agreement as to whether Achaian silver triobols were minted for the same purpose by Lucullus. In any case, regardless of the questions relating to these coins, it is remarkable that the Achaian Koinon, like other *koina*, is epigraphically attested again during this period, after its

65 Le Rider 1968: 313–335 on emissions of Gortyna, Hierapytna, Knossos, Kydonia, Lappa, Polyrhénium, and Priansus.

66 Macedonian tetradrachms bearing the name of the quaestor Aesillas, which were apparently used to pay the Roman soldiers, see Bauslaugh 2000; Kremydi-Sisilianou 2002: 50–51.

67 De Callatay 2015.

68 For a different view see Assenmaker, forthcoming and generally on the Sullan coinage during his campaign against Mithridates see Assenmaker 2014: 167–177.

dissolution in 146 BC. Pausanias (7. 16, 10) mentions that the *koina* were dissolved in 146 BC and were reinstated shortly afterwards. An exception was apparently the Aitolian Koinon, an ally of Rome, which seems not to have been dissolved, since it is epigraphically attested even after 146 BC; it has been suggested that perhaps the Acarnanian Koinon continued to exist as well.⁶⁹ The date of reactivation of the other *koina* is unknown, and there is not sufficient evidence on their new organization and competence. It is however remarkable that the revived *koina* of the Ainianes, Athamanes, Achaians again leave traces in inscriptions exactly during this period, and this cannot be regarded as a coincidence.⁷⁰ It is interesting to mention that the *koina* in some cases honour Roman magistrates involved in economic affairs. The Koinon of the Ainianes honours the *tamias* Lucullus and is perhaps involved in minting federal coins during this period; the Achaian Koinon honours the *proquaestor* Quintus Ancharius (*IvO* 328); the Koinon of the Athamanes honours (*IG* IX 2, 613) Q. Brutius Sura, whose title is partially preserved in the fragmentary inscription as $\pi\rho\epsilon\sigma\beta\epsilon\nu\tau\eta\nu$ [- --], but appears as *leg(atu)s pro q(uaestore)* in a coin series minted on Thasos.⁷¹ It is perhaps an indication that *koina* had to cooperate with them for several works of an economic nature. The aforementioned inscription of the Aitolian Koinon in honour of Ladas, as well as references in Appian to Sulla's gathering of troops from Aitolia and Thessaly, perhaps imply that federations were assigned the additional task of recruiting soldiers.

Thus it appears that *koina* were used by Roman magistrates of this period as convenient bodies and as intermediaries for communication with individual *poleis*, and were charged by Romans with several tasks in recruitment and economic affairs, such as the collection of precious metal and organization of the mints. We are not dealing with a real reorganization of the *koina* or of the regions they represent, but with an *ad hoc* use of the pre-existing knowledge of the leagues for specific purposes, of a 'reuse' of a pre-existing mechanism, in order to absorb the vital energies of the region, their human and material resources, and invest them in the war.⁷²

69 On the Aitolian Koinon see Strauch 1996: 129–130 and n. 14 on earlier bibliography; on the Acarnanian Koinon see Schmid, Schweighart 1996: esp. 143. See also de Callatay's 2015 view on coinage of Thyreion.

70 Achaian Koinon: *IvO* 328, 333, 367, 401, 415, 420, 938, see Zoumbaki 2010: 111–127. Koinon of the Ainianes: *IG* IX 2, 39 (honorary inscription for Lucullus), see also the numismatic evidence, n. 63 above. Koinon of the Athamanes: *IG* IX 2, 613 (honorary inscription for Brutius Sura). Koinon of the Aitolians: *IG* IX 1² 1, 139 (honorary inscription for Ladas (or Ladames) after his service in Sullan army).

71 de Callatay 1998.

72 Naco del Hoyo et al. 2009: 42.

Beyond the economic exploitation and material demands from *poleis* and sanctuaries aiming at financing his military operations, Sulla appropriated whatever valuable treasure he desired. Plundering of sanctuaries and art treasures in Boeotia is reported in written sources: from the Myniae sanctuary at Orchomenos, he stole a statue of Dionysos, a work of Myron, and he dedicated it to the sanctuary of the Muses on Helikon,⁷³ whilst from the sanctuary of Athena in the Boeotian village of Alalcomenae, he removed the cult statue of the goddess and precipitated the shrine's decline.⁷⁴ On his return to Italy in the spring of 83 BC, Sulla carried precious treasures off to Italy, works of art and the valuable library of Apellikon from Teos, which was taken from Athens and was held at Sulla's villa at Cuma at least until Cicero's time.⁷⁵

Confiscations and Levies of Revenues, but also Clementia and Festivals

The issue of the treatment of Greek *poleis* in the aftermath of Sulla's victory over Pontic forces poses the question of whether Sulla took any initiative aiming at any sort of organization of the regions of Greece under his control. Literary sources attest to the fact that certain *poleis* were awarded privileges as a reward for their pro-Roman stance. Elatea was declared 'free' for its resistance to the enemy (although the nature of this freedom is not clear) and exempted from some sort of taxation (ἀτελὴ νέμεσθαι τὴν χώραν).⁷⁶ Chaeronea should have been awarded similar privileges as well, since its contribution to

73 Paus. 9.30.1. Although Pausanias compares Sulla's treatment of Orchomenos (9.33.6) to that of Athens and Thebes, there is no other indication of hostile actions against Orchomenos, see Santangelo 2007: 200.

74 Paus. 9.33.6. Santangelo 2007: 201.

75 Strabo 13.1.54 on Appelikon's library; Paus. 10.21.6 on the booty from Delphi; on a work of Zeuxis, which represented a female centaur and was sent by Sulla to Rome, but was lost in a shipwreck off Cape Malea on its way to Rome, see Lukian, *Zeuxis* 3. On confiscation of gold and silver from the Acropolis see App. *Mithr.* 39 (συννηγέθη δ' ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως χρυσοῦ μὲν ἑς τεσσαράκοντα λίτρας μάλιστα, ἀργύρου δ' ἑς ἑξακοσίας), on the transportation of columns from Olympieion to Rome see Pliny *Naturalis Historia* 30. 6. 5.45, on shields of Athenian heroes of the past which were taken by soldiers from the stoa of Zeus Eleutherios see Paus. 10. 21. 6. See Santangelo 2007: 168. On Sulla's booty from the East see Arafat 1996: 100–104; Miles 2008: 24. On the shipwreck at Mahdia, which has been regarded as a vessel which transported part of Sulla's booty from Athens and doubts on that, see Santangelo 2007: 200 n. 5.

76 Paus. 10.34.2–6; see Zachos 2013: 118–122.

the victory over Mithridates was decisive, but such privileges are not attested in the sources.⁷⁷

From the punishment of the towns on the coast opposite Chalkis (Anthedon, Larymna and Halae) only Oropos was spared, while Sulla gave privileges to the sanctuary of Amphiaraos. This is known from an inscription recording Sulla's measures sanctioned by the Senate in favour of the sanctuary and against the exploitation of the publicans. The inscription is dated to the year 73 BC, but contains the whole history of the case, and refers to arrangements by Sulla that go back to his presence in the region during the First Mithridatic War. It emerges that Sulla had declared, in consultation with a council (Λεύκιος Κορνήλιος Σύλλας αὐτοκράτωρ ἀπὸ συμβουλίου γνώμης), which was apparently a board of his staff, that certain land in the area of Oropos was to be sacred to Amphiaraos, and ordered that the revenues of the *polis* and harbour were to be used for the organization of sacrifices and games. This decision was later confirmed by the Senate (ὃ τὸ αὐτὸ ἡ σύνκλητος ἐπεκύρωσεν). The *publicani* did not challenge the granting of these privileges, but they disputed their legality on the grounds that Amphiaraos was not a god. Both sides used before the committee of the Senate quotations from several of the documents involved, such as the *lex locationis*, which contained contracts for the exploitation of the region of Oropos or generally of Boeotia.⁷⁸ It has been further suggested that privileges to Oropos were an indirect detriment to Athenian interests, as the sanctuary was previously under Athenian control.⁷⁹ Oropos and the sanctuary of Amphiaraos apparently owed their favourable treatment not only to Sulla's 'piety' towards Amphiaraos and the possible wish for indirect harm to Athens, but also to the pro-Roman attitude of a citizen, Hermodoros, son of Olympichos, who perhaps also served under Sulla, since he is called ὑπὸ τῆς συνκλήτου σύνμαχος (i.e. ally) προσηγορευμένος and was exempted from contributions to the organization of games and sacrifices in the sanctuary.⁸⁰ The inscription from Oropos shows that certain measures of economic nature concerning this region were taken by Sulla. It is noteworthy that publicans are attested here for the first time in mainland Greece. Whether their activity was regulated by Sulla's arrangements or shortly afterwards, and were involved in the levy of revenues, cannot be traced on the basis of this text. It merely emerges that in 73 BC tributes were already regularly levied by Roman publicans.

77 Morstein-Marx 1995: 281.

78 Plut. *Sull.* 23.2 derived from Sulla's Memoirs. Morstein-Marx 1995: 272–273.

79 Cosmopoulos 2001: 79; Santangelo 2007: 202.

80 IG VII 413; Sherk 1969: no. 23; Petrakos 1997: no. 308, ll. 50–51: ... Ἑρμοδώρου Ὀλυνπίχου υἱοῦ ἱερέως Ἀμφιαράου τοῦ διὰ τέλους ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ῥωμαίων μεμενηκότος ...

Further evidence shows that Sulla imposed severe punishments on regions that had not sided with Rome during his confrontation against Mithridates. He confiscated (ἀποτέμνεσθαι, Plut. *Sull.*19; Paus. 10.7.4–6) half the territory of Thebes and dedicated it to Apollo and Zeus, ordering its revenues to be paid to the sanctuaries of Delphi, Epidauros and Olympia, as a repayment for the treasures he took from them. Moreover, the donation of 10,000 *plethra* of land on Euboea to Archelaos by Sulla, before the Peace of Dardanus, raises questions as to whether this is to be explained as an arbitrary decision of the victor or as a punitive measure which implies that the land was confiscated after the battle of Orchomenos or was already previously part of the *ager publicus*.⁸¹ The latter should probably be rejected, as the sources offer no evidence (beyond Corinth and lands in Macedonia) for such confiscations before the Mithridatic Wars.⁸² Since Euboea had been the base of the Mithridatic military forces, it is plausible that Sulla would have taken various punitive measures against it, including confiscation of land or the imposition of a tribute.⁸³ A *senatus consultum* of 78 BC, concerning three naval captains, one from Clazomenae, one from Miletus and Polystratos from Karystos on Euboea,⁸⁴ who together with their descendants were exempted from both local and Roman taxation as a reward for their military assistance to the Romans, also refers to the situation that arose after the Mithridatic Wars. This shows that a tribute for certain towns (in this case Karystos on Euboea) exists thereafter.⁸⁵

It is only after Sulla's presence in Greece that confiscations of land and imposition of tributes are attested in the sources, and this can hardly be regarded as a mere coincidence. The situation that prevailed in Greece after the Achaian War is not totally clear, but an analysis of various sources shows that Romans were lenient and did not demand regular taxation from the *poleis* nor did they

81 For a discussion of this event in the context of the question whether the land of Boeotia was made *ager publicus* after the Achaian War, see Hill 1946: 38–39, who rejects the view that Theban land was already a part of the *ager publicus*, since in that case Sulla would not confiscate it, as its revenues would be lost for the Roman state and not for Thebes. See Morstein-Marx 1996: 62.

82 The suggestion was made by Reinach 1985: 197, but it is disputed by Picard 1979: 295. The statement of Livy's epitomator (Liv. *Periochae* 3), that Chalkis had the same fate as Corinth, is disputed, see Hill 1946: 39–40. Morstein-Marx 1995: 63–64.

83 Hill 1946: 41; Morstein-Marx 1995: 63.

84 *IGRR* 118; Sherck 1969: no. 22; Raggi 2001. The inscription is engraved on a bronze tablet found in Rome, see the permission awarded through the *senatus consultum* to set up a bronze tablet of friendship in the Capitolium.

85 Morstein-Marx 1995: 59–65, 278–282.

confiscate land beyond that of Corinth and in Macedonia.⁸⁶ The fact that Sulla declared certain towns or sanctuaries free from tributes shows that tributes were imposed on other *poleis*, at least in Boeotia, Phokis and Euboea, where the decisive confrontations with Mithridatic forces took place. It is after Sulla's activity that we first hear of Roman publicans at work in Greece, their first attestation being the aforementioned inscription from Oropos. In Appian's account of the situation of the regions of the East in the aftermath of the war, including old Greece and Macedonia, it is noted that many of these regions, which previously did not pay tribute to the Romans, were now subjected to it. Certain men were exempted from these tributes, such as Polystratos from Karystos and the Oropian Hermodoros, apparently because they placed themselves at Sulla's service.⁸⁷

Evidently, a new era was launched in the economic relations of Greek *poleis* to Roman rule, establishing the beginning of regular tax obligations. The sources do not allow us to determine to what extent *poleis* were now made tributary, namely whether it was a general measure or concerned towns, which displayed a clear anti-Roman attitude. Nevertheless, Sulla's measures had later to be confirmed by the Senate, because during this period, Sulla was still a *hostis* and his decisions remained without full legal force, as is clear from the number of embassies to the Senate, known from inscriptions of the next decade.⁸⁸ Given the severe measures imposed by Sulla towards *poleis* that displayed an anti-Roman stance, a striking difference is to be observed in the treatment of Athens after the horror of its siege and plundering. Despite the bloodbath and moral humiliation that followed the fall of the town, no tribute was imposed on Athens in the aftermath, while its status as *civitas libera* and its external dependencies, such as Delos, were saved, as K. Harter-Uibopuu explicitly analyzes.⁸⁹ Moreover, individuals of the anti-Roman party are later attested again as officeholders.⁹⁰ K. Harter-Uibopuu interprets this on the basis of the importance of Athens, both for Sulla's campaign further in the East and as an economic and trade centre. This amnesty seems to explain

86 Hill 1946: esp. 35–38; Morstein-Marx 1995: 62–64. See Cicero *De lege agraria* 1. 2, 5, where *ager publicus* is mentioned only for Macedonia (... *agros in Macedonia* ...) and Corinth (... *agrum optimum et fructuosissimum Corinthium* ...).

87 App. *Mithr.* 118: ... καὶ φόρους τοῖς μὲν αὐτίκα τοῖς δὲ ὕστερον ἔταξαν.... καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν Ἑλλάδα καὶ Μακεδονίαν, Μιθριδάτου περισπᾶσαντος ὁξέως ἀνελάβοντο: καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς αὐτῶν, οὐπω σφίσιν ὑποτελέσιν οὖσιν, ἐπέθηκαν φόρους.

88 Morstein-Marx 1995: 267–273, esp. n. 32. Beyond the cases already mentioned, see also the case of Thasos (Picard 1989) and Maroneia (Clinton 2003). See Santangelo 2007: 105 n. 1.

89 K. Harter-Uibopuu, forthcoming.

90 Rizakis and Zoumbaki, 2017, 163–164.

the honorary monument erected for Sulla⁹¹ and the Sylleia games attested in Athens.⁹²

Despite the grim image of Sulla that must have been impressed on Greek consciousness, and the awe and panic that the population must have experienced, honorific monuments were erected for Sulla not only in storm-tossed Athens, but also in Oropos, Akraiphia, Thespiiai and Messene.⁹³ Games named Sylleia were also perhaps established in some Achaian *poleis* or in the context of the Achaian Koinon as a fragmentary inscription from Aigion shows.⁹⁴

Sulla organized games in Thebes to celebrate his *epinikia* after the victories over Mithridates in Boeotia, but the judges were Greeks from other *poleis*, as he was hostile towards Thebans (Plut. *Sull.* 19.6). He apparently played a role in the (re)organization of festivals, which were directly or indirectly connected to his personal religious emotions and to his and Rome's glory. D. Knoepfler⁹⁵ argues that the festival of Ἐρωτίδεια Ῥωμαία in Thespiiai was the reorganization of an old festival in honour of Eros. The occasion was possibly the return of the famous statue of Eros, the work of Praxiteles, to the town from Athens where Mummius had removed it in 146 BC. Knoepfler sees Sulla behind the return of the statue, given Sulla's connection to Aphrodite,⁹⁶ and the support offered to him by Thespiiai during the war against Mithridatic forces. *Amphiaraeia Rhomaia* of Oropos and *Hekatesia Rhomaia* of Stratonicea are regarded by Knoepfler as parallels of games organized by Sulla. Festivals apparently signaled a return to regularity of life in the towns and manifested Sulla's and Rome's complete dominance over them.

The image that arises from the above analysis is that of various *ad hoc* arrangements, including punishments or awards of privileges according to the pro- or anti-Roman stance of the towns, *ad hoc* exemptions from burdens

91 *IG* II² 4103 (*SEG* 24: 214). It is perhaps more acceptable to date the honorific monument erected for him in Athens to his second sojourn in Athens after his return from Asia in 84 BC than to the years immediately after the plundering of the town.

92 *IG* II² 1039: ll. 56–58 (*SEG* 22, 110) and *SEG* 37: 135. Raubitschek 1951: 49–57, suggests that the Athenian *Sylleia* followed the institution of the Ludi Victoriae Sullanae and were actually the *Theseia* and *Epitaphia*, renamed as *Sylleia*.

93 Monuments in honour of Sulla and his wife Caecilia Metella in Greek *poleis* beyond Athens: Oropos: *IG* VII 264; Petrakos 1997: no. 442 and *IG* VII 371; Petrakos 1997: no. 443 erected for Sulla and his wife Caecilia Metella. Akraiphia: *ADelt* 23, 1968, 293–294. Thespiiai: *IThesp.* 397, 398; see Plassart 1926: no. 73 and his comments. Messene: Themelis 1998, 100, no. 3 (*SEG* 48, 496). Delos: *ID* 1850–1852.

94 Rizakis 2008: no. 125, ll. 2–6.

95 Knoepfler 1997: 17–39 (*SEG* 47: 518; 521).

96 On Sulla's connection with Aphrodite see Assenmaker 2014: 215–218

or rewards to certain individuals. It is surprising that Mithridates's general, Archelaos, is to be found among these individuals, as he was given land on Euboea. The granting of privileges to certain individuals on the basis of Sulla's personal aspirations and ties are actions, which can hardly be placed into a concrete strategic plan or into a pre-existing set of rules or institutional system prescribed by the Roman state, since such a system does not seem to have existed at this point. On the contrary, as Sulla acted during this period independently of the Roman state, on several occasions his decisions had to be confirmed later by the Senate. However, this shows precisely that these decisions were seen by *poleis* as acts of a Roman magistrate and not of an independent leader. Sulla also formally saw his actions as those of a Roman magistrate and not of an independent commander, as various details show. In this respect, it is interesting to recall that Sulla sent a report to the Senate on his campaign in the East after the treaty of Dardanus, as was the usual practice of victorious commanders. This action was normally followed by the dispatch of a commission of ten *legati* for the arrangement of the region in question. From Liv. *Per.* 83 and App. *BC* 1.77.79 it emerges that the Senate indeed sent a commission, which however did not in fact engage with the organization of the region, but merely with Sulla's personal political status.⁹⁷

Certainly, no traces of plans for a real reorganization of the exhausted towns can be observed in Sulla's *ad hoc* arrangements. Similarly, the reappearance of the *koina* apparently aimed at providing a centralized mechanism for gathering troops and money and not as a real resettlement of the regions. Even his important measures for a reorganization of Asia Minor seem to focus on gathering taxes, fines and arrears.⁹⁸ Nonetheless, Sulla's presence marked the beginning of certain developments within the towns of Greece. First of all, Sulla's rewards to his supporters made prominent individuals of Greek *poleis* realize that they had no other choice but to side with Roman power and create links with Roman magistrates, in order to defend their personal interests and those of their hometown. Furthermore, for the *poleis*, which were forced to contribute with human and economic resources to the war against Mithridates, there was no other means but the old tradition of euergetism, if they were to confront the burdensome situation that continued in the period that followed (compulsory levies in currency or provisions, billeting of troops, which in certain cases were stationed in some regions). Similarly, being on good terms with Roman residents of the *poleis* was important, both for the notables who

97 Morstein-Marx 1995: 268–269.

98 The resettling of Asia is discussed by Santangelo 2007: 107–133 (with earlier bibliography); Naco del Hoyo et al. 2011: esp. 298–304.

sought links to Roman power and to the *poleis*, which needed their support. After a period of uncertainty and insecurity caused by the advance of Pontic forces and the massacre of Westerners in Asia and on Delos (App. *Mithr.* 5.28), Roman residents of the *poleis* of mainland Greece now appear dynamically at the forefront. They indeed undertake some of the economic obligations of the towns, either as moneylenders or as local benefactors or both. Public life now begins again to leave traces in epigraphic texts after a long period of silence and stagnation (see Polybius 36.17.5).

Conclusion

The analysis undertaken above has enabled us neither to apply the label of 'warlord' to Sulla nor to remove it. 'Warlordish' features can be recognized in certain aspects of his activity during the first phase of the Mithridatic War in regard to his relationship with the central authority in Rome, with his army, and with the population under his control in mainland Greece. These levels of relations are in some degree intertwined: the more distant from central authority Sulla becomes, the more he needs to rely on his army's support and the harsher measures he imposes on Greek *poleis* in order to cover a deficit of supplies. Contradictory elements are to be observed as well. Even in the period during which Sulla as a *hostis* of Rome displays most of his 'warlordish' characteristics, he still maintains traces of a formal allegiance to the Senate. He terrifies local populations and manifests his complete dominance over them, yet in some cases he shows a merciful or fair countenance to the region that he exploits. The apparent reorganization of some regions and the establishment of festivals were used to serve his own interests, but they also manifest Rome's glory. Moreover, rewarding *poleis* or individuals for their pro-Roman attitude, and imposing economic obligations on others, appears to be set within the framework of the activity of a Roman magistrate who acts on behalf of Rome, and they were seen by the *poleis* as such, since they appeal to the Senate to confirm them later, when their privileges are threatened.

It is obvious that in the next period, it was the changes in the balance of political power in Rome that restored Sulla's status as legal representative of the Roman state, instead of an enemy and 'warlord'. However, even during the periods of formal reinstatement of his relationship with the state authorities, 'warlordish' features still remained in his behavior. It is striking that such features can still be recognized in the behavior of several magistrates even during the Imperial period, as argued by B. Rankov in this volume.

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Q. Sertorius: A Warlord in Hispania?

*Toni Naco del Hoyo and Jordi Principal**

[...] and when Sertorius challenged Metellus to single combat, they cried aloud and bade him fight, general with general, and Roman with Roman, and when he declined, they mocked at him.

PLUT. SERT. 13.5, TRANSLATED BY B. PERRIN, LOEB 1919¹



Sertorius in Hispania: A New Approach

A clear division is shown between the available ancient sources that inform us about the Roman general, Q. Sertorius, and the war he fought in Hispania against the incumbent Roman government between 83 and 72. On the one hand, authors such as Sallust and Plutarch, were pro-Sertorian, whilst on the other, Livy and Appian were anti-Sertorian.² This split in the evidence has notably influenced modern interpretations and this can be seen, for example, in the first full scale modern biography, written almost a century ago, by the German scholar, A. Schulten. Considered a true classic, this book was translated into Spanish in 1949, and has been recently re-published with a new extensive prologue and historiographical study.³

Sertorius, as a subject, has caught the attention of modern scholars in three major ways. Firstly, Sertorius's political allegiances appear in the context of a

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1 '[...] καὶ τοῦ Σερτωρίου μονομαχήσαι προκαλουμένου τὸν Μέτελλον, βοᾶν καὶ κελεύειν μάχεσθαι στρατηγὸν στρατῷ καὶ Ῥωμαῖον Ῥωμαίῳ, ἀναδεδόμενον δὲ χλεθάζειν'.

2 The literary tradition regarding Sertorius, see Schulten 2013 (1926, repr. 1949): 49–63; Neira 1986: 205–206; Konrad 1994: xlii–lvi; Salinas 2014: 23–24.

3 Schulten 2013 (1926, repr. 1949): Prol. 7–39, and chap. 16–18, 235–272. For an overview on the modern historiography on Sertorius, see Gillis 1969, Konrad 1994: xlii–lvi and his extensive bibliography for works pre-dating Schulten, and Scardigli 2002.

Rome embroiled in the First Civil War (91–70). During this period, L. Sulla had made himself dictator and soon afterwards published a list of proscriptions: Sertorius, who had aligned himself with the *populares*, was on that list. This association encouraged his ‘fugitive’ profile once he reached Hispania. His knowledge of this territory was extensive, and he had received a legitimate mandate in the region having been assigned Hispania by the prevailing government, prior to Sulla’s overthrow. When Sulla became dictator in 82 BC, he took charge of the military and political resources in Rome. With backing now from the majority of *optimates*, they were intent in finishing off the *populares* resistance once and for all. Secondly, Sertorius’s undisputable military leadership and strategic qualities have often been highlighted. This is because for a decade, he resisted the might of Rome and its better-equipped forces. Thirdly, much has been written about Sertorius’s military coalitions with certain sections of the Hispanian communities in order to resist the advances of the Republic. This fact is sometimes seen as Sertorius explicitly supporting the indigenous opposition.⁴

However, these observations are unconvincing and are limited in scope. They are specific and do not place Sertorius in a wider context. They do not describe his leadership in the conflict, nor his importance in context to the crisis of the Late Republic and neither his management of Roman authority in Hispania. Therefore, a new analytical framework for this investigation is required. Effectively, it would be extremely useful to examine some theories that link current international relations with war and other types of violent conflicts.⁵ In fact, during discussions at the conference that gave rise to this volume (Barcelona, 2013), it was implied that Sertorius could be classified as a warlord. Indeed, when applying the strict contemporary definition of the term, some aspects of his leadership in the Sertorian War equated to modern

4 The bibliography is vast, but we can highlight the following interpretations: Treves 1932; Gillis 1969; Spann 1987: 140–152; Plácido 1989; García Morá 1991a; García Morá 1991b; Konrad 1994; Roddaz 2006; Santos 2009; Sampson 2013: 103–209; Matyszak 2013.

5 Although this is a wide-ranging debate, A.M. Eckstein, especially in the last decade, has applied neo-realist theories of modern international relations to the study of war and politics in the classical era: Eckstein 2006: 1–36 (chap. 1 and 2); Eckstein 2013: 132–134. Eckstein’s thesis explains and, in some aspects, contradicts the ‘aggressive’ vision of Roman imperialism advocated by W.V. Harris (1979). However, this neo-realist focus has been recently discussed by several scholars, including P.J. Burton who applies ‘constructivist’ theories of modern international relations to classical antiquity via Roman institutions such as the *amicitia*: Burton 2011: 1–27, esp. 24–27 (ch. 1), as a summary of his view. See also Jehne and Pina Polo 2015. Even more recently, W.V. Harris has convincingly ‘stricken back’ with his aggressive view of Roman imperialism in a new, thought-provoking book; see in particular Harris 2016: 15–67.

warlordism.⁶ Therefore, this chapter aims to clarify certain difficult aspects of Sertorius's character and actions within the strict parameters of the history of the Late Republic. This approach will attempt to show how the concept of the modern 'warlord' sits alongside Sertorius' attributes.

Warlords and Warlordism: A Foreword

According to some social scientists and modern historians, it has been shown that new forms of political authority, economic influence and undoubted military dominance may have appeared in regions in which the political and military legitimacy of state representative remained suspended for various reasons. In this context, new personalities, who are relevant within or outside of the community, take over the status quo.⁷ The term warlord is frequently applied to describe these individuals. There are numerous relevant examples from the last century, but this study will highlight four. First, there are the different warlords who had leading roles in disputes for power in several Chinese regions, which lasted for decades after the fall of the last imperial dynasty (1911–1912). Secondly, we see Khun Sa—also known as the 'Opium King'—who reigned in Thailand and Burma in the 70s and 80s. Thirdly, there is Charles Taylor who ruled in Liberia and Sierra Leone at the beginning of the 90s. Both the specialised literature and the wider public regularly describe these characters as warlords. Finally, the loss of authority in state structures coupled with the logic of a war resistant to any exterior intervention, such as in Afghanistan and Somalia, implies a serious threat to international stability in Asia and Southeast Africa today.⁸

In spite of the terms 'warlord' and 'warlordism' being trivialized by parts of the media and academics who insist that they should be classified as dictators or important military leaders, specialists hardly agree on defining these

6 See, in particular, the remarks on Sertorius in the chapters by N. Rosenstein and J.W. Rich in this same book.

7 Concepts such as 'failing states' (coined at the beginning of the 1990s) or 'fragile states' (towards 2005) enjoyed certain success after 9/11 and during the first decade of this century (Lake 2008: 53–54), although various aspects have emerged against their generalised use: Nay 2013: 335–338.

8 Lary 1980: 442–444; Jackson 2003: 134–137, 139–141; Marten 2006/2007: 50–58; Hodes and Sedra 2007: 11–15, with this last work concluding with certain despair that, in the case of post-Taliban Afghanistan, 'the government's strategy of engaging warlords in the political process in order to transform them into politicians or businessmen has largely failed,' 15; Ahram and King 2012: 179–180. See, in particular, R. Grasa's final chapter of this volume.

terms in the context of those described in previous case studies.⁹ Thus, in 1999, prior to the impact 9/11 had on the collective consciousness and logically on global security, P.B. Rich demonstrated how these new categories of analysis were useful in understanding 'both low intensity conflict and contemporary forms of intentional peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention'.¹⁰ In 2013, P. Jackson stressed the need to redefine the debate on warlordism, not just in the arena of war and conflict, but also in the field of politics. This was the only way to define a term of great complexity.¹¹ On the other hand, there are models that describe a series of common characteristics, which can be used to help us analyse this fact. D. Lary, for example, studied warlordism in China, but his conclusions were limited as they were applied to a specific region.¹² Recently, P. Jackson postulated five shared characteristics of a warlord borne out of case studies of varying origins and chronology:

1. The collapse of central power.
2. The use of violence to control a specific region.
3. The imposition of rules to coexist in order to enable the maintenance of a 'new order'.
4. The creation of government structures once the State has been replaced.
5. A certain desire for internationalisation especially regarding economic structures.¹³

Furthermore, A. Giustozzi insisted on emphasising, above any other consideration, the lack of political legitimacy amongst warlords, especially when

9 Jackson 2003: 134.

10 Rich 1999: 94. Likewise, the following year J. MacKinlay presented a definition of 'warlord' focused on its extensive military and political autonomy regarding any other form of power in the region: MacKinlay 2000: 48: 'In this study the term 'warlord' refers to the leader of an armed band, possibly numbering up to several thousand fighters, who can hold territory locally and at the same time act financially and politically in the international system without interference from the state in which he is based.'

11 Jackson 2003: 132: 'The term warlord has become synonymous with racketeering, violence and civilian misery, but this narrow, media-driven image is only part of the story. Warlords are not irrational anarchists, but an alternative form of governance system that has historically emerged during periods of central political collapse, either from an empire, or a 'state'.

12 Lary 1980: 441: 'The possession of autonomous military force, the control of a base region, the use of force as the final arbiter, the reliance on personal rather than impersonal patterns of rule, and a ruthless and extractive attitude towards society and the economy'

13 Jackson 2003: 137–139.

attributing military competencies and public representation in a restricted region, in the context of a generalised anarchy when the original state had virtually ceased to function.¹⁴ According to Giustozzi, a warlord must fulfil nine characteristics beyond his geographical or historical designation:

1. Recognises himself as a charismatic leader.
2. Needs periodic military successes to legitimise him as such.
3. Has total control over his military forces.
4. Exercises political control over the region once the former centralised State has collapsed.
5. Uses violence to maintain his position of power.
6. Therefore, effectively lacking political legitimacy.
7. Compensates for the absence of the State with paternalistic attitudes regarding the population.
8. Prioritises his personal or familial interest above any other consideration.
9. Prefers the substitution of the pre-existing State with his own State structures, and favours not to exercise substantial changes on the level of their conception.¹⁵

Finally, K. Marten has similarly addressed the need to establish some predominant features common to warlords. Taken from the most renowned case studies, with the exception of, for example, medieval Europe, they only originate from very recent periods in history and on a global scale.¹⁶

Indeed, an examination of the last point shows that the evidence employed by social scientists who have debated the characteristics of warlordism, does not usually include the classical world.¹⁷ The reason for this is because, in general, the discussion has barely aroused the interest of researchers dedicated to the study of the relationship between war and politics in antiquity. However, one exception is C.R. Whittaker who is frequently mentioned in various

14 Giustozzi 2005: 9, 'We could therefore define a warlord as a non-state politico-military actor who has military legitimacy, but little or no political legitimacy.'

15 Giustozzi 2005: 14.

16 Marten 2006–2007, 48: 'First, trained, armed men take advantage of the disintegration of central authority to seize control over relatively small slices of territory. Second, their actions are based on self-interest, not ideology. Third, their authority is based on charisma and patronage ties to their followers. Fourth, this personalistic rule leads to the fragmentation of political and economic arrangements across the country, disrupting the free flow of trade and making commerce and investment unpredictable. Savvy actors react by limiting their economic activity to local regions.'

17 Jackson 2003: 135–136, for example, concentrates his attention primarily on the Dark Age, the period following the end of Roman Britain, which was finally abandoned in AD 410.

chapters in this book. He deems it necessary to justify using 'warlord' in the title of his essay, dedicating the final pages of it to a comparative analysis of the term used between the Late Roman Empire and the Chinese Empire from 1911–1912. These brief pages set the template for further detailed deliberations on the issue.¹⁸

As a result of the processes involved in decolonisation during the 20th century and particularly the ending of the Cold War, terms like 'warlords' were used to correspond with those that benefited from the power vacuum left by large powers in certain regions. M. Zimmermann proposed a similar analysis on the process of privatisation of political power to the management of war and violence in the Greco-Roman world.¹⁹ He is of the view that warlord is a useful term when applied to historical contexts when control of the State is significantly weakened, for example: the emergence, from the Archaic period of known mercenary leaders in Classical Greece, along with aspects of piracy and organised banditry witnessed throughout the Mediterranean. Zimmermann goes on to highlight numerous cases in the Roman courts that warn of a progressive increase in illegal appropriation by the ruling classes of the Roman Republic, and of plunder and riches obtained as a result of war in Rome's expansion of the Mediterranean region. Some Roman leaders organised 'private wars' from which to profit and gain political kudos.²⁰ This was a widespread practice particularly in the Late Roman Republic. Likewise, A. Keaveney suggested in his, 'Sulla the warlord and other mythical beasts', the idea that some of his activities and the use of warlord in the case of Sulla relate to the extrapolation of the narrative of a much more advanced period of the civil wars. S. Zoumbaki discusses his views in detail in this volume.²¹

It became clear in cordial, but arduous, discussions in Barcelona (2013) that classical languages do not have specific definitions for the terms under

18 Whittaker 1993: 298–300. In p. 298: 'I have used the term 'warlord' to describe some of the actors, such as federate chiefs, in the later Empire, who controlled personal armies and I have tried to separate them from landlords, although, as I have argued, the distinction became increasingly blurred as the state army declined.' MacGeorge 2002: 2 is less precise when, in a work titled *Late Roman Warlords*, he dedicates just a few lines in the Introduction to the definition of this term: 'As the basis of their political power was military power, they, and other similar men, have often been referred to as warlords.' For more about the Late Roman period, see Wijnendaele's chapter in this volume.

19 Rich 1999: 78–79, 85–86. Zimmermann 2010: 27–29 also explores the use of 'condottiero' outside of its context in Renaissance Italy.

20 Zimmermann 2010: 29–40. A similar viewpoint, although more focused on piracy in Greece, is offered by Meissner 2010.

21 Keaveney 2005: 297–302, based on the comparison of Plutarch and a similar passage in Appian *Bellum Civile* 5.27.

discussion. We must emphasise the risk involved when uncritically applying modern terms to the remote past's institutions and its contexts. N. Fields, for example, in his recent book entitled, '*Warlords of the Roman Republic. Caesar versus Pompey*', highlights, in his final chapter, the decisive role of 'individuals who wielded vast amounts of power' calling them 'warlords [who] refused to accept the amateurish consular system [and who] put their own interests first before those of the state'. Fields could have, perhaps, used terms such as 'dynast' or 'triumvir' to refer to Caesar and Pompey. In reality, in Fields's book the military and political power of both individuals is not the central theme, neither do we find a terminological discussion of the term 'warlord', particularly the interpretive dimensions applied to it by social scientists.²²

Having highlighted the modern definitions of warlord by our social science and modern history colleagues, attention is now turned to their specific relation to Sertorius, in an attempt to see whether those descriptions match or fail to match his sojourn in Hispania. This analysis will focus on four areas. In the first place, Sertorius's significance as a military leader will be outlined. Secondly, the degree of Hispanic heterogeneous integration (or its absence) during the war will be addressed. Thirdly, Sertorius's political role and its often-discussed legitimacy (or its absence) during the conflict will be analysed, and the Sertorian initiative to construct what is considered to be 'state structures' in Hispania, will be of particular interest. Finally, the aim of the analysis will be to develop the international dimension of the conflict from a military and political assessment. We firmly believe that this investigation will create a solid case for the link between war and politics in the Late Roman Republic, and furthermore, ensure improvement and establish the understanding of Sertorius and his activities. From the day he departed in 83/2 to the defeat of his followers not long after his assassination in 72, Sertorius could be deemed a true 'warlord' when applying the contemporary meaning of the term.

Q. Sertorius as a Military Leader

One of Sertorius's greatest assets was his military leadership. He exuded charisma, inspired bravery in his troops and convinced, led and guided them in

22 Fields 2008: 186. Likewise, Sampson 2013: 2, 'To this end, we must move beyond seeing the war as Marians vs. Sullans, terms used by many both in ancient and modern times. This was not a war of *Optimates* vs. *Populares*, but a civil war more marked by the collapse of the central authority and the rise of warlords, as seen in the collapse of the Chinese Empire in the early twentieth century or many of the modern African civil wars'.

battle. He also generated trust and loyalty. The men under his command respected his authority, rank and actions. Roman troops even stood by him when the war was losing its direction. They placed his prestige and qualities as a general, and the act of following a victorious commander who is skilled in the art of war, before the legitimacy of their endeavours or a pardon granted by the Senate (App. *BC* 1.112). Sertorius was also a great strategist with an excellent tactical sense, which enabled him to tackle adverse situations with confidence, risks and bravery.²³ Likewise, he was a strong courageous man. He fought, apparently, at the battle of Arausio in 105²⁴ and made an impact in the campaigns against the Cimbri and Teutones in 102/1, under the command of C. Marius. It is here that we learn of Sertorius's ability to understand war, particularly knowledge of the territory, its inhabitants, their world-view and the concepts that determined their social and political behaviour. For instance, some authors place him, between 104/103–101, as the *praefectus* to a *turma* (or even an *ala*) of auxiliary cavalry, as a result of his equestrian status and after having served with Q. Servilius Caepio (cos. 106) as a *contubernalis* before the disaster of Arausio. Such an ascent would be inspired, (as described in Plutarch *Sertorius* 3.4) by his proven bravery and ability during the campaign. In fact, Plutarch highlights his συνέσεως ἔργα ('acts/works of intelligence', translation by the authors) as one of the causes for such an ascent.²⁵

Sertorius quickly learned that 'intelligence gathering and infiltration' was an important military resource. He understood that it was a significant diplomatic and political asset as it enabled him to manipulate and understand the idiosyncrasies of the indigenous peoples. By employing such tactics, he was able to earn trust, respect, devotion, and ultimately defeat them. These qualities, charisma, fearlessness and empathy were put to good use on several occasions: as a spy for Marius in the war with the Cimbri and Teutones;²⁶ psychological manipulation when opening the tomb of Antaeus in Africa;²⁷ similarly, the story of the white fawn²⁸ used as propaganda to influence native communities and Romans alike.²⁹ Equally, Sertorius's use of monomachy against

23 Plut. *Sert.* 10.2–3; App. *BC* 1.18; Frontinus, *Strategemata* 1.5.1; 1.10.1–2; 2.5.31; 2.12.2. It has been suggested that commentaries or works on the stratagems or tactics used by Sertorius may have existed: Gillis 1969: 722.

24 Scardigli 2002: 148.

25 García Morá 1989: 95–96; 1991a: 135; Santos 2009: 179.

26 Plut. *Sert.* 3. 3–4; García Morá 1989: 95; Naco del Hoyo 2014: 415.

27 Plut. *Sert.* 9.6–11; Strabo 17.3.8. For Sertorius's African journey: see Mederos 2008.

28 Plut. *Sert.* 11.3–8, García Morá 1992; Coppola 2006.

29 Moret and Pailler 2002.

Q. Metellus Pius has similar connotations.³⁰ Importantly, single-combat was a deep-rooted institution amongst Hispanians with its clear sense of heroic ritual and expression of *virtus*.³¹ It was also part of an old Roman war ritual linked to aristocratic ideals. However, by the beginning of the first century it had entered a significant decline³² rarely used and even scorned upon.³³ Sertorius's challenge could be interpreted as ambivalent in two ways: first, by siding with monomachy, which was ever present in the customs and ideals of Hispanians, which reinforced his charismatic leadership among the natives; and secondly, by relating to the classic Roman practice, thus making him old-fashioned and the champion of Roman traditions. Indeed, Sertorius's image as a defender of the *mos maiorum* is in sharp contrast to that of Sulla who exhibited no respect for either tradition or institutions.³⁴ This approach, to constantly explain and clarify Sertorius's *Romanitas* for the purpose of underlining his moral superiority and legitimacy, is necessary, because in Sertorius's view, his enemies were ignoble, and violated and disgraced their ancestral customs. Not only do we believe that such 'propaganda' could be used by Sertorius to further justify the institutional legitimacy of his actions (as discussed later), but it could also be interpreted as a latent response to the political setback and personal frustration he felt when Sulla thwarted his election to tribune of the plebs in 88 (Plut. *Sert.* 4.6).

Sertorius's image as a military leader certainly maintains a kind of interesting and calculated ambiguity. As a Roman magistrate, his military power stemmed from the mandate he legitimately received from Rome. But he was also a charismatic and highly regarded military commander in the style of proto-state chiefdoms or primitive state organizations.³⁵ A chief, who would lead his men into combat with a certain mythical air³⁶ would ultimately share their

30 Plut. *Sert.* 13.5; García Morá 1993: 381–382.

31 Fernández Nieto 1992; Gracia 2003: 52–53; Olmos 2003.

32 Harris 1979: 38–39; Oakley 1985.

33 Indeed, Metellus himself mocked the challenge; Plut. *Sert.* 13.6.

34 La Penna 1963; Katz 1983: 361; Santos 2009: 180–181. Likewise, Gillis 1969: 727 believes 'Sertorius was a soldier, with a soldier's respect for law and order. Not a reactionary, but a conservative willing to work through established channels of power.'

35 Muñiz 1994: 94; Ciprés 2002: 148–149; Gracia 2003: 56–57; for example, the case of the Ilergetan chieftain/*rex* Indibilis (Riera and Principal 2015: 62–65), but excluding the royal or the aristocratic component for the Sertorian case. On Sertorius's charismatic power—along with 'real outsiders' such as the rebel Eunus and the slave Spartacus—, see Harris 2016: 106.

36 Sertorius was again a great exponent of propaganda. A good example is the 'loss of one eye' episode in the Social War (Plut. *Sert.* 4.3–4). It has been suggested that the

fate and living conditions, and distribute gifts or favours among notable and loyal groups.³⁷ Such merits strengthened the military clientele and the scope of *devotio* among Hispanians.³⁸ Plutarch, for instance, describes Sertorius's Hispanian entourage (*Sert.* 14. 4–6) as a group of numerous warriors who had devoted their lives to that of the general, who would put his life before theirs, and who would incur the same fate as their leader. Actions like these share a clear, bi-univocal and military dependence that mutually links warriors and military commanders. Furthermore, there is a religious element that implies a sacred connection with a warlike chieftain. Therefore, a favourable position could be won amongst the gods through one's actions in war. Sertorius perfected this religious notion too, as in the case of the white fawn and the sacrifice at the tomb of Antaeus.³⁹

Sertorius earned respect and was thus able to preserve his authority between the Hispanians under his command.⁴⁰ His knowledge of their social, military and political structures encouraged this. Indeed, because of it, the powerful Lusitanians conceded power to him (*Plut. Sert.* 10.1 and 11.1–2). Accordingly, Sertorius's knowledge and portrayal as a flexible military leader enabled him to change the military nature of the native communities to the combat dynamics

exaggeration behind Sertorius's 'scars of war' may have come about because in the post-Marian military community, the importance of honorary military rewards, was lost. Therefore, these 'scars' would be seen as a sign of bravery and much more appreciated by troops in a post-Marian economic and psychological climate, Harmand 1967: 469, n. 204. On the other hand, this same anecdote, which was no more important for a Roman than an anecdote recalling an act of bravery worthy of consideration and respect, could entail a religious message for the Hispanians: comparing Sertorius to certain gods or mythical characters with a military nature (Moeller 1975). Even if this were the case, we would find ourselves faced, once again, with this intriguingly ambiguous outline of Sertorius.

37 *Plut. Sert.* 10.4 and 14.2. Muñiz 1994: 99–100; Ciprés 2002: 151.

38 In general: Ramos Loscertales 1924; Rodríguez Adrados 1946; Dopico 1994; Quesada 2003: 114–116; Greenland 2006. For the Sertorian case: Blázquez 2001: 49; Ciprés 2002: 149–151; Ramsey 2015: xix. However, and like Quesada 2003: 115–116, we reckon that this type of military clientele would require any kind of servitude or loss of freedom on behalf of the individuals involved.

39 Ciprés 2002: 115–116. This idea is not related to the Roman Republican concept of *devotio* in a military context: Versnel 1976. However, points of contact could be found in the religious idea of the dedication pact in which the life of the individual appears as a guarantee, although neither the meaning nor the purpose would be the same. Konrad 1994: 144.

40 In this regard, his 'fabulous' and legendary component: Paillet 2000.

employed by the Romans, thus transforming his troops into a fearsome army.⁴¹ In other words, he intelligently led the local Hispanian population towards a more intense 'Romanisation' via the calculated and directed promotion of Rome's warrior ethos. Sertorius's initial army in Hispania was formed by troops brought with him from Italy, the few forces found throughout the peninsula and Hispania Romans recruited *ad hoc*; in fact, he seemed to trust, militarily speaking, more in this contingent during his first year of government than in the friendship and contributions of the native people.⁴²

Q. Sertorius and the Hispanians: Dissolution and Integration

When Sertorius crossed the Pyrenees in late 83/early 82 to become governor of Hispania Citerior, the scene that he encountered there cannot be fully deduced from the written sources. It is plausible, from Plut. *Sert.* 6.7, that the interventionism of some former governors and their policies of exaction meted out on the Hispanians, provoked a certain level of hostility towards Roman occupation.⁴³ However, this was not the general case for the whole peninsula. The situation reported by Plutarch deals mostly with recently subjugated and precarious areas of Hispania Citerior (Meseta, between the Guadiana and the Tagus, and the Duero Valley), as well as other, permanently pacified areas with a greater impact of Roman administration, such as part of the Catalan coast or the lower Ebro Valley.⁴⁴ From the end of the Numantine War in 133 to the arrival of Sertorius, the latter experienced certain degrees of recovery and development in spite of continuous warfare. Plutarch infers that a demographic increase among the local Hispanians can be presumed without a period of cer-

41 Plut. *Sert.* 14.1. Manners and tactics that Sertorius adapted and made more understandable to the indigenous peoples. However, not only did they affect the manner of comprehending the fight, they were also almost certainly accompanied by the adoption of an organisational, coordination and general logistics system that the Hispanians did not possess or know of: Cadiou 2004.

42 Plut. *Sert.* 6.9. However, the supposedly differential treatment the general showed towards his 'barbarian' troops occasionally generated tensions and complaints among the Roman people (App. *BC* 1.112); Gabba 1958: 309–313 (n. 520–524). Moreover, surely complaints emerged among the Hispanians given that administrative roles were only trusted to Romans (Plut. *Sert.* 22.5–6). Despite all of this, Sertorius's prestige, talent and empathetic intelligence managed to keep the army sufficiently united until his death.

43 As has been considered using the example of the *Tabula Contrebiensis*: Beltrán Lloris 1996: 139.

44 Roldán 1980: 170.

tain economic prosperity that preceded and accompanied it. From this, one can perhaps understand the reason for magisterial greed at this time. Likewise, Plutarch's reference (*Sert.* 6.7) to φόρων ἀνέσει τοὺς πολλούς ('hostile to the empire in all its aspects', translated by B. Perrin, Loeb 1919) raises the question as to whether the uneasiness of the local Hispanians, coupled with the explicit action of Roman magistrates, could be interpreted as a situation derived from the new role of Roman administrators, who generated social and economic tensions, in the heart of these towns. Rome's inability to assume administrative control of newly subdued areas led to the Republic supporting and favouring the local elite, as well as promoting certain centres or groups instead of others. This patronage and backing surely implied the intention of oligarchies to subvert the traditional order of the indigenous communities, to control economic resources, and to permanently capture spaces of power; in other words, the political and social solidarity networks that had ensured order within indigenous societies would be weakened until they disappeared.⁴⁵

Indeed, the situation in Citerior was rather inadequate. Recently, subjugated territories in the Meseta and Duero Valley areas continued to experience phases of instability. This can be seen in two ways: one, a Roman administrative presence based solely on military control with the demand of supplies and auxiliary troops required for the army; and secondly, the negative economic conditions linked to a scarcity of resources, the scant development of urban structures, and the small impact of trade and contact with exogenous elements. However, in the Catalan and Levante coastal regions and the mid and lower Ebro valley, which were pacified at this time, signs of Romanisation were prevalent. Although the Celtiberian wars did not directly affect these Iberians⁴⁶ or their territories, the change to their land at this time, afforded it certain economic prosperity and recovery. The ports were used to transport shipments and supplies. Logistical convoys and military units moved towards several war locations in the interior of the peninsula. Such activities called for an administrative structure and infrastructure to guarantee the effectiveness of all measures. In the second half of the second century, it was Rome's goal to consolidate these measures. Not surprisingly, from the fall of Numantia to the beginning of the Sertorian War, two or perhaps three senatorial commissions

45 Roldán 1980: 165; Pina Polo 1993: 93; Konrad 1994: 89–95; Revilla and Santacana 2015: 86; García Riaza 2015: 130–131.

46 We understand 'Iberian peoples' as the 'second Iron Age indigenous communities' inhabiting the Mediterranean area of the Iberian Peninsula and its immediate hinterland: Harrison 1988; Sanmartí 2009: 49–50.

were dispatched to Hispania (132, 101 and 95/4) with the mission to organise its affairs, ineffective though they were.⁴⁷

Slowly but surely, the Romans were exerting their authority on the peninsula. Evidence of this can be seen with the establishment of an administrative management system affording flexible control and protection. Also, at this point in time, the first Roman 'roads' were being constructed to provide a network to facilitate communications and the transport of goods (mainly military).⁴⁸ Nonetheless, between 132 and 98, Citerior shows no signs of steady governmental control. In the fragmentary *Fasti* assigned to the province, no evidence of a *praetor* is indicated.⁴⁹ However, there is confirmation of the existence of promagistrates who aided in the construction of roads: the names of the proconsuls Q. Fabius Labeo and Manius Sergius were discovered on milestones dating back to the last quarter of the second century.⁵⁰

The Roman impact in this period can also be observed with the development of large scale Roman settlements: almost cities in some cases. The written sources, but mainly the archaeological evidence, attest to this.⁵¹ Unfortunately, some of them suffered violent destructions during the Sertorian War.⁵² However, archaeology gives us a glimpse that the foundation behind certain types of town/city, constructed by the Romans, did not necessarily meet the needs and objectives or execution, as others did. Their origins appear quite diverse. Some, like La Caridad and La Cabañeta, were formed from the settlement (or resettlement) of the indigenous population and Italian elements. Others were clearly Italian, army veterans, as in the case of *Valentia*. We can, therefore, perceive that with the new Roman infrastructure came the development of towns and proto-cities, some of which were used to control areas of conflict. Other well established cities, like *Emporion* (mod. Empúries, Girona)

47 Richardson 1986: 156–157; Pina Polo 1997: 83–104.

48 Ariño et al. 2004: 123–124.

49 Ñaco del Hoyo, Principal 2012: 170.

50 Fabre et al. 1984: 211; Richardson 1986: 167; Salinas 1995: 82–83; Díaz Ariño 2008: 90–92.

51 Perhaps *Valentia* (mod. València), founded in 138, is the most noteworthy (Ribera 2006). Also founded were La Caridad (Caminreal, Teruel), La Cabañeta (El Burgo de Ebro, Zaragoza) (Vicente 2005; Ferreruela and Mínguez 2002) as well as Ca l'Arnau-Can Mateu (Cabrera de Mar, Barcelona), built at the foot of the old *oppidum* of Burriac (Cabrera de Mar, Barcelona), capital of the *Laietani*; both settlements, one markedly indigenous, the other Roman-Italian, coexisted until the beginning of the first century, when they were abandoned following the foundation of the town of *Iluro* (mod. Mataró) (Martín Menéndez and García Roselló 2002).

52 La Caridad, La Cabañeta and *Valentia*. The first two never were re-occupied, while *Valentia* was re-founded in Augustus time.

and *Tarraco* (mod. Tarragona), which were under Roman influence at the beginning of their occupation, were great examples of this new initiative.⁵³

At this time, a profound transformation of the rural landscape can also be detected. It changed from being an arrangement of exploiting local lands to a colonial-style system. An intensive and systematic occupation of flat areas occurred with simple huts, farms and even villages. As a result, agricultural production increased. Changes in the form of labour are clearly visible when compared to the traditional methods of the second Iron Age populations.⁵⁴ According to some authors, this occupation began as a resettlement of local groups with the presence of some Italian settlers. Thus, this system was based on a certain level of rational planning related to agriculture and trade.⁵⁵

Therefore, a new wave of urban developments was constructed in Hispania Citerior by the beginning of the first century and the start of the Sertorian War.⁵⁶ As such, these settlements were born as clear centers of Roman power, models of social life and territorial control, actual strongholds of the imperial Roman Republic destined to become the base for a new provincial order, but with the collaboration and acquiescence of the local elites.⁵⁷ These new foundations show clear evidence of a different territorial organisation, almost

53 *Emporion*: Aquilué et al. 2006; *Tarraco*: Mar et al. 2015: 27–207. Maintenance and repairs were part of these dynamics: this may be also observed in cities of the same category such as *Saguntum* (mod. Sagunt, València) (Aranegui 2006) or *Carthago Nova* (Ramallo 2006).

54 Martín Ortega and Plana 2001; Plana and Revilla 2008.

55 Revilla 2004; Revilla and Santacana 2015: 87–91. It has also been suggested that one way to secure the population and establish administrative control aimed at implementing a tax system was the creation of a centuriated landscape for the allocation of land to new settlers: Palet and Orengo 2011. Although the hypothesis on the occupation and colonisation of the territory is rather attractive, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove the setting of a permanent taxation system on the land. As we have already demonstrated, Ñaco del Hoyo 2007, the dynamics of Rome's actions in Hispania were not this precise. On the other hand, the need to structure the territory at this point was originated from fundamentally military needs and definitely was linked to the logistics system, Ñaco del Hoyo and Principal 2012.

56 Examples include: *Gerunda* (mod. Girona), *Blandae* (mod. Blanes, Girona), *Iluro* (mod. Mataró, Barcelona), *Baetulo* (mod. Badalona, Barcelona), *Iesso* (mod. Guissona, Lleida), *Aeso* (mod. Isona, Lleida), *Auso* (mod. Vic, Barcelona), *Ilerda* (mod. Lleida) and *Osca* (mod. Huesca), Pina Polo 1993; Keay 1995; Guitart 2006. Their legal status at this initial period remains unknown. However, it is likely that most of them became *municipia* during the beginning of the Principate: Pina Polo 1993: 92.

57 Pina Polo 2011: 47–49; for an even more indigenist perspective, see Keay 2006: 224–227.

certainly adapted in each case to the social context and significance of every settlement.⁵⁸

This is the Hispania that Sertorius encountered upon his arrival in Citerior: well assimilated and advanced areas of Roman influence as well as areas of local traditional socioeconomic forms on Iron Age settlements. His initial strategy was to win over the native communities⁵⁹ and to distance himself from the previous administration.⁶⁰ Sertorius's best bet was to influence the local Hispanians in order to exploit the available human and economic resources, but at no point did this support translate to promises of freedom from Roman control or the formation of independent political organisations (Plut. *Sert.* 22.6). Sertorius still considered the locals as an issue of the struggle and political quandary that was connected to Rome. Sertorius believed that he was the true Roman, on Roman soil, and as will be discussed later, acting with a conviction he felt legitimate. His so-called policy of 'Romanisation' can be seen in several activities including the introduction of Roman fighting methods (Plut. *Sert.* 14.1) and the creation of the famous school at *Osca* for the sons of native aristocrats.⁶¹

Before the arrival of Sertorius, the foundations of *Romanitas* were being implemented. During and following Sertorius's tenancy in Hispania, its process, provincially, was augmented. In fact, the indigenous population that attempted to reject Roman domination eventually found itself, perhaps contradictorily, bound to it. In the Sertorian case, the more they were committed to his cause, the more they became immersed in the Roman world, increasingly moving

58 In this regard, archaeology shows examples that range from the typical geometrical centuriated division of plots (in the case of *Iesso*) to the existence of an *ager arcifinius* that appears to follow a pre-Roman pattern, seemingly attributable to a local practice (in the cases of *Iluro* and *Baetulo*): Ariño et al. 2004: 181–184.

59 Plutarch (*Sert.* 6.9) informs us that what Sertorius desired and obtained was 'ἡ εὐνοία τῶν βαρβάρων', the favour of the barbarians or, in other words, of the native communities, not that of the Italians or provincial Hispanians of the regions that were pacified earlier. Did Sertorius already have their support or did he simply believe that as governor, their obedience was guaranteed by default? It is very likely that Sertorius felt comfortable with the town-foundation and territorial structuring programmes started before his arrival; and he must have been necessarily aware of its progression.

60 Hence his first actions, Plut. *Sert.* 6.7; 8, with which he again demonstrated great empathetic intelligence and knowledge of the indigenous world.

61 *Sert.* 14.3–5. In theory, he trained them so that, in the future, they would integrate into Roman public administration. Furthermore, the parents of the residents at Sertorius' school were pleased to see their children interact with Romans. Therefore, the school in *Osca* was a clear example of Roman integration which also had the full acceptance of the local elite, Plut. *Sert.* 25.6. See Spann 1987: 80–81; Plácido 1989: 100; García Morá 1991b: 173–174; Konrad 1994: 142–144; Richardson 1996: 100–101.

away from their own traditions. It would be fair to say that Sertorius was instrumental in the process of Romanisation. Through him, the local Hispanians were confronted and introduced to a framework of Roman politics where they enjoyed active roles in the resolution of social, economic and political problems that affected the *urbs* and its empire.

Sertorius: A Legitimate, Political and Military Leader?

In a relatively unknown lecture, delivered a few decades ago, M.I. Finley highlighted the need to reflect on the nature of authority and its obedience in classical antiquity. Accordingly, the mechanisms by which this 'authority' was strengthened by the use of genuine ideological constructs should be considered. For example, one of these constructs consisted of a speech on legitimacy in which he, who unlawfully held power, was capable of creating in the same way that it transpired throughout history and up to the present day.⁶² It is the opinion of current historians and social scientists that, in many cases, leaders who accumulate military and political abilities over determined territories of a state, or a failing state, thus challenging their authorities, feel the need to equip their leadership with a certain degree of legitimacy. When a leader's power does not settle on legality as it would have originally, sustaining the original elements of this power over a discussion that affords them political legitimacy, it enables these actual 'warlords' to strengthen, through trust, links with their own followers. In turn, they offer their leaders the necessary stability to guarantee them a certain degree of continuity, in power, which gives them a united front against any exterior enemy who questions their legitimacy. As such, these individuals are then capable of maintaining and consolidating their power in the territory they occupy and against the population that inhabit it. This close union could only eventually be broken by external forces.⁶³

In the first century, authority was formally respected in terms of the institutions of the State. But during specific periods, rival political factions managed to alter and control the composition of the Senate and access key magistracies. As such, new majorities, conditioned by the partisan fight, imposed political decisions at the service of these new interests. Consequently, the legitimacy of

62 Finley 1982: 10–11; 12; 20–21.

63 'Experience shows that in no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the appeal to material or effectual or ideal motives as a basis for its continuance. In addition, every such system attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy', Weber 1978: 213. Giustozzi 2005: 7; 9; Zimmermann 2010: 34; 42; Marten 2006–2007: 43–44.

the institutions, as a whole, was questioned in one sense or another.⁶⁴ Thus, Sertorius and his Roman supporters in Hispania appreciated their politically legitimate positions, as granted to them by the State under the strict controls, traditionally exercised, by the *populares*. Sertorius, who was allied to the Cinno-Marian regime, suffered a humiliating defeat in the elections for tribunate of the plebs in 88. Opposed to his political advancement was Sulla who was then consul (Plut. *Sert.* 4.6). According to Sallust (*Historiae* 1.88), the cause was *per innobilitatem*, meaning that he belonged to a family whose members never previously occupied curule magistracies. Sertorius did not forget this affront inflicted by the *optimates* but particularly by Sulla himself. To Sertorius, his political career had been thwarted by the *ignobilitas-indignitas* of his lineage by a group who themselves disrespected traditions and behaved ignobly. However, any unlawfulness from the *optimates* should not justify Sertorius's own impropriety as it would imply that he recognized his actions, and as a consequence, his lack of legitimacy. In our view, Sertorius believed wholeheartedly in his legitimate role and his subsequent actions as a representative of the true Rome. It is paramount to emphasise Sertorius's *Romanitas*, culturally and morally and, to demonstrate, similarly, that of his enemies.⁶⁵

Due to the fragmentary nature of the evidence, establishing a date for Sertorius's praetorship is difficult. However, with his arrival in Hispania in late 83/early 82, we can assume he was praetor at this juncture in time because of the requirement, which that rank normally carried: the governorship of a province, in this case Hispania. In 83, events were hastened, due to the Civil War in Italy being accelerated when Sulla landed in Italy from the East. The *optimates* that were exiled by the previous Cinno-Marian government, returned with him. The *populares* cause eventually disintegrated. Scipio's army had defected to Sulla; the second consul, Norbanus, was defeated and he committed suicide; also routed were the new military leaders of the *populares*, the younger Marius and Carbo. Sertorius, who had envisaged this collapse, sought refuge in Etruria where the *populares* still had a significant following, and began to recruit new troops there. Once conscripted, Sertorius left Italy for Hispania with his troops.⁶⁶ However, we learn from Sallust's epitomist, Exuperantius, that Sertorius returned to Rome first, from Etruria, not only to receive his assignment, but also with orders to take care of several matters in Transalpine Gaul. The incumbent proconsul there at this time was, C. Valerius Flaccus

64 Mulligan 2005: 356–359; Morstein-Marx and Rosenstein 2006: 632–633; Hölkeskamp 2010: 70; Flaig 2011: 74–76; Laignoux 2011: 51–63; Morstein-Marx 2011: 275–277.

65 Treves 1932: 139; Gillis 1969: 714–716; Santos 2009: 180.

66 Plut. *Sert.* 6.1–2; App. *BC* 1.86; 108; Velleius Paterculus 2.25.4; Florus 2.10.1–2; Exuper. 7.43–48; Ampelius 18.17; Scardigli 1971: 239–240; Konrad 1994: 84–89; Strisino 2002.

(cos. 93). According to the evidence, he had been simultaneously in charge of both Citerior and Transalpine Gaul for the previous decade.⁶⁷

Nevertheless, the political situation had completely changed. With the *optimates* now in charge in Rome, they decided to dispatch a new magistrate, C. Annius Luscus, to Hispania (Plut. *Sert.* 7.1). His mission was to eradicate Sertorius who, in their eyes, had lost his legitimacy as a magistrate. Annius was also charged with pursuing any exiles and outlaws of the Cinno-Marian regime.⁶⁸ Sertorius knew he would be hunted, so upon his arrival in Hispania, he needed to cultivate an alliance with peregrine communities. His first measure was specifically aimed at the elite and at the powerful, on whom a large part of the province's administrative control rested: he improved his personal conduct which, as governor and representative of Rome, he had to demonstrate to indigenous aristocrats, probably strengthening links of personal *amicitia* on a reciprocal level (Plut. *Sert.* 6.7). Thus, with the loyalty shown from troops conscripted in Etruria, coupled with Roman allies drafted in Hispania, Sertorius could turn his attention to recruiting troops from the *Hispani*.⁶⁹ The second measure was more generalised and was aimed at the mass of the population. He did this by setting limits to traditional Roman abuse of billeting troops in Hispanian communities (Plut. *Sert.* 6.8). Indications now point to Sertorius being in a favourable position: backed by a political cause and a strengthened military backing attests to this.⁷⁰

With a confident backing now established in Hispania from the inception of the conflict, Sertorius's legitimate position resembles the definition of a warlord similarly to those in other periods of history. There is evidence that

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- 67 Exuper. 7.49–50, and esp. 50: *misere in citeriorem Hispaniam, atque ei mandatum est, ut transiens res in Gallia transalpina componeret*. The governors of Transalpine Gaul and Hispania Citerior acted in both territories for years and C. Valerius Flaccus is a good example of this: Broughton 1952, vol. 2: 58–59, 61, 64, 70, 77–78; Badian 1964: 88–90; Ebel 1976: 55–63; Crespo Ortiz de Zárate 1998: 234–239; Ñaco and Principal 2012: 170–171.
- 68 Spann 1987: 37–39; García Morá 1991a: 355–382; García Morá 1991b: 18–21; Konrad 1994: 84–85; Strisino 2002: 39–40; de Michele 2005: 286–7; Roddaz 2006: 106–107; Brennan 2010, vol. 2: 502–503; Kendall 2013: 606–610; Sampson 2013: 121–144.
- 69 Sertorius never minted Roman currency in Hispania. However, it has been suggested that certain issues of Iberian coinage that we are aware of in some hoards of the period may correspond to the payment of these *auxilia externa*, during the Sertorian War and in the preceding decades: Marcos Alonso 1999; López Sánchez 2007; Cadiou 2008: 524–543; Busquets 2015: 292–339.
- 70 Plut. *Sert.* 6.4–9; Sall. *Hist.* 1. 91* (94M, 83 Mc, inc. 79D, inc. 45K); Flor. 2.10.2; App. *Hisp.* 101; Orosius 5.23.13. Spann 1987: 40–44; Placido 1989: 101; Konrad 1994: 85–95; Ñaco del Hoyo 2001: 83–84; Cadiou 2008: 118–124; Santos 2009: 182; Sampson 2013: 155–156.

demonstrates this on the ground. For example, Sertorius exercising his power as a full magistrate can be seen with the discovery of several *glandes* of artillery containing inscriptions attributed to him as a proconsul or reference to his *pietas*. In this sense, through his *pietas*, Sertorius vindicated himself as a leader of the Republic and not a rebel fighting at the edge of the Roman world.⁷¹ The *optimate* leaders in control of the senate were agitated and bent on his eradication. Not only were they concerned with Sertorian dissent but now also with his diplomatic contacts, known enemies of Rome: the Cilician pirates, who patrolled the Mediterranean and Mithridates Eupator VI. Concerning Rome, it altered its safety in the West and endangered Rome's central control as arbiter of interstate relations in the East. However, the Sertorian challenge contained an even greater danger. It highlighted an array of legitimacies for conflict, which is neatly summed up by E.S. Gruen who writes, 'of greater relevance is the fact that his [Sertorius] political and military successes in Spain represented a clear challenge to the legitimacy of the Roman government'.⁷²

As already discussed, Sertorius legitimised his role to captivate his followers for several of his campaigns. His fight was aimed against the political factions that had monopolised almost all of the decision making in the Senate back in Rome. From this perspective, it appears a logical move to attempt to obtain some form of endorsement from an authority similar to that of the Senate. In this case, one situated in the territory in which Sertorius exercised his hegemony: namely, Hispania. Therefore, if any decisions, made under the command of Sertorius, were endorsed by his 'senate', for example in external politics, the idea that all of their activities remained protected under the political legitimacy of the Republican State would become widespread amongst his followers. Indeed, those who defended the logic of the Roman senate helped to propagate an image of Sertorius as a dangerous agent working against the established order: a vision that decisively influenced the subsequent historiographical accounts. However, ironically, having misappropriated the aforementioned political powers by creating a legitimate state structure, Sertorius did manage to maintain cohesion within his own ranks, thus extending the fight in spite of such difficulties.⁷³

71 Beltrán Lloris 1990: 211–226; Díaz Ariño 2005: 219–236; Santos 2009: 187–189; Moralejo and Saavedra 2016: esp. 49–53.

72 Gruen 1974: 17.

73 Gabba 1973: 427–441; Spann 1987: 86–89 (and Appendix VI: '*Patres Proscripti*: The Sertorian Senate', 169–174); García Morá 1991b: 179–183; Konrad 1994: 184–187; Richardson 1996: 95–104, esp. 102; Santos 2009: 183–185.

Everything had occurred at an advanced stage in the conflict. Sulla had died in 78 and by 77, remnants of the Lepidan revolt resulted in a new exodus to Hispania. These reinforcements were led by M. Perperenna (pr. 82) and included important Roman senators (App. *BC* 1.107).⁷⁴ According to P. Spann, this new impetus meant that Sertorius 'had something more than a pretext by which to legitimise the personal struggle of himself and his friends'.⁷⁵ Appian, too, at the end of his *Iberike*, caricatures Sertorius's political activity in Hispania stating, '[he] enrolled a council of his friends in imitation of the senate' (App. *Hisp.* 101.439).⁷⁶ This strengthens, to some extent, the Sertorian argument that the legitimacy of an institution like the Roman senate depended entirely on those who comprised it: that is the *philoï* who were linked to his party and then exiled from Italy. Appian, influenced by sources hostile to Sertorius, rather exaggeratingly goes on to add that the Sertorian senate comprised three hundred members (App. *BC* 1.108).⁷⁷ On the other hand, Plutarch praises Sertorius's magnanimity on calling his group of exiled senators, a 'senate'. Plutarch continues by saying that Sertorius was responsible for naming quaestors and praetors that fled to him, thus reinterpreting Republican traditions with the appointment of magistrates (Plut. *Sert.* 22.5).⁷⁸

As will be discussed in the next section, in 75, Sertorius was involved in negotiations with Mithridates, the king of Pontus. Interpretations of this pact with a known Roman enemy suggest that Sertorius had made a desperate attempt to regain the initiative in the war by offering the Pontic king certain concessions. Appian discloses that Pontic ambassadors were dispatched to Sertorius. He presented them to his 'senate' and declared that they both shared the utmost hostility toward Rome. Undoubtedly, this rhetorical statement

74 Gruen 1974: 17–18; Sampson 2013: 172; 178–179.

75 Spann 1987: 88.

76 και βουλὴν τῶν ἰδίων φίλων ἐς μίμημα τῆς συγκλήτου καταλέξας. Richardson 2000: 105.

77 περιώνυμος δὲ ὢν ἐπὶ τόλμῃ, βουλὴν κατέλεξεν ἐκ τῶν συνόντων οἱ φίλων τριακοσίους καὶ τήνδε ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὴν 'Ρωμαίων βουλὴν καὶ ἐς ὕβριν ἐκείνης σύγκλητον ἐκάλει. 'Having acquired a reputation for bravery he enrolled a council of 300 members from the friends who were with him, and called it the Roman Senate in derision of the real one' (translation H. White, Loeb 1913). According to Gabba 1958: 297–298 and n. 507, it is plausible that Appian counted the *Hispanienses* among the 300 members of the mentioned council.

78 μεγαλοφροσύνης δὲ τοῦ Σερτωρίου πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοὺς φεύγοντας ἀπὸ 'Ρώμης βουλευτὰς καὶ παρ' αὐτῷ διατρίβοντας σύγκλητον ἀναγορεῦσαι. 'But the magnanimity of Sertorius made itself apparent, firstly, in his giving the name of senate to the senators who fled from Rome and joined his cause, appointing quaestors and praetors from their number' (translation B. Perrin, Loeb 1919). The analysis of Konrad 1994: 184–187 regarding not just Plutarch's text, but also the other sources mentioned in this episode, is essential.

presents Sertorius and Mithridates as accomplices. Nevertheless, terms of the agreement were discussed, which involved the cession of Roman territories in Asian Minor (App. *Mithridatika* 68.288). However, technically, Sertorius could hardly assume the responsibility for this agreement as he was endangering his own political legitimacy. The Senate normally endorsed such settlements: in this case, Sertorius's Hispanian senate (Plut. *Sert.* 23. 4–5).⁷⁹

Still, Mithridates agreed to negotiate with Sertorius, now considered an outlaw by the Sullan regime, prior to the outbreak of his last and definitive war with Rome. Perhaps he was attempting to encourage dissent in the West. Offering support to Sertorius could have weakened the Republic's position in the East as it was seen to oblige and maintain, simultaneously, two operational wars in completely disparate geographical regions. In any case, the cessions made in these agreements were never completely fulfilled, nor did Mithridatic reinforcements arrive in Hispania. Despite the fact that, due to desperation over the development of the war, the territorial clauses made in the agreements to the Pontic king could have jeopardised the core of Roman domains in the East with the legitimacy of these arrangements. The facts, in reality, finally demonstrate that the legality of the State never suffered any great risk.⁸⁰ Of course, it will never be known to what extent Sertorius was prepared to commit his political legitimacy in order to obtain support from Mithridates.

Sertorius's Foreign Policy: A Threat to the Republic?

Finally, the question asked is at what point in the conflict does it coincide with the characteristics of the modern definition of 'warlord': that is to say, achieving prominence in foreign politics. In addition to the political alliances with the *peregrini*, we specifically turn to those powers situated in regions that were geographically remote from the centre of action (Hispania and Africa). Following Sertorius's arrival in Hispania, the evidence for his alliances with exterior regions is particularly silent. For example, several sojourns abroad are known. They include: the African expedition and conflict in 81/80, which was a desperate measure to recruit allies or perhaps mercenaries; in 81, Plutarch informs us that Sertorius and three thousand of his followers fled the pursuing

79 Konrad 1994: 192–193. The details of these negotiations are detailed later.

80 Liv. *Periochae* 93.3; Sall. *Hist.* 2.65* (79M, 91Mc, 3.12D, 3.9K); Plut. *Sert.* 23–24; Flor. 2. 10.4; App. *Mith.* 68; 72; 76; Oros. 6.2.12. Schulten 2013 (1926, repr. 1949): 185–186; Gabba 1954: 110–116; Glew 1981: 126–127; Spann 1987: 102–104; Callataj 1997: 342–343; Matyszak 2013: 136–140.

Sullan armies from New Carthage (mod. Cartagena), and boarded ships to North Africa where they were met by hostile 'barbarians' (*Sert.* 7.2–3); then, after equipping themselves with supplies, they quickly returned to Hispania, only to set off for Ibiza where Sertorius formed a pact with the Cilician pirates; next, after a brief confrontation with Republican forces, Sertorius set off for Mauretania (mod. Morocco).⁸¹ Prior to this, however, Pompey had taken control of the last remnants of *populares* resistance in the majority of North African kingdoms and cities (Plut. *Pompeios* 11–13). At one point, Sertorius did consider fleeing to some Atlantic islands, but whilst in Africa, a delegation of Lusitanians offered him control of their armies if he returned to Hispania (Plut. *Sert.* 10. 1–2). Sertorius accepted their offer. The Lusitanians had, most likely, decided to support a new form of Roman management of their affairs. This gave Sertorius a certain political legitimacy, which in reality, was perceived quite differently back in Rome (Plut. *Sert.* 11.1–2).⁸²

With regards to this last aspect and with reference to the characteristics of a 'warlord' in any of its guises, a thought proposed by Spann regarding Sertorius's pact with Mithridates should be considered. Spann argued that Sertorius's credibility as a political and military leader, required a powerful ally such as Mithridates, in order to convince his representative that he could eventually negotiate, in the name of Rome, issues relevant to the Pontic king, including the integrity of the Roman province of Asia.⁸³ According to Plutarch, Mithridates specifically received news of Sertorius's successes in Hispania via sailors coming from the West who, in addition to trading goods, often relayed news from throughout the Mediterranean (Plut. *Sert.* 23). It is possible that these seamen were actually pirates, but the sources make this difficult to determine as merchants in the ancient world often carried out similar activities.⁸⁴ During his naval expedition to Ibiza, Sertorius contacted the Cilician pirates (Plut. *Sert.* 7.3; 9.1) and they could have been the messengers of his exploits. Indeed, Cilician pirates rescued Mithridates after his ship had been damaged in a storm (App. *Mith.* 78). There is no conclusive evidence to

81 *Sert.* 7–9; Sall. *Hist.* 1.98–104; Liv. *Per.* 89; Flor. 2.10.3–4; Spann 1987: 47–58; García Morá 1991b: 34–52; de Souza 1999: 132–134; Chaves, García and Ferrer 2000: 1470; Alvarez-Ossorio 2008: 94–95; Mederos 2008: 99–116.

82 Seager 1979: 10–11; Chic 1982: 170–171; Spann 1987: 58–64; Konrad 1994: 116–118, 122–123, 177–178; Salinas 2012: 357; Matyszak 2013: 62–64.

83 Spann 1987: 89: 'The fact that Mithridates would soon seek the sanction of this Sertorian regime for his schemes in the East suggests that Sertorius was not just a *condottiero* leading some Spaniards and a few Roman desperados'.

84 Konrad 1994: 191; Ballesteros Pastor 1996: 203, *contra*: Alvarez-Ossorio 2008: 94–95; de Souza 1999: 22–23; Horden and Purcell 2000: 387.

confirm that Mithridates had established a form of permanent military alliance with the Cilicians, nor had he incited piratical activity in the Mediterranean. Strategically, both groups' shared interests could not be denied, especially when the pirates' objectives were to ambush the convoys that supplied the Republican armies throughout the Mediterranean (Plut. *Pomp.* 24.1; App. *Mith.* 119). If the astute Mithridates occasionally had contact with the pirates in order to acquire sensitive information, the fact that Sertorius was considering challenging the authority of Rome would have been of vital political importance to him.⁸⁵

Scholars have long debated and continue to dispute the alliance between Sertorius and Mithridates. Disagreement is particularly seen when determining who was responsible for this diplomatic contact and what political and military returns were available from this alliance, which is of particular relevance when questioning Sertorius's foreign policies.⁸⁶ According to a fragment in Sallust and seconded in Plutarch's *Life*, it was Mithridates who was informed of the situation in Hispania. He then proposed that they form an alliance at some point during the Third Mithridatic War, c. 75. The Pontic king sent a delegation to Hispania offering money and warships to Sertorius in exchange for important territorial concessions in Asia (Plut. *Sert.* 23, 1–3). Although hotly debated amongst scholars, it is plausible to surmise that the political initiative rested with Mithridates. However, Sertorius argued that the proposal was not acceptable to the interests of the State, irrespective of the opinion of his own 'senate'. He did propose an alternative: the ceding of Bithynia and Cappadocia, which was, finally accepted (Sal. *Hist.* 2.91; Plut. *Sert.* 23 4–5).⁸⁷

Plutarch informs us that once Mithridates had ratified the agreement, he sent 3,000 talents and 40 warships to Hispania in exchange for Asian territories (*Sert.* 24.1). This in fact points to the agreement being signed at some point in 74, the year when King Nicomedes bequeathed Bythnia to Rome upon his

85 App. *Mith.* 63; 70; 92–93; 119; Cic.2 *In Verrem* 5.157; Dio 36.20–22; Oros. 6.2.24; Flor. 1.41.2; Plut. *Lucullos* 13.3; McGing 1986: 139; Ballesteros Pastor 1996: 436–442; Morrison 1996: 115–119; Callataÿ 1997: 336–340; de Souza 1999: 116–143, and specifically about Sertorius: 132–134; Prag 2007: 80–81; Ñaco del Hoyo 2014: 410–412.

86 The bibliography on this issue extends for over a century, from Reinach 1890: 315–316; Schulten 2013 (1926, repr. 1949): 185–186; Treves 1932: 133, 140–143; Magie 1950, vol. 1: 321–326. See, more recently: McGing 1986: 137–145; Spann 1987: 99–104; García Morá 1991b: 287–298; Konrad 1994: 190–202; Ballesteros Pastor 1996: 203–210; Callataÿ 1997: 342–343; Santos 2009: 185–187; Mayor 2010: 258–261.

87 McGushin 1992, vol. 1: 215, 254–255; Konrad 1994: 190–193. Both Florus and Cicero attribute the initiative for the alliance to Sertorius, without offering further details: Flor. 2.10.4; Cic. *Murena* 15.32.

death (Liv. *Per.* 93). With the agreement signed, Sertorius sent soldiers and a general, M. Marius, to Asia.⁸⁸ The latter assumed a theoretical public representation, as well as offering tax immunity to certain Greek cities in Asia in the name of Sertorius. Perhaps considering Plutarchan exaggeration, it is interesting to note that his narrative attempts to dig deeper into Sertorius's alleged political legitimacy, his actions and his representatives. In this case, diplomatic agreements with a large powerful region, namely Pontus (Plut. *Sert.* 24. 2–4).⁸⁹

Appian, on the other hand, writes that it was two Romans of equestrian origins, L. Magius and L. Fannius that suggested to Mithridates he ally with Sertorian forces (App. *Mith.* 68). Both were under the Pontic king's sphere of influence (Oros. 6.2.12), but in reality they were supporters of C. Marius, practicing officials of L. Valerius Flaccus and C. Flavius Fimbria (86–85) before deserting to the Pontic side (App. *Mith.* 72).⁹⁰ Mithridates had received word of Sertorius's successes in Hispania either from the Cilician pirates or from the Roman deserters. For reasons addressed more extensively elsewhere, these deserters joined the Pontic military intelligence services, undertaking their secret mission from the refuge of Myndos. Cicero notes that Magius and Fannius contacted 'all enemies of the Roman people' using a *myoparon*, a swift vessel used by the Cilician pirates and by the C. Verres, *legatus* of Cn. Cornelius Dolabella, in Cilicia in the year 80 BC. In the Verrine Orations, there is mention of Pontic delegates—perhaps the deserters—travelling discreetly from Asia Minor to Dianium (mod. Denia), the Sertorian naval base, to establish first contact with him (Cic. 2*Verr.* 1.41; 87).⁹¹

Meanwhile, the letters from Mithridates delivered to Sertorius are difficult to pinpoint (Cic. *Man.* 9). Cicero informs us of a Pontic delegation arriving

88 While Oros. 6.2.12; Plut. *Sert.* 24, 24; *Luc.* 8.5; and Memn. F. 28.3 note M. Marius, identified as the Sertorian quaestor in the year 76, according to Liv. 91, *fr.* 22W, in this same context Appian (*Mith.* 68.268) named him 'Varius', Goukowski 2003: 192, n.574, while later he does the same again when he states that this individual was still following the orders of Mithridates in 73 (App. *Mith.* 76.332), Broughton 1952 vol. 2: 92; 1986 vol. 3: 139; Konrad 1994: 200–201; Couvenhes 2009: 432–433.

89 Sal. *Hist.* 2. 78; 79. Magie 1950 vol. 1: 322–323; La Penna 1963: 222, 227–229; Gillis 1969: 720–721; McGing 1986: 138; Spann 1987: 101–104; García Morá 1991b: 297–298; Rubinsohn 1993: 42–43; Konrad 1994: 196–202; Ballesteros Pastor 1996: 205–207; Callataÿ 1997: 342–343; Santos 2009: 185–186.

90 Gabba 1954: 98–101; Glew 1981: 126–127; Cassola 1983: 98–99; McGing 1986: 110–111. When Sertorius was assassinated in 72, L. Magius betrayed Mithridates and joined Lucullus' forces: App. *Mith.* 72.308; Dio 36.8.2.

91 Cic. 2*Verr.* 1.87: *Hoc illi navigio ad omnes populi Romani hostes, usque ab Dianio ad Sinopem navigaverunt*; Pena 1993: 72; Sheldon 2005: 74–77; Naco del Hoyo 2014: 415–419.

in Hispania with a mission to contact Pompey. However, whilst engaged in a military confrontation with Sertorius in 76, the *optimatus* leader accused the Pontic ambassador of being a spy (Cic. *Man.* 46). It is arguable that this episode was reconstructed with the intention of glorifying Pompey as Cicero was well aware, through having previously written the Verrine Orations, of Verres' activities. If the evidence here was to be true, the ambassador dispatched by Mithridates to the Far West, would not have been intended for Pompey, but instead for Sertorius (Cic. *Man.* 9).⁹² Therefore, it is not essential to explain whether Magius or Fannius had displayed personal roles on this trip or whether they merely facilitated it on behalf of the Pontic King. Instead, along with M. Marius's role in Asia, there is sufficient evidence that proves the existence of high ranking diplomatic contact between Sertorius and Mithridates at least throughout the first half of the 70s and certainly at the time prior to the beginning of the Third Mithridatic War (73).⁹³

The political and military agreements between Sertorius and Mithridates, irrespective of the paucity of evidence, seem credible and plausible. Memnon adds that the fleet the Pontic king promised to Sertorius, left for Crete and may, eventually have reached the Hispanian coast (*FGH* 423; *F* 29.5; 33). But events there advanced rapidly, and this supposed reinforcement did not play any major role in a conflict that fizzled out the following year. In the end, any signed agreement made between these two protagonists, never saw the light of day as both were defeated before they could be implemented. For Mithridates, particularly on the eve of a new conflict with Rome, the alliance with Sertorius was designed to ensure him hegemony in Asia and to support flexibility of the conditions of surrender as imposed by Sulla in 85. For Sertorius, it was simply the acquisition of military reinforcements in the form of a fleet of warships. However, to date, all the evidence seems to indicate that Sertorius never proposed to pay the high political price to achieve his goals. In any case, if he did consider it, the final outcome of events decided it for him.⁹⁴

92 Ballesteros Pastor 1996: 210–213, esp. 212, suggested that Mithridates effectively sent, in this case, the ambassador to Pompey, as he had previously done with Sertorius, with the intention of sounding out both sides; *contra*. Ñaco del Hoyo 2014: 419–421, with a specific bibliography on this issue.

93 The chronology of this whole episode continues to be widely debated due to the fragmentary nature of literary sources: Scardigli 1971: 252–258 ('La flotta pontica inviata in Spagna'); Spann 1987: 100–102; García Morá 1991b: 294–297; Callataÿ 1997: 343, n. 16.

94 McGing 1986: 142–143; Spann 1987: 102–104; Ballesteros Pastor 1996: 212–213; de Michele 2005: 288–289.

Conclusion

The title of this chapter asked whether Sertorius's activities in Hispania, between 83 and 72, could be defined as the actions of a 'warlord', namely a Roman Republican warlord. To answer this, we began by looking at the modern definition as explored by the social sciences. The data, however, focused on a multidisciplinary approach thanks to the constant dialogue between the disciplines of ancient history and classical archaeology. The response to that primordial question is ambivalent. However, in Sertorius's case, he was an outstanding, successful military leader, who, apart from a brief expedition to Africa, exercised control in Hispania. He also secured support from a significant portion of the population there, maintaining his hegemony in the region for a short but very intense period. Furthermore, Sertorius's political legitimacy was set when he departed for Hispania in 83/2. He created and maintained primordial state structures there, not challenging so much the legality of the Republic, but perhaps more so, attempting to control the power the *optimates* had over the political institutions of the Roman State. Finally, Sertorius was able to maintain a degree of leadership in international relations. Diplomacy and military intelligence were traits he used when dealing with Rome's enemies, namely the Cilician pirates and Mithridates Eupator VI. Therefore, when applying the theoretical framework generally used to define the term 'warlord', we believe it, *a priori*, to label Sertorius as such, in the same way it has been used to describe others throughout history.

Nonetheless, as stated earlier, the answer to the question posed contains a certain ambivalence i.e. specifically, the fact that the classical languages do not possess an equivalent, unique term for the modern word 'warlord'. Neither is there a summary which defines its meaning and its aspects as they do in the modern connotations of it, hence the need to shy away from considering it as a strictly 'ancient' label. It can be extrapolated that a large part of Sertorius's political and military actions can be classified as typical of a warlord from a modern point of view. But, if the focus of analysis is reverted, based on direct evidence from antiquity, this is 'not' the case, because neither the term nor its complex definition existed in the first century. It can be seen that if the modern definitions of 'warlord' is applied to this study, then Sertorius fits the category. But as none of the ancient evidence point to this, then it is unlikely that he was. In our opinion, in any case, the Sertorian War was paradigmatic in many senses and it offered us a magnificent case study on the functional nature of 'warlordism' set in the remote past but linked to the theoretical framework as provided by researchers in political science and international relations.

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Warlordism and the Making of the Roman Imperial Army

Boris Rankov

The military dynasts who fought the civil and other wars of the Late Republic bore a number of the characteristics normally attributed to warlords: they exercised charismatic leadership in a context in which the central authority of the Senate was weakened or destroyed; they led armies—sometimes with a regional base—which had a personal attachment to their commanders, cemented by regular distribution of booty and rewards; the loyalty of their troops depended in part upon their continuing military success; sometimes they promised protection to the population and the restoration of order; and ultimately, despite such promises, they operated for their own benefit.

By the sixties BC, if not before, the armies created and led by these men were being identified by the names of their commanders: Mariani, Sullani, Sertoriani, Pompeiani, Caesariani. Such adjectives, which appear frequently in the pages of Cicero, Caesar and Sallust, implied active partisanship and not simple attachment to a particular general and thus imply the existence of a concept of warlordship even if there is no clear Latin term for it.¹ It may be argued that, in effect, by the end of the Republic army service had become service to a warlord, and Keppie, following the thesis of Schmitthenner,² long ago recognised that the Augustan imperial army represented a reunification of the former armies of Julius Caesar—the Caesariani—after the civil wars of the Triumviral period; the Caesarian origins of several legions which had fought on both sides in the struggle between Antony and Octavian were proclaimed by the astrological emblem of the Bull (Taurus), while the legions created by

1 Mariani: Cicero *De Lege agraria* 3.7.2; Sullani: Cic. *Leg. agr.* 3.7.2; *Epistulae ad Atticum* 1.19.4; *Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem* 1.1.21; *orationum deperditarum fragmenta* 9 fr. 14; Sallust *Catilina* 16.4; *Historiae* 1 fr. 42; see also Cic. *Leg. agr.* 3.10 and 13; *In Verrem* 2.1.37; Nepos *Atticus* 2.2.4; Sertoriani: Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.72, 146, 153; 155; *De Lege Manilia* 21; Pompeiani: Caesar *Bellum Africum* 23.2; *Bellum Alexandrinum* 9.3; 59.1; *Bellum Hispaniense* 13.3; 14.3; 16.1; 34.2; see also 35.2 and 37.2; *Bellum Civile* 1.15.5; 28.1; 40.2; 3.42.3; 44.4; 46.3 and 5; 48.2; 51.2 and 6; 53.1; 58.1; 63.6; 65.1 and 2; 66.2; 67.5; 69.2; 72.1; 84.2 and 4; 93.1 and 8; 94.2 and 4; 95.1; 97. 2–5; 99.4; 101.7; 107.1; Cic. *Phillipicae* 13.32; 38; 45; *Epistulae ad Familiares* 10.32.3 (C. Asinius Pollio); *Att.* 1.12.1; Caesariani: Caes. *BAfr.* 7.5; 13.1; 14.2–3; 24.3; 28.2; 52.2; 53.1; 66.3; *BAlex.* 59.1; *BHisp.* 34.2.

2 Schmitthenner 1958.

Octavian/Augustus bore the Capricorn.³ Initially, perhaps only 6 of the 26 legions maintained after 30 BC were left under the control of governors appointed by the Senate, while the remaining twenty were located in provinces governed by Augustus through his deputies (*legati*), and the only regular military force left in Italy was Augustus' bodyguard, the *cohortes praetoriae*. By the end of Augustus' reign the Senate oversaw only a single legion under the proconsul of Africa, and perhaps significantly even that legion was entitled *III Augusta*.⁴ The warlord concept had not been forgotten, however, even after the accession of Tiberius, and in the senatorial decree condemning Cn. Piso the Elder in AD 20, one of the major charges against the latter is that he 'gave donatives under his own name from the *fiscus* of our *princeps* and having done this rejoiced that some troops were referred to as Pisoniani and others Caesariani, and even honoured those who had followed his orders after taking on this name';⁵ this is associated in the decree with a clear statement that Piso was attempting to bring back civil war. In this paper, I want to consider some of the other ways in which the warlordism of the late Republic left behind traces in the imperial Roman army, preserved in its units, its ranking structure and its reward system.

Although it seems possible, it is not entirely clear whether the emergence of praetorian cohorts in the late Republic⁶ should be connected with warlordism. Festus attributes the first praetorian cohort to Scipio Africanus in Spain,⁷ although it not certain whether this refers to the hero of the Second Punic War or to his adoptive grandson Aemilianus at Numantia in 133 BC. Such cohorts are mentioned a number of times in the first century BC, though not always attached to men we might regard as warlords: Marcus Petreius had one in 62 BC as legate to the proconsul C. Antonius Hibrida in the final battle against Catiline,⁸ while in the *Second Catilinarian Oration* Cicero was able to refer to

3 Keppie 1984: 132–44; 205–12.

4 See Le Bohec 1989.

5 *SC de Cn. Pisone patre* lines 54–7: *sed etiam donativa suo nomine ex fisco principis nostri dando, quo facto milites alios Pisonianos alios Caesarianos dici laetatus sit, honorando etiam eos qui post talis nominis usurpationem ipsi paruisset.*

6 Durry 1938: 70–6; Keppie 1984: 83–4, 115–8; 1996: 104–7; Bingham 2013: 9–15.

7 Festus p. 249L (223M) s.v. *praetoria*: *praetoria cohors est dicta, quod a praetore non discedebat. Scipio enim Africanus primus fortissimum quemque delegit, qui ab eo in bello non discederent et cetero munere militiae vacarent et sesquiplez stipendium acciperent.* On whether this should be associated with the $\phi\iota\lambda\omega\nu\ \iota\lambda\eta$ attributed to Scipio Aemilianus by Appian *Hispanica* 84, see Pina Polo 2001.

8 Sall. *Cat.* 60.5; and also 61.3.

Catiline's *scortorum cohortem praetoriam*;⁹ a few years later, Caesar during his conquest of Gaul declared that he would take his favourite *legio X* as his praetorian cohort to protect him when he met with Ariovistus;¹⁰ and Cicero apparently had a *cohors praetoria* when he was governor of Cilicia in 51 BC.¹¹ Marcus Petreius again had some sort of praetorian cohort, this time consisting of light-armed Spanish troops, when he was commanded Pompeian forces in Spain in 49 BC,¹² and in the final stages of the civil wars such cohorts had become a necessary accoutrement for any general, even subordinates. In a letter to Cicero, Ser. Sulpicius Galba refers to single praetorian cohorts attached to individual commanders, including Octavian, in the armies of both Hirtius and Antony at the battle of Forum Gallorum in 43 BC;¹³ when Antony, Lepidus and Octavian entered Rome later that year they each had a praetorian cohort and a legion with them;¹⁴ and a praetorian cohort of Octavian's consisting of 2,000 men was captured at sea en route to Greece in 42 BC.¹⁵ It was only after the battle of Philippi that Antony and Octavian divided 8,000 veterans between them to form new, multiple, praetorian cohorts for each of them;¹⁶ Antony had three when he fought the Parthians in 36 BC,¹⁷ and in the following year his wife Octavia took another 2,000 men out to Greece with her to supplement his praetorians;¹⁸ at Actium, Octavian supposedly had five cohorts with him.¹⁹

More clearly to be associated with warlordism were the Spanish bodyguards (Spain and Spaniards are a recurrent theme in this discussion) who were maintained in the late Republic by Marius (who used Βαρδυαίοι, that is Vardulli), Sertorius (Celtiberii), Petreius (Spanish *caetrati*), Caesar (Hispani) and then Octavian (Calagurritani), who dismissed them after the defeat of Antony and then employed Germans instead;²⁰ interestingly, the family of one of Octavian's

9 Cic. *In Catilinam* 2.23. Cicero (*Verr.* 2.1.14; 2.3.29; 2.4.43) also uses the term to designate Verres' staff in Sicily.

10 Caesar *Bellum Gallicum* 1.40.14; 1.42.5.

11 Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.7.

12 Caes. *BC* 1.75.2 (see note 40).

13 Cic. *Fam.* 10.30, 15 April, 43 BC.

14 App. *Bellum Civile* 4.7: σὺν ταῖς στρατηγίσι τάξεσι καὶ ὀπλιτῶν ἕκαστος ἐνὶ τέλει.

15 App. *BC* 4.115–6.

16 App. *BC* 5.3; 24; see also 5.19–21 and 59.

17 Plut. *Antonius* 39.2.

18 Plut. *Ant.* 53.3; see also App. *BC* 5.95; Cassius Dio 49.33.4.

19 Orosius 6.19.8.

20 Spanish bodyguards: Plut. *Marius* 43.5 (Marius); App. *BC* 1.112 (Sertorius); Caes. *BC* 1.75.2 (Petreius); Suetonius *Iulius* 86.1 (Caesar); *Augustus* 49.1 (Octavian). *Germani corporis custodes*: Bellen 1981; Speidel 1994: 12–31.

leading generals, T. Statilius Taurus, influential enough to have shared the *fascies* with him as Augustus in 26 BC, also appears to have employed German bodyguards for a time.²¹ With the Germans, Octavian may have been following the lead of Caesar who had kept 400 German cavalry about him in Gaul,²² and although they too were dismissed after the Varian disaster, Tiberius was able to send German bodyguards with Drusus to Pannonia in AD 14;²³ Caligula received an oracle in AD 39 telling him to recruit more men for his 'unit of Batavians', supposedly prompting his expedition to Germany, and when he was assassinated by officers of his Praetorian Guard two years later it was his German bodyguards who went on the rampage looking for the murderers,²⁴ just as they hunted down the Pisonian conspirators against Nero in AD 65²⁵ only to be disbanded by Nero's successor Galba.²⁶ Although, the Germani employed by the Julio-Claudians do not appear to have been part of the Roman army proper, Speidel sees them as the spiritual predecessors of the *equites singulares Augusti* who were probably formed by Trajan on his accession in AD 98 out of the *equites singulares* (cavalry bodyguard) he commanded as governor of Germania Superior.²⁷

Another of the ways in which the Roman imperial army reflected its origins in the warlord armies of the late Republic was in the titles of rank given to its junior officers or *principales*. The 'tactical' junior ranks of *tesserarius*, *optio* and *signifer* within the legionary century and maniple, corresponding to von Domaszewski's 'taktische Chargen',²⁸ go back to the middle Republic at least, and probably much earlier: all three of these ranks or their roles appear in Polybius' description of the Roman army.²⁹ There is no mention in Polybius, however, of either the ranks or the roles of the junior staff officers known in the Principate—*frumentarii*, *beneficiarii*, *speculatores* and *cornicularii*, corresponding to von Domaszewski's 'Benefiziarierchargen'. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that the level of bureaucracy in the Roman Republican army,

21 CIL 6.6221 (= ILS 7449); 6229 (= ILS 7448); 6230–7; 9191, two of which (6229 and 9191) refer to the Germans as *armigeri*; see Bellen 1981: 25–7, 117–9.

22 Caes. BG 7.13.1.

23 Tacitus *Annales* 1.24.

24 Suetonius *Caligula* 43; Josephus *Antiquitates Judaicae* 19.1.15, 119–26.

25 Tac. *Ann.* 15.58.2.

26 Suet. *Galba* 12.2.

27 Speidel 1994: 38–42.

28 Von Domaszewski 1908.

29 Polyb. 6.24. 2 (ὀυραγοί = *optiones*) and 6 (σημαιοφόροι = *signiferi*); 34.7–12 (soldiers selected to carry round the watchword written on a πλατεῖον = *tessera* or tablet, i.e. selected to act as *tesserarii*).

which had no permanent legions, would not have required the regular appointment of such *officiales*.³⁰ What is striking is that the titles of these staff officers appear to derive not from any bureaucratic function but from special marks of favour awarded by the generals of the Late Republic to selected members of their armies to bind these men to themselves, in the manner of warlords.

Some of the earliest evidence for this is one of two decrees of Cn. Pompeius Strabo (cos 89 BC) honouring thirty Spanish cavalrymen of the *turma Salluitana* for their courage (*virtutis caussa*) during the Social War and recorded on a bronze tablet now in the Capitoline Museum in Rome.³¹ The first decree records the grant of Roman citizenship to the cavalrymen while Pompeius' army was encamped at Asculum in Picenum and in accordance with the *lex Iulia*; the latter had been passed in 90 BC granting citizenship to Latins and Italians who had stayed loyal during the revolt of Rome's allies and apparently allowed commanders in the field to grant it also to individuals.³² This is followed by the names of 59 members of Pompeius' *consilium* and those of the 30 cavalrymen honoured, listed by town or tribe. The second decree records additional honours, including grants of a *corniculum*, *patella*, *torques*, *armilla*, *p(h)alerae* and *frumentum duplex* (double corn-ration). Two of these awards appear to have given their name to *officiales* of the Principate. The *corniculum* was perhaps a small horn which was worn on the helmet,³³ although the Pompeius Strabo decree is the only clear reference to it as a military award under either the Republic or the Principate;³⁴ it is entirely plausible, however, that the

30 Rankov 1999: 16–7.

31 *CIL* 1².709 = 6.37045 = *ILS* 8888: Cn. Pompeius Sex. f. Imperator / uirtutis caussa turmam / Salluitanam donauit in / castreis apud Asculum / cornuculo et patella torque armilla paler- / eis et faumentum [sic] / duplex. Criniti 1970: 47–61 argues that the decrees should be dated to 17 November, 89 BC.

32 Cic. *Pro Balbo* 19; 32–3; 38 indicates that his son Cn. Pompeius also gave such grants to individuals in Spain which were ratified by a law passed by the consuls L. Gellius Publicola and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus in 72 BC; these individuals included L. Cornelius Balbus the Elder (cos 40 BC) whose right to the citizenship Cicero defended in 56 BC.

33 See also Pliny *Historia Naturalis* 10.124, which refers to horns on a helmet though not in a military context.

34 The award by L. Papirius Cursor (cos 293 BC) of *cornicula* and silver *armillae* to his cavalry for their part in the capture of Aquilonia (Livy 10.44.5) is almost certainly anachronistic, and Livy's notice is quite possibly directly inspired by the awards made in the decree of Pompeius Strabo at the siege of Asculum. The service of Horace's schoolmaster, L. Orbilius Pupillus, with the *corniculum* in Macedonia in the 80s or 70s BC after he had acted as a magistrate's *apparitor* and before he served in the cavalry (Suet. *De Grammaticis* 9) may indicate a secretarial role (Rankov 1999: 19; Linderski 2007: 186–92), and Linderski (2007: 199–206) has argued that the same is likely to be true both of M. Aemilius Scaurus (cos

cornicularii were in origin men who had been granted the *corniculum* as a mark of the commander's favour. Similarly, the award of extra rations of *frumentum* is likely to have given rise to the *frumentarii*, as I suggested more than a decade ago at another Barcelona conference.³⁵

Amongst the other titles which became ranks under the Principate, the *speculatores* were apparently scouts or spies in origin, and the term is certainly used by Caesar in that sense specifically for men who operated in small numbers clandestinely or under cover and reported directly back to the commander, as opposed to *exploratores* who operated as a unit to provide a cavalry screen for the army.³⁶ Interestingly, the Roman imperial army included two quite distinct groups of *speculatores*: one group were men seconded from the legions to serve on the staff of their provincial governor—the only provincial official with *ius gladii*—where they held a special place as his executioners;³⁷ the other group presumably derived from the *speculatores* who had attended on Octavian himself, since they formed an élite cavalry bodyguard for the *princeps* and were at some stage incorporated as a cavalry element into the Praetorian cohorts.³⁸ The close attendance of such men on their commander is implied by the fact that Augustus sometimes stayed at the villa of one of his former *speculatores* and had even invited the man to dinner;³⁹ moreover, the fact that Augustus appears to have recorded this himself suggests that he was making a point of emphasising his personal relationship with even quite humble members of his military entourage.

The largest group under consideration here were the *beneficiarii*, who in origin were simply men who had received some sort of *beneficium* from their

and *princeps senatus* 115 BC, cens. 109 BC) who, according to [Aur. Vict.] *De viris illustribus* 3.72.3, *corniculum* meruit in Spain early in his career, and of the soldiers who, according to Fronto *Principia Historiae* 207–8, were promoted to the centurionate and the *corniculum* by Trajan during the Parthian expedition of AD 114–7; in other words, Suetonius, the author of the *De viris illustribus* and Fronto may all have been referring to service as *cornicularii* (possibly using the term anachronistically in the case of the first two). For the interpretation of the *corniculum* as a purely military award, see Maxfield 1981: 97–9.

35 Rankov 2007.

36 Clauss 1973: 59–77; Austin and Rankov 1995: 54–60.

37 Seneca *De Beneficiis* 3.25; *De ira* 1.18.4; 1.16.5; see also Mark *Evangelion* 6.27; *Acta Alexandrinorum* 11 A 2.12; Firmicus Maternus *Mathesis* 8.26.6, see also 4.11.4. See Rankov 1999: 26–7.

38 Durry 1938: 108–10; Passerini 1939: 70–2; Speidel 1994: 33–5; Bingham 2013: 89–91; Mark Antony evidently maintained a *cohors speculatorum* (*BMCRR* 11: 527 nos. 185–6), and it is not impossible that Octavian had one of his own too.

39 Suet. *Aug.* 74.1.

commander which in some way tied them to him. Thus, in the *Bellum Civile* Caesar speaks of M. Petreius, when he was acting as Pompey's legate in Spain, maintaining not only a praetorian cohort but a personal bodyguard of a few 'barbarian' cavalry who are described as *beneficarii sui*.⁴⁰ Later, Caesar refers to 2,000 *evocati* in Pompey's forces at Pharsalus who were drawn from the *beneficarii* of his former armies and were dispersed through his battle line, presumably to stiffen its resolve;⁴¹ since these men had been called out of retirement as *evocati*, and given their number, it may be suggested that the *beneficium* they had received from Pompey consisted in their case of land grants he had arranged for them, such as those he had sought for his eastern veterans in 60 and 59 BC and which had been part of the agrarian legislation passed during Caesar's consulship.⁴² This habit of personal attachment of *beneficarii* to their commander was carried over directly into the standing army of Augustus. *Beneficarii* appear to be referred to in a papyrus fragment of the late first century BC from Qasr Ibrîm (Primis) in southern Egypt,⁴³ and at the beginning of the reign of Tiberius a soldier of *cohors VI praetoria* served as *Drusi Caesaris beneficiarius*.⁴⁴

What is noteworthy is that this habit of personal attachment of *beneficarii* and other staff officers under the Principate was not confined to the emperor or members of the imperial family, but appears to have been a general trend within the army as a whole. The earliest recorded attachment to a provincial governor is a soldier of *cohors I urbana* who was *beneficiarius Tettieni Sereni* in Gallia Lugdunensis in AD 79. It has been noted that in the late first and early second centuries, it was still normal for *beneficarii* and other staff officers to specify their attachment to a governor by name, before this practice gave way to the use of the anonymous title of *beneficiarius consularis* ('of the governor').⁴⁵

While it appears to have been acceptable in the early imperial army for governors and other senior officers to have a personal attachment of staff officers, there was evidently much more nervousness about the granting of *dona militaria*. Military awards for bravery had a long ancestry, with the granting of

40 Caes. BC 1.75.2: *armat familiam: cum hac et praetoria cohorte caetratorum barbarisque equitibus paucis, beneficariis suis, quos suae custodiae causa habere consueverat, improviso ad vallum advolat.*

41 Caes. BC 3.88.4: *haec erant milia XLV, evocatorum circiter duo, quae ex beneficariis superiorum exercituum ad eum convenerant; quae tota acie disperserat.*

42 Plut. *Cato Minor* 31.1; Cass. Dio 37.49.2; 38.1.5.

43 SB 14.11935.11 = *P. Qasr Ibrîm* inv. no. 7.3.

44 CIL 9.4121; but see also: Nelis-Clément 2000: 64 n. 32.

45 Dise 1997; Nelis-Clément 2000: 76–8.

coronae (crowns) of leaves or precious metals as supreme awards, regardless of rank, going back to Classical Greece; officer's awards such as *hastae* (spears) and *vexilla* (flags) were apparently Roman in origin, but awards such as *torques* (neck-ornaments), *armillae* (arm-bands), *patellae* (small dishes), and *phalerae* (medals), normally awarded to centurions and lower ranks, apparently originated in spoils taken from Celtic barbarian enemies.⁴⁶ The awards for valour in the Roman army of the mid-Republic are described by Polybius, including *coronae* (στεφάνοι), the *hasta* (γαῖσος), the *patella* (φιάλη) for infantry, and *phalerae* (φάλαρα) for cavalry. In line with what Polybius tells us, the *dona* recorded for the Second Punic War were awarded for specific acts of bravery or good service,⁴⁷ and this was still the case with the *turma Salluitana* honoured by Cn. Pompeius Strabo *virtutis causa* and right through into the Principate. The emergence of the ranks of *cornicularius* and *frumentarius*, however, suggests that *dona* had also begun to be seen in the late Republic in part as marks of a commander's favour, and this certainly became the case under the Principate.

Suetonius says that Augustus was generous in the award of *phalerae* and *torques* and any *dona* which were made of gold or silver, but much less so with rampart and mural crowns, which he awarded 'as sparingly as possible and without currying favour (*sine ambitione*) and often even to common soldiers', which implies that one acknowledged function of such awards was to maintain army support.⁴⁸ This accords with an incident reported to have taken place in AD 20/21, when the proconsul of Africa, L. Apronius, granted only *torques* and a *hasta* to a common soldier, M. Helvius Rufus, who had saved the life of a Roman citizen in a battle against the Numidian rebel, Tacfarinas. The normal award for such a feat was the *corona civica*, but Apronius was evidently apprehensive of encroaching on the emperor's prerogative and appearing to curry favour with his troops, even though he was a proconsul appointed by the Senate; Tiberius pointedly intervened to grant the *corona*, protesting that Apronius should have done so on his own initiative in the first place.⁴⁹ One

46 Maxfield 1981: 60–1.

47 Liv. 24.16.9 (awards for the battle of Beneventum in 214 BC); 26.48; see also Silius Italicus *Punica* 15.254–62 (Q. Trebellius and Sex. Digitius first over the wall at New Carthage in 210 BC).

48 Suet. *Aug.* 25.3: (*Augustus*) *dona militaria aliquanto facilius phaleras et torques, quicquid auro argentoque constaret, quam vallares ac murales coronas, quae honore praeexcellerent, dabat; has quam parcissime et sine ambitione ac saepe etiam caligatis tribuit ... solos triumphales, quamquam et socios expeditionum et participes victoriarum suarum, numquam donis impertiendos putavit, quod ipsi quoque ius habuissent tribuendi ea quibus vellent.*

49 Tacitus *Ann.* 3.21; see also Aulus Gellius *Noctes Atticae* 5.6.14; M. Helvius Rufus subsequently took the *agnomen* *Civica* and rose to the rank of *primus pilus* (*CIL* 14.3472–ILS 2637).

of the reasons Apronius may have been so cautious is that one of the charges laid against Piso (albeit as *legatus Augusti* in Syria) at precisely the same time was that he had honoured troops for taking orders from him after he had allowed them to be called 'Pisoniani'.⁵⁰ The epigraphic evidence suggests that, as the Principate progressed, *dona* were awarded exclusively by the emperor or members of the imperial family, often on campaigns in which the emperor was personally present,⁵¹ and sometimes to men who are unlikely to have won them for personal bravery.⁵² *Dona militaria* thus became more often a mark of imperial favour or direct contact with the emperor than of courageous and distinguished service, so that both army units and individuals sometimes felt the need to specify that their honours had been awarded *ob virtutem*.⁵³

The Roman army thus continued to bear fossilized traces of its earlier incarnations right through its history, like the pairing of century barracks in its forts and the use of *signa* in the form of a hand which recalled the army's long-obsolete manipular organisation well into the Principate. Similarly, it retained

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- 50 See above note 5. Towards the end of his reign, Tiberus himself affirmed the principle that the emperor was the only legitimate source of reward (*praemia*) for the troops (Tac. *Ann.* 6.3): *at Iunium Gallionem qui censuerat ut praetoriani actis stipendiis ius apiscerentur in quattuordecim ordinibus sedendi violenter increpuit, velut coram rogitans quid illi cum militibus quos neque dicta imperatoris neque praemia nisi ab imperatore accipere par esset.*
- 51 Maxfield 1981: 116–7; Campbell 1984: 198–203, however, argues that even though *dona* became in effect an imperial monopoly, they could be and still were awarded for campaigns in which the emperor or members of the imperial family did not themselves take an active part.
- 52 Thus M. Vettius Valens of *cohort VI praetoria* was awarded *torques*, *armillae* and *phalerae* during Claudius' invasion of Britain while he was serving as a *beneficiarius* of the praetorian prefect (*CIL* XI 395), while Q. Geminius Sabinus received the *corona vallaris*, *torques*, *armillae* and *phalerae* from Trajan whilst serving as *princeps peregrinorum* (i.e. a centurion in charge of the imperial couriers/*frumentarii*) during the *bellum Germanicum* on the Danube in AD 97/8 (*IL Tun* 778 = *AE* 1923.28; *IL Tun* 779; see also *CIL* 8.825; 8.12232 = 23841). Although it is possible that both earned their honours in action, their close proximity to the emperor and the trajectory of their subsequent careers (Valens rose to be procurator of the province of Lusitania, while Sabinus died as *praefectus* of *legio X Fretensis* in Jerusalem and possibly acting governor of Judaea) rather suggests that their awards were for personal services and loyalty to the emperor. For Valens, see Pflaum 1950: 236; Pflaum 1960: 32; Dobson 1978: 198–9; Maxfield 1981: 211; for Sabinus, see Dobson 1978: 222; Maxfield 1981: 194, see also 187; Dąbrowa 1993: 68–9 no. 6, 78–9; Rankov 2012.
- 53 Units: e.g. *cohort I Breucorum ... Valeria Victrix bis toquata ob virtutem appellata* (*CIL* 3.5918a = 11931); *ala Augusta ob virtutem appellata* (*RIB* 893–4; 897; 946; *Britannia* 10 (1979): 346 no. 7). Individuals: e.g. *Ti. Claudius Maximus ... ob virtute<m> donis donatus ab imp(eratore) Domitiano ... ob virtute<m> bis donis donatus bello Dacico et Parthico* (*AE* 1969/70.583).

the imprints of its emergence out of the armies of the last warlords, not just in the legions which displayed the Bull symbol of the Caesariani and in its body-guard units, the Praetorian cohorts and *equites singulares Augusti*, but in much subtler ways such as the titles given to its staff-officers, and the way in which its system of decorations rewarded and reinforced loyalty as much as courage.

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PART 3

A Necessary Epilogue



Generalissimos and Warlords in the Late Roman West*

Jeroen W.P. Wijnendaele

461 and the Disintegration of the Imperial West

Few events capture the breakdown between the western Roman government and its armed forces as vividly as the aftermath of the emperor Majorian's execution (AD 461). Flavius Julius Valerius Maiorianus stands as a lone exception to an overall pattern of imperial rule throughout the fifth and sixth centuries. In an era when the emperor spent most of his life at the palace in splendid isolation, ceremonially embodying the state, Majorian had led armies from Italy to Gaul and Spain.¹ For all intents and purposes, Majorian was a soldier-emperor whose style of rule would have been more akin to that of a Valentinian I (364–375) than that of an Honorius (393–423).² He had embarked on an ambitious campaign to reinforce the fragile cohesion of the western Roman empire, not only over its various neighbouring tributary peoples (often, but not always correctly, described as 'barbarian' *foederati*) but also its own civilian and military elites. His forces defeated the Alamanni in northern Italy in the spring of 457, and Vandal raiders in Campania during the summer of 458. He campaigned in western Illyricum where he incorporated Huns into his army. In late 458, Majorian arrived in Gaul, which had not accepted his rule.³ Majorian ousted a Burgundian garrison from Lyon and defeated the Visigoths, who afterwards renewed their allegiance. In 460, Majorian entered Spain with a large army to attempt the reconquest of Vandal Africa. However, the Vandals

* John Rich and Toni Naco del Hoyo were so gracious as to invite me to contribute to this volume, after exchanging ideas on ancient warlords at the 'Processes of integration in the Roman world' conference at University of Nottingham (July 2013). Some ideas were fleshed out after discussions with Peter Brennan and Andy Merrills at University of Sydney. I am grateful for feedback on this chapter by Michael Kulikowski, David Woods and Fernando López Sánchez. Needless to say that any remaining errors are my sole responsibility. The 'Abbreviation' section of this volume provides more information on the sources and abbreviations used in this chapter.

- 1 For specific references to the sources, see *PLRE* 2: 'Fl. Iulius Valerius Maiorianus': 702–3.
- 2 On Majorian's reign, see: Meyer 1969; Harries 1994: 82–102; MacGeorge 2002: 196–214. Regrettably, I did not have access to Oppedisano 2013 during the time of publication.
- 3 Mathisen 1979; Max 1979.

managed to sabotage his fleet near Alicante, which forced Majorian to abort the campaign. On his arrival in Italy, Majorian was deposed and executed by his *magister utriusque militia* Ricimer near Tortona on 7 August 461.

As consequent events were to demonstrate, Majorian was the last western Roman emperor who had maintained the allegiance of imperial troops in Italy, Gaul, Dalmatia, and Spain. Unintentionally, when Ricimer executed the emperor and later elevated his puppet Libius Severus (461–465), he not only chopped off Majorian's head but also the remaining imperial territory outside Italy.⁴ 461 could rightfully be regarded as the pivotal year when the western Roman Empire finally disintegrated into various warlord fiefdoms. Imperial armies in Gaul and Dalmatia refused to recognize Severus, and went into open rebellion (*Priscus Fragments* 39.1). The armies were commanded respectively by two of Majorian's former generals, Aegidius and Marcellinus. Ricimer pursued diplomatic ties with Constantinople to defuse the Dalmatian crisis. In order to ward off a potential counter-offensive from Gaul, however, he made serious concessions to the neighbouring Visigoths and Burgundians. The city of Narbonne, a former bulwark that had withstood a lengthy Visigothic siege in 437, was officially ceded by Severus to the Visigothic king Theoderic II as a reward for aid against Aegidius, while Aegidius's rank as *magister militum* of the imperial forces in Gaul was allocated to the Burgundian king Gundioc. One thus witnessed the paradoxical scenario of the imperial government in Italy officially ceding Roman territory in order to fight its own army in Gaul. Furthermore, by abandoning Narbonne, the western court gave up its land-bridge with Spain, where Majorian's general Nepotian was soon replaced by a representative of the Visigothic king: Hyd. 208 (213). For the remainder of the fifth century, the Iberian peninsula would become a twilight zone, in which neither the Visigoths nor the Sueves managed to fill the vacuum the empire had left behind.⁵ For the rest of the 460s and 470s, the western imperial administration's writ ran no further than Italy and a few footholds in southern Gaul.

It must have been as challenging for anyone living throughout Libius Severus' reign (461–465), as it is for scholars today, to gauge how political factions in the imperial west aligned to one another, and which one of them could claim legitimacy. The Spanish bishop Hydatius regarded Aegidius as a champion of Roman order, yet the Gallo-Roman aristocrat Sidonius Apollinarius refused to make mention of him or his son and successor Syagrius throughout his voluminous work despite his awareness of northern Gallic affairs.⁶ While the Vandal

4 On Severus, see: Oost 1970; Woods 2002.

5 Kulikowski 2004: 197–209.

6 Hyd. 214 (218); Harries 1994: 247–8.

king Geiseric may have been marauding the western Mediterranean and thus damaging the empire's economy, he was simultaneously the only ruler who could claim to be representing the interests of the Theodosian dynasty.⁷ His son and heir Huneric was married to Eudocia, the elder daughter of the late emperor Valentinian III, while he publically backed the claims to the western throne of the prominent senator Olybrius, married to Valentinian's younger daughter Placidia (Priscus *Fr.* 38). The case of Geiseric shows how schizophrenic the nature of legitimate rule and loyalty to the empire had become in the early 460s. The Vandals presented the greatest threat to domestic security in the western Mediterranean, and even threatened eastern coasts, but the various factions representing imperial power were thoroughly divided on how to deal with him. The western court lacked the naval capacity to counter the Vandals, while the eastern court remained uncommitted to handling Geiseric militarily, and opted for diplomatic resolution. Similarly, Constantinople dissuaded Marcellinus in Dalmatia from taking up arms against Italy (Priscus *Fr.* 39). Yet not long afterwards Marcellinus took his forces to Sicily where he fought the Vandals independently, at the same time as his former colleague Aegidius was trying to set up an alliance with Geiseric: Hydatius 220 (224), 223 (227). Exactly who was who on whose side was a very thorny question indeed.

In 461, the Roman Empire finally became a failed state in the western Mediterranean and its hinterland. Dalmatia and Northern Gaul effectively turned into warlord fiefdoms maintained by 'orphaned generals'. Even when Aegidius and Marcellinus were killed, these territories did not return to the imperial fold but were taken over by relatives of the warlord-commanders. Similarly, while a series of western emperors continued to reside in Italy, henceforth they would either reign as puppets or be rivals to the warlord-commanders of the regional field army. None of these emperors ever regained full control of the army in Italy, let alone those forces outside the peninsula previously still taking orders from Majorian. Eastern Roman historiography regarded Ricimer already as a *rex* in these years (Marcellinus Comes *s.a.* 464). Giving him the title was technically incorrect but understandable, since his control over Italy was so complete that after Severus' death he could comfortably govern the peninsula without a western emperor from 15 August 465 to 12 April 467 (*Fasti vindobonenses priores et posteriores s.a.* 465, 467).

Such a scenario, with regional strongmen exercising *de facto* control over various tracts of the imperial west without showing allegiance to an official head of state, would have been unfathomable a century earlier. In this chapter, I wish to highlight some of the root causes of warlordism in the Late Roman

7 Clover 1966: 163–206.

West and their contribution to the crumbling of state authority in the fifth century. I will survey the personalization of military power inside the western high command, whilst considering cases of insubordination, mutiny and desertion. Special attention will be given to the accumulation of private wealth, the growing economy of violence, the rise of factionalism inside the ranks of the western Roman officer class, and their combined catalyzing contribution to the crumbling of state authority.

The Personalization of Military Power

One of the key features of the state's loss of its monopoly on violence can be seen in its mounting inability to relieve generals of their commands. Throughout the fourth century, we encounter various examples of officers who were cashiered, deservedly or not. Ursicinus, a *magister peditum* who had served in Gaul and the East during the 350s, was relieved from his command by the emperor Constantius II after the Persian capture of Amida in 359 (Ammianus Marcellinus 20.2). The future emperors Valentinian I and Theodosius were both dishonourably discharged during their early military careers.⁸ The *comes Africae* Romanus seems to have been dismissed for corruption contributing towards the revolt of Firmus in the early 370s (Amm. Marc. 29.5.5–7).

It is debatable whether any of these discharges was justified or not. To name but one example, Ammianus Marcellinus, who had served under Ursicinus, certainly took a partisan stance towards his superior's dismissal.⁹ Nevertheless, the very fact that these discharges occurred should serve as a reminder that the emperor, and by extension the imperial government, remained the ultimate arbiter of military authority.¹⁰ Regardless of any feelings of indignity, officers were conditioned to accept their dismissal. However, already during the last quarter of the fourth century, a noticeable shift occurred in the way emperors had to deal with their commanders.

When the western emperor Gratian confronted the usurper Magnus Maximus near Paris in 383, his *magister peditum praesentalis* Merobaudes deserted to Maximus with a significant part of the dynastic army (Prosper s.a.

8 Valentinian's dismissal: Amm. Marc. 16.11.6–7. Theodosius' dismissal: Pacatus 2.9.1–3; Ambrose *Obituary for Theodosius* 53; Theodoret *Historia Ecclesiastica* 5.5.1–2. On these, see Woods 1995; Woods 1999.

9 Matthews 1989: 46–7.

10 Independently from one another, Lee 2015 has made similar observations for the fourth century.

384). Maximus later found it necessary, however, to force Merobaudes to commit suicide (Pacat. 2.28). The same Maximus later criticized the conduct of Bauto, *magister militum* in Italy, as controlling the throne of the infant emperor Valentinian II (Ambr. *Epistulae* 24.4). Several years after the death of Maximus and Bauto, Valentinian was unable to cashier his *magister equitum praesentalis* Arbogastes (Zosimus 4.33.1–2; John of Antioch *Fragments* 187). The latter owed his command to Theodosius and thus found himself *incontournable* in the face of an emperor who had come to the throne during his infancy, and had never managed to assert his right to rule. Merobaudes, Bauto, and Arbogastes were the first western *magistri militum* whose sway over the military was so strong they could dictate government policy. This phenomenon cannot be dissociated from the increasing marginalisation of the western emperor.

The Roman emperor had always acted as a supreme commander of the army, and throughout the late third and fourth centuries had played an important role leading in the field.¹¹ Yet the young age of accession of emperors such as Gratian (367–383), Valentinian II (375–392), Honorius (393–423), and Valentinian III (425–455), paved the way for a series of military power brokers who gradually assumed the responsibility to conduct governmental policies.¹² As the fifth century progressed, powerful generals of the western Roman army eventually found that they were no longer subservient to the state; the state was rather subservient to them. Simply dismissing these generals was no longer a viable option. W. Goffart astutely observed that the prominence of murders in the fifth century is a clear sign of the personalization of late Roman politics.¹³ Indeed, the domination of these generals usually only ended with their deaths.

The *magister utriusque militiae* Stilicho thoroughly dominated the western Roman court for thirteen years (395–408). Yet when his position became politically untenable during a series of crises in 407–8, such as the usurpation of Constantine III (407–11) and the succession of the eastern emperor Arcadius, his opponents were not satisfied with simply engineering his fall from grace. The general was publicly condemned and executed, after mutineers at Ticinum had already lynched all of his key officers and officials gathered there. Afterwards, Stilicho's son and barbarian retainers were hunted down and assassinated. Between 408 and 411, several officials and generals struggled for power at Honorius' court. It is revealing that nearly all those who were deemed unsatisfactory paid with their lives. Even non-entities such as the *magistri militum*

11 Lee 2007: 22–30; Hebblewhite 2016.

12 On this development, see O'Flynn 1983; McEvoy 2013.

13 Goffart 2006: 194.

Vigilantius and Turpilio, who had accepted their sacking by Honorius, were not given the chance to go into exile but were soon murdered (Zos. 5.47.2–3).

When Constantius finally emerged as uncontested *magister utriusque militiae* in 413, it was atop the corpses of several palatine officials who had been prominent in Honorius' administration after Stilicho's downfall, such as the *magister officiorum* Olympius, the *magister equitum* Allobichus and the *comes Africae* Heraclian. One of the most significant consequences of the emergence of military dictatorship in the imperial west was that loyal service to the emperor was no longer sufficient to guarantee one's position or indeed one's life. As the fifth century progressed, any western Roman general who was keen on preserving either had to ensure that he belonged to the faction of the dominant *magister utriusque militiae*, or try to remove the incumbent one altogether and take his place. It was this deadly competition for unofficial supreme power that fueled warlord-politics within the western Roman army during the fifth century.

Insubordination, Mutiny and Desertion

Modern scholarship has usually focused on those *generalissimos* who managed to obtain a dominant position at court.¹⁴ Indeed, one could be deceived into thinking that the model of a 'military manager' controlling the government of a western ceremonial emperor became accepted without controversy during the fifth century.¹⁵ Yet there was no legal basis for the position of a *generalissimo*, and this created a critical fault-line in military authority. The position of a *generalissimo* always relied on the implicit threat of force. The result was, therefore, that anyone who aspired to a similar position would also have to countenance the use of violence. What would prevent one officer from professing outward loyalty to the state, i.e. the emperor and his dynasty, while simultaneously trying to engineer the downfall of its leading *magister militum*?

The history of the Theodosian dynasty in the west (395–455) is hallmarked by the mounting unwillingness of the western military aristocracy to adhere to the traditional chain of command. Gildo, the senior commander of the African field army (*magister utriusque militiae per Africam*) was the first to

14 See the various individual biographies covered by Zecchini 1983; Lütkenhaus 1998; Stickler 2002; Janssen 2004; Anders 2010.

15 O'Flynn 1983; Lee 2013: 81–109; McEvoy 2013.

grasp the new reality of power and its ill-defined legitimacy.¹⁶ He made the momentous decision to shift his allegiance from the western court to the eastern court in 397/398. He halted vital grain shipments to Rome in the process, just when Stilicho was leading a campaign against Alaric's Gothic army in the Peloponnese.¹⁷ The polemic historiographer Orosius specifically argued that Gildo was motivated to seize power because of the very young age and feeble rule of the imperial brothers Arcadius and Honorius (Oros. 7.36.3). While one does not need to accept Orosius' hostile account of Gildo's revolt *prima facie*, the entrenchment of child-emperor rule in 395 did encourage generals to aim for higher power within the chain of command. Gildo eventually failed, but others followed his lead.

The Gothic magnate Sarus played this game more carefully. When his patron Stilicho fell in the summer of 408, he operated as a free agent with a troop of several hundred retainers for almost two years in Italy, while Alaric and Honorius struggled against one another. Sarus ultimately thwarted Alaric's integration into the western Roman government during his final negotiations with Honorius in 410, and thus prevented the Gothic *rex* from turning into Stilicho's 'successor' within the western Roman high command. He was accepted again at Honorius' court until the unsolved murder of one of his lieutenants drove him to seek employment with the usurper Jovinus (411–413). However, he was ambushed and killed by Alaric's successor Athaulf on his journey to Gaul (Olympiodorus *Fragments* 18).

In the same vein as Gildo, the *comes Africae* Heraclian had tried to react against the growing influence of Constantius.¹⁸ Not only did he withhold the African grain shipments during a critical campaign by Constantius against the Visigoths, he even set sail to Italy with an army in 413: Oros. 7.42.12–14; Hyd. 48 (56). The most puzzling thing about this intervention is that it happened in the very same year as Heraclian's consulship.¹⁹ To be a consul was one of the most prestigious honours in the Late Roman Empire; it did not confer any power as such but whoever held it would be remembered for generations to come because his name was used to define the year. That Heraclian was willing to take up arms at the pinnacle of his prestige can only mean that he felt personally threatened by Constantius' rise to power.²⁰ Nevertheless, he was swiftly

16 On Gildo, see: Wijnendaele 2017.

17 For the connection between Gildo's revolt and Stilicho's suspension of this second campaign against Alaric, see: Burell 2004.

18 *PLRE* 2: 'Heraclianus 3' 539–40.

19 *CLRE* 360.

20 Oost 1966; Gaggero 1991.

defeated in the Italian peninsula and eventually murdered after his flight to Carthage.

Gildo, Sarus, and Heraclian have often been viewed as rebels. But they are mainly regarded as minor rebels and they do not feature prominently in the history of Honorius' calamitous reign. More attention is usually devoted to the *generalissimos* Stilicho and Constantius. Yet all three men were alike in that they could show a track record of proven loyalty to the reigning dynasty prior to their ultimate disaffection. In 397, Gildo was the last western Roman general who could trace his career in the western army all the way back to the reign of Valentinian I. More importantly, he had kept Africa loyal to Theodosius' cause during the latter's civil war with Eugenius and Arbogastes (394), for which he had been duly rewarded.²¹ Similarly, Sarus played a decisive role in stopping Radagaisus' horde in Italy (406), and scored some success in temporarily halting the usurper Constantine III's advance in Gaul (407–8).²² Finally, Heraclian had played the decisive role in ensuring Honorius' hold on the western throne by redirecting Rome's grain fleet to Ravenna, during Attalus' usurpation in Italy (409–10).²³ While all three men committed some form of insubordination and thus defied state authority, it makes more sense to interpret their actions as a rallying against the growing influence of individual *generalissimos* or other contenders for positions of influence, than to dismiss them as rebels in the traditional sense. They ultimately failed, but it is impossible to understand the behaviour of the next generation of commanders, who could clearly be categorised as warlords, without considering these earlier precursors.

Rivalry for high office was a time-honoured tradition in Roman history, but it had rarely materialised in such public eruptions of violent unrest as from the death of Honorius' co-*Augustus* Constantius III (421) onwards. The tribune Bonifatius deserted his position in Italy after dismissed from a high-profile campaign against the Vandals organised by the *magister militum* Castinus in 422, only to usurp the office of *comes Africae* in the process and establish an autonomous power base in Africa.²⁴ Through the rest of the 420s, he managed to thwart the ambitions of his superiors Castinus and Felix. The latter eventually lost his life in a mutiny instigated by Aëtius, a rival senior officer.²⁵ Soon

21 Gaggero 1998.

22 Oros. 7.37.12; Marcell. Com. s.a. 406 (2); Zos. 6.2 3–6.

23 Halsall 2007: 216.

24 *PLRE* 2: 'Bonifatius 3': 237–40, Wijnendaele 2015: 43–56.

25 On Aëtius, see: Zecchini 1983; Stickler 2002; McEvoy 2013: 251–72.

afterwards, Aëtius waged a private war with Bonifatius, his main competitor for the supreme command of the western field army.²⁶ After Bonifatius' death due to wounds incurred during this showdown, Aëtius himself only narrowly escaped an attempt on his life in the aftermath. Fleeing to Pannonia, he managed to acquire a large force of Huns that enabled him to return to Italy and demand at sword's length that the supreme command of the western army be returned to him.

The careers of both Bonifatius and Aëtius, misleadingly styled as the 'last of the Romans,' (Procopius *Bellum Vandalicum* 3.3.15) represent the pinnacle of successful warlord politics. One is tempted to perceive similar ambitions in other generals who failed to achieve such success. Sanoeces was a general sent by Felix to eliminate the dissident Bonifatius in 427, but decided to have his colleagues who held joint command of the campaign murdered, thereby facilitating Bonifatius' victory and his own death (Prosper *s.a.* 427). The very fact that an imperial commander sent on behalf of the legitimate government was willing to eliminate his fellow generals, jeopardising a critical operation in the process, can best be understood as the outcome of an attempt at greater power that went awry. This is more apparent in the case of Litorius, Aëtius' subordinate commander, who scored notable victories in Gaul during the second half of the 430s.²⁷ However, during a war with the Visigoths, he took the unprecedented step of leading his army all the way to their royal seat at Toulouse where it was eventually annihilated. Litorius paid for his daring with his life, and it was later rumoured that he had undertaken this fiasco out of eagerness to outshine Aëtius' exploits.²⁸

When Aegidius, Marcellinus, and Ricimer cast off their allegiance to specific emperors in the early 460s and 470s without assuming the imperial purple themselves, they merely took the next logical step in a decades-long process of disintegrating military authority that had gradually grown out of military unrest via violent insubordination to outright rule through arms. The success or failure of aspiring warlord-commanders, such as Sarus, Aëtius or Marcellinus, ultimately hinged on a combination of three factors: economic resources, personal troops, and factional alliances.

26 *Chronica Gallica* 452, 111; Hyd. 89 (99); Marcell. Com. *s.a.* 432.3.

27 *PLRE* 2: 'Litorius', 684–5.

28 Prosper *s.a.* 439. Kulikowski 2012: 45 makes similar observations.

Private Wealth and Public Violence

Accumulation of wealth and property can be attested in various cases of the western Roman military aristocracy. During his twelve-year tenure as senior commander of the African field army, Gildo managed to accumulate tremendous riches. When he finally fell in 398, Honorius' government had to create a new bureau led by the *comes Gildioniaci patrimonii* specifically for administering his extensive domains as part of the state fisc (Codex Theodosianus 9.42.16; Notitia Dignitatum, Occidens 12.5). Heraclian's property was more modest in comparison, but still allowed Constantius, the beneficiary of his death, to organise lavish consular games (Olympiod. *Fr.* 23). As for Aëtius, one of the advantages of his marriage to Pelagia, Bonifatius' widow, was that she was incredibly wealthy: Marcell. Com. *s.a.* 432 (3). It is explicitly recorded that, after Majorian's death, Ricimer was able to bribe Marcellinus' barbarian troops in Sicily 'because of his greater wealth' (Priscus *Fr.* 38.1). Yet by 468, Marcellinus had strengthened his position to such an extent that he was able to bring an army and financial support to the west during the great allied campaign against Geiseric (Marcell. Com. *s.a.* 468).

Exactly how much greater the private wealth of these generals was to that of their fourth century counterparts is hard to discern.²⁹ It has been argued that the *comes* Sebastian's modest wealth made it easier for his rivals to remove him after the death of Valentinian I.³⁰ Yet Arbogastes was similarly praised for possessing no more than a common soldier despite the fact that he was able to seize control of all western military forces in the early 390s (Eunapius *Fragments* 58.1). The key area where private wealth mattered the most for ambitious commanders in the fifth century was in their ability to attract personal forces and maintain their allegiance. Nearly all western Roman generals covered in this survey possessed armed retainers variously identified in the sources as *satellites*, *doruphoroi*, *buccellarii*, *armigeri* and so forth. Gildo, Stilicho, and Heraclian possessed considerable bodies of clients tied to their person whom the state deemed dangerous enough to hunt down after these generals' downfall.³¹ Indeed, it is safe to assume that one of the main reasons for the

29 Whittaker 1993: 287–91 emphasises the growing concern of imperial authorities about the accumulation of private property at the end of the fourth century. Liebeschuetz 2007: 488–91 rightly rejects Whittaker's argument, however, that landed property enabled men to become warlords. I concur with Liebeschuetz that military service formed the crucial basis.

30 MacMullen 1988: 194.

31 Stilicho: *CTh.* 9.42.21–22; Gildo: *CTh.* 9.40.19; Heraclian: *CTh.* 9.40.21.

violent removal of these generals was their personal bond with such retainers that persisted beyond their office.³²

The title *buccellarii* is used in the *Notitia Dignitatum* to describe an elite unit of heavy cavalry (ND Orientalis 7.25). During the reign of Honorius they seem to have consisted of both Goths and Roman soldiers, and to have taken pride in their rations of *buccellatum* (a type of hearty dry biscuit akin to hardtack): Olympiod. *Fr.* 7.4; 12. The failure of Radagaisus' invasion of Italy in 406 resulted in a great influx of Gothic soldiers who needed to be integrated into western military structures and who played a vital role in the subsequent actions of Stilicho, Alaric and Sarus.³³ Though they were officially state troops, they depended for their pay and rewards on the generals they served.³⁴ It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that the lack of a proper command could strain the ability of officers to keep such troops in check when they went rogue.

The dangerous liaison between a disgraced commander and his retainers is explicitly recorded in the case of Bonifatius. Augustine castigated the latter when he acquiesced to his retainers' pillaging of the African countryside during a civil war with the imperial court (Aug. *Ep.* 220.6). Yet Bonifatius may simply have had no choice than to reward his troops, who depended on him for their livelihood, and whose loyalty he in turn needed to ensure his own survival by allowing them to ravage the countryside. After his death, his son-in-law Sebastian briefly took over his position as supreme commander of the western Roman army, but eventually had to surrender it to Aëtius in 434. When Sebastian subsequently fell out of grace at the eastern court, his *doruphoroï* took to piracy (Priscus *Fr.* 4). While such disturbances are never reported among Aëtius' followers, the very fact that he campaigned nearly every other year between 425–440 in Gaul against Visigoths, Franks, and Burgundians, perhaps had more to do with finding profitable targets for his Hunnic retainers than was strictly militarily necessary.³⁵ Similar motivations may have inspired Marcellinus to campaign against the Vandals in Sicily in the mid 460s, despite having his stronghold in Dalmatia and being sabotaged by Ricimer on this very island previously: Hyd. 223 (227); Priscus *Fr.* 38.1.

There may be some correlation between this economy of violence and the decline of monetisation in the western provinces as the fifth century dawned.³⁶

32 Liebeschuetz 1990: 43.

33 On Radagaisus' invasion, see: Wijnendaele 2016a.

34 On the development of the *buccellarii*, see Schmitt 1994; Sarris 2006: 162–75; Lenski 2009.

35 For a critical analysis of Aëtius' commitment to Gaul at the expense of other provinces, see Moss 1973.

36 López Sánchez 2005; Esmonde-Cleary 2013: 348–50.

The western state apparatus certainly saw financial retraction in this period. Stilicho dissuaded Honorius from travelling to Constantinople in 408 when the emperor's brother Arcadius died on the grounds that such a journey would be a burden to the treasury.³⁷ Repeated tax amnesties were necessary throughout the 410s in order to help the Italian peninsula recover from the damage sustained during the war with Alaric.³⁸ Furthermore, the Vandal conquest of Africa delivered another crippling blow to the western empire's public finances.³⁹ It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that generals were encouraged to provide for their troops personally, regardless of the origin of these provisions.

Sarus departed from his campaign against Constantine III with a baggage train laden with booty, while he most probably supplied his retainers from the Italian countryside during the war between Alaric and Honorius (Zos. 6.2.3; 6.13.2). Gerontius, chief general of Constantine III, already allowed his troops to pillage a Spanish town they were supposed to win for the usurper's cause in 408 (Oros. 7.40.8). The palatine faction orchestrating the mutiny at Ticinum, which lynched Stilicho's key generals and ministers, probably looked the other way when its soldiers subsequently looted the city (Zos. 5.32.5). Similarly, the eastern army that was sent to restore Valentinian III on the western throne celebrated its victory over the usurper Ioannes by sacking Ravenna in 425 (Chron. Gall. 452, 99). When Ricimer finally toppled the western emperor Anthemius, and his troops entered Rome in 472, the city suffered widespread looting (Paulus Diaconus *Historia Romana* 15.4).

Trickle-down Diplomacy

When introducing his seminal work on the fall of the Roman Republic, Sir Ronald Syme famously remarked that 'however talented and powerful in himself, the Roman statesman cannot stand alone, without allies, without a following'.⁴⁰ Personal armies and resources go some way towards explaining the individual power bases growing around ambitious generals in the fifth century. Yet modern scholarship has rarely examined the extent to which generals tried to tie these troops to themselves personally. One recurring element is

37 Zos. 5.32.1; Matthews 1975: 280.

38 Jones 1964: 204–205; Heather 2005: 245–246. *CTh* 11.18.1 issued at Ravenna in February 412 already speaks of 'an exhausted treasury'.

39 Elton 1996: 118–127.

40 Syme 1939: 7.

their attempted construction of marriage alliances between themselves and their officers.⁴¹

In a certain way this emulated the practice of the eastern emperor Theodosius I.⁴² He had tied various generals to his dynasty through marriages to his relatives, such as Gildo's daughter Salvina to a nephew of the empress Flacilla, that of Bauto's daughter Eudoxia to his son Arcadius, and that of Stilicho to his own adoptive daughter Serena. He even raised his general Promotus' sons together with his own. It has been traditionally argued that Theodosius ruled solely over both imperial realms for a brief period in 394–395, but the sources make it clear that he only intended to rearrange western affairs before returning to the east where urgent problems needed to be tackled. His son-in-law Stilicho was then meant to supervise the western Roman government as guardian of his infant son Honorius.⁴³ Theodosius' unexpected demise and his succession by ceremonial child-emperors allowed other generals to aspire to a position similar to that intended for Stilicho.

One of the first attested cases of such a marriage alliance is the marriage of Bathanarius to Stilicho's sister, when Stilicho also granted him the command over the African field army.⁴⁴ Stilicho's decision to allow Bathanarius to marry a relative cannot have been a coincidence considering the grave difficulties that he had encountered with Gildo in Africa. Ensuring the loyalty of the African field army through his own brother-in-law seems to have been the primary aim behind the appointment and marriage.⁴⁵ This approach was adopted by two of Bathanarius' successors as *comes Africae*. The *comes Africae* Heraclian married his daughter to Sabinus, who is described as his *domesticus* (Oros. 7.42.11). The *domestici* in this period often served as 'lieutenants' to key generals who maintained *buccellarii*. When Heraclian crossed into Italy with an army, most probably to counter the growing dominance of Constantius, Sabinus stayed behind. Heraclian's adventure failed dismally, and his son-in-law preferred to flee to Constantinople while Heraclian's *satellites* (a term often used for generals' armed retainers) were hunted down in Africa. This seems an indication that Heraclian had wished to safeguard his regional powerbase by having an officer directly tied to his house supervising it.

41 Demandt 1980 provides the most thorough study of the various links between the highest generals, imperial families and royal barbarian houses. Yet the marriage links between the lower ranking generals in the survey presented in this chapter escaped his notice.

42 Liebeschuetz 1990: 24.

43 Cameron 1969: 274.

44 *PLRE* 2: 'Bathanarius': 221.

45 Warmington 1954: 12; Lütkenhaus 1998: 13, n. 40.

That pattern is further exemplified by Bonifatius who gave his eldest daughter in marriage to Sebastian, who had temporarily replaced him as *comes Africae* in 425–426 while Bonifatius was overseas (Augustine *Epistulae* 7*). After Bonifatius' death, Sebastian briefly succeeded him as *magister utriusque militiae*: Hyd. 89 (99). We know too little about Sabinus to conjecture why Heraclian would have found him a suitable partner for his daughter. But Sebastian showed himself an excellent career-soldier who could maintain control over personal troops during years of adversity.⁴⁶ Both Heraclian and Bonifatius were able to call upon the allegiance of the African military for their autonomous endeavours. Their personal ties to their officers below can partially explain this. Similarly, the *magister equitum* Gaudentius enrolled his son Aëtius among the *protectores et domestici*, and was probably responsible for his marriage to the daughter of the *comes domesticorum* Carpillio (Gregorius Turonensis *Historiae* 2.8). Again during his ascendancy, Aëtius' panegyricist and subordinate commander Merobaudes married the daughter of the *magister militum* Astyrius. This relationship allowed both men to cooperate in Tarraconensis during the early 440s. When Astyrius was recalled, his son-in-law simply continued the campaign: Hyd. 120 (128). Thraustilla, one of Aëtius' *buccellarii* who later murdered the emperor Valentinian III, was reported to have been his son-in-law (Addit. Prosp. Haun. s.a. 455). The source preserving this information is admittedly a late one, but it seems credible given the overall pattern of such marriages. The final culmination of this process of military networking can be seen in the events of 461 that transformed Italy, northern Gaul and Dalmatia into warlord fiefdoms.

Marcellinus held sway as warlord over Dalmatia for most of the 460s. When he was assassinated in Sicily, during the 'Fourth Punic War' against Geiseric, the Italian government did not manage to re-establish control over Dalmatia. Instead, Julius Nepos simply took over his position that was eventually formalised by the east as *magister militum per Dalmatiae* (CJ. 6.61.5). One source suggests that Nepos was the son of Nepotian, a high-ranking general of Majorian who accompanied the emperor to Spain and campaigned against the Sueves (Jordanes *Romana* 338). Hence Marcellinus, seems to have married his sister to Nepotian in order to create a powerbase for the future. Again, the future Burgundian king Gundioc married Ricimer's sister, and the tie between both men has been interpreted as that of one barbarian royal house securing an alliance with each other by means of marriage. In contrast, both Ricimer and Gundioc will have been minor officers serving under Aëtius when the marriage

46 Clover 1979; Scharf 1989; Wijnendaele 2015: 107–13.

was enacted, probably at some point in the early 450s.⁴⁷ Gundobad, Gundioc's son and Ricimer's nephew, later reigned as Burgundian king until his death in 516.⁴⁸ Yet he was already old enough to assist Ricimer with an army against the emperor Anthemius in 472 and this relationship allowed Gundobad to inherit Ricimer's position in Italy as lord of the Italian field army when the latter died in 472 (Joh. Ant. *Fr.* 209.2). Similarly, Aegidius continued to hold onto former imperial territory north of the Loire as king of the Franks, and inflicted a great victory over the Goths in 463.⁴⁹ Yet when he was assassinated in 465, no force allied to Ricimer was able to take over his domain. Instead, Aegidius' son Syagrius eventually inherited his position as a *Rex Romanorum* operating from Soissons.⁵⁰ Marriage alliances that originally were arranged by ambitious generals with an eye to safeguard key provinces ultimately evolved into dynasties where military power could be inherited.

Warlordism and the Collapse of State Power

In the field of ancient history, the concept of 'Warlords' has received most attention by scholars studying the Later Roman Empire.⁵¹ As this volume aims to demonstrate, theories of 'Warlordism' as developed in social sciences can be useful as much for the Late Imperial West as for the wider Mediterranean world in the second half of the first millennium BC. In the Late Imperial West, warlordism emerged on the fringes among middle-ranking officers, and could (unfairly) be called the poor-man's usurpation. In fact, it was an alternative form of political and military opposition, and more efficient to accomplish. The *generalissimo's* lack of any constitutionally defined position meant that it was easier to replace him than replacing a dynastic emperor and his government altogether. The steady withdrawal of troops during the early fifth century from Britain and the Rhine frontier, traditional hotbeds for usurpations in the fourth century,⁵² also meant that there were simply no resources for 'traditional

47 The Burgundians only reasserted their autonomy during the short reign of Avitus (455–456), after Aëtius had thoroughly decimated them in the mid-430s. Note that unlike the Visigoths and Alans, the Burgundians did not fight with Aëtius under their own king at the so-called battle of the Catalaunian Plains against Attila in 451.

48 *PLRE* 2: 'Gundobadus' 1: 524–5.

49 *PLRE* 2: 'Aegidius': 11–3.

50 On Syagrius, see Halsall 2001; MacGeorge 2002: 111–24.

51 Whittaker 1993; Liebeschuetz 2007; Wijnendaele 2016b.

52 Wardman 1984.

usurpations' in the west after the last surge of such between 406 and 413.⁵³ For the rest of the fifth century, the western Roman army steadily devolved into a single imperial field army stationed in Italy.

None of Gildo, Sarus, Heraclian, Bonifatius, Aëtius or Sebastian ever aimed to replace the legitimate emperors Honorius or Valentinian III. This dynamic only changed with the death of Valentinian in 455, and the demise of the Theodosian dynasty in the west. At this point, the question of who possessed the credentials to reign from the western throne, while catering to the interests of the various elites, was thrown wide open. Only in this scenario could Ricimer become a kingmaker and kingslayer. Furthermore, it has to be stressed that none of these generals desired to place themselves outside of the imperial framework indefinitely.⁵⁴

Stilicho's panegyrist Claudian famously vilified Gildo for his rupture with the government in Italy, but even he had to concede that the rebel-commander had received official recognition from the Constantinopolitan court to administer Africa as eastern territory (Claudian *De consulate Stilichonus* 1, 277–87, *Eutropius* 1, 410–1). Bonifatius seemingly fought imperial troops as a rebel without a cause between 427 and 428. Yet he combined an impressive guerrilla stance with diplomatic negotiations through aristocratic networks in Rome to have his position restored (Procop. *BV* 3.3.27–30; Theophanes *AM* 5931). Even Sebastian still desired to play a role in imperial politics after a decade-long odyssey that took him from Africa to Italy, Constantinople, Gaul, Spain and back to Africa.⁵⁵ This motivation is evident in his ambition to reconquer Carthage while Geiseric was absent in Sicily (Prosper *s.a.* 440). The same process can be seen with Aegidius and Marcellinus. Neither commander was initially content to become ruler of a Gallo-Roman or a Dalmatian secessionist state, and both aimed to march on Italy.⁵⁶ The crucial difference is that neither was ever able to project his power beyond his immediate domain into Italy. Marcellinus did

53 This is already apparent in the different power bases backing Constantine III in 407 and Jovinus in 411. Constantine crossed from Britain to Gaul with the last British field army and quickly gained support from remaining imperial forces in Gaul. In contrast, Jovinus was proclaimed by an alliance of Alans, Burgundians and remnants of Constantine's faction. See, Drinkwater 1998; Halsall 2007: 220–4.

54 Wood 2000: 508 uses the phrase 'opting out of the system' to describe Aegidius' actions in Gaul post 461. I concur that this is a useful way to describe the behaviour of men such as Sarus, Sebastian or Marcellinus during their respective stints as warlords, but I would stress that none of them desired to opt out indefinitely.

55 *PLRE* 2: 'Sebastianus 3': 983–4.

56 Priscus *Fr.* 39.1. *Contra* Henning 1999, who styles his sections on these realms as 'Sezessionen'.

succeed very briefly to regain a legitimate position as imperial commander through his alliance with the western emperor Anthemius in 467, yet Aegidius ultimately died as king of the Franks.

When Odoacer requested permission from the eastern emperor to assume control of Italy, he was still acting as chief of the field army in Italy—such as it was.⁵⁷ His request to be granted the title of Patrician by Zeno only underlined his desire to receive official recognition (Malchus *Fragments* 14). Too often Odoacer's policy towards the non-entity Romulus Augustulus in 476, which Arnaldo Momigliano famously coined the *caduta senza rumore di un impero*, has been identified as the formal end of the Roman Empire in the western Mediterranean world.⁵⁸ In fact, Odoacer merely followed the precedents already established by Gildo in 397–398, Bonifatius between 423–425, and Marcellinus in the 460s. All of these commanders operating from the periphery sought to align themselves with the legitimate powers in Constantinople when they were at odds with the government in Italy. The difference here is that by 476, Italy had already been transformed into a peripheral warlord fiefdom, and Odoacer simply formalised a *de facto* state of affairs. Alternative methods of violent opposition and the acquisition of force through private means had ensured the breakdown of the state's monopoly on violence and the disintegration of centralised armies. What had started as an accidental revolution in the late fourth century became a new form of military rule in the late fifth century.

The End of Rome's Republic and Empire in the West

In the long history of the *Res Publica*, there were arguably three moments when Roman state authority collapsed and gave way to a new order of power: the civil wars heralding the end of the Republic, the crisis of the third century, and the disintegration of the western imperial apparatus in the fifth century. Ever since E. Gibbon, historians have been obsessed with trying to establish one particular moment in time that signaled the end of Rome's empire in the west. More often than not, this is usually associated with the death of key individuals who may or may not have been able to steer the western Roman government towards a better course should they have lived. Yet historians should be wary of stumbling into this pitfall of the 'great-men-theory'.⁵⁹

57 *PLRE* 2: 'Odoacer': 791–3.

58 Momigliano 1973.

59 Even a traditional historian as Oost 1968: 133 already commented on the premature demise of Athaulf and Galla Placidia's son Theodosius that '[i]f one believes that if the

When critiquing O. Seeck's social Darwinist approach to the decline of the ancient world, Baynes already remarked that '[i]f ever there were supermen in human history they are to be found in the Roman emperors of the third and fourth centuries,—men who shouldered the burden of a tottering world and resolutely refused to despair of the Republic'.⁶⁰ Indeed, the rapid succession of the emperors Gallienus (268), Claudius II (270), Aurelian (275), and Probus (282) at the zenith of the third-century crisis showed that despite their undeniable contributions to the recovery of state power, the Roman Empire was not dependent on these emperors' reigns for its own survival. The most astonishing feature is that these emperors could come and go, while making place for equally capable men. Historians should be wary, therefore, of identifying the survival of western Roman state power in the fifth century with the fortunes of any single individual. Yet this is often the line taken in regards to the fall of Aëtius.⁶¹ However, if the western Roman Empire had reached a point in the fifth century where it was utterly dependent on the talents and survival of one individual, such as Aëtius, then its destruction was inevitable anyway.

It has not been the intention of this study to reduce the debate concerning the fragmentation of western imperial power to the type of scapegoating in which the ancient sources particularly like to indulge. Yet if one wishes to look for a single date that heralded the end of Rome's hegemony over the western provinces, it should be sought in neither Aëtius' murder in 454, nor in Romulus Augustulus' dismissal in 476 when a mere cypher was removed, but rather in 461 when Ricimer executed Majorian.⁶² The critical point here is that Majorian was the last emperor to gain the allegiance of all imperial forces in the west, and that his death resulted in the irrevocable degeneration of these territories into warlord fiefdoms. In doing so, Roman history finally reverted to a point it had reached five centuries earlier.

accession of this child had come to pass the West Roman Empire might have been saved, one must necessarily also subscribe to the theory that great events in history depend on accident rather than on deep-rooted causes, a type of aetiology likely to be repugnant to most students of history today'.

60 Baynes 1943: 31.

61 O'Flynn 1983: 103; Zecchini 1983: 284; Sticker 2002: 83.

62 One can also observe this in the contemporary work of the eastern Priscus, whose history ended with the reign of Leo I (457–473), and who did not witness the final dissolution of western emperorship. Yet already in the 460s he refers to regional entities such as 'western Romans', 'Italians' and 'Gauls', thus tacitly acknowledging the discrepancy between the constitutional unity of empire and its *de facto* dismemberment in the western provinces. See also Blockley 1992: 46–7; McEvoy 2014: 246, n. 5.

A few scholars have already noted one striking similarity between the fall of the Roman Republic and the disintegration of the Late Imperial West.⁶³ In both cases the state lost control over its own military, which ultimately dissolved traditional political structures in favour of a new system entrenching its own rule. Warlordism was a vital element in both collapses, and resonated in the fates of several strongmen five centuries apart.⁶⁴

The case of Aegidius could be compared with that of Sertorius. Both men refused to recognize new governments in Italy, and continued their resistance in provinces on the western side of Alps. They were supported by both former state troops and barbarian allies, and were even willing to make common cause with other enemies of the Roman state. Both were ultimately powerless, however, to project their power beyond their respective domains, and eventually succumbed to treachery. Similarly, Marcellinus and Sextus Pompeius both grabbed control over a key province close to Italy, and were slightly more successful in maneuvering their way back to the heart of western politics due to their naval resources and proximity to the heartland of state government. Yet each man died violently not long afterwards.

Ricimer had a reputation for violently bringing down emperors and raising new ones, but also one of reluctance to do away with traditional government. This echoed Sulla's bloody rise to power. Both men probably never considered themselves as revolutionaries and regarded their violent acts as necessary to preserve the state. Yet both men also had no qualms about taking up arms against the very city of Rome, or letting their soldiers grab hold of it. They also shared the relatively rare fate of not dying a violent death.

The banker Sittius operated as an entrepreneur of violence with his mercenary gang near Egypt, Mauretania and Africa, just as the desperado Sebastian offered his sword-services to Visigothic Aquitaine, the urban aristocracy of Tarraconensis and the Vandal king Geiseric. The refusal of Aëtius to disarm prior to the accession of Valentinian III and his ambition to obtain higher offices against the government's wishes should be compared to the early career of the *adulescentulus carnefex* Pompey. The latter's refusal to disband his troops in Africa during the ascendancy of Sulla was soon followed by equally insidious demands to be invested with higher authority during the wars against Sertorius and Spartacus. When Bonifatius and Aëtius took up arms against one another at Rimini in 432, their clash was not aimed at bringing about a revolution in the state, but settling the primacy of the victor, in much the same way as Julius Caesar and Pompey vied for control of the republic after 50 BC.

63 Oost 1964: 23; O'Flynn 1983: 23; Liebeschuetz 2007: 482–3.

64 For references to these Republican warlord-commanders, see the various chapters in this volume.

Tacitus already described how the Roman world was worn out by the two decades between Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon and the battle of Actium—basically one long period of civil war (Tacitus *Annales* 1.1). It is optimal to regard the period between 461 and 480 in the same light. In 461, the last western emperor died who had held the allegiance of all state troops in Italy, Gaul, Spain and the Balkans. In 480 the last legitimate western emperor died in exile, and the governments of Italy and Constantinople finally resolved their differences.⁶⁵ Citizens in Italy will have sighed with relief when both Octavian and Odoacer finally took the obvious step of formalizing their military rule under a thin veil of professed loyalty to the traditional but powerless state, whilst settling their troops over the peninsula and letting arms rest after decades of intermittent civil war.

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65 This is particularly symbolised in eastern recognition for the Italian aristocrat Caecina Decius Maximus Basilius as consul of 480 (*CLRE* 494–495). Basilius was the first consul designated by the west since 472; a clear symptom of the state of quasi anarchy that had plagued Italy during the rest of the decade. Furthermore, he received eastern recognition as sole consul for 480. This honour had never previously been bestowed on a western aristocrat, and reveals that Italy and Constantinople had finally reestablished a mutual rapport.

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Contemporary Warlordism, Armed Conflicts and the International System: An International Relations Perspective

Rafael Grasa*

If protection rackets represent organized crime at the smoothest, then war making and state-making—quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of *legitimacy*—qualify as our largest examples of organized crime.¹

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Introduction

The objective of this book is to challenge certain theses regarding the relationship between war and politics during the period of classical antiquity, prior to the unipolar dominance of the Roman Empire. In this period, there is a dual factual trend that is apparently unconnected: on the one hand, there is a weakening of the power of the ancient states and the predominance of militarism and anarchy; and at the same time, we find examples that this anarchy and militarism reinforced and strengthened the creation of states. A closer look, using an ideational filter of the concepts originating in the social sciences, and in the analysis of the international system of the past centuries—particularly the system of the post-Cold War period—allows us to discern some of the credible causal connections between these two trends, as well as additional phenomena and relations.² To summarize, it is possible to explore and construct other explanatory narratives, new frameworks for interpretation, which indicate that these phenomena are not specific to the period

* Professor of International Relations at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. He has served as the President of *the International Catalan Institute for Peace* since its creation (2008) until May of 2016, and he currently coordinates the 'Strategic peace-building, human security and conflict transformation' Program. E-mail: Rafael.grasa@uab.cat.

1 Tilly 1985: 169.

2 This refers to concepts such as 'anarchy', 'multipolarity', 'governance', 'multi-level governance', 'private security actors', 'interdependence' and, naturally, 'warlords', among others.

examined in this book. On the contrary, it is known that they may be observed in historical periods, including the most recent post-Cold war. In such contexts, with no diffusive power centers and no effective unipolar or 'oligopolar' orders at work, alternative forms of governance appeared in multipolar and apparently anarchic systems. That is, governance without the constant presence of a central power, but connectivity inside and outside of the different polities, via distinct forms of political and military leadership, as well as exchange and interaction between the heterogeneous actors who serve as the cohesive cement in a turbulent environment, subject to constant upheavals and changes. In brief, during the period discussed in this book, as well as during others such as the present-day, it is believed that cooperation and order may exist, in a restrictive sense, even in contexts of anarchy, a lack of hegemonic states, multipolarity, and also, with competition and open-conflict militarism between the distinct political, state and non-state entities. In this chapter, it is argued that as expected, 'warlordism' is often a defining feature of certain international systems, but not merely a peripheral or circumstantial phenomenon.

As this book clearly shows, one way of examining this same phenomenon in a remote historical past such as the classical antiquity is to obtain theoretical support from the social science debates. Therefore, some of the current theoretical constructs usually employed, such as 'warlords' or 'multipolarity', are common not only in scholarly studies on International Relations concerning recent contemporary historical periods, but are also recurring in the current debate, which focuses on understanding the international post-Cold War system. That being said, the post-Cold War system, and the concepts that are frequently used to explain it, continues to be the subject of intense academic discussions, specifically regarding its nature, distinctive features, similarities and differences with prior systems, the role of the different actors (public and private, state and non-state actors), and finally, its explanatory structure, dynamics and processes.

In this context, the term 'warlord', initially coined in German having pejorative connotations, has reappeared in the scholarly debate almost sixty years later. However, it is not under the auspices of contemporary history such as early 20th century China,³ specifically that of 1916 to 1927,⁴ or to the Japanese

3 For a good characterization of the Chinese warlords of the early 20th century, see McCord 1993.

4 During this period, warlords gained relevance following the 1911 collapse of the Qing dynasty, when China was devastated by a series of civil wars between conflicting territorial leaders. The term was popularized thanks to its repetition by the foreign correspondents in their chronicles. Strictly speaking, the period ended around 1937, with the onset of the war against Japan. In comparative terms, it is interesting to consider that these two decades of direct

samurais, that 'warlord' is widely quoted nowadays. On the contrary, according to P.B. Rich, the most common use of such a term today is referred to the genuine production of international systems at the end of the Cold War and above all, the post-Cold War. This coincidence in name is based on circumstantial factors, their dramatism and plasticity, their ease of use by the media and also, perhaps, their great denotative capacity, despite the succinctness of the term.⁵

In other words, as stated in the introduction to this volume, the academic agenda on warlordism is related to the theoretical and meta-theoretical debates currently conducted in the Social Sciences, specifically in International Relations. Such debate is normally twofold. It firstly focuses on the controversy between realism, liberalism and constructivism and the mechanisms of order and change in the absence of wars for hegemony.⁶ In addition, there is an endless discussion—typical of all of the Social Sciences—regarding the explanatory pre-eminence of the 'agency';⁷ vis-à-vis the 'structure'. That is, whereas the 'agency' is to be understood as the ability and capacity of the distinct actors and subjects in the international arena to 'act', the 'structure' holds the constraints and rules of the game that affect the context, the rules of play and the interactions between different actors in the distinct dimensions of the social and political life. At this point, a consensus has been reached among scholars suggesting that for social explanations it must currently combine material elements—which some continue to call Realist—, such as the capabilities and interests of the actors, with ideational elements, specifically, changes in values and preferences.

Accordingly, this chapter, which is the final one of this book, is devoted to the analysis of the role of warlords in the international post-Cold War system, as well as their insertion in the analysis of the attributes and dynamics of the international system that has emerged after the end of the Cold War period. In order to proceed with the analysis and reach appropriate conclusions at the end of this chapter, a methodological approach, which is based on three

violence were pervasive, with constant fighting between the distinct factions—up to eight simultaneous wars per year and sixteen in 1923, a particularly violent year. For more on this, see Lary 1985: 5 ff.

5 Rich 1999: 1–17.

6 The predominant explanation of the causes of the change in the nature of the international system, until 1989, with the opening of the Berlin Wall, was that the winners of the wars for hegemony imposed new rules after their victories, explaining the changes in 1815, in 1919 and in 1945, but failing to justly explain the change occurring as of 1989, with the end of the Cold War.

7 This term is used here in the most typical 'Social Science' sense, derived from the Latin *agere*, the capacity to act.

a priori statements and two research questions, will be adopted in the following pages.

To begin with, the three *a priori* statements will be considered. Firstly, in the post-Cold War, in contrast to other direct forms of violence, a decrease in direct political violence—armed conflicts, terrorism—as well as a growing presence of private security actors, is being detected. Therefore, warlords can hardly be described as mere ‘armed non-state actors’ or ‘illegal military and political leaders’ with great charisma, to use the term coined by Max Weber in his analysis of leadership and domination forms, particularly when the local specificities of some cases from Afghanistan, the Balkans or Liberia add more complexity to the warlord definition and to this scholarly debate. Secondly, the characterization of what may be understood by a ‘warlord’ in the current international system is justly inseparable from the features of such a system, for example, the key role played by private security actors and the proliferation of direct forms of violence without immediate political purpose. And thirdly, although it is not the intention here to thoroughly describe the present-day international system, unlike that of my colleagues in their respective chapters, comparing—explicitly mentioning the *ceteris paribus* clause—the post-Cold War system with the ancient Mediterranean system, ranging from the end of the Peloponnesian War to the onset of the Wars of Augustus, it will certainly be of mutual interest to specialists of both eras.

Concerning the research questions, there are two, which are inter-related:

- a) Generally speaking, can the warlord phenomena be understood as anecdotal, an epiphenomenon, or is it a central feature of the international system and therefore, a persistent feature in distinct regional or functional sub-systems?
- b) Is it possible to distinguish between different ideal types of warlords in the post-Cold War system and, if so, what is the contribution of these types to the research agenda?

The *a priori* and the research questions extend beyond the scope of analysis of this book, and therefore, shall be considered in a future monograph, whose aim will be a more thorough description of the post-Cold War international system. Nevertheless, in the following pages, a preliminary sketch of some central theses from the projected book will be outlined, but only viewed as conjectures for analysis and discussion.

The *a priori* knowledge and the research questions result in the structure of the chapter, which is divided into three main sections and a conclusion. The three sections, respectively, are devoted to, firstly, characterizing the nature of

the post-Cold War international system and the state of the analytical tools commonly used to explain it; secondly, presenting the main features of the consensus on the nature and role of the warlords in this system; and finally, illustrating the three warlord typologies and some features of the same, using as examples, the Balkans, Africa—during the first decade of the post-Cold War—and Afghanistan, immediately after the impact of the September 11th terrorist attacks.

1 The Nature of the Post-Cold War International System and Approaches for Explaining Its Behavior

Over recent decades, the world has changed considerably and this change is clearly reflected in the international sphere, 25 years after the end of the Cold War. In fact, the change in the international system continues and different events such as the economic and financial crisis, beginning in 2007, are accelerating it.⁸

In short, for the past 25 years, the agenda, actors and interactions of conflict and cooperation in regards to international relations have been transforming. Slowly, the progressive substitution of the classic international system is seen, with its rather precise borders and rules of functioning, with a globalized social system producing somewhat contradictory phenomena: globalization, regionalization, fragmentation and localization. And naturally, these contexts and challenges are affecting the areas of security and armed conflict management.

We can summarize the basic pillars of this change as follows: a) economic factors—not political ones—lie at the core of the system; b) the concept of power has transformed, as well as the distribution and diffusion of the same, at a state, regional and transnational (non-governmental) actor level; c) the emerging countries and, particularly the Global South, are gaining a growing quantitative and qualitative centrality; d) development, now understood in a plural manner and not only in terms of economic growth, are now, more than ever, at the center of the system concerns, along with the new faces of poverty and inequality; e) a new concept of security has emerged—understood as a multi-dimensional process, also focusing on individuals and not only on nations—which should pay attention to new risks and dangers, as well as new faces and forms of violence.

A change has also taken place in regards to the conception and practice of power, as well as its diffusion and the power relations between actors. On the

8 Grasa 2010.

one hand, fundamental power now comes from what has been referred to as 'structural power'⁹—the ability to create the rules of play—and 'soft power'¹⁰—the ability to persuade, to convince—with a clear erosion of 'hard' (military) power. In other words, power does not only depend on what one has—power as resources—but rather, on one's relationships—relational power—, of the capacity to make up the system—structural power—and the capacity to offer input and attractive relationships, of mutual interest to the other actors ('soft' power).¹¹ This is not so different from that which has been discussed in some of the chapters of this book. Furthermore, the international power structures are being altered by the combination of three interrelated phenomena: 1) the progressive weakening, at least in relative terms, of the great powers of the Global North; 2) the growing centrality of the emerging powers—*BRICS*, for example—, with weak linkage systems between them, and the regional and sub-regional reformulation of the regional powers and of countries with a high growth potential; 3) the presence of distinct leaderships—hegemonic and aspiring powers—in the different dimensions of international life (political, military, economic, financial, technological, etc.).¹²

In explanatory terms, these changes in international power structure may be described, as a strong trend, as 'de-Westernization' of the world, with a growing presence—not only economic—of the South and the East, a shift in gravitation of economic activity and global power from the Atlantic to the Pacific. However, there are clearly existing doubts in regards to whether the future shall lead to a distribution of the growing multipolar power, to a 'G-2'—with the US and China at the lead—or even to a 'G-0', an order in which no state & multi-lateral organism either wishes to, or could, govern the system.

In functional terms, the changes particularly affect the two basic public goods that should be provided by the states: welfare, as well as development and security, especially the physical safety of the citizens. As for the topic of warlords, the relevant changes here have to do with security and the management of violent conflicts. The post-Cold War has created a new concept of security, considered to be a multi-dimensional process that affects multiple actors and not merely the states.

9 This alludes to the concept coined by Strange 1998: esp. 24–32.

10 Both expressions were popularized by Joseph Nye in different works. For a conceptual presentation, see Nye 2004.

11 The heuristic capacity of using these concepts for the antiquity, as discussed in this volume, is in a layman's opinion quite ambitious.

12 See Grasa 2010.

This new concept may be quickly characterized by its distinct features. First and foremost, the threats, challenges and dangers affecting individuals should be considered, in view of the decrease in armed conflicts and mortal violence with political purposes.¹³ Furthermore, new facets or manifestations of violence have emerged. On the one hand, we see homicidal violence without direct political purpose. For example, according to data from the three-year report on *Global Burden of Armed Violence*,¹⁴ firearms result in an average of 500,000 deaths per year. Eighty percent of these are not due to politically based violence—that is, to distinct armed conflicts or to terrorism—, but to other causes such as national and transnational crime, citizen insecurity, drug smuggling, gangs, etc.

Secondly, there is a need to deal with the proliferation of the so-called ‘chronic violence’, a phenomenon that describes the fact that in certain countries the population is entangled in a growing spiral of social violence, affecting social relations, the development of democracy and citizen life in the region. Recent studies reveal the mechanisms by which a variety of deep-rooted forces stimulate and propagate this chronic violence, weakening and destroying the social fabric of vulnerable communities and countries, to the point of running the risk that these trends may become social norms, given that often there are cases in which three generations of individuals have not known any life context other than this chronic violence.¹⁵

Thirdly, changes have taken place in the nature and location of armed conflicts across the globe, with a clear decrease in inter-state conflicts compared to internal ones, although a significant percentage of the latter have been internationalized. These changes may be summarized as follows: 1) although all of the armed conflicts have had multiple causes, in all of them it is possible to identify, at least in each stage, one predominant territorial or political factor. And in the post-Cold War, a greater presence of political issues may be observed along with a decrease in territorial issues; 2) geographic location of the armed conflicts, always varied and oscillatory, has changed. Until 1990, there was a continued high presence in Asia and a limited presence in terms of armed conflict in Europe. In the post-Cold War, there has been a characteristic reappearance of Europe as a major scenario of armed conflict along with its

13 For a more detailed analysis, see Grasa 2007.

14 Declaration of Geneva, *Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011*. See <http://www.geneva-declaration.org/measurability/global-burden-of-armed-violence.html>.

15 Pearce 2007; Adams 2012.

redistribution in the Global South, with an increase in Africa and Asia and a clear and sharp decrease in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Specifically, the post-Cold War period has amplified what was already visible since the 1970s: the existence of two differentiated areas, one of peace and the other of turbulence. An area of peace, clearly consisting of some 50 or 60 countries that have not been involved in warfare since 1945 and that appear to be unlikely to be involved in any in the future—with the exception of the Russian border area at the moment, specifically the Ukraine. The reasoning is quite simple: these countries have consolidated democratic systems and strong economic ties between them, so much so that most likely, they would not resort to war even in the case of very strong differences, since even the winner would be jeopardized given the strong interrelation existing between them. Additionally, we see an area of great violent conflict, the Global Southern area, in which three characteristics tend to exist, not necessarily having a causal relationship: 1) doubtful democratic systems, which some political scientists have termed 'uncertain democracies' or 'anocracies', that is, countries with a significant lack of democracy, even in the most formal sense of the word; 2) very fragile economies; and 3) populations with a strong ethno-cultural divide. Africa, despite some improvement, continues to be, globally speaking, in this area of turbulence. It can be said that the post-Cold War armed conflict occurs, to a small degree, in the Global North and in the Global South—generally, in South-South conflicts. To this, those conflicts must be added, in which the transnational factor and a specific type of warlords such as the 'warlord entrepreneurs' (see section 3) are very closely linked to crucial economic outcomes, as that occurring in the paradigmatic case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Finally, in the post-Cold War, there has been a very clear growth of a trend of the armed conflicts visible since the mid-1970s: a decrease in interstate conflicts and an increase in internal conflicts, perceived in their precise location—regardless of the existing borders—as well as in the resulting number of victims. The first post-Cold War decade saw a sharp increase in this trend, to the point at which some 90% to 95% of all armed conflicts, according to the records used, were found to be internal. All this highlighted a theoretical reflection, and led to the coining of diverse terms for this phenomenon, including: the era of the 'small wars' (Singer, Zartman, Bloomfield); the '*guerilla* wars or wars of the third kind' (Rice); the 'non-Clausewitzian or non-trinitarian wars' (Kaldor, Holsti) or the 'new wars', to state only a few.

Finally, in fourth place, we find a growing and significant presence of private security actors, not only in the open and active armed conflicts. The reasons

for their presence may be multi-causal, including the following: a) the partial loss of the monopoly of the mass media of violence by the state, into the hands of private actors, often illegal—terrorist groups, drug traffickers and organized crime, etc.; b) the growing legal resources of private security actors—private companies and mercenaries; and c) the presence, in many armed conflicts, of non-state based armed groups and of distinct types of ‘warlords’.

In summary, we are in an era that is characterized by a diffuse international system, having distinct rules in regards to state relations and transnational economic relations, in which public and private actors co-exist, having distinct alliances between them. Concerning their management, armed conflicts are rather complex phenomena, often internal but internationalized, and simplistic Manichean interpretations are virtually impossible to make. In this era, therefore, armed conflicts as well as direct non-political violence are dynamic, constantly changing, with multiple and heterogeneous causes, implicating and affecting not only states but multiple actors, specifically private ones.

Within this context, warlords are to be understood as linked—according to the first research question—to the very nature of the current international system. The recent spread of illegal actors—specifically of non-state armed groups—can hardly explain it thoroughly. On the contrary, ‘warlordism’ is a phenomenon, which requires a multi-layered approach, linked to at least four shared causal factors, in addition to some more specific issues, which also need to be considered: a) changes in the type of power; b) partial loss by the states of the monopoly of exerting mass violence, all of them to a greater or lesser extent, not only the failing or failed states; c) the growing privatization of security; and d) the change in the nature, location and impact of the armed conflicts and of terrorism, as direct forms of political violence, and the actual hegemony of direct but non-political forms of violence.

The nature and roles of the post-Cold War warlords shall now be considered.

2 Nature, Types and Roles of the Warlords

There has been considerable debate as to how to define post-Cold War warlords, leaving aside the negative connotations of the term, associated with brutality, violent extraction of resources, savage banditry and suffering of civil communities. To begin with, the very general definition of Duffield’s work will be used, with some adaptations: ‘warlord’ refers to the leader of an armed band or militia, whose troops may range from dozens to thousands of soldiers, and who can take over local territory and, at the same time, act

financially and politically in the international system, without significant interference from the state in which he is based.¹⁶ Given this perspective, the central characteristic of modern warlords would be their ability to live and to thrive in areas of crisis, where civil wars and humanitarian crises are frequent. This explains the relevance of focusing this analysis on some particular regions such as the Balkans; the numerous cases of armed conflicts shaking sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s; cases arising from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent Commonwealth of Independent States; and, especially, the most relevant of all: Afghanistan after 2001.¹⁷ All of these cases have something in common, i.e.: the respective states were weak, almost completely collapsed, or had failed, often leading to the confusion of the 'warlord' with a mere 'illegal actor', thriving in the midst of these fragile states.

It begins with three very distinct assumptions. Firstly, that in order to speak of warlords of the post-Cold War—beyond the mass media and social media headlines—certain features are to be found in addition to the absence of regulatory, coercive and normative state power. Secondly, that there are several theoretical explanations as to why distinct types of warlords emerge, but it is still difficult to single out the most relevant. And thirdly, that beyond more specific cases and regional studies, listing ideal types of warlords may be a useful methodological approach. Accordingly, three issues will now be considered in greater detail.

Regarding the distinctive features, the summary made by Robinson is quite applicable, with the appropriate variations.¹⁸ The post-Cold War warlord should satisfy, to a greater or lesser extent, five specific criteria. First and foremost, the actor should operate in a context or region where there is no state, where the state has collapsed or where it is very weak.¹⁹ Otherwise, the warlord would not have a favorable environment in which to thrive and establish his power. Second, there should not be simple military control, but rather extractive activities, including economic control.²⁰ In other words, the warlord

16 Duffield 1998: 18.

17 See the case studies and definition attempts of Rich 1999; Mackinlay 1998; Duffield 1998.

18 Robinson 2001: 123.

19 It should be noted that the requirement permits mixed cases: relatively strong states, lacking territorial control of some of their regions and territories. The case of Colombia, where 30% of the territory has, largely due to the armed conflict with the FARC-EP and the ELN, a clear absence of state control, is a good example of this. In these territories without (or with limited) state control, warlords may arise. The same may be said for certain areas of Mexico.

20 See Ch. Tilly's words quoted at the start of this chapter, n. 2.

should also pursue economic and commercial benefits in his area of influence, and this makes his territorial control different in nature. Third, in order to pursue these territorial and economic goals, the warlord should count on balanced human resources, and that means sufficient and well-equipped forces at his disposal, which may vary from case to case. Fourth, he should be inclined, in military and political terms, to use direct violence without limits when necessary, showing restraint to avoid exaggerated reactions. In other words, violence may be justified given his economic and commercial interests and in some ways, he is not bound to consider the general needs of the society in which he acts or the standards of behavior of the human rights and the humanitarian law. And fifth, the warlord does not have—regarding this issue, he is an illegal actor—a democratic mandate or one that demands accountability; even when he has social acceptance, as may occur in those cases in which *a posteriori*, certain communities or populations gain advantages from the warlord's domination. In summary, the basic purpose of the warlord is to pursue economic, commercial and extractive benefits for his own benefit. A lack of rules and an insufficient state presence are necessary conditions, but they are not sufficient for these warlords to emerge and take control and exert power over the territory. Their illegality, possession of sufficient weapons and combatants, their clear acceptance to resort to violence without compliance with the law or the lack of democratic legitimacy, are additional traits of warlordism.

In a subsequent work, Giustozzi, examining some historic cases, once again insisted on these traits. In his opinion, the main skill of a warlord is his ability to marshal coercive measures: controlling military forces, using them to advance on new territories, and ultimately a successful management of any military operations involved (Giustozzi 2003). All of this serves to legitimize the warlord as an effective military leader, a political requirement to make him an actual political leader, since such achievement depends on his ability to use, or credibly threaten to use, organized violence. That said, Giustozzi, both in the cited work as well as in a subsequent work from 2009, insisted that the key to the warlord's exercising of power is his ability to maintain or expand his power, something that basically depends on his ability to mobilize and distribute economic resources, and on his ability to extract income. In theoretical terms—of a religious or political base—these resources play a small role, at most they allow for legitimizing narratives for external or internal consumption; what is fundamental is that nevertheless, they ensure local support on a base of neo-patrimonial rule. Or, in other words, to extract, accumulate and distribute them so that the warlord's partners and 'subjects' are reasonably content, thereby avoiding the constant use of violence and coercion. In this respect, it should be noted that the case study from Afghanistan, and even when

discussing the events prior to 2001,²¹ clearly shows that although warlordism is often found to be accompanied by the collapse or weakening of the states, warlords can also potentially emerge from other contexts.²²

Concerning how the reasons for the emergence of warlords have been argued in theoretical terms, scholars usually highlight issues such as the political economy, as well as the ideological and relational factors.²³ These are not mutually exclusive explanations, however. To begin with, M. Olson had already considered the relevance of the political economy on how warlords have come to exist, specifically in a work from 1993 and later in 1998, by W. Renno, in a work focusing on the African case. Olson argued that, once the warlord had managed to attain some degree of territorial control, it was quite beneficial to him to ensure a minimal level of security for the individuals living in his territory: otherwise, it would be impossible for the warlord to raise revenue from them and thereby acquire economic profits. Therefore, the search for economic benefits demands levels of safety and stability, as well as provisions of public goods and reasonable and predictable governance. Or, in other words, they could or should create proto-states by 'providing some degree of welfare and security to the local population, otherwise they would become "stationary bandits"'. This would also explain why not all warlords were successful in keeping their position for long: they are all self-interested actors, trying to reinforce their political and economic position, but how they do so ends up determining whether they shall succeed or fail.²⁴

The second reasoning deals with the legitimizing use of ideology by warlords who, as discussed, are basically pragmatic and self-interested actors. Thus, according to K.B. Harpviken, the explanations based on ideological grounds tend

21 As a quick reminder and to summarize the facts, the Afghan warlords arise as follows. In 1978, there was a coup d'état by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), followed in 1979 by the Soviet invasion and the appearance of numerous resistance groups and their leaders. Initially, the resistance took the form of local groups opposing the coercive reforms of the PDPA. However, in the early 80s, political parties based in Iran and Pakistan arrived, having quite different ideological profiles and considerable financial, humanitarian and military resources. Within these parties, there were numerous Islamists. The diverse parties and factions created grass-level militias and with them, the initial warlords, key in the resistance, until the collapse of the PDPA (1993) and the access to power of a coalition of resistance groups. See, Edwards 1986; Bhatia and Sedra 2008; Giustozzi 2007 and 2009.

22 Bhatia and Sedra 2008: 78–88.

23 Harpviken 2010: 3.

24 There are other explanations of an economic nature, based on greed. These include Keen 1998, Collier and Hoeffler 2000, Berdal 2003, among others.

to focus on groups or factions of warlords having few resources, with consideration of at least three distinct cases. First, individuals who recur to 'some sort of preexisting legitimacy to achieve power', which occurs in many cases in Afghanistan when religious powers and legitimization processes, fit into the Islamic tradition from each particular region. Secondly, warlords who never challenge the basic principles of those already living in the region they control, simply by accepting the shared rules of everyday life. And thirdly, Harpviken recalls the case of the contagious ideology resource, based on the warlord's contact—and that of his constituents—with external actors 'through their relationships with external backers, whether political parties, transnational movements or foreign governments'.²⁵

The third theoretical explanation, having an extensive tradition, employs relational factors, an approach very similar to that used by Ch. Tilly in his own work. According to this view, warlordism is based on a search for profits and for business, but its roots lie in pre-existing social links of the controlled territories, of a tribal, ethnic, religious, shared-location or vassalage type. These links are key to explaining the warlord's successful support and means of recruitment and thus, also understanding the bonds of solidarity between the warlords and their local constituents. Therefore, 'in his understanding, warlordism can be a fairly stable political system, and it can be partially responsive to the local populations' need for security and welfare'.²⁶ Such mutual accord, built on the initial relationships existing between the warlord and his local constituents, as well as on the reinforcement and extension of these relationships via links of mutual benefit, would ultimately explain their stability and permanence, as well as their growing role as a proto-state and successfully provider of public goods.

Considering this, what types of warlords can be considered for this international post-Cold War system? This issue will be considered in the following section.

3 Warlordism, A Process with Distinct Warlord Types

It should be noted that the compared bibliography—both the general one (more limited) as well as the one focusing on local, national or regional cases (abundant)—does not consider warlordism in a unique manner. Given the heterogeneity of the cases, controversial issues persist, such as: the predatory

²⁵ Harpviken 2010: 4–5.

²⁶ Harpviken 2010: 5.

nature (or not) of the warlords; the level of direct and uncontrolled violence that may be used; or the importance of the explicit and clear economic motives in the ultimate rationale behind their emergence and actions. Concerning this last case, some scholarly opinions are very keen on this idea in regards to the armed conflicts in Africa and the role of the warlords.²⁷ Others, however, have more nuanced arguments. For instance, they insist that the motivation based on resource collection is a direct result of the need to maintain strong armed forces.²⁸ These theoretical differences will be shown to affect the types of warlords that emerge.

Nevertheless, some clear assumptions have to be noted. First, that warlordism, despite its heterogeneity, is commonly considered to be a process,²⁹ both with regards to its functioning dynamic, as well as the techniques and skills usually deployed by warlords. Surely, the most promising treatment of the issue, despite belonging to the analytical framework for the Afghanistan case study in particular, was presented by A. Giustozzi in 2009:

warlordism has to be seen as a dynamic process, susceptible to develop into a more sophisticated type of policy as well to culminate in outright collapse (...) we need to look at both the social and political processes underpinning it and at the techniques and skills that subjectively warlords have to use in order to emerge and consolidate their power.³⁰

Both of these, dynamics and skills, allow for the determination of several factors to be considered, both in order to establish types and more specific cases. As for the training and evolution dynamics and processes underlying warlordism, according to Giustozzi, certain aspects must be considered more carefully. First, their relationship, either direct or indirect with the internal crisis of the state, given that, as has been suggested, the disintegration, inexistence or weakening of the political or security institutions is a pre-requisite for the actual emergence of this phenomenon. Second, the expansionist dynamics, which following the emergence and consolidation of warlords, are, in each case, the result of demand by external actors or the need to expand the revenue base. Third, the disintegrative processes and dynamics, due to the

²⁷ Keen 1998; Adebajo and Keen 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2000.

²⁸ Berdal 2003.

²⁹ Something typical in many features of the post-war international system, as carefully observed in the development and the security cases, the two basic public goods that should be provided by the state are always defined as processes, and not as final, static results.

³⁰ Giustozzi 2009: 9.

successive 'legacies' bestowed—by the warlords themselves—on others of their 'vassal' leaders or their families, and also due to the deterioration of solidarity groups—which Ibn Khaldun considered to be the crucial and cohesive component of the patrimonial politics.³¹ Fourth, the functioning of the political economics of warlordism in each case. Fifth, the role of cities and other urban conglomerates, taking into account the emergence of the states, which has often been linked to alliances and unions of cities.³² Sixth, the specific impact in each case and type, of the international system, and particularly, of the hegemonic powers and their influence on certain leaders who, in some cases, go from being mere pawns of some great power to actual warlords.³³ Seventh, the effects of ideology, measured both by the impact of the society at its grass-roots level, and its aims to achieve or improve the political legitimation of those already living in the controlled territory, and also by the impact of 'imported' ideas, from above and often from the outside. And eighth, the role of warlords in state reconstruction and peace-building processes in areas where they rule or have exercised significant control—typical of the post-Cold War era and the liberal peace consensus.

As for skills and capabilities, Giustozzi revives the 'virtues' presented by Machiavelli as requirements for the success of the warlord candidates: ruthlessness and deceit; diplomacy; institutionalization; and finally, legitimation.³⁴ As for ruthlessness and deceit, Giustozzi suggests that every warlord has numerous tools at his disposal in order to control political fragmentation, which occurred in the feudal era, although their use is only fundamental during the initial power accumulation stage—thus, monopoly of territorial violence. As for diplomacy, in the broadest sense, Giustozzi includes means of establishing and extending alliances, creating enemy coalitions or effective control of the enemies. The third type of skill is related to institutionalization, understood to be an antidote to excessive patrimonialization ('depatrimonialization') and therefore, a process using regulations to reinforce the excessive arrogance and supremacy of the self-appointed leader.³⁵ Finally, following

31 *Asabyya* is the Arab term used by Khaldun. See Giustozzi 2009: 18.

32 Giustozzi 2009: 21.

33 One frequently cited case is that of Angolan UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, who until 1992 was a pawn in the Cold War battles, but after the end of the Cuban-Soviet support, evolved, without overly significant ideological causes, into a warlord.

34 Giustozzi 2009: 9.

35 In the words of Giustozzi, taken from Machiavelli, regarding forms of resisting the patronage of politics: excessive 'liberality' should be avoided, as it 'rewards few', 'offends many' and it might not be sustainable: *ibid.* 11.

such Machiavellian schemes, the fourth skill relates to the processes and mechanisms of legitimation, both those linked to the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, as well as those focusing on ideological and political legitimation, by means of using religion on the one hand and electoral processes—never structured and consistent—on the other.³⁶

All of this allows us to establish three large ideal types of warlords which shall, in each case, result in multiple sub-types: a) warlords basically military, without overly significant functions in the creation of states; b) warlords having a very significant role in the creation of proto-states, or in the reconstruction of the same states after a violent conflict; and c) warlords having a mainly economic component.

Regarding the first, there is little to say here in a general sense. This type of warlords is found in many of the armed conflicts of the post-Cold War, in the Balkans, in Africa and in the post-Soviet space. It is also found in Afghanistan, where examples of all three ideal types are easy to locate. Furthermore, these cases tend to be linked to the negative view of the warlord, which has been predominant in the analysis of the African cases since the special issue of the *Review of African Political Economy* of 1989, devoted to debating the utility of the warlord notion for this region, a debate which has ultimately resulted in the acceptance of its usefulness.³⁷

The Warlord as a State-maker

The second ideal type, much more interesting and typically linked to a somewhat positive consideration of the warlords—although clearly with certain negative elements—relates to the function of warlord in the creation of states or proto-states. This typology has been primarily elaborated for the current era, but examples of the same in earlier eras are also to be found, including the classical antiquity—as previously examined in this book—and the Middle Ages. Likewise, the role of the warlords, thanks to the explanatory model based on ‘marriage of capital and coercion’, is at the core of Tilly’s research on the

36 Recall the election speech of Jonas Savimbi and Charles Taylor, for example. *Ibid.* 11–15.

37 ‘Militarism, Warlords & the Problems of Democracy’, vol. 45/46 (pp. 3–125). We shall set aside the necessary differences between the warlords who are so diverse, including: ‘General’ Aidid, based in Mogadishu, rebel and president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, Inkatha leaders in the Natal region of South Africa, Foday Sankoh of the Revolutionary United Front (UF) in Sierra Leona or Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda. In any case, examples can be found of the second type of warlord, useful as state-maker.

creation of the European nation states in the Modern History period.³⁸ Broadly speaking, the several examples of warlordism of this type should be considered to be a part of the vast literature that, from feudal Europe to China, has considered warlords to be part and parcel of this state creation process, given the dominant role of war in it. As Tilly declared, 'war made the state and the state made war'.³⁹

Considerable interest in this type of approach may be found in works that consider the negative analysis of African warlords, such as the recent work by L. Freeman. Given the usual thesis that warlordism has declined in Africa, she argues that in many African nations, the conditions remain—'uneven state authority and the existence of ungoverned space'—to promote the emergence of warlords in order to assist the consolidation of state.⁴⁰

Even more interesting is the second aspect of this warlord type, of growing interest and debate: the role of 'warlords' in violent post-conflict transition periods, in making and building peace, that is, their role in contexts where peace-building, after agreements to end hostilities, requires that local leaders play a key role. Between the late 1990s and the mid 2000s, many scholars examined the role of innovative leadership in international politics and more specifically, in societies emerging from violent conflict.⁴¹ Of the experiences that were examined, what remains clear is that often, many of these leaders have been or continue to be 'warlords' during the transition period. As a result, the relevant question is: to what extent can these individuals turn into peace makers and how does this happen? What incentives may be used to do so?

Due to space and topic restrictions, the important work published by three reputed scholars in 2004, devoted to the local leadership role, and the ability of international organizations present in post-agreement processes to turn these transformations into factors of positive change, will be commented on briefly. This scholarly work shows examples, sometimes successful, from three cases: Kosovo, Sierra Leona and Afghanistan. The study was based on an *a priori* statement: that the motivation to commit to a peace process is rarely strictly altruistic, but rather, depends on 'give and take' transaction elements between the negotiating groups. In particular, this paper establishes four major conclusions:

38 Tilly 1990.

39 Tilly 1975: 42.

40 See, for example, the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan and South Sudan, and Libya. Freeman 2015: 804.

41 Some relevant works include: Gormley-Heenan 2001; Crainer 1999; Davis 1996; Gill 1999; and Sheffer 1993.

- a) Positive and truly selfless leadership does not tend to exist in contexts of great direct violence, as demonstrated by the almost always cited counter-example, Nelson Mandela;
- b) The role of local leaders to make peace or continue with war is limited, when compared with the importance of international pressures. In none of the three studied cases does the initial impulse for negotiations that leads to the agreement come from these leaders, but rather tends to depend mainly on other actors;
- c) With some exceptions, local leaders tend to have a limited practical administrative capacity; accordingly, when forming part of the new administrations, they should deal with their significant shortcomings;
- d) The influence of the leaders' bases and followers on their specific behavior is quite low, given that they come from less than democratic and accountable environments.

In other words, the four conclusions collectively argue that although the local actors, including warlords, are key in the process of ending the armed conflicts, they are not sufficient to do so on their own, and more likely neither are they a driving force in this process. As their actions must be thus complemented, numerous political proposals have emerged suggesting that it was time for the private and public international actors, taking part in the peacebuilding processes, to direct their own actions on strengthening and maximizing their impact and influence on the local leaders, in order to support them.⁴²

The Warlord Entrepreneur

The third type of ideal warlord existing in the post-Cold War period is one who links illegal and charismatic military leadership (*caudillismo*) with large scale business activities, thereby relating this figure with the growing role of organized transnational crime in the post-Cold War international system. This type of warlord has been termed *warlord entrepreneur*.⁴³ Accordingly, the relevance of its links with transnational crime requires at least a brief note on this phenomenon.

Transnational crime is a global phenomenon, which transcends all sorts of boundaries—of course also the state borders—as revealed by the growing concern by regional and international organizations and by the United Nations (UN), although it is often considered to be basically an internal phenomenon, linked to domestic security. However, like warlordism, it is inseparable from

42 Peake, Gormley-Heenan and Fitzduff 2004.

43 Mackinlay 1998: 28–29.

the changes in the international system and more specifically, in the subsystems of security. This is a transnational effort, very heterogeneous, which involves many individuals and many hierarchical organizations, which attempt to obtain benefits and power, recurring to a varied and dynamic combination of licit and illicit activities. In order to understand the nature and action of transnational crime, we must first accept that the actors implicated, their mutual relationships and activities, share the following features:

- a) Some are similar to those of the state—as in Ch. Tilly's quote at the beginning of this chapter—such as collecting taxes and rents and providing services;
- b) Some, of a business nature, clearly interrelate both legal and illegal dimensions;
- c) Some share lawless mafia activity;
- d) Some are of a relational nature, and based on social traditions and legitimacies of the local communities existing prior to the emergence of crime activities.

For the purpose of the interests here, perhaps the most characteristic feature of transnational crime is the symbiosis between the legal and the illegal, which ultimately poison all other dimensions of social life—economic, political, security-based, cultural, etc.—and also most of its actors. As a result, it is now possible to better understand the growing presence of organized transnational crime in various economic and financial activities, and how they seek for manpower and resources within the actual states. Finally, the transnational crime also takes advantage of the already created networks in order to promote and expand some other illegal activities, since everything seems increasingly interconnected and tied to more diverse activities. Some of these do not always include the more obvious areas, such as illegal labor force trafficking, sexual dealings, arms trade, drug trafficking, luxury product falsifications, but also, for instance, trafficking of endangered animal species.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, very often the scholarly debate has been blurred when instead of dealing with transnational crime as a whole, some have focused their interest only on particular issues such as drug trafficking.

Another similarity with the warlord debate may be observed when it is often argued that organized transnational crime correlates with low institutionalization or weakness of the state, or simply put, with its failure or collapse. However, this theoretical approach allows multiple interpretations depending

44 Grasa 2016.

on the particular features of each specific region. However, a pure empirical analysis reveals that failure of collapsing states is not always directly related to this phenomenon. In fact, the evidence seems to point out that organized transnational crime is currently found in very distinct contexts: in those with limited state structures, those with no state—or with a true failed state—as well as in those with strong states.

Therefore, this phenomenon may be better understood if analyzed through four distinct features, as follows:

- 1) As a transnational phenomenon, growing and global in scope, but with a more specific and differentiated regional and local presence;
- 2) As a global, multi-dimensional phenomenon, connected with other issues, linked to changes in the international system, which derived from the impact of globalization and the end of the Cold War and also, from the 'great transformation'—in Karl Polanyi's sense—taking place in Global South countries and in their position in the system;
- 3) It should be related, for purposes of analysis and explanation, to changes in the conceptualization and practice of security, as previously mentioned;⁴⁵
- 4) It is basically fueled by two interrelated features: on the one hand, the link between legal and illegal activities in different areas of the country's economic activity, taking advantage of any gaps between the law—national and international—and technical, economic areas with scarce regulation;⁴⁶ and on the other hand, to international financial transactions—having very limited regulation—holding recurring concerns on financial liquidity of the global economy.

At present, it is when organized transnational crime seems to be directly related to a specific type of warlord—the so-called 'warlord entrepreneur'—using the term coined most recently. The nature and practical action of these warlords maximize a fundamental feature of warlordism, such as the ability to extract funds and attain economic benefits for themselves.⁴⁷

45 Such as the growing presence of private security actors, the partial loss of the monopoly of violence on behalf of the states and the appearance of alternative forms of violence, distinct from those of a political nature—armed conflicts and terrorism.

46 For example, those related to the widespread access to information and communication networks.

47 Raford and Trabulsi 2015.

A better understanding of this can be found by considering the anecdote cited by Trabulsi. In 1994, a US anti-narcotics operation in Cali, raided the building of the cartel's 'padrino', José Santacruz Londoño, with some surprising results: whereas they expected to find an arsenal of automatic weapons and cocaine, instead, they discovered an IBM AS400 computer, valued at 1.5 million \$\$, and terminals and technicians working 24/7 with all of them. Software similar to that used by intelligence organizations was located, as well as large databases, contacts from US government employees, extortion records and a detailed archive of complex monetary transfers via off-shore bank accounts. The investigation ultimately revealed a network of interconnected legal and illegal financing networks, having a global scope. It soon became clear that the anecdote was not exclusive of the Cali cartel: similar examples were found in Russia, the Balkans and Japan.⁴⁸

These examples reveal that during the first years of the post-Cold War period, organized transnational crime, emerging from local contexts and initially working as 'small-time operators', had mixed together with warlords and their organizations, to ultimately operate in similar dynamics as the states and markets:

As their influence grows, especially in economically depressed locales, they can become market makers and market shapers, rivaling and often exceeding traditional economic development enterprises. Having captured existing markets and made new ones, they can diversify into established legal trades, financing these efforts with cash from a network of globalized criminal syndicates. Then, armed with wealth and power, these deviant economic agents eventually become political actors themselves, often assuming leadership roles in the same state organization and institutions upon which they originally preyed.⁴⁹

Since then, these warlord entrepreneurs, like businessmen of the black market with ties to legal markets, carried out an enormous range of illicit activities, generating billions of dollars of earnings in the global economy every year. And interestingly enough, as shown in section one of this chapter, they do so by combining legal and illegal activities, separate from but at the same time closely linked to private administrations and state structures. In short, they take advantage of globalization with the limitless interconnections that it creates, as well as the global access to information and networking technologies.

48 See, Trabulsi 2015.

49 Rford and Trabulsi 2015: XVII.

Accordingly, within this context, an expression such as ‘warlord entrepreneur’ describes ‘the broader organizational dimension of the business of warlord entrepreneurialism, the dimension at which an element of scale is required to succeed’.⁵⁰

This type of warlord, with close ties to organized transnational crime, is anchored in the legal global structures and markets, while at the same time weakening them when using them. They are on the inside but also on the outside, thus widening their maneuverability and surpassing the possibilities of strictly legal actors, given that their wider range of activities allows them to combine legal actions with bribes, threats and coercion, murder, blackmailing and, in order to serve the needs of their business, an attempt to control violent behavior. Therefore, the connection between warlords, as leaders of significant military forces, and economic operators, reinforces and also modifies both of these activities, providing them with the ability to create huge networks of illegal activities, expected of organized transnational crime. This turns the warlord entrepreneur’s organizations into highly adaptive organizations, with the ability for transformation and resistance, making them quite significant actors in the development of the political-economic system of many countries, regions and even globally, while at the same time, operating in illegal markets. All this, in a world in which the boundaries between legal markets—white, grey and black markets—are blurring, converting these warlord entrepreneurs or their front men into actors, difficult to distinguish from the legal ones. In some cases, they even resemble state actors, particularly in the Global Southern countries and even, in emerging countries. Therefore, challenges are not only established in the short term, and more specifically, where almost nothing worked,⁵¹ where the actors knowing the rules of the game in this mixed legal/illegal world have advantages over the states and institutions; challenges also exist over the middle and long term, generating on-going threats and forms of governance.

Particular case analyses allow the singling out of some of the distinctive behavioral features of this type of warlord. Firstly, they have the capacity to manage and lead in circumstances of limited governance, with a presence of diverse competing actors and a high degree of anarchy and widespread corruption. Whereas legal activities usually succeed in environments with economic networks, high levels of confidence, abundant manpower and a great availability of capital, corruption is frequent in environments prone to a lack

⁵⁰ Raford and Trabulsi 2015: XVIII.

⁵¹ The list of examples, at distinct times in the post-Cold War period, may be quite broad: Egypt, Libya, Syria, Mali, Mexico, Honduras, Brazil, Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, the Ukraine, etc.

of legitimacy, with a limited presence of state and scarce business benefits, making this the perfect place for warlord entrepreneurs to emerge. Secondly, these warlords have great capacity for innovation and risk assumption, more than the average, generating successful entrepreneurial practices. Thus, very recently it has been argued that warlord entrepreneurs join the inner circle of global economic innovators, since they are inclined to take risks and seek out bold solutions in their pursue of a competitive advantage. There are examples of this in their financial analysis, in their marketing, organizational design, logistics, information management, etc. Such innovative abilities and the warlords' involvement in human and drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, handling of cross border waste, illegal organ trade, sexual tourism, money laundering, etc.—which are the most common business activities usually connected with this type of warlords—explain why they may accumulate wealth two or three times greater than those resulting from legal activities.⁵²

A third significant feature is the capacity to selectively use violence, often in a very intense manner. Its aim is to 'educate and punish' their fellow citizens—as Mexican cartels still do, for example—but at the same time to provide a general access to 'parastatal' services, in particular concerning security and welfare—clearly the two basic public goods most demanded by common people. In doing so, they may occasionally fulfill regulatory functions, establishing different types of social and even institutional norms.

All of this suggests that, in numerous cases since the 1990s, the state system has failed or collapsed, but globalization has somehow permitted the expansion of warlords, blurring the lines between legal and illegal. Likewise, the boundaries between security, economics and regulation in the areas that they control have been deleted through innovative methods, particularly those suited to the business world. In other words, the warlords have used not only massacres and great violence, but also transitions from chaotic and overwhelming violence to 'fiefdoms', parastatal markets and institutions that make stable and organized communities keep running as normal. Therefore, according to the evidence provided from across the world, warlord entrepreneurs and their allies manage to exercise a control over these areas using something similar to hybrid 'states', markets and ideological and regulatory functions: 'Their ability to establish authority and stability will depend first on their martial might, second on their organizational prowess, and third on their ability to stabilize their gains and provide para-statal services to those upon which they prey, depend and support.'⁵³

52 Gilman, Goldhammer and Weber 2015: 1–25 ('Introduction').

53 Gilman, Goldhammer and Weber 2015: 21.

It should be noted that up to now, ideal types have been described, which are in no way exclusive or incompatible, even during distinct periods of time within the same area, country or region.

4 Conclusion

To conclude, once again the two research questions posed at the beginning of this chapter will be reviewed, in an attempt to offer responses based on actual knowledge and also, to determine a future research agenda:

- Is the warlord phenomenon, in its generic form, an anecdotal, epi-phenomenal or central feature of the international system, and therefore, does it exist in distinct regional or functional sub-systems?
- Is it possible to distinguish between different ideal types of warlords in the post-Cold War system and if so, what do these types offer to the research agenda?

The first question concerns the nature of the warlords themselves. It has become blatantly clear that warlords should not be considered either anecdotal or epi-phenomenal. Rather, they are actors clearly attached to the nature of the post-Cold War international system, both to the evolution of the security issues, as well as to transnational economic relations, and more specifically to the role of organized transnational crime and its relationship with warlord entrepreneurs. According to Gustozzi, today's warlord is 'a legitimate, charismatic and patrimonial military leader with autonomous control over a military force, capable of achieving/maintaining a monopoly of large-scale violence over a sizeable territory'.⁵⁴ This, according to the author, suggests that, despite the warlord's lack of political legitimacy, he is capable of exerting political power over a territory, taking advantage of the inexistence, insufficiency or collapse of its legitimate central authority.

Regarding the second question, the characterization of three ideal types of warlords has allowed the suggestion that, in certain contexts, warlordism is not necessarily always a negative phenomenon, since these individuals may eventually assist or contribute to the recovery or even the emergency of the state structures. There may even be successful cases of local empowerment in which warlords serve as actual peacebuilders in the aftermath of an armed conflict.

54 Gustozzi 2009: 5.

Summarizing, warlordism is a permanent feature of the post-Cold War international system, at least until the present day. There are very distinct forms of warlords according to the specific regions and states to which they direct their activities. Likewise, identifying ideal warlord types allows us to refine the analysis and the setting up of a future research agenda: to better define the different warlord cases, to establish the different causal relationships within the context of emergence and the rules of the international system—with a special emphasis on those of security and economics—and ultimately to examine, decades after their emergence, their role in the creation of new institutions and sets of rules. As we have shown, this agenda serves not only to study the international system following the Cold War, but also to shed new light on other more ancient eras, based on the following question: Under what conditions do warlords offer alternate forms of governance and what impact do they have, over the middle term, on changes in national, regional and international political and economic systems?

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